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fi Pacifist Critique of Imprisonment builds upon a primary 
commitment to human dignity, scepticism about the effects of 
the use of force and a conviction that people are vi tally 
inter-connected. As an approach to prison reform, pacifism 
identifies intrinsic threats to human dignity; it can 
distinguish basic, inherent harms of imprisonment from those 
that are remediable. 
Part One sets a broad frame for the study. The first 
chapter, History, shows that the earliest reforms were 
unsystematic attempts to cope with social upheaval, and were 
based on a profound under-estimate of human wholeness. The 
second chapter discusses retribution. This defence of 
punishment is based on an unrealistic, categorical difference 
between innocence and guilt. Viewed as a theory of justice, 
retribution is in fact a theory of inequal·ity. The final 
chapter of Part One discusses the prisoners' experience of 
confinement. Incarceration is not only a product of society's 
intensions; rather, the meaning of imprisonment is also 
determined by the people who endure it. 
Part Two applies the above philosophical lessons to more 
concrete issues. The first chapter discusses ways that the 
prison environment nurtures violence. The second chapter 
explores prison sexuality. Dimensions which are intrinsically 
human cannot be eradicated by penal rEf!gimes. Rather, human 
institutions <like sexuality) take on distorted forms, as this 
chapter argues. The final chapter compares ethical views of 
personal responsibility with the passive obedience inculcated 
by prison discipline. Prison rules do not encourage prisoners 
to feel a stake in their community; consequently, prison 
discipline discourages the development of personal 
responsibility. The ways that prison harms human dignity 
suggest three principles for reform: greater recognition of 
the prisoner's views, increased means by which the prisoner 
can hold the state accountable, and increased contact with the 
outside. 
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Homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto. 
I am a human beingi nothing human is alien to me. 
-- Terence 
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Editorial Note 
The thesis is not a linear, sustained argument. 
As an interdisciplinary study of the harms of 
imprisonment, it might be approached best as a 
collection of essays, treating discrete facets of the 
subject. Each chapter, therefore, concludes with a 
List of References. All citations refer to the 
particular list for that chapter. Only a few foot-
notes are citations, where lengthy references within 
the text would be disruptive. There is an index. 
The use of different print requires some 
explanation. Cross-references are bracketed, in bold 
print: <Pacifism). Bold print is also used for 
emphasis: Peace need not imply no conflict. 
Italics are used in five ways: 
1) the epigrams; 2) book titles; 3) following an 
author's usage; 4) foreign phrases. Italics are also 
employed (5) to signal technical usage of a word: 
Kant bases his case upon reciprocit~ 
Single quotation marks have two functions that may 
not be self-evident: 
1) to mark an ironic use of a common word: To claim 
that hanging was 'humanitarian' reflected deterrent 
thinking. 2) for special terms <'The Bloody Code') or 
for short phrases used by particular authors: 
Bentham's 'mill for grinding rogues honest'. 
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Despite the disproportion of males in prison, the 
use of gender terms is as balanced as possible; Cthis 
has not prevented me from thinking predominantly of 
male prisoners as I write. ) Rather than s/he, 'she' 
and 'her' are sometimes used instead of 'he' or 'him'. 
Quotations 
spelling, 
of American 
without {sic} 
authors 
after 
replicate their 
each instance of 
different spelling: recognized, behavior. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author. No quotation from it should be published 
without his prior written consent and information 
derived from it should be acknowledged. No part of 
the thesis has been submitted for a degree in this or 
any other university. I did all the work myself and, 
apart from the following, 
can dispute that: Ann 
I cannot think of anyone who 
Loades, my parents John and 
Dorothy Edgar, my sister and brothers, Dinu, Lou (2), 
Herb, Mike Dixon, Neville Newhouse, Ronald Preston, 
David Jenkins; the Daveys, the de la Bat Smits, the 
Dinsdales, the Drapers, the Hensons, the Joneses; 
Andre, Bob, and the Lifers at HMP Frankland and at 
5. C. I. Graterford; Hat field College, Durham Meeting, 
Brigflatts Meeting, Upper Dublin Meeting, Philadelphia 
Yearly Meeting and London Yearly Meeting; all the 
astounding authors I've read and many others too 
numerous to mention. 
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PREFACE 
Jesus died at the hands of the state; his death 
was an execution. This fact places an analysis of the 
state's system of punishment at the heart of a 
Christian interpretation of social ethics. Beyond 
Jesus' reported dialogue with the thief on the cross, 
or his parabolic identification with the prisoner, 
Jesus' life with the powerless, and his ministry of 
forgiveness tie criminal just ice to the shaping of a 
Christian ethos. To take a position on the state's 
authority to impose punishment is to make a 
christological statement; to examine ways of defining 
crime has theological implications, as do methods of 
responding t'o the aftermath of offences. 
Jesus' actions were defined as crimes meriting 
capital punishment. The state's response 
is not at issue so much as Jesus' 
execution 
manner of 
responding to evil. The cross offers support for a 
reconciliation model of justice, founded upon for-
giveness and the New Covenant. A retributive model, 
founded upon the perceived need to atone for 
wrongdoing with suffering is not supported by the 
cross in that it is quite clearly an innocent whose 
death atones for the evil, in marked contrast to the 
standard retributive claim to punish only the guilty. 
7 
preface 
There is another interpretation of the 'cross 
event' . A number of theologians <e.g., Mol tmann, 
Gutierrez) have adopted the principle that the manner 
of Christ's death requires us to direct searching 
questions to the use of power in society. To identify 
Christ with the prisoner, with the poor, is not to 
exonerate them. Yet, his death signifies the ways 
that the perspective of the powerless, the challenge 
to those in authority, is silenced. 
The God of Christianity, the God of Judaism, is 
inextricably linked to justice and truth. The 
interest of Christian pacifism in reconciling conflict 
combines with Jesus' recognition of the poor to 
suggest that those without power, those who are denied 
a voice, must be heard as a preliminary 
establishing truth and peace. 
When there is conflict in society it is always the 
powerful institutions which find it easy to put 
out a version of the events which - even if it is 
only based on hearsay - is reported by the mass 
media as if there was no other truth. Those 
without power have no such voice. 1 
Lord Gifford: The Broadwater Farm Inquir~ cited in Boyle, 
Duff, Horsley and others: T.he Roof Comes Of~ Edinburgh: 
Gateway Exchange, [19871). 
- 8 -
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preface 
An Inquiry into the Harms of Imprisonment 
Dignity is a problematic concept. We might 
attempt to stipulate aspects of human dignity relevant 
to imprisonment, by minimum standards of cent ainment. 
Cell size, diet, exercise, sanitation, privileges, 
adjudications - each aspect can be couched in terms of 
some threshold beneath which dignity is debased. 
Underlying these measures of human dignity are divers 
combinations of philosophical posit ions and empirical 
data. Given the transcendent nature of the person, no 
single discipline will fully meet these questions of 
standards. For example, rules to gauge fairness in 
adjudications may rely upon principles of law; 
measures of sanitation, in contrast, may be based on 
medical data; population ceilings <prison capacity 
ratings> may be based in part upon sociological data, 
in part upon the ethology of population density and 
stress. 
Not only is 
demonstrate that 
it possible, 
prisons do not 
it is simple 
harm persons. 
to 
A 
selection of favourable philosophical premises, 
grounded in the traditions from which imprisonment 
emerged, can support incarceration. Such notions 
include the political convictions of the 18th century 
that generated our present culture: 
- 9 -
theories of indi-
vidualism, desert, reason, order. 
can be carefully circumscribed: 
preface 
The empirical data 
diet can refer to 
1 normal' nutritional minimumsi cell-size computations 
can be based upon clearly observable deficits <sensory 
deprivation 1 crack-up' points, etc.) Moreover, it is 
always possible to restrict the relevance of empirical 
evidence by citing distinctive conditions. 
The claim that prisons harm persons is less a 
matter of proof than it is of persuasion. It is not a 
mere 1 value judgment' i but we deceive ourselves if we 
believe that harm to human dignity is a simple, 
empirically demonstrable fact. The challenge is to 
describe dignity in sufficient detail, and to under-
stand prison in its fulness <symbolically, 
philosophically, sociologically, as well as 
empirically) so that the answer ceases to be a yes-or-
no, and begins to point to ways in which human dignity 
is a) maintained by imprisonment i b) harmed in 
rectifiable ways by imprisonment <a practical 
question); and c) intrinsically harmed by imprisonment 
(a question of fundamentals). 
It is clear that this approach is not a pre-
determined path to the abolition of the prisons. The 
most that one can hope to establish is that certain 
aspects of prisons intrinsically harm prisoners. The 
purpose of the present study is to expose the 
10-
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intrinsic faults of imprisonment, and to prepare those 
who work on behalf of prisoners fat~ the inevitable 
assault upon human dignity inflicted by the prison 
experience. 
A Pacifist Approach to Prisons 
Peacemaking pr·ovides an appropriate fr·amework for 
our task. First, pacifist principles differ in 
significant ways from the philosophical foundations of 
prisons. Second, a full understanding of nonviolence 
identifies and clarifies the violations of human 
dignity inherent in the use of force or coercion, 
whether legitimate or not. Clearly, harm can result 
from legitimate coercion. Whether incarceration is 
justified or not, the penal uses of force carry 
harmful, albeit unintended, consequences. 
Pacifism, no less than dignity, is complex. As a 
method, peacemaking reconciles divergent perspectives. 
Hence, pacifism requires an approach marked by 
openness. Conflict and violence are not comprehended 
by any single academic discipline. An approach to 
prisons that surveys a number of disciplines is not a 
- 11-
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purely logical processj it will not build an argument 
that moves from premise through evidence to inevitable 
conclusion. Rather, understanding of the problem - in 
this case, imprisonment emerges gradually, as the 
input from various sources bui 1 ds up a comprehensive 
picture. A pacifist approach builds upon collabora-
tion to share the struggle to gain understanding. 
The foundation for the open-ended character of 
pacifist ethics is found within the philosophy of 
nonviolence itself. Gandhi held that nonviolence 
included the principle that no human being holds the 
whole truthj no one is wholly right, or wholly wrong. 2 
Thus, resolutions of conflict must be collaborative 
projects. Formal processes that meet disputes with 
the premise that one side is totally wrong (e. g., the 
adversarial system) are flawed in denying this 
fundamental tt~uth about human beings. 
In the discussions that follow, I rely on these 
disciplines: philosophy, for a t heor·y of punishment, 
and for a phenomenological perspective on the prison 
:2 Richard B. Gregg: The Power of Nonviolence, London: 
George Routledge and Sons, 1936. See pages 53, 206 ff., 
221. 
- 12-
experiencej theology and law, 
views of human naturej history, 
for 
for 
preface 
their disparate 
an idea of the 
origins of modern penal 
to analyse particular 
techniques. 
problems 
I 
of 
use sociology 
imprisonment, 
including prison violence, the sexuality of prisoners 
and the effects of discipline on personal 
responsi bi 1 it y. 
The way of peace is also clarified by a closer 
look at Gandhi's central concept, satyagraha. The 
roots of this word are • truth' and • force'. The way 
of peace assumes that harmony <or shalom in Judaism) 
is the true nature of human relations. Violence and 
oppression evince our estrangement from our true 
selves. Peace is a goal toward which we strive, but 
it is one that gives meaning to the struggle. It is 
in this sense eschatological. 
Utopias, too, 
the future ideal 
tives are false 
can be forward-looking, but then, 
may be deceptive. Future perspec-
<Utopian in a pejorative sense) when 
the efforts toward that goal actually violate the true 
nature of persons. At its best, pacifism can help to 
expose the 'bad faith' of Utopias built upon the 
denial of our true nature. 
The history of prison reform reveals two examples 
of 'bad faith'. First, penal reform built upon the 
- 13-
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belief that the emerging human sciences could achieve 
dramatic reductions in crime. The late 18th century 
penal reforms manifested a change from a philosophy of 
deterrence based on terror to a belief that 
imprisonment would cure criminality. Yet, the 
philosophical basis of reform was the belief that 
human beings are purely products of their environment 
- a flawed anthropology that few today take seriously. 
The most consistent thread in two centuries of 
prison reform is the promise that the ultimate success 
of the prison was imminent, once the final refinement 
was in place. Thus, second, pacifism punctures the 
confidence that progress is automatic, or assured 
through greater 
marked by harmony, 
but a pacifist 
force. The pacifist eschatology, 
does not lead us to doubt progress; 
approach spotlights particular, 
specious claims made on behalf of imprisonment. 
Reform is not progress where it is built upon the 
certainty that crime is limited to some sort of sub-
species, which we shall soon identify. Genuine reform 
must grow out of the conviction that we humans are 
inter-connected. It is not reform to shift the right 
of retaliation from the victim to the state: genuine 
reform would aim at approaches that focus on resolving 
the conflicts that underlie crimes. 
- 14-
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This means that a pacifist approach will 
inevitably examine aspects of justice. Peacemaking 
has special value for 
serious disparities 
relations 
in power. 
that are marked 
Peacemakers 
by 
may 
struggle to demonstrate that blacks and whites, or 
women and men are of equal value. They may work to 
show how the unequal distribution of resources or 
benefits is conducive to conflict. In each case the 
convictions that all persons are of equal value, and 
that true relations respect this fact, fuel peace-
making efforts. 
In contrast, retribution <said to be a theory of 
justice> is a theory of inequality. A categorical 
difference between innocents and the guilty is 
assumed. Further, retribution attempts to justify the 
retaliatory principle that the guilty must be harmed. 
A pacifist sense of justice is less likely to be 
swayed by such rationalisations of the use of force. 
Pacifism is most lucid in exposing the harmful 
effects of force upon persons. If a pacifist approach 
had nothing else to say about criminal justice, its 
perspectives on the use of force would require 
pacifism to address the practice of imprisonment. The 
modern prison was built, in part, on a faith in the 
- 15-
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of ar·chitecture to shape 
beings are affected by 
behaviour. Clearly 
their environments. 
Imprisonment rests upon the power of a setting to 
inscribe habits and meanings upon prisoners. 
However 
must include 
we understand human dignity, 
limits on the power of 
our concept 
the state to 
impose patterns of behaviour upon people. As every 
human body reacts to its setting, the individual 
exercises an inherent capacity to confer meaning upon 
that setting. To examine the active role played by 
one's body in perception is to raise the possibility 
that imprisonment rests upon a mistake. 
The prisons' distorted view of human nature shows 
itself in those harms to human dignity which are 
intrinsic to imprisonment. I argue that those harms 
are social rather than physiological. The damage is 
less a matter of poor hygiene or bad diet than it is a 
contamination of relations between prisoner and 
prisoner, between prisoner and family and friends, 
between prisoner and prison staff and between prisoner 
and society. As a general rule, wherever the prison 
r~gime makes the attempt to eradicate a human quality 
in prisoners e. g.' prisoner's sexuality that 
quality is maintained in forms cont aminated by the 
prison r~gime. 
to establish. 
But this is the case which I have yet 
- 16-
INTRODUCTION 
METHOD 
PACIFISM 
Introduction 
Much of Christian ethics is conducted in terms of 
principles, duties, right and wrong. According to 
this style, pacifism can be seen as a principled 
opposition to war. Out ies of love, laws forbidding 
killing, are absolutes, regardless of circumstances. 
Alternatively, Christian ethics devoted to good 
consequences may see pacifism as a means in the cause 
of peace. This approach, strategic pacifism, would 
employ a range of methods to achieve its goals. 
In an earlier thesis I espoused an ethic founded 
upon responsibility and a sensitivity to detailed 
information about the problem. 1 While I did not 
consider the place of Christian pacifism, and while 
the two styles speak quite different languages, ethics 
of responsibility and of pacifism do resonate. For 
instance, pacifists stress the inter-connectedness of 
life, while the ethics of responsibility draw upon the 
sources of selfhood in social interaction. Dietrich 
D. K. Edgar, The Moral Theology of Ian Ramse~ Durham 
University, 1980. 
- 17-
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pacifism 
Bonhoeffer explicitly draws the two strands together: 
"Responsibility differs from violence and exploitation 
precisely in the fact that it recognizes the other as 
a responsible agent." <Bonhoeffer, 234) 
The point is not to tie this thesis to an earlier 
one, nor to compare and contrast responsibility and 
pacifism. But they differ from other forms of 
Christian ethics in imitating a pattern of life rather 
than dwelling on transgressions of rules; and in 
aiming toward actions that fit the setting rather than 
resorting to any instrument in order to further a set 
goal. 
In discussing 
understandings of 
pacifism, 
peace and 
I 
of 
shall: 1) describe 
pacifism; 2) trace 
attempts to justify the ethic of peace; 3) elucidate 
the methods of peacemaking; and 4) distinguish the 
pacifism of the Society of Friends from others. I do 
not attempt to defend pacifism against particular 
challenges, to distinguish it from Just War theory, 
nor to trace a history of pacifism through Christian 
tradition. This is not a thesis about pacifism: it 
is about prisons. Peacemaking is a way that 
characterises my approach. 
In this sense, peacemaking is only my method. I 
do not claim to apply pacifist principles to prisons 
- 18-
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by deduction; I shall not use some pacifist premise, 
e.g., 'turn the other cheek', to oppose some specific 
prison policy. Nor can peace be grafted onto prison 
policies as a basic purpose of imprisonment. 
my aim is to approach prisons critically, 
Rather, 
from a 
number of vantage points, with the aid of the 
peacemaking methods I describe below. 
Absolute pacifism requires the abolition of 
prisons. Logical development of the law of 
nonresistance rules out coercion, even by the state. 
Yet, the total rejection of force - even to restrain a 
murderer in the act of killing more - is not only 
impracticable but <for good reasons) morally 
repugnant. Absolute pacifism, then, is a caricature. 
It may be worthwhile to approach the meaning of 
pacifism by raising doubts about the extreme forms it 
can take, as often in the stances assumed by pacifists 
as through the distortions of it by opponents. 
There are two distinct ways to see pacifism as 
absolutist: 1) Opposition to all killing; a blanket 
condemnation that makes no distinction between more or 
less justifiable cases. As such, pacifism is 
incapable of discriminating between the terrorist's 
- 19-
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assassination of a child and a doctor's compassionate 
act of euthanasia. 2) Opposition to war alone, 
condoning any sort of violence or conflict short of 
declared war. It recognises only overt violence, 
preferring an oppressive status quo to a conflict 
ridden change toward justice. 
Another distortion is the puritanical pacifist. 
This pacifist is legalistic and self-saving. The rule 
of nonresistance tolerates no exceptions or 
gradations, setting a standard that few can meet. 
Those few can do so only by withdrawing from the 
tensions and dynamics of society. They are, by 
definition, narrow-minded, relying on isolated verses 
to justify their resolution to avoid sin at all costs. 
A third form of extremist pacifism is passivism. 
It is a counsel of fatalism. Recognising that one 
cannot act without using force, passivists choose not 
to get involved. They fail to see that humans are 
fallen, and that force is necessary in a fallen world. 
Hence, any recommendations from the passivist will be 
unrealistic and impractical, based on a view of human 
nature devoid of greed or lust or guilt. 
pacifist is necessarily politically aloof. 
The passive 
The problem with tempering these extremes is that 
pacifism loses some of its clarity and power. 
-20-
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pacifism 
pacifists acknowledge that a given revolution may be 
more justified than a specific war of aggression, they 
begin to shade toward Just War theory. A pacifism 
that opposes situations of covert oppression may apply 
the brand of violence to any form of injustice, or may 
lend itself to ideological bias, or both. But 
pacifism should not be equated with passivism, reduced 
to legalism or stretched to absolutism. 
A broader perspective is required. Pacifists do 
not restrict their cause to war, but address a 
theology of statehood, universalism, eschatology; they 
distinguish between force and violence, overt conflict 
and oppression. This is not to say that pacifism 
entails a single view of authority, or sin, or force. 
Indeed, we can distinguish one pacifist approach from 
another by the stance taken on a whole spectrum of 
issues. But a broader perspective frees us to 
understand the concepts and styles basic to the 
pacifist approach. 
Following this wider vision, we turn to the task 
of definition. Peace is a quality of relations 
between persons and between groups. It is often 
helpful to see peace in terms of opposites. Here, 
concepts of force, violence, conflict, oppression and 
- 21-
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structural violence help to define the ways of 
nonviolence. 
Force can be distinguished from violence in that 
the latter implies a moral negative. Force is morally 
neutral, a given fact of being human. Violence is an 
evil <though it remains an open question whether the 
evil instrument of violence can be used to accomplish 
some good). One distinction between force and 
violence depends upon the legitimacy of those 
resorting to force. Violence is defined as the 
illegitimate use of force. The distinction is 
dubious, however, in that it is weighted toward the 
stat us quo. We can rescue it to some extent if we 
recognise that legitimate authorities can exercise 
excessive force, and thus commit violence. 
A different ~pproach links violence to the effects 
of force upon persons. Actions that violate persons -
either directly or in damage to one's potential- are 
violent. 2 Obviously, damage to one's potential must 
be defined more precisely. Restraint of an aggressive 
:2 Marion McNaughton drew attention to violence as a 
violation during a workshop on nonviolence, 30 May, 1987. 
- 22-
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boy may deny his wishes, may limit his potential <to 
do harm), but it is not violence. Adam Curle gives as 
examples of violence the measures by which people 
are: 
oppressed, exploited, cheated, manipulated, by 
having their minds distorted by propaganda or 
falsehood, by being derided, humiliated, cor-
rupted, enslaved, terrified. 
<Curle, 37) 
Shifting the focus from legitimacy to personhood 
recognises the pacifist's concern for the individual, 
and allows for the possibility of violence that is not 
overt, for 'structural violence'. 3 
Structural violence locates the cause of observed 
harms in injustices. Structure refers to hierarchies, 
policies, laws, practices that maintain social 
relations. Violence alerts us to the harms caused by 
inequalities in these structures. Evidence of 
structural violence would include statistical 
correlations between illiteracy rates in women and 
infant mortality, or between race and the likelihood 
of custodial sentences. 
The concept originated in the work of Johan Galtung, e.g., 
Essays in Peace Research, I-V, Copenhagen: Eilers1 . 1 ')75-80. 
-23-
The World Council of Churches recognises 
structural violence practices whereby: 
resources and powers are unevenly distributed, 
concentrated in the hands of a few who do not use 
them to achieve the possible self-realization of 
all members, but use parts of them for self-
satisfaction for the elite or for purposes of 
domination, oppression, and control of other 
societies or of the under-privileged in that same 
society. 
<Cited in Davies, 130-131) 
pacifism 
as 
My study of the harms of imprisonment suggests that 
certain aspects of prisons (discipline, for example) 
can be instances of structural violence against 
prisoners. 
A simplistic view of peace as the orderly 
maintenance of the stat us quo - sets all conf 1 ict in 
opposition to peace. Structural violence suggests a 
more dynamic understanding of conflict. To recognise 
structural violence frees us to see that apparent 
peace can disguise violence inflicted through injus-
tices, or to see that violence is sometimes social, 
not physical. 
Conflict may be necessary to dislodge the 
established inequality, but it can be conducted in 
nonviolence, as in civil disobedience. Yet, even 
violent disruption may be preferred to an entrenched 
- 24-
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tyranny, if it is the sole means of attaining 
relations that are less exploitative, less repressive, 
ultimately, less violent. 
Obviously the idea of justifiable revolution is 
sensitive for pacifists and Just War theorists alike. 
Two points may clarify the matter <though I cannot 
pretend that they resolve it). First, the pacifist 
argues that injustice and structural violence harm 
those in power, those who inflict it. The liberation 
of the oppressed is also a liberation of the 
oppressors. The goal for the pacifist is not for the 
victim and the oppressor to switch roles, but a trans-
valuation that achieves right relations, "in which the 
human rights of all were recognized, including the 
right to be spared both the humiliation of oppression 
and the degradation of oppressing." <Curle, 48) 
Second, the dilemma assumes that the pacifist will 
be involved in the conflict, but it does not 
predetermine the character 
Again, not all conflicts will 
of that 
be violent. 
involvement. 
But, more 
important, the person's involvement in conflict need 
not be violent. To renounce violence does not commit 
the pacifist to abandon efforts to change the world. 
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Peace is not necessarily free of conflict. The 
struggle for justice may entail conflict. 4 But peace-
ful relations are marked by respect for individuals, 
healing and mutual sacrifice, open communication and 
empowerment to develop one's potential. Where peace 
is defined as the absence of war, it is often seen as 
static, in contrast to radical changes brought about 
by war. But defining peace as harmonious relations 
requires a dynamic concept. Harmony recognises the 
richness and goodness of diversity. 
Peace in the Judeo-Christ ian tradition owes much 
to the concept of Shalom. The popular understanding 
of the term is the absence of war. But, as John 
Ferguson states, Shalom is a much more comprehensive 
vision. "It comes from a root meaning 'wholeness'. 
It is well-being or harmony for all people in 
community. It is the proper condition of human beings 
in relationship with one another.'' <In Barrett, 19) 
Two aspects of this harmony are respect for 
individuals, and community, based on the inter-
4 This paragraph paraphrases the views put forward by John 
Hamilton at the workshop cited above, n. 2. 
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connectedness of p.ll human beings. Our solidarity 
itself confirms the transcendental significance of 
each person, particularly against violations of 
personhood. For many pacifists, this inviolability is 
centred in the relations between the individual and 
the state. Pacifism upholds the dignity of 
individuals as it exposes the idols of the state. 
I remarked above that peacemaking shifts power to 
victims of structural violence. I also suggested that 
gross disparities of power harm both the powerful and 
the powerless. In the context of individual dignity, 
pacifism makes clear the need to secure for persons 
the power to make changes in her life, or to develop 
his potential. 
Without this ability to effect some change or 
achieve some end, any individual ceases to be 
human. If the ability is impaired or drastically 
restricted, then to that extent the person 
concerned is de-humanized. 
<Davies, 124) 
Community is the second fundamental of harmony. 
One of the most unfair distortions of pacifism 
suggests that it advocates noninvolvement. To the 
contrary, it is the pacifist who stresses the 
essential inter-connectedness of all human life. The 
state, on the other hand, may justify its resort to 
violence by characterising enemies as alien, inhuman. 
, 
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Roger Ruston has stated that pacifism during war-
time declares: 
the common humanity of all who are caught up in 
it. It refuses to give in to the lie that those 
on the other side are hateful, children of the 
devil, a lesser breed, fit only to be wiped out by 
a people of superior morals. 
<Ruston, 6) 
John Howard Yoder also denounces the deception at 
the heart of violent conflict. Moral values are 
distorted in the interest of the war effort. uFor 
those who are on the wrong side, even their good deeds 
are deceptive facade; for those who are on our ~ide, 
even the most evil deeds ar~ excusabl~.; II <Yoder,: OR, 
172) These aspeq.s o.f pacifism suggest that peace-
making may require social order and subordination to 
law, but pacifism will not condone criminal justice 
built upon the stigmatisation of offenders. 
Undoubtedly, a key aspect of the deceit condemned 
by Ruston and Yoder is that of projection. Indeed, 
project ion has two important functions. First, it 
denies human solidarity by painting the other side as 
fundamentally alien. Second, it lifts the burden of 
our own short -comings, allowing us to rationalise our 
evils as necessary to defend us from the enemy. 
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In short, the perpetrator of violence - not the 
pacifist most directly denies our involvement with 
others. The violent do not engage with their 
counterparts so much as they rely on force to finish 
the dispute. In contrast, the pacifist is sensitive 
to the failings of both parties. Indeed, Paul 
Oestreicher writes that our sinfulness in relation to 
God cements us as fallen, yet redeemed. 
Peace, then, is a dynamic harmony, marked by open 
relations that honour both the diversity of persons 
and their essential connectedness. The balance 
between individual dignity and communal one-ness 
implies that pacifism need not be ideologically 
slanted. While pacifism does not pretend to provide a 
comprehensive political philosophy, its twin foci of 
individual integrity and social solidarity incline 
pacifism toward a political middle ground. 
Beyond these general remarks the relationship of 
particular pacifists to the state may be 
idiosyncratic. The theoretical aim of the Christ ian 
pacifist is shared by all believers: to strike the 
right balance between obedience to God and to the 
state; to be subject to those in authority who, in 
turn, are subject to God's will. In theory, the 
pacifist resists the state only insofar as the state 
diverges from God's will. It is not the theory, but 
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the practice of reaching such a balance that poses the 
difficulty. 
The rejection of power is not a solution. 
Christians on the whole believe that power ultimately 
comes from God. Nor is there much to be gained from 
condemning authority for failing to attain perfect 
justice. Such an expectation borders on an idolatrous 
sense of state-craft. Given that the state must use 
force in order to approximate justice, the moral 
challenge is to judge whether specific instances of 
state force are justified. 
For many pacifists, the convenient point at which 
to draw the line is war. Paul Oestreicher seeks to 
balance the necessity of state-force in maintaining 
social order against the pacifist rejection of 
aggressive state force exemplified by war. He writes: 
in 
Coercive action need not be incompatible with 
genuine concern for the person against whom it is 
taken. . War is inherently different, be it 
civil or international, guerilla or legitimate, 
local or global. It demands the destruction of 
the enemy. 
<In Barrett, 57) 
Yet, for others, the issues raised by peacemaking 
wartime parallel those in other dilemmas. 
Questions concerning the legitimacy of both the extent 
and the purposes of state-force apply to domestic 
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issues as well as international conflict. Truth is 
distorted when others are characterised as 
categorically alien, whether they are foreign soldiers 
or domestic offenders. Thus, many pacifists go beyond 
opposition to war, to reject as violent any instance 
of excessive state power. 
The present work is one of Christian pacifism in 
this latter sense, exposing the abuses of state power 
in the damage done to persons in prison. The violence 
I identify is not that inflicted by an illegitimate 
authority, but the violence of excessive use of 
legitimate power. Pacifism is ideally suited to the 
task because it upholds the intrinsic value of persons 
as it exposes the idolatry of state power. 
A scathing and thorough critic of the pretensions 
of state-force is John Howard Yoder. He labels his 
biblically informed political stance 'revolutionary 
subordination' . He emphatically rejects the claim 
that Jesus himself was non-political, 
ethic was merely personal. 
or that his 
Jesus' revolutionary subordination differs from 
obedience to the state in two ways. First, both the 
dominant and subject parties are charged with the duty 
of subordination. Leadership is a mode of servant-
hood. The politics of subordination establish recip-
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rocal responsibilities. Second, subordination affirms 
the moral powers of the socially inferior. The 
revolutionary subordinate may be called to disobey the 
state. Yoder illustrates this point with a 
conscientious objector who, while submitting to 
punishment, refuses to fight. 5 
Roger Ruston believes that eschatology is 
essential to Christian pacifis~ The perfect harmony 
of the kingdom is eschatological rather than utopian. 
It is not a didactic fantasy of a hypothetical world 
of perfectly rational citizens, but an expectation of 
the life to which God calls us, and whose way is 
demonstrated in the life of Christ. 
In similar manner, Yoder writes that the eschaton 
is the key to history, and not victories in the field 
of battle, nor the interpretative methods of a given 
culture. Furthermore, Yoder contends that it is by 
recognising the eschatological significance of peace 
that we can see in it the vocation of all Christians, 
and not just those few who are called to be pacifists. 
s Yoder acknowledges his debt to C.E.B. Cranfield for the 
distinction between obedience and subordination. He also 
stresses, following Cranfield, that for Paul fear should 
be directed only to God. 
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the light of which he acts, the character of his 
action, the ultimate divine certainty which lets 
his position make sense. 
<Yoder, OR, 56) 
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The future orientation of pacifism should not 
imply that it is unrealistic or other-worldly. 
"Peace," writes Christopher Rowland, "is above all an 
eschatological event, though not necessarily for that 
reason unattainable under God in this world." <In 
Barrett, 8) 
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Christian pacifism begins with the life, ministry 
and work of Christ. It rejects the view that violence 
is more effective, more powerful than peacemaking. 
Further, Christian pacifism opposes the idolatry of 
the state in its claims to absolute allegiance. Each 
of these amounts to a defence of pacifism. My concern 
here is to develop the sense of peace outlined briefly 
above, rather than to build a comprehensive argument 
for nonviolence. 
The Bible is a shifting foundation for a 
commitment to peace. Images of God as Lord of Hosts, 
mighty in battle, share space with hopes for social 
and world peace. At the heart of monotheism, however, 
is the conviction that Yahweh is not one of many petty 
national gods, but God alone. Thus, Hebrew writings 
reveal a well-developed tradition of calling the 
nation to peace. Despite these elements, however, one 
cannot discount the militancy of much of the history 
of Israel, nor can one translate that militancy into 
sp~ritual victories. 
Turning to the New Testament, however, the burden 
of argument falls upon those who would defend or 
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justify violence. The Lambeth Conference of 1978 
summarised the ethical force of Jesus' example: 
He made evident that self-giving love, obedience 
to the way of the Cross, is the way to 
reconciliation in all relationships and conflicts. 
Therefore the use of violence is ultimately 
contradictory to the gospel. 
<Cited in Barrett, 36) 
The writings of pacifists show the normative power 
of the cross. John Howard Yoder comments that Jesus' 
choice of the cross instead of the sword reveals the 
nature of God's relations with humanity. "If this is 
what God reveals Himself to be doing, this is by the 
same token a revealed moral imperative for those who 
would belong to and obey Him. " <Yoder, OR, 136-137) 
Similarly, Valerie Flessati and Clare Prangley 
write of identifying with Jesus in their experience of 
exclusion, powerlessness and guilt. They observe, 
"Jesus himself identified with outcasts and chose to 
suffer the fate of the guilty and powerless." <In 
Barrett, 76> 
Finally, John Lampen writes that Jesus would not 
be caught up in a cycle of hate and violence. 
He would not forge the next link in the chain of 
hurt and revenge. He allowed all those others to 
crush him with their pain and hate, unresisting, 
forgiving, trusting that he could take all their 
evil into himself and so bring it to an end. 
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Theologians disagree, however, about the relevance 
of Jesus' character to current social-ethical 
dilemmas. J. G. Davies writes, "Jesus did not put 
himself at the head of a nationalistic freedom 
movement, employing forcible means to secure liberty, 
but this has nothing to do with the question of 
violence or nonviolence. " <Davies, 152) 
John Howard Yoder, in The Politics of Jesus, 
explicitly counters the view that Christ's example has 
little bearing on issues of political force. Not only 
did Jesus' execution demonstrate the threat his poli-
tics posed to the status qu~ but Jesus directly faces 
the question of violence - first, in the temptation 
narrative, then in Gethsemane - and rejects it. 
Jesus' nonviolence cannot be equated with apathy 
or irrelevance. It is social withdrawal only 1 f we 
assume that violence is the way to change society. 
This Yoder denies. 
The renunciation of coercive force is the 
prerequisite of a genuinely creative social 
responsibility and to the exercise of those kinds 
of social power which are less self-defeating. 
<Yoder, OR, 178) 
Yoder argues that the basis of historical study is 
distorted, presuming as it does that force directs 
social change. He suggests that a peace-based 
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not by military 
of the poor, its 
ecological common sense, etc. For him, genuine power 
is not a question of armed strength, but determined in 
the mutual responsibility that nurtures the consent of 
the ruled. 
Violence is a form of pride. A person resorting 
to violence cannot afford the humility of uncertainty 
or ambiguity. Bonhoeffer states that violence doesn't 
recognise the other party's capacity for 
responsi bi lit y. Yoder writes that one side considers 
itself wholly righteous; the other is assumed to bear 
all the blame. Violence is typified by an encounter 
on a dusty street in Dodge City: One saintly hero, 
and one diabolical villain - the roles to be assigned 
according to who walks away. 
As Yoder observed that the good deeds of enemies 
are dismissed as deceit, so, in punishing our enemies, 
do we delude ourselves into self-righteousness. 
International war and interpersonal violence share 
this crusading pride. Pacifism is more reviled when 
pacifists take the prophetic role of exposing self-
righteousness. Two aspects 
questioning the morality of the 
of 
cause, 
the state's claim to absolute 
allegiance. 
-37-
this role are 
and puncturing 
obedience and 
pacifism 
It may be that the power of pacifism to specify 
the harms of justified coercion is its most important 
function. The force that brings or maintains order 
also harms people. J.G. Davies sees social order as a 
trade-off. 
Force, which is accepted as legitimate, serves to 
minimize force that is illegitimate. Of course, 
we have to recognize the tragic nature of this 
coercion because it involves treating persons as 
things. 
<Davies, 147) 
Davies' caution helps to expose the blithe 
acceptance of state-force as the solution to social 
stresses; he reminds us that coercive measures carry 
costs. But the perceived trade-off poses a rather 
tame challenge to the state. John Howard Yoder takes 
the critique of force further, to question the 
legitimacy of measures that harm people without 
achieving justice or social tranquillity. 
There has been hierarchy and authority and power 
since human society existed. Its exercise has 
involved domination, disrespect for human dignity, 
and real or potential violence ever since sin has 
existed. 
<Yoder, PJ, 203) 
The resort to force actually causes problems; 
moreover, its fruits are limited. Violence the 
excessive use of force or use of excessive force 
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provides the means to destroy, to kill, to oppress, to 
entice others into violence. But it does not achieve 
for society the goals of harmony or stability. 
Violence can keep out the enemy but cannot create 
a wholesome society. It can aggress but not 
defend; it can revolt but not build. It can 
eliminate a specific abuse but cannot bring social 
health. 
Force cannot create or sustain the shared sense of 
meaning at the heart of social peace. .. Rationality is 
difficult to maintain in what is ultimately an 
irrational system bound together by force and fear 
rather than by positive ties of cooperation and 
community." <Bello, 40) 
Of course, those who seek to .justify violence do 
not do so by arguing for the moral superior! ty of 
those who 'retaliate first' , 6 or who mistreat the 
vanquished. Violence is proposed as a last resort. 
It is relied upon in proportion to the need to 
overcome the evil foe. 
The phrase was suggested by I.R. Dinsdale, of 
Brigflatts Farm, in a discussion of rugby strategy. 
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Pacifists have been scathing in criticising these 
points. Hypothetically, Just War theory may seem to 
give a minimal basis for international agreements 
against aggression, or to provide a gauge of just ice 
for a particular instance of fighting. In practice, 
the framework becomes a method available for nat ions 
to justify violence to which they have already 
committed themselves. Every war is an exceptional 
case for the state that desires to pursue it. The 
violence inflicted on the foe rends "the fabric of 
human solidarity, poisoning the future and introducing 
a i-·upt m~e which is the precise opposite of the • peace' 
which it is the duty of the state under the lordship 
of Christ to insure." <Yoder, OR, 72) 
In wartime, flaws of state-force are evident: 
this may suggest why many pacifists find it convenient 
to draw the line against war. But the sins of war are 
not limited to killing, nor to the harms inflicted on 
enemies. The assumption of moral superiority, the 
conviction that the future of the good depends upon 
the victor, the belief that God's love is restricted 
to one race or one people: these aspects of bad faith 
are present wherever a resort to force is espoused. 
It is not only the use of force that links 
imprisonment and warfare. 
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I have already considered idolatry in terms of 
pride the belief that one is righteous, or the 
belief that force transforms the world. Pride in 
force marks a disparity between the state and the 
character of the God the people purport to serve; 
viz. the God of Shalom of wholeness and community -
not the Lord of Hosts. Here again, a link is made 
between true transforming power, revealed in Christ's 
nonresistant love, and the Christian's potential to 
change the world through that same ethic. 
Many pacifists who reject war·fare as ineffective 
nonetheless stop short of treating pacifism merely as 
a tool. 'Strategic pacifism' may involve selling non-
violence on the basis of its efficiency; as a sort of 
'moral jiu-jitsu' , 7 For those who take peace as the 
ultimate goal, pacifism is not to be discarded when it 
appears to fail. Nor does the pacifist jettison the 
dedication to global community when circumstances seem 
to demand unalloyed patriotism. A faithful disciple, 
following the example of Christ, allying with the 
outcast, should be prepared for suffering, not 
7 Richard B. Gregg applies the term to political leverage 
generated by nonviolent action. Richard B. Gregg: The 
Power of Nonviolence. 
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success. This stance, rejecting the criterion of 
success, helps to show how pacifism can be attacked as 
absolutist, legalistic, or apathetic. 
The opposite problem is accommodation. Using 
pacifism as a method can retreat so far from a 
resolute opposition to violence that it becomes 
indistinguishable from Just War theory. 'Strategic 
pacifism' deploys nonresistance or force as dictated 
by circumstancesj the have's preach peace to the have-
not's out of fearj ethicists distinguish between 
personal and social ethics, in order to restrict the 
claims of peace to the personal: these 
compromises of pacifism that vitiate its 
integrity. 
No plea of necessity or of policy, however urgent 
or peculiar, can avail to release either 
individuals or nations from the paramount 
allegiance which they owe unto Him who hath said, 
'Love your enemies'. To carry out such a 
profession consistently is indeed a life 
attainment, but it should be the aim of every 
Christian. 
<London Yearly Meeting, Epistle, 1854.) 
are 
moral 
One way to counter the charge of absolutism, to 
bring together the goal of peace and the ways of 
peace, is to limit pacifism to the opposition to war. 
In affirming the role of state-force in keeping order, 
pacifism would be denying only warfare as excessive. 
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But to draw the line at open warfare is too crude. 
It fails to distinguish between more and less 
justifiable acts of warj it fails to recognise the 
injustices <structural violence) that nurture waq it 
fails to oppose other forms of violence, not directly 
1 inked to war <e. g. , domestic violence, humiliating 
practices in schools, exploitative labour relations). 
An overview of peacemaking activities, to which I now 
turn, may clarify the relevance of pacifism to more 
mundane instances in which people are violated by the 
use of force. 
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There is no way to peace. Peace is the rvay. 
-A. J. Muste 
Justifications of pacifism can sometimes imply 
that it is simple to balance the means of peacemaking 
against the ends of peaceful relations. Pacifist 
methods are attacked as unrealistic by those who hold 
that force - even violence - is necessary to maintain 
social cohesion, given human nature. But such logical 
dilemmas illuminate the difficulties inherent in an 
abstract approach to pacifism. It is equally 
difficult to find a single standard methodology within 
pacifism. While there are shared methods, it is 
impossible to suppose that peace is produced through a 
standard, twenty-step process. 
A pacifist approach begins 
conflict. Presence as a first 
noteworthy because it helps 
from inVolvement in a 
step in a dispute is 
to illuminate the 
character of pacifism. 1) The peacemaker is not aloof 
or apathetic; 2) pacifism is ·pragmatic, as opposed to 
stan ding apart to reach judgments in cool, abstract 
objectivity; 3) pacifist presence in the midst of the 
dispute witnesses to the possibility of transforming 
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the situation without taking sides or participating in 
combat. Those who enter a conflict to impose order by 
force may halt fighting, but at the cost of continued, 
long-term friction or covert violence. The pacifist 
presence is not a 'force to be reckoned with', but a 
non-aligned human witness. 
Perhaps the clearest contemporary example of the 
power of mere presence is the group of women at 
Greenham Common. Flessati and Prangley list three 
benefits of observing. 1) It makes visible that which 
was hidden. Visibility can bring moral clarity when: 
a) violence is veiled or presumes itself to be 
legitimate; or b) disputants are actually unclear 
about the other parties' true interests and needs. 2) 
Presence constitutes a protest against the violence. 
3) It awakens the conscience of each militant.e 
Pacifist presence illuminates the common humanity 
that unites the foes. In wartime, the pacifist demon-
strates a bond with one combatant and with the other, 
thereby spotlighting the obscenity of the violence. 
In some sense, being uninformed <innocent) in this 
a See 11 Women's Perspective on War and Peace," in Barrett, 
75ff. 
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role is beneficial; the observer's reactions to abuses 
or brutality show those caught up in the conflict the 
true nature of their actions. Thus the mere presence 
of the outsider makes an appeal to conscience. 
Ignorance is not, however, an attribute for long. 
Peacemakers have a duty to become informed about the 
facts of the conflict. Testimony from both sides -
official and informal can provide clues to the 
causes of the conflict, the interests in the dispute, 
and any shared ground. Presence includes the task of 
listening. This skill is stressed by mediators, 
negotiators and counsellors. 
The peacemaker must sift through the in format ion 
for distortions, exaggerations, falsehoods. While it 
is understandable that each side might exaggerate its 
claims, it is rarely appreciated that each side may 
listen selectively. The skilled mediator learns to 
listen for evidence that one side has misinterpreted 
the other. Adam Curle describes a peace process that 
seemed intractable. He discovered selective listening 
on both sides: 
Words were filtered through a compound of anger, 
fear, resentment and preconception that radically 
changed their meaning. It was to this new meaning 
that the people we were talking with responded, 
often angrily and usually irrelevantly. 
<Curle, 59) 
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In analysing dialogue to pinpoint deception and 
mis-communication, the peacemaker has evidently moved 
beyond mere presence to active involvement. This role 
might be termed the analysis of the conflict. Adam 
Curle's list of degradation, humiliation, exploita-
tion, distortion, etc. identifies some of the more 
obvious sources of conflict. 
Gandhi's satyagraha was aimed at truth. The un-
truths of a situation distort the picture of the 
differences, and make resolution more difficult. I 
have mentioned the distorting influence of projection, 
in assigning the full burden of guilt to the opponent. 
Combatants may believe that such distortions as 
stereotyping and scape-goating are needed to buttress 
morale. But, to an outsider, the falsehoods create 
obstacles for the central task of resolution. Thus it 
is the peacemaker's task not just to seek out the 
truth but to advertise it. 
Adam Curle finds the task of speaking the truth 
essential, to empower the disadvantaged, to motivate 
them out of hopelessness 
active struggle for just ice. 
and ignorance toward an 
People who do not know 
that they are being violated, or who feel that nothing 
can be done, can be drawn out of their fatalism. 
Their own powers can be activated. 
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Power is an area of conflict that is particularly 
susceptible to ambiguity and misunderstanding. While 
it would be valuable to investigate power at some 
length, a few hints must suffice in this context. 
Flessati and Prangley write of their discovery of 
power in the seeming powerlessness of the Greenham 
Common women. In part, their power derived from 
spiritual resources; in part, from their solidarity -
decisions taken in common, deliberate sharing of 
affection and warmth; in part, from their strength as 
women. A final factor is the sacrifice that claimed 
their commitment. 
Power at Greenham, as in the non-violent Cross, 
resides in the willingness of some to make 
substantial sacrifices in order to witness to the 
truth and to save the rest of creation. 
ern Barrett I 80) 
Roles such as empowerment, witnessing to the 
truth, mere human presence together: each prepares 
the ground for tasks more commonly associated with 
pacifism. These include mediation, advocacy and 
working to change the situation. 
Adam Curle means by mediation: The effort to 
improve communication and mutual understanding; the 
attempt to change the protagonists' distorted 
perceptions of each other and to create an atmosphere 
favourable for negotiation." <Curle, "Terminology"> 
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Two essential aspects of his definition are 
communication between foes, and seeking truth behind 
distorted perceptions. The mediator who cannot bring 
about direct contact risks being used as a go-between. 
Certainly there is value in serving as a bridge 
between two parties who cannot meet without violence. 
But each side is likely to view the go-between with a 
mixture of suspicion, opportunism and disrespect. 
Suspicion falls upon anyone who talks to the 
enemy; noncombatants rarely win full respect; the go-
between is seen as a potential tool to manipulate or 
deceive the opponent. These go-between dilemmas 
reveal the crucial function of presence as a 
preliminary to peacemaking. It can build trust 
through familiarity with both sides and respect 
through the demonstrated endurance of the 
noncombatant. It can reduce the temptations to 
opportunism as combatants recognise the peacemaker's 
integrity and as she grows in a sophisticated grasp of 
the conflict. 
Linked to mediation is advocacy. It is a 
sensitive area for peacemakers. Adam Curle defines it 
as "representation of the interests of any particular 
group or individuals." <Curle, disadvantaged 
"Terminology") He distinguishes it from settlements 
enforced upon disputants by a greater power. 
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is risky 
appears to 
mediation. Indeed, in True Justice, Adam Curle 
stresses the need for peacemakers to avoid taking 
sides. 
The dilemma can be partially cleared away by a 
distinction between interests and positions. Roger 
Fisher and William Ury show the differences in their 
handbook for negotiators, Getting to Yes. "Your 
position is something you have decided upon. Your 
interests are what caused you to so decide." <Fisher & 
Ury, 42) They point out that taking up a position may 
impede compromise. A settlement based upon a calcu-
lation of power between the two positions nevertheless 
may preclude certain vital interests. The positions 
are 'won', but the continuing needs disturb the peace. 
For Fisher and Ury interests, not positions, 
define the conflict. Once interests can be specified, 
balanced and settled, disputes (and often positions, 
too) become easier to resolve. It requires more work 
to attend to interests: positions are as explicit as 
flags. Interests need to be discovered and analysed. 
But a grasp of the interests discloses possible 
compromises that could balance the needs of both 
sides. 
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From the perspective of interests, then, one can 
see that peacemakers can advocate the case of the 
disadvantaged. It is the interests of the powerless 
and not their position, that the peacemaker may be 
called to defend. The position of the powerless might 
be one of unbending antipathy to those in authority. 
To represent the powerless by abhorring the 
authorities is to take on their position. But to 
voice the needs of the disadvantaged improves 
down the distortions of communications, breaks 
positions and exaggerated demands, and allows the 
peacemaker to distinguish between valid and 
unreasonable interests. 
I do not believe, however, that a focus on 
interests resolves the dilemma. The role of advocate 
is simply not a neutral posit ion. Advocates of the 
powerless may indeed perform impartial functions. 
But, to advocate effectively, she or 
articulate the needs of the disadvantaged 
he 
and 
must 
must 
expose the injustices that are maintained by policies 
administered by the authorities. 
between the justified interests 
She must distinguish 
of the disadvantaged 
to maintain the and the desires of the powerful 
injustice. 
Advocacy strains the traditional impartiality of 
the peacemaker. But the role invites comparison with 
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the active work of liberation theology. Here again, 
the key task is to make known the whole truth, even 
where that is to oppose the official version of 
events. Gustavo Gutierrez quotes from Bonhoeffer' s 
Letters and Papers from Prison: 
We have learned to see the great events of the 
history of the world from beneath - from the 
viewpoint of the useless, the suspect, the abused, 
the powerless, the oppressed, the despised. In a 
word, from the viewpoint of the suffering. 
<Cited in Gutierrez, 203) 
The peacemaker cannot indulge in projecting all 
blame upon those in authority, but she contributes to 
lasting peace when she reveals the harms inflicted by 
the abuse of power. Adam Curle describes a way for 
peacemakers to maintain impartiality while defending 
the interests of the powerless. Peacemakers must make 
it known that: 
they cannot take sides with one party or the 
otherj that they are on the side of all who are in 
any way suffering, that they have unconditional 
sympathy with all who are caught in the trap of 
war, whether as civilians, soldiers or political 
leadersj that their only enemy is the belief that 
human problems can be solved through violence. 
<Curle, 93) 
These suggestions expand the t~esponsibilities of 
the peacemaker from mediation alone. Bluntly, the 
peacemaking advocate represents the disadvantaged, but 
does so in service to an independent interest: If the 
oppressor's interest is maintaining order or a balance 
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of power; 
liberation; 
if the oppressed have an interest in 
the peacemaker's interest is peace. 
Expanding peace to ultimate status, to a goal so all-
encompassing that it includes method as well, suggests 
that the peacemaker can hold together impartiality and 
advocacy. 
In some situations, it may be impossible to 
maintain both impartiality and an effective advocacy 
on behalf of the powerless. In other dilemmas, the 
balance might be maintained only through the 
peacemaker's act of sacrifice. John Lampen stresses 
the need for sacrifice in working toward reconcil-
iation. He argues that the pain of conflict must be 
faced, and worked upon, and surmounted. It is 
easiest, however, to pass it on, thus maintaining a 
cycle of harm. The peacemaker must be prepared to ab-
sorb the hurt, to take it in without unloading it onto 
9thers, in order to bring the domino fall to a halt. 
Such sacrifice in cases of profound violence or 
conflict can seem a perversity, a particularly 
offensive form of masochism. But John Lampen states 
that the weight of evil sometimes requires such 
radical sacrifice; the paradigm of self-giving 
reconciliation is the cross, not the crown, and not 
the scales of justice. 
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When we are confronted with hurt to ourselves or 
others, and the rational ways of mending it are 
not effective, we are forced to choose bet ween 
complicity in the universal wrong and an act of 
sacrifice. 
<Lampen, 95-97) 
pacifism 
Sacrifice may be demanded of the peacemaker even 
if one party or both have a serious commitment to 
peace. But in these cases, the role of the peacemaker 
is to encourage that common interest in peace. 
Ideally, the initiatives that lead to an agreement 
should come from each of the parties involved. In 
such cooperation, the mediator's role is in the 
background, as a witness to the resolution. To the 
extent that the process resembles this ideal, the 
parties involved will have a stake in the success of 
the agreement. 
Given the improvement of communi cat ions, the 
enlightenment of both parties, a willingness to 
cooperate in settlements that balance interests, peace 
becornes a r-ealistic hope. Adam Curle asserts that 
reconciliation goes beyond a mutually agreed 
settlement, beyond mutual toleration, beyond workable 
compromises. Reconciliation creates relations that 
allow for joint decision-making. It views the 
establishment of communication and cooperation as 
basic to the relationship, quite apart from their 
short-term instrumental values. Adam Curle concedes 
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that reconciliation is difficult; the more limited 
goals that bring to an end the overt conflict are more 
It may prove necessary to build gradually 
on the basis of approximate justice. 9 
I am conscious of many shortcomings in this 
overview of pacifist met hods. I have not discussed 
the role of law in arbitrating between competing 
claims. I have mentioned very little of the practice 
of religious peacemaking: the existence of a 
worshipping community as a redeeming servant, prayer, 
the uniting of both parties in subservience to God. I 
have taken as a model a conflict between two groups or 
individuals and I have neglected the possibility of 
conflicts between many groups; this last situation 
would include the role of alliances and 
significance of collective security. 
9 
•Approximate justice' is a term used by the Mennonite 
Central Committee on Justice, U.S.A. 
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pacifism 
Many of these wider situations, however, depend 
ultimately on the peacemaking dynamics outlined above. 
The redeeming community of a church must nonetheless 
sift through the interests of one party and another. 
Furthermore, the aim is to identify the significance 
of pacifist practice for the manner in which prisons 
are operated. Hence, the spheres of law and alliances 
bet ween groups 
chapters. The 
will be 
religious 
discussed 
dimensions 
in subsequent 
of peacemaking 
entail, for me, a distinction between pacifism as a 
coherent philosophy and as a part of Quaker faith, to 
which I must now turn. 
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Quaker Pacifism 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a 
uniquely Quaker pacifism from the foregoing picture. 
Yet, there is a distinctive Quaker thread in the 
pacifist tradition. This section draws attention to 
the ethical significance of pacifism in the Society of 
Friends, to set it apart from Anglican, Roman 
Catholic, Calvinist or non-Christian pacifism. Of 
course, not all Friends are pacifist; clearly there is 
a variety of views within the Society. 
Friends traditionally refer to two documents to 
describe their opposition to war. The first is the 
Declaration to Charles II, issued in 1661: 
We utterly deny all outward wars and strife and 
fight ings with outward weapons, for any end or 
under any pretence whatsoever. And this is our 
testimony to t,he whole world. The spirit of 
Christ, by which we are guided, is not changeable, 
so as once to command us from a thing as evil and 
again to move unto it; and we do certainly know, 
and so testify to the world, that the spirit of 
Christ, which leads us into all Truth, will never 
move us to fight and war against any man with 
outward weapons, neither for the kingdom of 
Christ, nor for the kingdoms of this world. 
<Christian Faith & Practic~ 614> 
The second document is an excerpt from a letter by 
George Fox. The Commissioners of the Commonwealth had 
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approached him with the offer of a captaincy in the 
army. The reasoning behind his refusal explains much 
of the early Friends' objection to armed force. 
I told them I lived in the virtue of that life and 
power that took away the occasion of all wars and 
I knew from whence all wars did rise, from the 
lust, according to James' doctrine . I told 
them I was come into the covenant of peace which 
was before wars and strifes were. 
<Christian Faith & Practice, 613) 
A full discussion of the historical context of 
these statements would supply evidence of a developing 
Quaker theology; I can do no more than trace hints. 
Fox' phrase 1 peace which was before wars' alludes to 
the Quaker belief that the New Covenant was present, 
that those who lived in Christ were in the state of 
Adam before he fell. The stress on 'outward' weapons 
alerts us to the tendency of early Quakers to see 
world events as pale reflections of the truly 
meaningful, spiritual conflict bet ween Good and Evi 1. 
Fox ties war-making to lusts - inordinate desires, a 
preference for earthly pleasures over the virtues of 
the kingdom of heaven. Finally, both references 
reflect the priority given to a living demonstration 
of identity with the spirit of Christ over doctrinal 
positions, particular goals or a puritanical morality. 
The basic problem for the ethicist is not so much 
the exegesis or the orthodoxy of this pacifism: 
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rather, it is the function of the Peace Testimony in 
Quaker lives. It may be a relic, and obsolete. Were 
this true, it would mean that the Testimony once met a 
particular purpose and is no 
perhaps for historical value. 
Quaker doctrine, alongside a 
' that of God in everyone'. 
longer relevant, except 
It may be the second 
belief that there is 
It may be a fundamental 
rule of Quaker moral! ty, binding on all Friends ever 
since pacifism was established at the centre of the 
Society in its first generation. 
Relic, rule or doctrine, the Testimony does show 
how Quaker pacifism might be distinguished from other 
forms. Christopher Hill has argued that the move to 
pacifism was to some extent a betrayal of the early 
Quaker fire. He states that there were Friends in the 
army, or bearing arms, even as late as 1685 <as, of 
course, other Friends have fought since). Making a 
commitment to peace was, from Hill's lofty perspec-
tive, part of the process of institutionalisation. He 
remarks that the Peace Testimony itself followed the 
unsuccessful revolt of the Fifth Monarchists. "It was 
intended especially to protect Quakers against charges 
of sedition." <Hill, 241> 
Hill is quite right to set early Quaker attitudes 
within the social upheaval of the civil war. But the 
mature Quakerism of later years is consistent with the 
-59-
pacifism 
youthful fervour of its beginnings. In both cases the 
phrase 'revolutionary subordination' is apt. The 
leaders in Parliament, the King himself, may have been 
reassured by the denial of armed rebellion, but they 
could not have found the principled stance against all 
armed force comforting. The statement unambiguously 
rejects the possibility of fighting to defend the 
crown. The Society of Friends was not a threat to the 
state, except that their obedience was to Christ, not 
Charles. Friends were certainly not as anarchic as 
the Ranters of the period, but the refusal to bear 
arms was a declaration of principle: 
pragmatic diplomacy. 
Throughout the history of 
it was not mere 
the Society, a 
distinction can be traced between those who oppose all 
conflict and those who object to the injustice beneath 
apparent calm. I believe that this distinction rests 
in fact upon differing functions of the Testimony. 
Where the Testimony is a rule, overt conflict is to be 
prevented or avoided at all costs, ·even wtler~e .. Stoic 
passivism in the face. o'f inj u·st'ice creates suffering, 
and si:ructural ·violence leads others into fighting. 
The distinction does mean that some Friends have 
been selective in the application of the Peace 
Testimony to the uses of force. 
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Friends made a clear distinction between the 
waging of war by the state against an external 
enemy and the state's function of law enforcement 
against the domestic lawbreaker. 
<Peter Brock, in Bello, 14) 
pacifism 
In cant rast, where peace and just ice are brought 
into dynamic tension, where Friends oppose the abusive 
demands of 'the lust', seeing the status quo as a 
source of conflict, Quaker pacifism stirs up unrest. 
It draws Friends into civil disobedience to expose the 
idolatry and injustice of the state and to work, ulti-
mately, for deeper justice to establish lasting peace. 
In either case, whether it functions as a rule or 
as an image of a way of life, Quaker pacifism is 
practical, down-to-earth and built upon a broad base. 
For instance, Quaker opposition to war is not simply 
based on attitudes to death. Howard Brinton cites 
another source of the stance against war. "The evil 
results of war hat red, brutality, callousness to 
suffering and deceit - are spiritual and moral rather 
than material. " <Brinton, 164) Likewise, a 
fundamental commitment to truth urges Friends to react 
against the distortions inherent in all disputes. 
Quaker pacifism, far from being world-denying, 
presupposes the ties between love for one's neighbour 
and peace through political and economic relations. 
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In words that echo the pattern of life approach moreso 
than the rule of peace, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting 
wrote: 
We must all seriously consider the implications of 
our employment, our investments, our payments of 
taxes, and our manner of living as they relate to 
violence. we must at tempt to change those 
elements which violate that of God in everyone. 
<Faith & Practice , Philadelphia, 35) 
The balance of pragmatism and Christian virtue is 
one consistent thread in Quakerism. In the 18th cen-
tury, John Woolman asked, "May we look upon our trea-
sures, the furniture of our houses, and our garments, 
and see whether the seeds of war have nourishment in 
these our possessions." <Cited in Bello, 22) 
Many forms of pacifism evince less direct 
involvement. The Society of Friends traditionally has 
been reluct ant to form distinct communities. It is 
true that Friends hope that their lives will witness 
to the Light of Christ, and that others will be 
encouraged to follow God's light in their own lives. 
But the idea of a separate community from the wider 
society is not typical of Friends. Other forms of 
pacifism hope to practice the ways of peace within 
their segregated communities, and thus to witness 
collectively to Christ. Mennonite pacifism, as 
portrayed by John Howard Yoder, is also a pattern of 
life, but the point has an other-worldly tint. 
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It is loving in such a way that, when the kingdom 
approaches, we find ourselves among those who at·e 
'at home', who 'fit' there, who are not out of 
place. 
<Yoder, OR, 40) 
pacifism 
Biblically orthodox and morally admirable as these 
sentiments are, the separation they imply is foreign 
to Friends. Underlying the faith in that of God in 
everyone is the conviction that the Light of Christ 
dwells in all people. 
Yoder is perfectly consistent in developing a 
dogmatic basis for Christ ian pacifism. He terms the 
view that all humanity is one a theological 
proclamation. He argues that Christians love others 
because Christ did, and that that is a sufficient 
reason. Yet, his pacifism draws him to a more 
distanced critique of society than many Quakers would 
feel able to share. In fact, Yoder himself declares 
the fideism at the heart of his thesis. 
To insist that we must be committed to Jesus plus 
social responsibility, or Jesus plus the defense 
of Western liberty, or Jesus plus 'the 
revolution', is to create a new sectarianism which 
by its commitment to a second value standard 
renders it unable to converse further. 
<Yoder, OR, 146) 
The pacifism of Friends is founded upon a 
conviction that does not endorse the dogmatism of 
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Yoder's stand. The Friends' recognition of the light 
in everyone requires dialogue with those who hold 
radically differing standards. There are two 
important aspects of this faith: 1 ) it is 
pragmatically optimistici 2) it requires an openness 
to the insights of others. 
Quaker involvement in social problems is a 
testimony that God's love is poured out for the whole 
world, and not for an elected minority. 
They did not share the pessimistic Wel tenschauung 
of those reared in the Anabaptist tradition, the 
conviction that the godly would always constitute 
a small remnant on this earth. 
<Brock, cited in Bello, 14) 
The hope is manifested in the presumption that 
there is good in everyone, good which can be 
encouraged and empowered. "The acknowledgement of the 
good in others promotes the expression of the good." 
<Curle, 56) I do not mean that Friends have a single 
view about original sin, or that all Quakers draw the 
same distinction between 'that of God in everyone' and 
'humanity is divine'. But the optimism does mean that 
Friends expect to find the good in others. 
Second, where my convict ion cant radicts yours, I 
am bound by my faith in the ubiquity of the Light to 
allow that your view may be the true one. 
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In appealing to this Light in [another], we also 
appeal to the same Light in ourselves and as a 
result we may find that [ s/hel is right while we 
are wrong. We cannot honestly set out to change 
[others] . . . without being willing to be changed 
ourselves. 
<Brinton, 162) 
pacifism 
Quaker hope and trust. in others does not result in 
a rigid legalism under pacifist principles. 
Brinton writes: 
Pacifism is not a doctrine which can be practiced 
with absolute consistency by one who is an 
integral part of society. The Quakers have not 
generally retreated from society in order to be 
consistent pacifists. They believe that God does 
not require more than is possible for human beings 
living a normal life. Inward peace and the sense 
of freedom from guilt is not the result of a 
complete success in an undertaking. It comes 
rather from living up to what appears to be the 
divine requirement, however small or large that 
requirement is. 
<Brinton, 165) 
Howard 
A commitment to pessimism, e. g. , the assumption 
that humanity is depraved, is no more realistic than 
optimism. It can be impractical to expect the worst 
from others. In struggling to meet the dilemmas of 
peace and justice constructively, Friends take the 
view that it is better to be practical and hopeful 
than practical and cynical. Friends are convinced 
that the power of God working through people sows 
peace in the midst of occasions of war. In maintain-
ing this convict ion, Friends can be hopeful in the 
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face of suffering and patient where efforts have 
apparently failed. 
Quaker pacifism has changed through different eras 
in history. Hopes for peace are expressed in 
different ways when they respond to civil war <as in 
the seventeenth century) or to the threat of nuclear 
war. But one consistent theme in Quaker writings is 
the faith that our true future is one of peace. In 
its vision of future harmony, pacifism provides a 
standard against which contemporary struggles can be 
judged. A Friend, writing in 1806, eloquently de-
scribed the Quaker faith in the eschatology of peace. 
10 
The tumultuous course of violence is easily marked 
by the world. When its sudden and impetuous 
movements have been accomplished, it ceases. 
The world then proclaims peace, while the 
latent cause of war subsists as before. It is not 
so with the peace of the gospel. Those changes, 
in the moral and intellectual state of mankind, 
which prepare the way for this, have proceeded for 
ages, like the growth of solid timber, slowly, 
silently, irresistibly . . . 
10 
'Eccletus', uA Letter to the Archbishops and Bishops of the 
Church of England, etc.," London, 1806, printed in The Tract 
Association: Tracts on Moral and Religious Subjects, 
Vol. II., London: William and Samuel Graves, 1823. 
<I am grateful to Peter Hughes for helpful comments 
on a draft of this chapter. ) 
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PART ONE: 
PRISONS IN PERSPECTIVE 
Pacifism and Imprisonment 
There is a temptation to use peacemaking to 
generate specific proposals for changing prisons. But 
whatever the attractions of a linear deduction of 
urgent reforms, it would betray the open-ended methods 
of pacifism. A wide, inter-disciplinary survey of 
imprisonment 
reforms. 
is a necessary preliminary to any 
To anticipate my case, then, my focus is the harm 
caused by prisons to prisoners. The way of peace 
illuminates the inherent dignity of human beings. I 
believe that prisons consistently violate that 
dignity. I must first trace the notions in penal 
philosophy that undermine human dignity before 
sketching their consequences in specific areas. 
Part One, Prisons in Perspective, is rather 
abstract, and surveys key issues in imprisonment. The 
first chapter narrates the origins of the modern 
prison. I argue that the idea of a revolution in 
penal practice is an exaggeration, that the changes 
were 
the 
piece-meal reforms. 
Quaker commitment 
history. Nonetheless, 
I do not attempt 
to peace directly 
to apply 
to this 
the chapter builds on the 
Quaker eschatology of peace with which Pacifism ended. 
I argue that the promise of a crime-free future was 
false, bas~d on a divisive and reductivist notion of 
human beings. 
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The second chapter explores the philosophy of 
punishment, and specifically, retribution. Reduced to 
retaliation by the state, the theory has little to 
commend it. But retributive thought, in a positive 
1 ight' witnesses to wounds to which society must 
respond in the aftermath of criminal offences. 
The third chapter contrasts images of human nature 
in penal theory and theology. Pacifist thought is 
less significant in this context than broad-based 
Christian convictions about human beings. Here again, 
I argue that Christian perspectives reveal the reduc-
tivism at the heart of the philosophy of punishment. 
In the final chapter, 
beneath • punitive space' . 
I study the assumptions 
I subject the idea that 
space can 
analysis. 
be made punitive to a phenomenological 
I find in the philosophy of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty an understanding of knowledge that 
supports a pacifist dedication to human dignity. 
Part Two, The Harms of Prisons, is the more 
concrete. I examine 
studies of aggression. 
prison violence, in light of 
I explore the deprivation of 
sexual access and discuss its effects upon prisoners. 
Finally, I analyse the failure of prison discipline to 
instil personal responsibility in prisoners. 
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HISTORY 
A Chronology of Reform 
1730 Sollom Emlyn pleads for reform of English criminal law, 
arguing that the death penalty does not admit a grada-
tion to parallel the range of gravity in crimes. 
1764 Cesare de Beccaria publishes Traite des delites et 
des peine~ the most influential text in 18th century 
penal reform. 
1767 English translation of Beccaria's work appears. 
1769 New penal code instituted in Russia, applying Beccaria's 
views to Russian law. Death penalty is limited to murder, 
attempted murder, and acts dangerous to the state. 
1771 William Eden publishes Principles of Penal Law, drawing 
upon Beccaria. Eden advocates certainty of punishment as 
more effective than severity. 
1773 The Walnut Street Jail constructed in Philadelphia. 
1774 Alexander Popham introduces two bills to Parliament: 
1) authorises payment of fees for persons who are 
detained after acquittali 
2) authorises justices to take responsibility for 
health conditions in prisons. 
1775 Jonas Hanway advocates hard labour with total segregation. 
1776 Hulks on the Thames accept prisoners for hard labour. 
1777 John Howard's The State of the Prisons first published. 
1778 Howard, Blackstone and Eden draft the Hard Labour Bill, 
including: salaried gaolers, secure and sanitary build-
ings, preventative r~gimes, and systematic, independent 
inspections. 
1779 The Hard Labour Bill passes in attenuated form as the 
Penitentiary Act. 
Horsham County Gaol opens, using many of Howard's recom-
mendations. Felons are confined separately at night. 
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1785 Madan publishes Thoughts on Executive Justice, arguing 
that the use of pardons vitiates the power of capital 
sanctions against crime. 
1786 Pennsylvania General Assembly passes Reform of Criminal 
Law, substituting hard labour, publicly imposed, for most 
capital statutes. 
1788 Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of 
Public Prisons addresses first Memorial to Pennsylvania 
General Assembly, advocating punishment out of the public 
eye, separation of hardened offenders from youths <and men 
from women), and prohibition of hard liquors in prison. 
1789 Pillory abolished in France. 
1790 Imprisonment at hard labour becomes norm as punishment for 
most offences in Pennsylvania. Remaining capital statutes 
<except for murder) are repealed over next nine years. 
1791 New penal code in France. Uniformity of executions 
replaces aggravated forms. 
1792 Guillotine first used. 
1794 Jeremy Bentham granted contract to build The Panopticon. 
1798 Outbreak of jail fever <typhus) in Walnut Street Jail. 
1803 Lord Ellenborough's Act creates ten new capital statutes 
in England. 
1808 Samuel Romilly gains passage of an act which repeals 
capital statute against pick-pocketing. 
1810 Romilly moves for repeal of three more statutes. <One 
bill passes the house of Commons, but it dies in the House 
of Lords. ) 
Holford Committee appointed to investigate the prisons to 
discover if they can be made suitable for hard labour. 
1811 Romilly brings five more statutes forward for repeal. All 
five pass both Houses. Transportation is substituted as 
penalty, with an option to imprison an offender for not 
less than seven years. 
1812 New capital statutes are passed in Parliament. 
1816 Millbank Penitentiary receives forty women. Other 
prisoners follow as cells become ready. 
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HISTORY 
Eighteenth Century Prisons 
Electronic tagging, privatised prisons and an 
uncontrollable population indicate both crisis and 
transition in the prison system. There is great 
evidence, however, that crisis and transition are 
endemic to the institution of the prison. What sort 
of crisis lasts for two centuries? 
I begin this chapter with a survey of the problems 
in the prisons of the 18th century. 1 In the second 
section, I examine the social and legal changes within 
which reform of the prisons took shape. I do not see 
the prison emerging from the informed decisions of the 
authorities, so much as from a series of ad hoc 
reactions to social pressures. The third and fourth 
sections are intended to draw out the philosophical 
and ideological foundations of modern imprisonment. 
18th century is abbreviated throughout, except in titles and 
the above heading. 
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A broad sketch of the pre-reform prison reveals 
three basic types: 2 County and borough gaols were 
places of detention, where people waited for trial, 
or, having been sentenced, awaited their punishment. A 
second type was the debtors' prison, either a separate 
prison <e. g. , the King's Bench, London> or an area set 
apart from the gaol. The third type, the workhouse or 
Bridewell, had been intended to 1 correct' juveniles, 
petty offenders, and 1 the idle' . These houses o·r 
correction often resulted from ·the viSinn· and energy 
of a single person - ·John -seller, to name one. Each, 
~lncluding the original Bridewell, showed a familiar 
pattern of confident enthusiasm, giving way to misuse 
and lax discipline, deterioration of the project and 
its eventual demise. 
A detailed picture of the 18th century prison is 
gained from the observations of John Howard. He took 
a principled stand as sheriff of Bedford, and his 
commitment led him to a life as a monitor of prisons 
throughout the world. 
The descriptions of pre-reform prisons are gleaned from a 
number of sources, including: Howard, Ignatieff, McConville 
and Radzinowicz. 
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Howard found that the prisons of England and Wales 
were over·-crowded and dangerous. The shortest section 
in his opus, The State of the Prisons is the census. 
Howard counted 4084 prisoners, of whom 59. 7 per cent 
were debtors, and 24.3 per cent, felons. The 
prisoners, however, were not the cause of the over-
crowding. Howard estimated that for each prisoner 
there were two dependants <the figure is conservative, 
because he did not include parents of those confined). 
This brings the estimate to 12, 252 people in prison. 
We must also add to this figure the wives who brought 
their husbands meals each day as well as friends who 
entered the prison at night to have a pint at the bar. 
Neither of these groups slept within the walls; nor 
did the debtors who had paid the fees for the 
privilege of lodging outside the walls. 
A simple parallel between the population pressures 
of prisons then and now would miss import ant points. 
For instance, the census reveals that the 18th century 
prison was not primarily a place of punishment. 3 
3 There is some disagreement on this point, as Sean McConville 
argues that prisons were places of punishment. But Michael 
Ignatieff reports that the rate of dispositions to imprison-
ment in the years 1770-1774 (just before reform) was a mere 
2.3 per cent <Ignatieff, 81>. My judgment in favour of 
Ignatieff's view is based upon factors discussed below. 
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mind that the suggest ion may 
history 
so linked in the modern 
seem 1 udicrous. It is 
true that the use of prisons for punishment pre-dates 
the 18th century reforms, going back at least to the 
thirteenth century. In Howard's time, though, the 
concept was at a low ebb. Popular culture recognised 
as punishment: hanging, whipping, flogging, branding, 
the pillory, and a favourite recourse of judges, 
transportation. 
The prison was for those who awaited their trials 
or, after conviction, the punishment itself. And this 
was true of the confined felons only. The majority of 
those sent to prison were not criminals; they were 
debtors. For them, prison was intended to be a place 
of duress. 
The startling fact is that the vast majority of 
the prison population had not been sent to prison in 
any legal sense; they were the dependants of 
prisoners. There was far more commerce between the 
18th century prison and the wider society than is 
thinkable by today' s practices. From full conjugal 
rights to the serving of alcohol at the gaol pub, the 
contrasts abound. These contrasts will require further 
analysis below. 
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Sean McConville evokes the scene that would have 
greeted John Howard in one brief phrase: [ Anl 
unregulated, frequently packed, assemblage of 
unwashed, verminous, often starving and diseased 
prisoners in ill-ventilated and badly sewered rooms." 
<McConville, 50) Gaols did not exhibit the cell-block 
wings seen 
and damp 
today in Pentonville, 
enclosures of small 
buildings and rookeries. 
but were disordered 
yards, dilapidated 
Howard was not exaggerating the disastrous condi-
tions when he wrote that a prison needs food, water 
and air. The prisoners' diet was nourishing only on 
paper. In practice, it was inadequate. The idle, the 
petty offender and juveniles were to be sent to 
Bridewells for a term of hard labour. The money 
earned from work theoretically paid for upkeep. But 
prisoners were not allowed to work, on the grounds 
that they could pass tools on to felons. The 
insensitive response of magistrates to this abuse was, 
11
'Let them work or starve!'" <Howard, 8) 
Likewise, debtors and their dependants were 
reduced to begging for food. The laws governing 
imprisonment for debt called for creditors to pay the 
maintenance costs of the debtor. These laws were 
largely ignored. A final threat to prisoners' diets 
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came from the gaolers, many of whom skimped on the 
provision of bread. 
Howard recommended that prisons be sited near 
rivers or streams. He found cases in which the daily 
ration of water was less than three pints <no doubt a 
factor in the observed lack of washing). A water 
supply would serve three purposes: drinking, bathing, 
and to keep the sewers flowing. McConville comments 
that the predominant feature of the 18th century 
prison was its smell. 
appealed for relief 
Indeed, businesses near Newgate 
from rates, claiming that the 
prison's stench drove customers away. 
The lack of ventilation was lethal. Howard' s 
demand for fresh air was not cosmetic, but founded on 
medical knowledge. Dr. James Lind, of the naval 
hospital in Portsmouth, estimated that over 2000 lives 
were lost to typhus in the cramped ships that 
transported the army to the Colonies during the war. 
<Cited by Howard in The State of the Prisons) It was 
during this time that men, having awaited their trials 
in the gaols, could be sentenced to service in the 
army. When the hulks were set up on the Thames in 
1775, one in four prisoners diedi the mortality rate 
within the prisons could not have been much better. 
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The epidemic of typhus in the prisons was common 
knowledge. Michael I gnat ieff reports on the phenom-
enon of the Black Assizes. In 1750, in London, 'the 
putrid streams from the bail dock' infected the court, 
killing judge, jury, the lawyers and many spectators. 
Howard himself cites another Black Assize, in Oxford: 
over three hundred died after prisoners contaminated a 
courtroom. 
It would be untrue to say that John Howard risked 
his life by going where no one had dared to go before 
- after all, people called felons had been going into 
the dark, dank, lice-infested holes for centuries. 
But Howard's willingness to inspect the prisons and 
his detailed descriptions of the conditions were 
singularly responsible for the changes that followed. 
The abuses and corruption of the staff in the 
gaols were well-known, but ignored. The chief abuse 
was the system of fees. Howard cited one such fee as 
the impetus for his work: prisoners who had been 
acquitted were sometimes returned to prison if they 
owed the keeper any fees for their pre-trial 
confinement. Keepers also collected fees for 
providing better quarters, for transporting felons, 
and for other incidental services. The 18th century 
prison was decidedly private. 
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Howard argued that the keepers' salaries ought to 
be paid by the county. A bill calling for keepers' 
salaries had been proposed by Alexander Popham, M.P., 
in 1773 the year Howard assumed his duties as 
sheriff, but the bill was defeated. Gaolers were not 
the only authorities who augmented their income with 
fees. The justices of the peace, whose interests were 
guarded by Parliament, likewise enjoyed the benefits 
of an unregulated system of fees. 
The prisons were conspicuously under-staffed. It 
was not mandatory for the gaoler to live on the 
premises, and some refused to accompany Howard on his 
tours. 
budgets, 
Turnkeys, often paid out of the gaolers' 
were too few in number, and disinclined 
anyway, to make any attempt to regulate behaviour 
within the walls. 
Chaplains saw their duty as ministering to the 
condemned before 
services, which 
wonder about the 
executions 
few prisoners 
stature of 
and performing 
attended. One 
the 
Sunday 
might 
that Howard finds it necessary 
prison chaplain in 
to stipulate that 
chaplains should profess Christian belief! 
Medical care was unusual. Though doctors did 
visit the larger prisons, Howard thought it right to 
recommend a salaried doctor for each prison in the 
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country. For the larger prisons, he called for three 
medical personnel: surgeon, physician and apothecary. 
The lack of purpose <meaningful work) and the lack 
of staff supervision fostered a lively and brutal 
prison culture. The ethos included: 1) gaming, 
including gambling, and boxing to settle disputes; 
2) mock trials, a burlesque that may have provided 
accused persons with the only legal aid they would 
ever receive; 3) garnishing - the custom of distribut-
ing the possessions of inductee prisoners; 4) begging, 
a very common necessity in view of the keepers' 
negligence; and 5) the ritual destruction of the gaol, 
to be enjoyed the night before felons were removed for 
transportation. 4 
The State of the Prisons is comprised of detailed 
descriptions of prisons in England and Wales, and of 
prisons in Europe, as well as John Howard's specific 
recommendations for prison administration. Neither 
his recommendations nor his criticisms were novel -
4 These activities are described in detail in Ignatieff, 
pages 41 ff. 
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Henry Fielding had proposed many of the same elements 
as early as 1750. The determinative factor was the 
impressive assemblage of facts and details, which gave 
scientific backing to his ideas in an age when science 
was revered without reservation. 
Some points specific to John Howard are 
appropriate: He received the rare honour of a vote of 
thanks from the House of Commons after his appearance 
in 1774. A statue of the philanthropist was erected 
in St. Paul's and he was a Nonconformist. He 
referred to himself as philosophically naive, a 
'plodder'. John Howard never ran a prison. Finally, 
as the premier authority in a time of prison reform, 
we are indebted to his particular sense of order - and 
disorder for the prison regimen that has developed 
in the U.S. and England. 
One of his views, axiomatic today, was that 
prisons are 'seminaries of vice' <the phrase comes 
from Henry Fielding). Howard had observed males and 
females, petty offenders and capital cases, children 
and hardened criminals, all thrown in together. He 
sketches a frightful scene of young children sitting 
in rapt attention as hardened villains recite their 
heinous adventures. 
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Howard, who abstained from alcohol, laid part i-
cular emphasis on the evils of intoxication. <He was 
closely related to the Whitbreads). But he argued 
that the chief flaw of the prisons was the lack of 
regulation and· segregation. Debtors, the 'idle' and 
most petty of fenders were meant to be subjected to 
productive labour, but the keepers argued that the 
prisoners could pass tools on to the felons, who could 
use them to escape. 
Segregation would serve two purposes. It would 
provide those mandated to work or to learn skills with 
the chance to do so; and it would aid security by 
foiling escape attempts. It was not necessary that 
the segregated felons be subjected to long periods of 
isolation. 
Perhaps no recommendation of John Howard was to 
have as great an effect as this: 
I wish to have so many small rooms or cabins in 
this [the felons'] ward that each criminal may 
sleep alone. If it be difficult to prevent their 
being together in the day-time, they should by all 
means be separated at night. Solitude and silence 
are favourable to reflection; and may possibly 
lead them to repentance. 
<Howard, 43> 
Like many visionaries, Howard could not foresee 
ways in which his suggestions would be twisted by 
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authorities with more extreme views. If nights of 
solitude could be edifying, then perhaps a month of 
unbroken isolation, or no six months, nine, eighteen 
- there seemed no 1 imi t. But of course there was. 
Despite disturbing reports from the American 
originators of the solitary system, Pentonville opened 
in 1842 to a system of complete segregation. The rate 
of those removed due to insanity was four times that 
of previous prison regimes in Britain. 6 
Michael Ignatieff comments that Howard would have 
denied paternity of such a system. In fact, he did. 
In a letter cited by Jeremy Bentham, Howard stresses 
that solitary confinement was to be used for short 
periods only, to break the prisoner. He found 
monstrous the 1 de a of en fore ed solitude, both total 
and continuous. 6 
Ignatieff cites a figure of 5 - 15 men per year. 
Walter Moberly follows Sydney Webb and Beatrice Webb in 
estimating the number at twenty times the previous rate. 
I have found no explanation for the discrepancies. 
4 Bentham, pages 71-72, n. Bentham quotes Howard: 
It should . . . be considered by those who are ready to 
commit for a long time petty offenders to absolute solitude, 
that such a state is more than human nature can bear, with-
out the hazard of distraction or despair. " 
Cf. John Howard, Account of the Lazeretto~ page 169. 
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It is unfair and harsh to blame the transformation 
of the prisons on one man. First, his recommendations 
were drawn from observations of well-established 
practices. Second, there was a collaborative effort 
at reform <and this was international). Third, the 
underlying philosophical strides had nothing to do 
with Howard. 
The disordered 
surveyed above must 
of the period, the 
took inspiration. 
and vicious prisons we have 
be off-set by the better examples 
raw materials from which Howard 
In the Rasphuis of Holland, Howard 
found quietness, order, cleanliness, uniforms. From 
the Maison de Force at Ghent, Howard took the need for 
silence and solitude; he also found architecture that 
sui ted the prisons' functions. Ghent, incidentally, 
had been modelled upon San Michel prison for juveniles 
at the Vatican; under Clement XII, the prison applied', 
a strict monastic rule to adolescents .. 
The State of ther Prisons d·t:~ .. es not dispute the gov·-
ernment' s ~'~ght to punish. Rather, Howard criticised 
the filth, disorder and corruption within the prisons. 
Howard was a strict low-church Calvinist who would 
have appreciated more discipline. Indeed, he found 
the Germans extravagant for giving the condemned a 
choice of meals before their execution. He writes 
that simple bread and water would be more proper. 
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One biographer comments that the prison reformer's 
ideas on human nature come close to zoology: 
Howard might be accused of regarding prisoners 
almost as animals, who had no conception of a 
future and only needed clean, dry housing and 
adequate food to reach acquiescence in their 
confinement. 
CD.L. Howard, cited in McConville, 92) 
Ultimately, this judgment is too harsh. Howard's 
belief in the universality of sin led him to see the 
prisoner as representative of his own spiritual state. 
Deeply convinced of his own unrighteousness, Howard 
knew that no one was beyond the reach of God's mercy. 
He denied, in the strongest terms, images of offenders 
that severed the common bonds of humanity. 
Debtors and felons, as well as hostile foreigners, 
are men, and by men they ought to be treated as 
men. 
<Howard, 23) 
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Two dimensions of 18th century society shed light 
on the reformation of prisons. 
legal environment and the 
I shall 
These are the socio-
philosophical 
argue that 
pres up-
the basic posit ions of the age. 
shift in penology, following mat erial ism, makes 
punishment symbolic of the offence. An execution may 
symbolise the state's power to punish, but the 
reformers believed that the penalty should reflect the 
offence itself. 
The legal setting helps to demonstrate the slow, 
piece-meal quality of reforms begun, as they were, as 
ad hoc solutions to practical pressures. The 18th 
century reforms can be seen as a form of crisis 
intervention. The roles of social crises and an 
evolving law code wi 11 be the focus of this sect ion. 
If Howard's account of the prisons shows the need for 
reform, then this overview of 18th century law and 
government suggests that prison reform was a small 
part of a broader change. 
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In 1771, William Eden opposed imprisonment on two 
counts: its inability to deter <because it is 
hidden), and its harmful effects on prisoners <its 
inability to reform them). Seven years later, Eden 
collaborated with John Howard and William Blackstone 
to propose the 'Hard-Labour Bill', which called for 
the government to build a national system of prisons. 
In 1781, Jonas Hanway published a pamphlet 
opposing hanging and transportation. He considered 
the latter expensive, reckoning the loss of potential 
labour at £1.5 million from 1749-1772. Hanway was a 
advocate of solitary confinement to hard fervent 
labour the length of sentence to depend on the 
religious conversion of the confined. 
Calls for penal reform meshed well with two broad 
trends in late 18th century culture. The first was an 
evolving dialectic between government and the ruled -
between more centralised rule on one hand and a vocal 
and critical citizenry on the other; the second was 
the emergence of science-inspired optimism. <This 
included tangible progress in education, 
engineering, agriculture, etc.) 
medicine, 
The character of 18th century, laissez-faire 
government can be approached through a description of 
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law and its administration. 7 "Government has no other 
end but the preservation of property. " (John Locke, 
cited in Hay, 18) Douglas Hay argues that Locke 
distorted natural law to free property from all 
restraints, whether political or moral. Hay charges 
Locke with the view "that the unfettered accumulation 
of money, goods, and land was sanctioned by Nature, 
and, implicitly, by God." <Hay, 18) 
The corollary of the idea that property is 
sanctified through labour is t_he condemnation of 
idleness. If wealth was the divinely established 
blessing, then poverty was the punishment visited upon 
the idle. In terms of the civil contract, this 
implied that those who refused to work were parasitic, 
draining the resources of the state. Idleness, 
identified as a character flaw, was attacked by 
government through legislation, and by the judiciary 
through their powers to punish. 
The labourer was trapped in a system that sancti-
fied wealth, even as wages were kept low. The belief 
7 The overview of 18th century law is drawn primarily from 
Radzinowicz; also Hay, Linebaugh and Thompson; and 
Marshall. 
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was widespread that the labourers were so degenerate 
that they would work only if it were necessary for 
survival. Arthur Young wrote, "Everyone but an idiot 
knows that the lower class must be kept poor or they 
will never be industrious." (Cited in Marshall, 180) 
Labourers also suffered from the vagaries of the 
market. When weather conditions made it impossible to 
distribute stocks, the work force would be sacked or 
given shorter working hours. 
combined with high costs of 
created a 
The insecurity o~ work, 
food brought on by low 
volatile spirit in the grain harvests, 
working people. Riots, some of them severe, were a 
constant concern of legislators and judges. 
Law was used by the authorities to maintain social 
order. Douglas Hay describes the response to a food 
riot in Warwick in 1756. Justice Willes made known 
his intention to hang all 
until peace was restored. 
to death, he allowed that 
rioters brought before him 
After sentencing four men 
he would apply for a royal 
pardon for two of them if the rioting ceased. The 
others, alleged leaders, would be hanged as examples. 
The reach of law was extended during the 18th 
century in two senses. 1) There was an expansion of 
the range of actions covered by law. 2> The powers of 
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the judiciary to punish were enlarged through a 
gradation of penalties. These points can be 
established by exploring the increase in capital 
statutes and the role of judicial discretion. 
It was perhaps inevitable that the vast ma.jority 
of capital offences established during the period 
involved property. The number of offences punishable 
by hanging rose from about 50 in 1688, to 160 in 1760, 
to over 225 by 1810. After 1810, the complexities of 
interpretation make a precise count impossible. 8 
Hay argues that capital sanctions arose out of 
specific threats to property. For example, in 1753, 
the act of · stealing ship-wrecked g~ods was made a 
capital of fence. Merchants, traders and insurers had 
pressed for such a measure, arguing that the law was 
too gentle. In 1764, the English Linen Company 
convinced Parliament to pass a law prescribing hanging 
a These figures are cited by Radzinowicz. cf. Ignatieff. 
E. P. Thompson, in W-higs and Hunter~ provides an 
illuminating discussion of the 'Waltham Black Act', from 
which one can draw at least 200 discrete acts punishable by 
hanging. 
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for the theft of linens. Likewise, an act passed in 
1769 responded to a wave of food riots by making the 
destruction of mills a capital offence. 
The rise in capital sanctions also reflects a 
penal philosophy steeped in irony. Many of those who 
pressed for capital sanctions appealed to the 
humanitarian bases of capital punishment. The point 
of the pamphlet, Hanging Not Punishment Enough, was 
that the purpose of punishment was not retributive, 
but to deter others. The author, who chose anonymity, 
defended the severity of his <her?) proposals. The 
purpose was, "not that Man's blood should be shed, but 
that it should not." <Cited in McConville, 60) 
William Paley brought the deterrence argument to 
greater sophistication by stating in 1785, .. 
crimes are not by any government punished in 
proportion to their guilt, nor in all cases ought to 
be so, but in proportion to the difficulty and 
necessity of preventing them. " <2 Paley, page 2; Book 
VI, Chapter ix. ) 
Hay assumes that the ruling class jealously 
guarded their property through brutal intimidation 
because he underestimates the significance of the 
doctrine of deterrence. The government did expand the 
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number of offences, to reduce the threats to property. 
But the ready resort to capital statutes demonstrates 
trust in the deterrent power of hanging, in which the 
punishment represented the state's powers. 
faith which was soon to be undermined. 
It was a 
Hand in hand with the broader reach of law was an 
intensification of the power to punish. More severe 
sane t ions gave judges the power of life and de at h. 
The judiciary's power to punish an offender was 
extended to its absolute. This discretion over 
greater severity must be seen in the context of a more 
general valorization of the judiciary. 
From the moment the judges arrived in town for the 
assizes until the sessions ended, their presence was 
attended with pomp and spectacle. There was powerful 
imagery in the scarlet robes, as well as in the black 
cap, worn to pronounce the sentence of death <or, 
white gloves, a sign of a session without an 
execution.) Both the court and the gallows were 
imbued with quasi-religious ritual. 
The administration of law was a theatre, which 
inspired heightened emotions and which was permeated 
with the aura of sanctity. Three elements of this 
ritual can be isolated: divine just ice, which held 
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the power of life and death; the inunutable rule of 
law, under which both judge and accused were subjects; 
and the holy mystery of mercy. 
It seems illogical that the rate of actual 
hangings should have fallen throughout the 18th 
century. 9 Given the disparity between the severity of 
the code and its lenient application, there was a 
puzzling lack of conflict between the judiciary and 
the legislature. But it is odd only if one assumes 
that ret ri but ion was primary. The apparent disparity 
must be set in the context of an economy of punishment 
based upon deterrent presuppositions. 
The expansion of judicial power to the point of 
discretion over life and death marks an attempt to 
maintain a rigid social order through force and 
intimidation. While the Church steadily lost its 
power to frighten the laity with images of hell, the 
Hay estimates that only 50 per cent of those sentenced to 
hang in the 18th century were executed. Patrick Colquhoun 
set the figure of pardons or commutations as high as four-
fifths of those sentenced to death. <Cited in Radzinowicz, 
134) Ignatieff's figures show that the drop was interrupted 
briefly by a slight increase in actual hangings after 1776, 
when transportation to the American Colonies was disrupted. 
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judiciary claimed authority with its own sanctions; 
this fire and brimstone was as tangible as a hangman's 
noose. 
The judges held the power over life and death. But 
the courts' legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
depended upon the justices' obeisance to the rule of 
law. In practice, of course, a veneer of conformity 
to the demands of the law could aid or doom an 
accused. Douglas Hay remarks on the number of cases 
that were dismissed for some trivial error; and there 
were numerous cases in which the judge 'regretfully' 
yielded to his duty and pronounced the sentence of 
death. 
The sanctity of the law was seen by some to be 
threatened by its severity. Because of the cruelty of 
the sanctions, prosecutors declined to bring cases, 
juries refused to convict, pardons became common. The 
gentry could decide whether to bring a case to court 
or settle the issue themselves. Further, through 
their links to the justices of the peace, they could 
largely tailor the punishment to fit the offence. 
In retrospect, the contradictions seem obvious: 
the legislature continued to order hanging; the 
justices habitually undermined the law with clemency. 
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Leon Radzinowicz takes this view, arguing that Parlia-
ment intended its penal code to be strictly applied. 
But an alternative view is more likely. In the 
face of rising social unrest, the authorities (both 
the legislature and the judiciary) sought more power, 
more intense controls over the populace. Yet, the 
application of that power depended upon the consent of 
the ruled 
Therefore, 
<especially in view of the social 
the humanity and restraint 
unrest). 
of the 
authorities <acting in service to the omnipotent law) 
functioned to maintain legitimacy. In short, the 
vicious code and the gentle, reluctant practice were 
complementary. 
The pardon had many functions in 18th century law. 
Co-ordinated with the rule of law the pardon could 
demonstrate the humane concern of the king. Legal 
mercy could be effective in appeasing angry mobs, as 
we have seen in Justice Willes' handling of the 
Warwick food riot. The pardon could have didactic 
force, when the news of mercy was staged at precisely 
the most dramatic moment, at the gallows. Pardons 
could disguise the inadequacies of policing, as a 
judge might rule 'mercifully' in cases that ought to 
have been dismissed out right. Pardons could be used 
as contracts, to exact obligations from the convicted. 
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In view of the scope of these functions, the 
pardon was clearly a reasoned and deliberate comple-
ment to the 'Bloody Code'. If legislators felt their 
aims were vitiated by the judiciary, they did not show 
their frustration. Indeed, the men in Parliament were 
only too willing to use their position to exploit the 
possibility of clemency. Then, too, the 'humani-
tarian' arguments for capital statutes demonstrate a 
penal philosophy of deterrence that included mercy: 
the purpose was not to take vengeance, but to increase 
respect for law and authority. In this sense, 
clemency is also a sign of the judges' power. 
Perhaps most significant, the authority of 
government was fragile. Without an efficient police 
force, social control was dependent upon the 
commoners' willingness to be ruled. In Principles of 
Moral and Political Philosophy, William Paley wrote: 
Let civil governors learn hence to respect their 
subjects; let them be admonished, that the phy-
sical strength lies in the governed; that this 
strength wants only to be felt and roused, to lay 
prostrate the most ancient and confirmed domi-
nion; that general opinion therefore ought always 
to be treated with deference, and managed with 
delicacy and circumspection. 
< 1 Paley, page 363; Book IV, chapter ij) 
Adjustments to the power to punish must be seen in 
light of a more general crisis of authority. 
Immediately before the reform period, the criticism of 
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government reached its zenith. The 1 oss of the war 
against the American colonies had profound effects 
upon the government, confirming the need for reform. 
The War combined with social upheavals, such as the 
Gordon Riots of 1780, to encourage attacks upon 
administrative inefficiency, sinecure positions, 
laissez-faire government, as well as the inflated 
powers of the judiciary. But, paradoxically, a more 
responsive and efficient government was also allowed 
to enlarge its scope. 
Without the changes that began to make both 
government as a whole and individual government 
officials more accountable, more responsible, 
honest, and accessible, it is highly unlikely that 
Parliament would gradually have come to grant more 
powers to government and accept its expanding role 
in society 
<Baker, 218) 
A key issue for government during this period was 
the power to punish. The question of the government's 
power was crystallised in the exercise of capital 
punishment'. The accounts of public hangings illus-
trate the delicate balance of power between the state 
and the people. The public's role was full of risk 
for the authorities. The crowd could demonstrate 
their civic condemnation of the crimes, as they did at 
the hanging of Jonathan Wild, whom they pelted with 
stones. But they could also side with the condemned, 
sometimes to the point of assaulting the hangman. The 
gallows were a stage for the power relations between 
-97-
history 
king and people, and the 'theatre' could be usurped by 
the ruled. 
It was a ribald, reckless, brutal mob, violently 
combative, fighting and struggling for foremost 
places, fiercely aggressive, distinctly abusive. 
Spectators often had their limbs broken, their 
teeth knocked out, sometimes they were crushed to 
death. 
<A contemporary, cited in Radzinowicz, 176) 
The presence of the public served several 
functions: 1) They were to be the passive audience, 
treated to a display of justice and power. Hangings 
symbolised the power of the state over the condemned, 
but also over the public at large. 2) But the public 
had an active role in vindicating the sentence - and 
this duty was not always accepted. In 1749, in the 
aftermath of the • Penlez Riots', a force of 300 armed 
soldiers was required to assure an orderly execution. 
3) The public also served as witnesses. Ignatieff 
reports that early calls for private hangings were 
ignored. The public presence was needed, it was said, 
to ensure that the right person was hanged. The point 
may have been justified, but it does not reflect well 
on the level of corruption in criminal justice. 
It was not until 1783 that the processions from 
Newgate to the gallows at Tyburn were stopped. Even 
then, the hangings at Newgate were open to the public. 
But if the end of the processions was a minor change, 
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it heralded a deeper shift in penology. Henceforth, 
the arguments of the reformers would carry mot'e 
weight. 
I have spoken of 18th century law in terms of 
theatre, of religious ritual and of just ice. Clearly, 
the public hanging was a theatrical event, but a more 
accurate image is that of a battlefield. The violence 
of the state <or the monarch) was arrayed against the 
unruliness of the people. The gallows were the 
setting for the conflict between the will of the 
state, expressed in law, and the rebellion of the 
offender <the crime). 
A simplistic view characterises pre-reform 
punishment as barbaric; the reformer, as a champion of 
humanity. From this perspective, the pre-reform 
authorities were stupid as well as vindictive, killing 
or whipping those whom they could not understand. The 
reformers intelligently saw the potential for reform 
in criminals, and sought to develop the rehabilitative 
potential of prisons. 
Such a thoroughly misleading contrast distorts the 
reforms. 
penology, 
First, it seriously neglects a shift in 
from deterrence to rehabilitation. Pre-
reform authorities lacked the enlightenment of the 
reformers; they could not see how simple it might be 
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to rehabilitate an offender. Lacking the faith in the 
miraculous power of the human sciences, they could 
only hope that potential offenders might be prevented 
by shows of punitive ferocity. 
Hence, second, the caricature of pre-reform 
justice leads us to misunderstand clemency. We 
imagine that it was an aberration in a period of 
brutality, ignoring its vital role in maintaining the 
fragile legitimacy of law. The movement to moderate 
punishment 
trate the 
was but part of a wider shift: 
social body with a ubiquitous 
to infil-
disci pline. 
To take one example: the pre-reform authority 
laboured without benefit of an organised police force. 
Third, we are mistaken if we believe that the 
conflict-ridden nature of criminal justice before 
reform gave way to some radically new function. We 
may view criminal just ice as coerced normalisation, 
through the punishment of deviance. We may prefer a 
social contract view, wherein imprisonment is the cost 
of transgressing the terms of civil society. But the 
symbolic weight of the gallows, the dramatic fight 
between order and resistance, cannot have disappeared 
without trace. 
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Gentle Punishment: 
The Philosophy of Reformation 
Punishment, Its End. With respect to the Progress 
of Society, we may conceive three Epochs: distin-
guishable in idea, though running into one another 
in fact. The first, which is past, in which every 
man actuated by the vindictive principle, 
inflicted the arbitrary punishment for a received 
offense, more or less intense according to the 
greater or less violence of his passion. The 
second, which is present, in which the Idea of a 
Public being formed and established . taking 
the rod of vengeance out of the hand of the 
Individual, uses it according to settled rules 
still governed however in great measure by the 
same principle. The third, which is to come, in 
which all traces of the vindictive principle being 
entirely obliterated, Prevention shall be the sole 
end and object of a Penal Legislation. 
<Jeremy Bentham, cited in Radzinowicz, 381, n. 99) 
If there is a flaw in Bentham's argument, then it 
is one of prophecy rather than historical accuracy. 
Subsequent developments demonstrate that it is harder 
to eradicate vengeance from penal philosophy than 
Bentham thought. 
The basis of the reformation was not a new view of 
the purpose of punishment. The reformers Hanway, 
Bentham, Eden, Romilly, Howard - did not eschew the 
deterrence argument. Instead they opposed, from 
various directions, the method of severity. Further, 
doubts that the severity of the code was working were 
combined with positive recommendations for change. 
The true objective of the reform movement . 
was not so much to establish a new right to punish 
based on more equitable principles, as to set up a 
new 'economy' of the power to punish, to assure 
its better distribution . . according to modal-
ities that render it more regular, more effective, 
more constant and more detailed in its effectsi 
in short, which increase its effects while 
diminishing its economic cost. 
<Foucault, 80-81) 
history 
Leon Radzinowicz comments that the lack of any 
scientific understanding of criminality militated 
against gradations of punishment, and favoured the 
simplistic cruelty of intimidation. Yet, dissatis-
faction with the 'Bloody Code' had been expressed long 
before the reform period. 'A student of politics' had 
written: 
As moral actions are infinitely variable, on 
account of the difference of persons, age, and 
education, in order to adapt penalties to every 
offense, there ought to be in every well-govern'd 
state, an harmonised proportion regulated by 
distributive justice. 
<Cited in Radzinowicz, 32-33> 
In 1771, William Eden published his Principles of 
Penal Law. Eden held that, while deterrence is a part 
of punishment, the effectiveness of the various 
methods must be evaluated. He criticised banishment 
<transportation) because its deterrence value was 
extremely limited. Those punished were out of the 
public eye, and, for some, the chance at starting a 
new life in another land could constitute an 
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inducement to crime. Imprisonment, too, was flawed. 
"It sinks 
community, 
morals: 
useful subjects into burt hens on the 
and has always a bad effect on their 
nor can it communicate the benefit of 
example, being in its nature secluded from the eye of 
the people." <Cited in Radzinowicz, 312) 
Eden preferred flogging to hanging, and the 
pillory to whipping. He suggested that forced labour 
had much to commend it. His most original proposal 
was to exchange serious offenders for Christians held 
as slaves by alien nations. Alternatively, offenders 
could be used on dangerous expeditions. 
In his suggestions as well as his philosophy, 
Eden's work recalls the argument of Cesare de 
Beccaria. Beccaria's classic Essay on Crimes and 
Punishments was written in 1764, and published in 
English in 1767. Like John Howard, Beccaria's views 
served to sum up the convictions of his age. 
Beccaria advocated moderation in punishment on the 
grounds that it was more effective. The preventative 
goal of punishment positively required restraint. All 
that was required of the penalty was that it should 
exceed in pain the anticipated pleasure held out by 
the offence. At this point, according to Beccaria, 
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the punishment was most efficient; anything further is 
superfluous and tyrannical. 
Beccaria 
applied under 
promised that moderation 
three principles: 1) the 
worked, if 
punishment 
must be certain <thus, he opposed clemency>; 2) the 
punishment must be prompt; 3) it must somehow conform 
to the offence <acts of violence should be punished 
corporally, 
restitution). 
thefts, by 
Beccaria 
forced 
adamantly 
labour to exact 
opposed capital 
punishment. He conceded that the social contract may 
have obliged the citizen to submit to punishment, "but 
who ever wished to leave to other men the option of 
killing him?" <Cited in Radzinowicz, 285) 
Beccaria marks an important turning point: his 
ideas reverse the intuitive desire to strengthen 
deterrence with greater violence, but <as we shall 
see) the reformers go far beyond· his penology. His 
great achievement was to convince his audience that 
punishment can represent the offence itself. If the 
punishment must symbolise the ruler, 
become more brutal to show more power. 
then it must 
If, however, 
the offender comes to associate the punishment with 
the offence, so that it seems the crime has caused the 
pain of punishment, then offenders will be deterred by 
moderate penalties. 
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Beccaria's ideas were favourably received by 
several monarchs. Empress Catherine of Russia put his 
ideas into law as early as 1769. His Essay enjoyed 
spectacular success, earning him worldwide acclaim. 
Its popularity 
criminals was of 
implies that 
great concern, 
the punishment of 
and that society was 
open to reforms. But it also suggests that Beccaria's 
ideas matched broader philosophical trends. 
A key shift in thought was the development of the 
'human sciences' . An emerging view of human nature 
informed education, medicine and industry, as well as 
law. In particular, assumptions about criminal nature 
fuelled the drive for penal reform. At the heart of 
the philosophy was the view that criminals could be 
reformed through science. I shall refer to the 
philosophical convictions about criminal nature as a 
criminal anthropology. 
In Britain, the chief exponent of the new anthro-
pology was David Hartley. A consistent materialist, 
Hartley posited a physical basis for conscious 
processes. He argued that sensations entered the 
body, were processed by a complicated mechanism, and 
resulted in action. 
Hartley 
associationist 
advocated 
psychology. 
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responses directly to stimuli, as thunder follows 
lightning. More important for criminal as 
lightning leads one to expect thunder, so the 
delinquent could be taught to associate penalties with 
the offences being considered. 
Under associationist principles, Beccaria's second 
and third principles are crucial <Punishment must be 
certain; and 1 t must be prompt). Beccaria wrote that 
the more closely these are followed: 
the stronger and more lasting in the human mind is 
the association of these ideas, crime and 
punishment, so that insensibly, they come to be 
considered, the one the cause and the other as its 
necessary and inevitable consequence. It is a 
proved fact that the association of ideas is the 
cement of the whole fabric of the human intellect. 
<Cited in Radzinowicz, 282-283) 
Indeed, Beccaria consistently applied the lessons 
of materialism which he had gained from Claude-Adrien 
Helvetius and Offray de la Met tray. Helvetius 
believed that all our abilities are acquired. In De 
L'esprit ( 1758) 1 he argued that human beings are 
perfectible. Any one can be put right, simply by a 
careful manipulation of experience, particularly by 
the control of pleasure and pain. As behaviour is 
linked to environment, the task for the human 
scientist is to unravel these links and manipulate the 
defect 1 ve humans accordingly. When Beccaria opposed 
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capital punishment by arguing that "human minds 
harden, adjusting themselves like fluids, to the level 
of the objects around them, "~ 0 he was applying 
Hel vet 1 us' mechanical anthropology directly to 
criminal justice. 
A vital connection for these materialists linked 
physical ill-health and social deviance. John Howard 
certainly made these connections explicit. While 
cleanliness was advocated as a response to typhus, it 
was also clearly intended to alter behaviour. 
quoted Sir John Pringle: 
It is well-known how much cleanliness conduces to 
health; but it is not so obvious how much it also 
tends to good order and other virtues. [Captain 
Cookl was persuaded - that such men as he could 
induce to be more cleanly than they were disposed 
to be of themselves, became at the same time more 
sober, more orderly, and more attentive to their 
duty. 
<Howard, 59, n. ) 
Howard 
The idea that order could be imposed on the 
prisoners had intuitive appeal for the emerging middle 
class. Their own efforts to organise the labour force 
in 'manufactories' had taught them that discipline of 
10 Cited in Radzinowicz, 281. 
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others was no less effective than self-discipline. 
Increasingly influential industrialists eagerly 
grasped the genius of the reformative ideal in penal 
philosophy. 
The factory regime was thought to have produced 
"industry, decorous behaviour, attendance on public 
worship and general good conduct"; Josiah Wedgewood 
boasted that his discipline had 11 made machines of men 
as cannot err." (Cited in Ignatieff, pages 62,68) 
Such links between an imposed regimen and dispositions 
free from criminal intent may strike us as simplistic, 
but for such newly successful people, they were self-
evident. 
One of the most articulate advocates of a 
Bentham. Bentham materialist penology was Jeremy 
followed Hartley's adherence to the springs of 
the concept 
pain 
to and pleasure, but he developed 
incredible lengths. His 'hedonic calculus' measured 
pain and pleasure by thirty-two aspects: age (broken 
into five stages), sex, health, strength, intellect, 
occupation, etc. 
Bentham shared with Beccaria the belief that the 
goal of punishment is prevention. But he argued that 
the selection of an appropriate punishment depends 
upon his hedonic calculus. Otherwise, of course, the 
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infliction of pain will not reform the sufferer. 
one cannot claim to compute the balance of Obviously, 
pain and pleasure exactly. But Bentham argued that 
these subjective factors must be considered in any 
if it is to serve the purposes of legislation 
prevent ion. Here he stands in stark contrast to 
Beccaria; the latter had argued that punishments must 
be inflexibly applied. 
Bentham also suggested an economy of punishment, 
measuring it according to its human costs as well as 
financial ones. He was emphatic in his view that 
punishment is an evil; hence it is crucial that it be 
used with maximum efficiency 
punishment to the offenders, 
<i._e., that the harm of 
their families, and 
society be minimised). "It has been too frequently 
forgot ten, that the delinquent is a member of the 
community, as well as any other individual." <Cited in 
Radzinowicz, 382) 
This image of Bentham's moderation must be 
balanced by his ready resort to pain inflicted for 
reformative purposes. He advocated a whipping machine 
that would mete out strokes with exactly uniform 
force, a diet that maintained recalcitrant prisoners 
on the border of starvation and a dungeon to achieve 
sensory deprivation. In his relentless logic and 
detail he clearly takes us beyond the simple elegance 
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of the materialists. Nonetheless, he is repre-
sentative of the age of reform in his optimis~ in his 
confidence that the subtle manipulation of pain would 
permanently alter behaviour. 
It would be reckless to claim that materialist 
determinism was solely responsible for the rise of 
prisons. In the work of William Godwin, for instance, 
the determinist thrust was turned on its head. Godwin 
argued that it is no more just to punish an assassin 
than it would be to punish the knife: both are 
mechanically propelled into action. Then, too, the 
inspiration behind many industrialists - as for John 
Howard - was their Nonconformist faith. 
Nonetheless, from the materialists came the 
authority 
resulting 
of science, 
from its proven 
bolstered 
successes 
by an 
in other 
optimism 
fields. 
In France, Offray de la Mettrey proclaimed that, in 
the near future, questions of guilt would be left to 
the doctors. 
In America, Benjamin Rush proudly advertised his 
hope that science would soon find the cure for crime. 
Rush wrote of prisons as "the most speedy and effec-
tual methods of restoring the vicious part of mankind 
to virtue and happiness." And he cant inued, "I have 
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no more doubt of every crime having its cure in moral 
and physical influence." (Cited in Foucault, 128) 
All that the 'scientists' required was a 
laboratory, free from the nagging variables of public 
life. The prison was destined to become a Utopian 
micro-cosm, a controlled world in which the order 
sought by the middle and upper classes was to be 
achieved by the infallible work of the experts. And 
their methods were nice. 
Materialist psychology implied that a regimen 
applied to the body by the external force of 
authority would first become a habit and then 
gradually be transformed into a moral preference. 
<Ignatieff, 67) 
The practices of the doctor-wardens would exert a 
gentle discipline upon the chaotic and obscene 
practices of the prisoners. If prisoners were dirty 
and smelly, the experts would force them to bathe. If 
they were lazy, the doctors would force industry upon 
them. If they exhibited anti-social behaviours, the 
prison would implant orderly, if not quite noble, 
habits. And the unassailable logic of associationist 
psychology guaranteed that the controlled environment, 
the measured stimuli of pleasures and pains, would 
achieve cures. 
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The Prison and Social Control 
There are cords of love as well as fetters of iron 
- John Brewster, 1792, cited by I gnat ieff 
My Hand is Severe but my Intention Benevolent 
from the Rasphuis, Amsterdam, cited by Ignatieff 
In the sections above, we have reviewed the 
conditions in 18th century prisons; we have explored 
the stresses upon government in the years before 
reform; and we have examined the changes in penal 
philosophy. These perspectives have shed light on the 
process through which the modern prison evolved. In 
this section, I present the first years of reform in 
the light of politics, power and punishment. The aim 
is to discover how prisons fitted into evolving 
patterns of social control. 
Michael Ignatieff describes A Just Measure of Pain 
as a study of "the moral boundaries of social 
authority in a society undergoing capitalist trans-
format ion. " <I gnat ieff, xii i. ) The social setting for 
reform featured a delicate balance between brutality 
and mercy in criminal just ice. The harsh style was 
viewed with scepticism by those who preferred a penal 
philosophy based on moderation, following Beccaria. 
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In 1778, Beccaria's new economy of punishment was 
presented to Parliament in the form of a bill drafted 
by Eden, Howard, and William Blackstone, the "Hard-
Labour Bi 11". The outbreak of hostilities with 
America had temporarily ended the practice of trans-
portation. Parliament had moved swiftly in response, 
authorising the re-fitting of old ships to confine 
prisoners. These were the notorious hulks. The 
prisoners were to be put to hard labour on the Thames. 
<This 'temporary measure' was still in use in 1827.) 
The end of transportation brought a slight rise in 
the number of hangings, but the increased use of 
imprisonment was much more dramatic. As early as 
1776, a firm step toward primary reliance upon prisons 
had been taken. There was no doubt that transporta-
t ion would ret urn, but it was never again to hold the 
predominant position it had enjoyed before the War. 
The objectives of the Hard Labour Bill were 
ambitious. The authors proposed a national system of 
nineteen houses of labour. The Bill was comprised of 
sixty-eight sect ions: It outlined nineteen districts 
throughout England; provided for national funding; set 
out the administrative structure; defined tasks for 
prisoners; described the style of architecture; set 
the terms of confinement; specified diet and clothing. 
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Here, the intention of restricting prisoner contact 
with the outside was emphatically stated. 
The Bill was passed by Parliament the following 
year. The authors changed the title to the 
Penitentiary Act, making explicit the connection 
between imprisonment and correction. Science promised 
that the offender was reclaimable through the measured 
application of pleasures and pain. Howard was con-
vinced that prisoners subjected to labour in solitude 
might repent of their ways. Such promises were 
necessary to persuade a legislature devoted to 
deterrence through absolute power, brutality of 
punishment, and intimidation. 
The Penitentiary Act, in its final form, showed 
the reluctance of Parliament to undertake respon-
sibility for punishment. 
four major points: the 
It barely retained Howard's 
segregation of prisoners, 
confined in heal thy, secure rooms, under a salaried 
gaoler, with an independent external inspectorate. 
Rather than nineteen prisons, there were two <one for 
men, one for women). 
Neither prison was constructed. 
lapsed in 1784 it was not renewed. 
When the Act 
Nonetheless, 
however fruitless the Act, it did constitute a 
significant step forward. The government had pledged 
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itself to a 
imprisonment 
national prison. 
as a valid option 
It had recognised 
in the face of 
confusion over practicable penalties. 
imprisonment envisaged was corrective. 
And the form of 
The acceptance of imprisonment was by no means 
widespread. Prisons fitted awkwardly if at all 
into the prevailing philosophy: 
(i) Associationist psychology demanded that the 
punishment conform to the offence. If the penalty was 
to be seen as the effect, caused by the offence 
itself, then the punishment would need to mirror the 
crime. Imprisonment was simply too monolithic. <Eden 
had himself denied the deterrent potential of 
prisons. ) 
(i i) It was also costly. The public was bound to 
wonder about a punishment that cost money. 
<iii) There was no precedent of a prison entirely for 
the confinement of felons. 
<iv) One of the nagging problems of transportation was 
that many of those who had been banished returned to 
England. Imprisonment would worsen the problem, 
since, apart from a high mortality rate, prisoners 
would return to society. 
Finally, (v) the preferred style of deterrence through 
brutality opposed incarceration in clean, orderly 
cells. Bad as prisons were, conditions were not 
markedly worse than many areas of London. 
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Howard and his collaborators did not need to prove 
that their regimen would be humane. Quite the 
contrary, they were pressed to demonstrate that 
conditions of cleanliness and order would not debase 
the deterrent power of prisons completely. Howard had 
joined rehabilitation and pain in The State of the 
Prisons: 
If to [humane treatment J be joined such regula-
tions in preventing all dissipation and riotous 
amusement [imprisonment] will not fail to 
be sufficiently irksome and disagreeable, 
especially to the idle and profligate. 
<Cited in Ignatieff, 94) 
Despite the failure of the Penitentiary Act, it 
did help to popularise Howard's ideas. Local 
authorities moved to apply his policies in their own 
jurisdictions. If I in 1791, there were still no 
national penitentiaries, there were a number of county 
prisons that boasted Howardian discipline. 
The first 1 the Horsham County Gaol was completed 
in 1779. A project of the Duke of Richmond, the 
prison included separate confinement at night, 
cleanliness of prisoners and buildings, and salaried 
staff, including gaoler, chaplain, doctor and 
independent inspectors. Of Howard's four require-
ment s 1 Horsham ami t ted only labour. Hard labour was 
the predominant feature of the House of Correction at 
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Petworth <1782). In addition, complete separation of 
prisoners was enforced. 
George Onesiphorus Paul, the driving force behind 
Gloucester Penitentiary, was a fervent disciple and an 
articulate advocate of Howard's ideas. 11 He confessed 
to Parliament in 1810 that he found his inspiration in 
the Penitentiary Act of 1779. Yet, in order to 
practice Howard's policies in Gloucester, Paul had to 
sell imprisonment to the county authorities. He 
argued that a better diet, healthier conditions, 
enforced baths, and the privilege of labour did not 
coddle prisoners. - He introduced measures <e. g., the 
shaving of prisoners' heads upon induction) that 
combined medical and punitive functions. 
Paul deliberately isolated the prisoner from 
family and friends. Next of kin were allowed to visit 
once every six months. He defended the provision of 
an adequate diet as one means of severing the 
prisoners' links with the outside. Ironically, then, 
prisoners were isolated from their families initially 
1 1 The story of G.O. Paul is told in Foucault, 
Ignatieff and McConville. 
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for reformative aims the isolation was a 
medical/moral quarantine, not a punitive deprivation. 
Paul clearly saw the potential of prisons in 
reformative terms. Further, he saw the provision of 
labour as a part of the rehabilitative process. The 
Penitentiary Act stipulated hard labour as a punish-
ment for felons. Previous houses of correct ion had 
been limited to petty offenders and juveniles. But 
Paul set out to use labour to reform felons. He 
elected to reward good behaviour with the privilege of 
work, and to punish infractions with its withdrawal. 
His success might be gauged from prison discipline at 
Gloucester. In the first nineteen years, only three 
prisoners were subjected to whipping. 
Yet success brought its own costs. Paul so con-
vincingly proclaimed the benefits of imprisonment that 
the penitentiary was quickly over-used. Judges went 
beyond the plan of sending felons to Paul, and began 
to sentence minors and petty offenders. Landowners, 
who might otherwise have acted independently, chose to 
bring cases to court. Thus, even in the first years 
at Gloucester, we find a measure of the swing in the 
public mood toward imprisonment. 
Gloucester 
pri~ons in the 
prefigured 
period of 
the fate 
transit ion. 
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Petworth, Wymondham <an older house of correction) was 
re-modelled in 1785, Salford was built in 1787, and 
Prest on, in 1792. In addition, the Walnut Street 
Jail, in Philadelphia, was re-designed with Gloucester 
as one of its models. Each of these prisons exhibit 
the pains of transition: initial uncertainty on the 
part of the public, strong advocacy from reformers 
followed by over-subscription, resources failing to 
meet demands, and a failure to maintain the policies 
of separation and industry. , 2 
like Gloucester, required and nurtured 
growth in the administrative powers of county 
government. Paul's battles with the authorities are 
instructive, not least because he needed to convince 
them of the advantages of their taking on fiscal 
responsibility for imprisonment. A chief attract ion 
was that prisons offered the authorities an unmatched 
level of control over the convict. 
12 Ignatieff comments that Paul's discipline 'lay in ruins' 
by 1820. This evokes parallels with the Bridewells which 
had been launched with great hopes, sustained by the deter-
mination of one person, and which collapsed into disuse and 
disorder after the founder's departure. 
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This control was made possible by the isolation of 
the prisoner. More important, however, the emerging 
penal anthropology promised techniques that would cure 
the offender. The prison promised to deliver 
reclaimed subjects. These techniques are analysed in 
intricate detail by Mich~l Foucault. 
The new function of the prison would be the 
transformation of the criminal into a respectful 
worker. The method controlled the prisoner's 
environment, daily schedule and activities; and it co-
ordinated the techniques applied to each sphere. Each 
technique can be described in greater depth. 
There were two aspects to the control of 
environment. First, enclosure, which set the prison 
apart from the community, in service to its unique 
function. In archi teet ure, this meant a high wall. 
In practice, enclosure produced a penal quarantine: 
the prisoner was protected from social contagion, and 
<more import ant) the state was enabled to practice 
punishment without the intrusion of outsiders. 
The second facet of this technique was the 
partitioning of the prison. Space was dedicated to 
certain functions: cells for sleeping, shops for 
work. Irrelevant parts of the pre-reform prison 
(e. g., the pub) were eliminated. Partitioning allowed 
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for better classification: first, men from women and 
hardened felons from juveniles, then the total 
seclusion of each 'infectious' offender from all 
others. 
The regimen included strict control of time. The 
duration of the sentence the control of a set 
portion of the offender's life- was an embellishment 
of a power already provided to 1 ust ices. 
' ' 
But the 
prison sentence gradually provided a broad range of 
available penalties. As in schools, the prisoner 
could pass onto the next stage at a time determined by 
his/her own progress. More important, the prisoners' 
day was regulated: hours of rising, of eating, of 
working were rigidly enforced. 
The activities of the prisoner were closely 
observed and directed. Activity now had a didactic 
purpose, as opposed to the chaos that ruled the pre-
reform prison. The scheduled day applied the pope 
that enforced labour woul'd lead to h~bi ts of industry. 
Li_k'e a factory, the prison could distribute the human 
resources according to the requirements of production. 
Foucault comments, "Is it surprising that prisons 
resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, all 
of which resemble prisons?" <Foucault, 228) 
-121-
history 
Although Foucault's thesis is focused upon France, 
an entire chapter is devoted to the architecture of 
one Englishman. 
Morals reformed - health preserved - industry 
invigorated instruction diffused public 
burthens lightened all by a simple idea in 
Architecture! 
(4 Bentham, page 39) 
The Panopticon is the apotheosis of the prison. 
The maximum number of prisoners can be surveilled 
by the minimum number of staff. The springs of pain 
and pleasure can be modulated with utmost precision. 
The prison pays for itself - indeed, it guarantees a 
profit. Security can be achieved with 'lightness', 
without the monstrous walls of the prison. Its flexi-
bi 1 it y ext ends to non- penal uses: hospital, factory, 
school, asylum, barracks. The Panopticon is a perfect 
laboratory for human science. Bentham called it his 
'mill for grinding rogues honest'. 
It is embarrassing to present the essence of this 
astounding solution in a single paragraph. The 
Panopticon is an annular (doughnut-shaped), multi-
story building, with cells arranged round the 
perimeter, and an inspection tower at the core. Each 
cell is open to the view of the inspector in the 
'lodge' or tower, without those in the cells being 
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able to see the inspector. Further sophistication 
provides lamps (for night-time inspection) and tubes 
which allow the inspector to listen to any cell. 
In 1792, Bentham offered to supervise 1000 
prisoners. In 1794, he was granted a contract by an 
Act of Parliament. By 1799, he had assembled a work 
force and had selected a site. All that was needed 
was £1000 to buy out a single remaining land-holder. 
The money was never found. The architectural 
principle of surveillance was influential <for 
instance, in the • first penitentiary', Cherry Hill, in 
Philadelphia). But a 
Panopticon was delayed 
Illinois, was constructed. 
close rendering of the 
until 1925 when Stateville, 
Although Bentham's plan was not realised in his 
lifetime, it exemplified the spirit of the penal 
reformers. From the prisoners' perspective, the new 
style prison was constricting, time weighed upon them, 
enforced segregation was a burden. But for the 'in-
spector' - with whom the emergent middle class iden-
tified - the prison promised social control through 
perfect surveillance, through the measured manipula-
tion of pleasur~ and pain, through hygiene and order. 
Perhaps 
laboratory, 
most attractive, the 
designed to further 
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knowledge of 
was a 
human 
history 
behaviour. The precedent for this aspect of the penal 
regime was established at the Walnut Street Prison, in 
Philadelphia. The reformers in Pennsylvania set out 
to classify each inductee according to a mass of data: 
reports on the offence, notes on behaviour, summaries 
of examinations, etc. Vital information was co-
ordinated with architecture that partitioned the 
population to expose each prisoner to manipulation. 
The degree of control offered by the new model of 
punishment was unthinkable in pre-reform prisons. It 
was also irresistible to governments anxious about 
social order. 
The penitentiary . was more than a functional 
response to a specific institutional crisis. It 
exerted a hold on men's imaginations because it 
represented in microcosm the hierarchical, 
obedient, and godly social order, which they felt 
was coming apart around them. 
<Ignatieff, 81) 
It is hardly surprising that the penitentiary grew 
in popularity during the last decade of the 1700s. 
Increasingly, the vocal and dangerous radical was 
confined in the penitentiary, rather than the pre-
reform gaols. Not only did the new generation prisons 
provide better security, but inside, the radical could 
be disarmed through classification, segregation and 
specially designed treatment. 
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Beneath the myth of prison reform, Ignatieff and 
Foucault perceive a sinister exchange. Foucault 
writes of a "double movement by which, during this 
period, crimes seemed to lose their violence, while 
punishments, reciprocally, lost some of their 
intensity, but at the cost of greater intervention. " 
<Foucault, 75) 
Ignat ieff sees broader ramifications in terms of 
political philosophy: 
In contrast to a paternalist conception of order 
that allowed only a constricted political right, 
but tolerated a wider range of customary, popular 
liberties, liberalism extended formal political 
rights while sharply reducing public tolerance for 
popular disorder. 
<Ignatieff, 212) 
The reforms were not, however, as deliberate and 
reasoned as Ignatieff sometimes implies. Heather 
Tomlinson writes that to locate the changes in a 
general strategy of social control "is to endow them 
with a unity of form and concept ion that would not 
have been recognised by [the reformers' l 
contemporaries." <Tomlinson, 75) 
The prison offered a tolerable compromise between 
the demands of deterrence and of legitimacy. The 
power to punish was enhanced in two ways: being 
hidden, the punishment could be more terrifying in its 
mystery, but it was also less vulnerable to the 
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disapproval of a capricious public. Here again, the 
symbolic effects illuminate the nature of criminal 
just ice. John Haviland, the architect for Cherry Hill 
in Philadelphia, was praised for capturing both the 
terror of imprisonment and the power of the state in a 
veritable fortress. Nineteenth century prisons in 
Britain present the same twin image of eeriness and 
might. 
The latter marks the resurgence of justice as a 
form of combat. John Locke argued that offenders had, 
in effect, declared war on the state. At Tyburn, the 
violence of the state triumphed over the violence of 
the lawbreaker. In the nineteenth century, the war 
would be conducted with greater subtlety. Foucault 
comments that his survey of the period of reform 
evokes 'the distant roar of battle', that prisons 
function as the setting for combat over self-hood, and 
that this battle was diffused throughout society. 
The scaffold, where the body of the tortured 
criminal had been exposed to the ritually mani-
fest ed force of the sovereign, the punitive 
theatre in which the representation of punishment 
was permanently available to the social body, was 
replaced by a great enclosed, complex and hierach-
ized structure that was integrated into the very 
body of the state apparatus. . . . The high wall 
. . . the meticulously sealed wall, uncrossable in 
either direction, closed in upon the now myster-
ious work of punishment, will become near at hand, 
sometimes even at the very centre of the cities of 
the nineteenth century, at once material and 
symbolic, of the power to punish. 
<Foucault, 115-116) 
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In 1810, at the suggestion of Samuel Romilly, 
Parliament appointed a committee, led by George 
Holford, to investigate the suitability of prisons for 
sentences of hard labour. The Committee considered 
regimes such as Paul's at Gloucester and that proposed 
by Bentham. Reverend John Becher's proposal 
stipulated associated work. The views of the • old 
guard' were also taken into consideration. 
Competition 
schemes. The 
if not yet 
recommendations 
was strong among 
pre-reform prison was 
in fact, dead. 
led to the 
the various new 
philosophically, 
The Committee's 
first national 
penitentiary, at Millbank. From this point, locating 
the end of the genesis of the modern prison becomes 
more arbitrary. Foucault marks it in January, 1840; 
Ignatieff carries on till Pentonville, in 1842. 
The end of the period is ambiguous precisely 
because, after the reformation, reforms carried on 
<and on>. The penal archipelago continues to respond 
<albeit in a more callous, reluct ant and self-assured 
manner) to social needs as they arise. The prison 
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still holds out the promise of working, once the 
methods of incarceration are refined. 
Nineteenth century attempts to exploit fully the 
new functions of prisons should not be taken as 
reforms of a new social institution <the 
penitentiary). In the first place, the changes we 
have reviewed were far too slow and fragmented to be 
revel ut ionary. Second, any genealogy of the prison 
exhibits an untidy ancestry: regimes at Pent on ville 
or Cherry Hill were modelled on Gloucester or Walnut 
Street; and these in turn drew heavily upon the 
examples of Bridewells and the Rasphuis. 
I am not suggesting that there has been no 
progress, that the dispersal system is no different 
from Newgat e. I am arguing that the tortuous 
emergence of the prison precludes any 'first modern 
prison' , or a golden age when prisons were performing 
as they should. The real achievement of the reformers 
was to persuade the public <as well as government) 
that prisons would serve purposes of rehabilitation 
and deterrence equally well. 
The movement that began with Howard established 
among a sceptical, middle class public the ideal 
that prisons ought to reform, without ever having 
to convince them that penitentiaries actually did 
so. 
<Ignatieff, 209) 
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Prison reform, then, is not the result of external 
forces on a traditional and structured social 
institution. Rather, reform is intrinsic to the 
practice of imprisonment. 
The movement for reforming the prisons, for 
controlling their functioning, is not a recent 
phenomenon. It does not even seem to have 
originated in a recognition of failure. Prison 
'reform' is virtually contemporary with the prison 
itself: it constitutes, as it were, its program. 
From the outset, the prison was caught up in a 
series of accompanying mechanisms, whose purpose 
was apparently to correct it, but which seem to 
form part of its very functioning, so closely have 
they been bound up with its existence throughout 
its long history. 
<Foucault, 234) 
<Colin Barham commented helpfully upon this chapter. 
I am grateful for his help. ) 
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RETRIBUTION 
two wrongs . 
Introduction 
There are four major theories in the defence of 
punishment. 
is an evil. 
Three of the four concede that punishment 
These approaches refer to benefits of 
punishment in order to justify it. For deterrence 
theorists, the evil of punishment is justified because 
it prevents further offences. For rehabilitation 
advocates, punishment is harm, but it is part of a 
process through which the person is brought back to 
conformity. For social defence theorists, punishment 
is to be avoided, but the incapacitation of people who 
harm society cannot be achieved without some harm 
being committed against the offender. 
of liberty, while not necessarily 
inflict a harm upon the prisoner). 
<The deprivation 
punitive, does 
In each case, it is acknowledged that punishment 
is a harm <at least in the short-term). Each theory 
or justifies the harm done in a markedly explains 
different way. In practice, deterrent concepts fade 
rehabilitation ideals into social defence ones or 
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buttress arguments for deterrence. 
dJ:'·ffer~nces are real. 
But the underlying 
Retribution, too, seeks 
Retribution does not concede, 
to defend punishment. 
however, that punishment 
is an evil. It is not founded upon a category of 
agreed benefits. Retribution means the return of harm 
to one who has committed some wrong. For most 
advocates of retribution, punishment is self-
justifying: there is no need to appeal to beneficial 
consequences or higher principles in order to defend 
punishment. Ret ri but ion, therefore, is a just i-
fication of punishment that must itself be defended. 
In my approach to the philosophy of punishment, I 
focus upon retribution. The other theories will enter 
the discussion only peripherally. They will also 
receive some attention in subsequent chapters, 
<especially Penal Anthropology). 
I focus upon retribution for two reasons: First, 
other theories are in some disrepute at the moment: 
rehabilitation, for example, has been dethroned as the 
raison d'i:?tre of prisons since the late 60s. 
Retribution is perhaps the most popular .justification 
of imprisonment at this time. <I say perhaps, not 
because it may be that social defence or deterrence 
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actually commands more assent, but because the defence 
of imprisonment at present is not based on any 
consistent philosophy. However, the current advocacy 
of imprisonment is more like retribution than it is 
like the others. ) 
The pacifist approach provides the second reason 
for my concentration upon retribution. Pacifism and 
retribution are more clearly opposed than, say, 
pacifism and rehabilitation. Indeed, I shall argue 
that the defence of punishment through retribution 
consistently parallels Just War theory. Here, a theme 
briefly exposed in History becomes more pronounced: 
criminal justice is a form of conflict. 
Retribution builds from the premise that the 
powers of the state include punishment <include the 
right to harm those who can be defined as offenders). 
Further, retribution makes clear the bounds of ethical 
behaviour toward the internal enemies of society. 
Two principles are common to retributive theories: 
A) The guilty ought to be punished; the innocent ought 
not to. be punished. 
B> Punishment is to be imposed in proportion to the 
gravity of the offence. 
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Further, punishment is not an effect of nature, but is 
performed by an authority empowered to inflict it. 
There are difficulties in finding a universally 
agreed definition of punishment, even in retributive 
terms. In a survey of advocates of retribution, one 
might find three or four distinct styles of approach. 
Though one shades into another, I believe that there 
is a clear progression of stages, from a narrow to a 
broad focus. The most narrow might be called act-
consequence; the second is analytical; the third, 
rules-retributio~ I use broad retribution to refer to 
the final form. 
Act-consequence retribution justifies punishment 
as the inevitable consequence of the wrongful act. In 
general, the act-consequence tradition views punish-
ment as automatic and mechanical. The harm incurred 
through punishment Ce. g. , the pain of confinement) is 
thought to follow wrongdoing as naturally as a broken 
ankle from a misguided jump from a roof. 
Some may argue that the punitive reflex is 
natural, or divinely ordained. Bishop Butler, for 
example, argued 
punishments just 
that society provides rewards and 
as nature does. Others may take the 
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view that punishment is the effect, and the wrong is 
the cause. 
Finally, act-consequence thinking holds that 
wrongdoing is personally reflexive: to wrong you is 
to harm myself. To choose to commit wrong is to 
pollute one's moral integrity. As two pints of beer 
may reduce one's resistance to the third, so each 
discrete 
significant 
We might 
decision 
path, 
refer 
inclines 
either for 
to this 
one in a morally 
righteousness or evil. 
as the existentialist 
component, since the argument is based on our supposed 
power to author our very selves by the decisions we 
make. 
Act-consequence thinking presents punishment as 
automatic, or binds those in authority by an 
inescapable duty to punish, as 
bear no responsibility for 
though those who punish 
the harm they inflict. 
Arguments for punishment that appeal solely to desert, 
that view the products of punishment as superfluous, 
also reflect act-consequence theory. 
There are two problems with the act-consequence 
approach: 
doing, if 
upon us, 
1) If there is a boomerang effect of wrong-
in causing harm, harmful effects rebound 
then there is no sense in which the process 
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has an end. 1 2) The parallels with nature are 
stretched, such that it would appear that nature 
already applies ample negative effects to wrongful 
deeds. Our own punishment would seem to be super-
fluous. Indeed, the argument tends to omit the role 
of punisher, as though the punishment simply happens. 
The latter weakness draws from those who would 
justify punishment a slightly broader perspective. 
The analytic style captures the retributive spirit in 
definitions of punishment. Although it is made clear 
that someone does the punishing, the duty to punish is 
unavoidable. It is intrinsic to the concept of rules 
that breaches will be punished. In Britain, the 
analytic approach is typified by J.D. Mabbott, whose 
1939 article "Punishment" inspired a resurgence of 
interest in retribution. 
The analytic approach leads directly to a third 
style of retribution, based upon the performance of 
rules in maintaining a framework of meaning for 
Retribution as a 'boomerang' was introduced 
to me by Tadeusz Grygier, in conversation. 
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actions. 
reference 
To see actions as right or wrong by 
to rules is 
mode of ethics. Here, 
typical of the 
the arguments 
deontological 
for punishment 
are couched in terms of rights, 
punishment for transgressions. 
analytical with the deontological, 
any society needs rules; rules 
sanctions against wrongdoing. 
duties, laws and 
To combine the 
we might say that 
logically entail 
A rule-retributive approach to punishment obliges 
authorities in society to inflict harm on wrongdoers 
in order to vindicate the rules. Whether a society is 
repressive or liberal, there will be acts that lie 
outside the limits of acceptable behaviour. Rules 
mark such a behavioural boundary. Punishments, then, 
are thought to defend the boundary by applying 
negative consequences to those who offend. 
The rule-retributive approach makes it clear that 
punishment is a deliberate action <not a reflex, as in 
the act-consequence school). Further, it raises the 
concrete objective of denouncing certain acts <which I 
shall consider below). Finally, rule-retribution puts 
forward the claim that a just system of laws should 
have the effect of rewarding the good, and making the 
evil suffer. However, from this sketch, rules-
retribution does not appear to confront the problem of 
unjust rules, or wrongful punishment. 
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A broader approach includes an understanding of 
justice that goes beyond rules. The focus is upon the 
harm done more than the law-breaking itself. A key 
factor is reciprocity. Society provides us with 
certain benefits, in exchange for which we ought to 
obey the laws. We have a duty to participate as 
responsible citizens, but further, we ought not to 
harm others. Any offence (it is argued) creates an 
imbalance in the community. The 'ripples' include 
physical effects, implications for law, and personal 
consequences - psychological, economic, moral, etc. 
Like the first school, broad retributivists see 
that criminal justice focuses upon acts and their 
consequences. Like the second, they see that laws 
<rules, too) require social manifestations in order to 
hold their meaning. Beyond these points, however, 
broad retribution draws attention to harms that must 
be redressed, to tensions between law and morality, to 
the effectiveness of punishments. 
Here punishment is justified primarily by appeal 
to reciprocity: insofar as society has been fair to 
the innocent and guilty alike, its response to the 
offender must be punitive. Punishment is justified 
because society has been fair to the offender and 
because the offender has been unfair to society. But 
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this means that retributive justice slides into 
distributive justice. If, hypothetically, a society 
were markedly unjust in its distribution of benefits, 
and if this contributed to an increase in criminal 
behaviour, then that society would not be just in 
responding with more punishment. 
Talk of benefits and distributive justice seems to 
have diverted us from retribution. In general, 
advocates of retribution see punishment as self-
justifying, or as an inevitable result of the 
offenders' wrongdoing. Few would go so far as to say 
that punishment should not do any one any good. 2 
However, justifications of punishment that are founded 
upon its benefits are utilitarian in nature. The 
consistent advocate of retribution supports 
punishment, not because it 'works', but because 
justice would seem to demand recompense. 
It is here that the central, distinguishing aim of 
retribution becomes manifest. The utilitarian is 
2 Ernest van den Haag quotes a judge who states that retri-
bution is " ... the doctrine of legal revenge, or 
punishment merely for the sake of punishment. " 
<van den Haag, 10> 
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interested in results for society. 
intended to change the offender. 
Rehabilitation is 
But the goal of 
retribution is justice. At the simplest level, this 
means returning blow for blow. At the level of rules, 
it means the maintenance of a system of laws to define 
boundaries of accepta_ble behaviour by harming those 
who would transgress them. At the broadest level, 
this entails a comparative approach to just ice, 
including d-istributive, civil and criminal aspects; it 
encompasses the harms done to victims, to society at 
large and to the offender. 
These different retributive approaches are more 
like concentric circles than distinct types. 
have hinted, the rule-retributive approach 
encompass the act-consequence style, and 
retribution includes insights from each of 
As I 
will 
broad 
the 
narrower ones. No philosopher stands completely 
within any one style, particularly those who advocate 
broad retribution. 
Immanuel Kant, for example, opposed the tendency 
to defend punishment by its utility, arguing that the 
only justification for punishment is desert or guilt. 
He implies that the harm of punishment is actually 
self-inflicted. But Kant does not limit himself to an 
act-consequence perspective. He draws a distinction 
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between the natural punishments of wrongdoing <e. g., 
the existential component I spoke of) and juridical 
punishment. 
Punishment is a physical evil which, though it be 
not connected with moral evil as a natural 
consequence, ought to be connected with it as a 
consequence by the principles of a moral 
legislation. 
<Kant, cited in Moberly, 218) 
Kant sets his theory of punishment within social 
contract theory. Punishment is seen as a duty to 
one's descendants. The society punishes wrongdoing, 
"so that the bloodguil t thereof will not be fixed on 
the people because they failed to insist on carrying 
out the punishment" <Cited in Murphy, 82) 
A significant difference between the approaches is 
their setting in time. Act-consequence is purely 
retrospective, attending to the action in the past 
which merits punishment. The 'consequence' of pain 
follows the offence, but there is no concern for the 
consequence of the punishment. Justification stops 
with the harm due the offender. Rule-retribution 
includes the past, but adds a present concern for the 
maintenance of the authority of law. This synchronous 
perspective measures the offence by reference to 
present law. 
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Broad retribution seems to me to concentrate upon 
a future sense of justice. Again, 
past harm as well as the present 
one has offended. But the 
it encompasses the 
codes against which 
language of broad 
retribution is of an equilibrium which the offence has 
disturbed, and of the harmony that punishment might 
help to restore. 
These differences have direct bearing on the 
justification of punishment. Arguments that defend 
punishment within the narrow time span of an act of 
wrongdoing and a reflexive penalty ignore the effects 
of punishment (e. g. , in maintaining standards of 
behaviour). Rule-retributive argument, which may 
include a limit on the duration of punishments, does 
not aim t award a future just ice. 
is to defend the status qu~ 
Rather, the intent 
According to broad retribution, punishment is part 
of a process. An offence disturbs a relatively 
settled situation. It is met with punishment, which 
serves as an expiation. Out of the series of wrongful 
act, punishment and expiation emerges reconciliation 
or the restoration of justice. 
-14.2-
retribution 
A fuller understanding of retribution can be 
gained through an exploration of various arguments 
that have been offered in its defence. I shall 
concentrate upon the concept of desert. In a 
subsequent 
the case 
section, I shall examine other aspects of 
for retribution, with special reference to 
the underlying experiences of crime to which they 
refer. In a final section, I hope to draw out the 
implications of retribution for a distinctive response 
to offences. 
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E11ery birth a crime, every sentence life. 
--Basil Bunting 
Punishment can be seen as a method of correct ion 
or guidance; as a mark of standards Ct o gauge one' s 
performance); as sanctions or signs marking a 
behavioural boundary; as a framework for force or 
coercion; a means of maintaining domination; a 
means of exclusion; a rationalisation of vengeance. 
The moral continuum should be obvious: few would deny 
the desirability of correction; few would espouse the 
need for revenge. 
Given this range of meaning, moral questions 
surrounding the practice of punishment become non-
sensical. The temptation is to slip into relativism: 
punishment is correction or the maintenance of 
standards <laudable functions) according to the 
punishing authority. Punishment is oppression and 
retaliation through the eyes of the person(s) being 
punished. 
Beneath the apparent relativism, though, are 
logical problems that require attention. There is 
clearly a contradiction, and not just a tension, 
between the retrospective mechanism of act-consequence 
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punishment, and the broad retributive interest in 
expiation and reconciliation. Indeed, from the act-
consequence perspective, to justify a punishment by 
its power of reconciliation would not be properly 
retributive at all. Stripped of wider benefits, 
punishment is difficult to separate from though, 
revenge. Given the broad retribution objective of a 
renewed equilibrium, of justice as a 'clean slate', 
punishment seems much like correction or cure. 
If punishment can be as laudable as correction and 
as deplorable as revenge; if retribution can be a 
means to achieve reconciliation or a mechanism that 
returns suffering for wrongdoing, then both terms have 
been debased, and should be discarded. I believe that 
the concept of retribution can be clarified, but this 
requires a rigorous attention to the centre of the 
concept that strips away all hybrids and glosses. 
Retribution is the return of harm for wrongdoing. 
Thus, the keystone of the theory is the concept of 
desert. Retribution can be justified only if we can 
demonstrate that wrongdoers deserve to suffer as a 
result of their offence. We cannot support the 
concept of desert if we cannot prove that it differs 
from vengeance. 
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'Vengeance', like 'saint', is a morally textured 
term. The word carries negative moral force. When we 
try to make clear what vengeance is in order to 
distinguish retribution from vengeance we find 
aspects shared with punishment. For instance, both 
vengeance and punishment are responses to some 
previous wrong. Likewise, vengeance and punishment 
both harm persons. 
It might be argued that vengeance harms 
arbitrarilyi that, for example, a survivor might kill 
the sibling of her brother's murderer if circumstances 
preclude her reaching the guilty person. But 
punishment is nowhere so focused that it spares all 
but the guilty. In theory, perhaps, punishment could 
be applied to one person alone, but <since this is 
impossible in life) this aspect of the theory is 
1 rrelevant. In the practice of punishment, harm is 
widespread. 3 
From this we might draw a criterion by which to evaluate 
punishments: those penalties are most just that focus the 
harm on the offenderj the more widespread the harm of the 
penalty, the more crude and unjust, the form of punishment. 
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This fact casts doubt upon a second claim based on 
the arbitrary nature of vengeance, i. e. , that 
vengeance exacts a penalty based on passion. Punish-
ment, it is argued, is measured with reference to the 
gravity of the original harm. 'Montero's Aim' refers 
to the fact that people do pursue retaliation. Thus, 
it is argued, punishment is inflicted by some 
authority in order to deny the victim any right to 
private retribution. 
There are two points that require analysis here. 
The first is that punishment is measured, 
proportionate to the offence whereas vengeance is 
arbitrary, based on the person's feelings. <This 
arbitrariness can vary from the victim who desires no 
redress to one who kills out of some petty grievance.) 
The second point is that there is a morally decisive 
difference between so-called private retaliation and 
public- or civic-administered punishment. 
The first claim, then, is that punishment is 
measured and vengeance is not. In practice, however, 
the effects of punishment are not so controllable. We 
cannot ensure that the harm of punishment affects only 
the guilty party. We cannot even calibrate the harm 
to the one person <assuming it were possible to find 
one solely guilty party whose pains of punishment will 
not affect others. ) Subjective 
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sexuality, gender, occupation, education, etc. Cto 
borrow from Jeremy Bentham's 'hedonic calculus', to 
the opposite effect) these and other variables 
determining the extent of harm eliminate any claim to 
proportionality in punishment. 
Thus, the key difference between vengeance and 
punishment is evidently that the latter is inflicted 
by an authority. 4 We might note in passing that the 
act-consequence style is ruled out, as we must appeal 
to a theory of state-craft or authority to distinguish 
punishment from vengeance. Broader retributive 
thought - either rule-retribution or broad retribution 
- is needed in order to establish punishment on moral 
grounds. 
Even so, however, it is difficult to prove that 
desert, as a part of a wider scheme, is not a 
retaliatory concept. Despite differences between the 
demands of personal ethics and state-craft, it is 
inconsistent to claim that one individual is wrong for 
Justifying force by the fact that it is the state that 
inflicts it is one clear parallel to Just War theory, 
which I shall explore below. 
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harming another, yet the state is obligated to inflict 
harm upon persons. Hence, that harm must be justified 
by the way in which it adheres to a full political 
theory. 
Rules retribution is the style of retributive 
punishment most appropriate to an abstract theory of 
statehood. From this perspective, any legal system 
requires a concept of desert to maintain a consistent 
theory of government. Law violators are punished, 
not because of harm done, but simply because they have 
broken the law <whether or not that law is just). 
One perspective, 6 drawn from a theory of civil 
government, holds that of fenders earn punishment by 
acting in a way that infringes others' rights. Thus, 
to attack the rights of another person constitutes the 
surrender of the right not to be punished. 
This seemingly sensible relation is nowhere 
consistently practiced. A judge who violates a 
defendant's right to a fair trial is not thereby 
My discussion of defences of desert through the place of 
punishment in theories of civil government is drawn in part 
fro~ Richard W. Burgh, "Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?" 
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deprived of that right. If one can violate another's 
rights without surrendering rights, then the abuse of 
another's rights is not sufficient to establish 
desert. 
Perhaps what is meant is that each citizen has a 
right to gain the benefits of living in a just 
society. By acting unjustly, the offender creates an 
imbalance in satisfactions. But this line of 
argument, based on distribution of benefits, leads too 
easily to the opposite conclusion. A glance at the 
disproportionate representation of the poor, the 
unemployed, racial minorities, the under-educated in 
the prison population demonstrates that those being 
punished have received a less-than-average share of 
society's benefits. The composition of the prison 
population demonstrates that justice itself 
benefit of society that is unequally distributed. 
Given our societies as they are, the general 
principle that individuals ought to be equal in 
satisfactions would direct us in at least a great 
many cases to the conclusion that we ought not to 
punish offenders. 
<Honderich, 26) 
is a 
Denunciation theory suggests that punishment is 
the result of the offenders' choices. In choosing to 
break the rules, offenders have surrendered their 
right not to be punished. H.L.A. Hart writes: 
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Consider the law . as a choosing system, in 
which individuals can find out, in general terms 
at least, the costs they have to pay if they act 
in certain ways. 
<Cited in Burgh, 199) 
retribution 
Richard Burgh makes two points in rebut tal. 
First, Hart has not established that a wrong choice 
entails the loss of the right not to be punished. 
Certainly, no one would choose <rationally) to be 
punished. Burgh argues <second) that justice requires 
that the offender would have had equal opportunity to 
choose the laws to which s/he must be obedient. "In 
the world of practical politics," Burgh declares, 
11 such a choice is impossible." <Burgh, 201) 
One of the keystones in theories of civil 
government that supports desert is the need for self-
restraint. In breaking the laws, offenders have 
usurped a 1 i bert y beyond any mat erial gains of the 
of fence. Responsible citizens (in theory) allow 
restrictions on their liberty voluntarily, through 
self-restraint. The offender has chosen not to 
exercise self-restraint. 
To restore equilibrium, it would seem just for the 
authority to deprive offenders of their liberty. 
Jeffrie G. Murphy presents a Kant-inspired argument 
along these lines. Richard Burgh argues against it. 
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Ultimately, I think that Burgh's rebuttal falls short, 
and that Murphy himself provides a cogent counter-
argument. 
Jeffrie Murphy places Kant's defence of punishment 
within a more general theory of social obligation. 
Central to civil society is the attitude of 
reciprocit~ Law maintains social order by minimising 
the advantages to be gained by renouncing self-
restraint. Further, the offender receives the full 
benefits of the civil government insofar as others 
restrain themselves; therefore, offenders have no 
cause for complaint if sanctions are applied against 
their own wrongdoing. For Murphy, the state's 
authority to punish is established by reciprocity in a 
society toward which offenders have been unfair. 
Burgh highlights a weakness of the argument from 
self-restraint. If the reason we deserve punishment 
is that we have chosen to forego self-restraint, then 
the severity of punishment must be linked to one's 
inclination to commit an offence. The penalty must be 
proportioned to the inclination to commit a particular 
offence, and not to the gravity of harm. Otherwise, 
punishment is arbitrary because it is based on 
something other than desert; otherwise, the state does 
not punish the renunciation of self-restraint. 
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Burgh points out that the inclination to 
underestimate one's earnings is far greater than the 
inclination to murder. Citizens who declare their 
earnings honestly exercise great self-restraint. The 
self-restraint required to prevent citizens from 
committing murder is relatively low. Thus, to base 
desert upon self-restraint may show one way in which 
offenders deserve punishment, but it does so at too 
high a price. Tax evasion would need to be punished 
more severely than murder. 
Burgh's 
desert, but 
argument might 
his attack 
eliminate the 
is incomplete. 
basis of 
Though 
retribution according to inclination creates monstrous 
implications for proportionality, it still allows a 
dichotomy between the innocent and guilty. The claim 
that the innocent exercise perfect self-control is 
suspect, and must be explored critically. 
Jeffrie Murphy supplies such an argument. He 
directs searching 
self-restraint of 
he follows Kant. 
<and concrete) questions to 
• law-abiding citizens'. Here, 
While, in his Rechtsl ehre, Kant 
the 
too, 
was 
adamant in support of retribution, his stringency is 
moderated by humility in Religion Within the Limits of 
Reason Alone. 
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[Persons] may even picture themselves as meri-
torious, feeling themselves guilty of no such 
offences as they see others burdened with; nor do 
they even inquire whether good luck should not 
have the credit, [or if) they would not have 
practiced similar vices, had not inability, 
temperament, training, and circumstance of time 
and place which serve to tempt one <matters which 
are not imputable), kept them out of the way of 
those vices. 
<Cited in Murphy, 88) 
r·etribution 
Kant • s point is not so much that no one deserves 
punishment but that no one is sufficiently righteous 
that they hold the right to punish. Murphy's analysis 
of reciprocity suggests that an ideally just society 
has the moral right to inflict punishment. In such a 
society, the burdens of self-restraint would be 
distributed equally. The perfect self-restraint of 
each citizen would justify punishment but there would 
be no one to punish. 
There are deeper problems with the concept of 
desert. At this point, however, it is clear .that the 
concept has failed to find compelling support in a 
theory of statehood. Neither from an act-consequence 
approach nor from rules-retribution can we draw a 
convincing distinction between retribution based on 
desert and vengeance. 
The language of desert closely parallels a very 
different ethical argument. John Locke compared 
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felons to enemy invaders, and saw law-breaking as a 
declaration of war. 
theory of government 
punishment. 
Given these presuppositions, his 
predictably provides for capital 
Theories of punishment based on desert describe 
the conditions under which we are justified in harming 
the internal enemies of society. Just War theory 
outlines the criteria to be met in defence of deci-
sions to kill the external enemies. The similarities 
between the two help to illustrate pacifist 
reservations about retributive punishment. 
Both theories set out a framework to bring order 
to the harm inflicted. That is, Just War theory, like· 
retributive 
damage that 
.j tist if ied by 
penal theory, striY~s to -~iAimise 
mi~ht bu· seen· as arbitrary. Harm 
imposing restrictions upon the uses 
harm. But subsequent links are the more profound. 
the 
is 
of 
In both cases, the authority must control the 
harm. Where punishment is meted out by a private 
party it is characterised as lynching, mob rule, 
vengeance. Where armed force is used by groups denied 
sovereignty, it is revolution or terrorism. But where 
the state takes control - where presidents or princes 
declare war, where judges pass sentence - the harm is 
thereby assumed to be legitimate. 
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A fundamental element 
proportion, 
gravity of 
where justified 
the offence. In 
of 
harm 
war, 
r-etr-ibution 
retribution is 
the is gauged by 
the harm must be 
measured against the potential gains in order to win 
support. Each theory attempts to set a limit to the 
degree of suffering one party can inflict before its 
action is deemed wrong. In each case, we complacently 
quantify the harm: the numbers killed in battle, the 
years served in prison. In each case, we bracket off 
as irrelevant those harms that detract from our 
theories: the unintended lessons of violence, the 
injustices maintained by the state that cause war and 
crime, our project ion of evil onto others, our lack of 
attention to other, less harmful approaches. 
A final parallel concerns the psychology 
underlying our justification of punishment. We punish 
and we go to war, • only as a last resort'. As an 
argument from expediency, this point hardly serves to 
establish war or punishment as morally valid; indeed, 
it acknowledges that they are evils. But beneath the 
argument from necessity is a more subtle implication. 
'Last resort' does not refer to two equal parties 
who have given equal attention to the resolution of a 
dispute. Rather, the phrase implies that the 
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punishing authority or the warring nation has done all 
that is possible to achieve justice without resort to 
force. In this light, 
predetermines the blame: 
the argument from 'last resort' 
it is the enemy <or offender) 
whose lack of response to the state's efforts causes 
the state to go to war <or punish). 
It is true that punishment is a sign of failure. 
A sentence 
tried. War 
is imposed after other means have been 
may be undertaken after negotiation and 
posturing have failed to bring results. But the 
of 'last resort' language is underlying assumption 
that the blame for the failure rests with the other 
party <enemy or offender). 
Here again, desert is the lynch-pin of justifi-
cations of state-violence. In the case of war, 
attempted justifications rule out the wilful 
destruction of civilians. Those who kill justly must 
recognise a categorical difference between the enemy 
and one's allies, but also between combatant and 
civilian enemies. 
is 
Punishment 
considered 
is judged by its targets, 
legitimate if those 
punishment have offended. 
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too, and it 
subjected to 
that 
Offenders, like our enemies in war, are envisioned 
as being categorically different from us . 
Images of both war and crime involve a process of 
'abstracting' ... the 'enemy'. 
<Gross, Knopp & Zehr, 7) 
retribution 
Tal<en together, 'last resort' and desert imply 
the state has nobly restrained itself from 
punishing an unrepentant offender. It is not meant to 
signify that the person's needs are greater than 
society is prepared to meet, or that the state places 
a higher priority on punitive responses than on 
healing or nurturing ones. There is a reason for this 
stress upon the righteousness of the state in the face 
of the offender's guilt, but it fails to justify 
punishment: 
Before human beings can bring themselves to 
participate in, or approve of, destructive actions 
against others, it is first necessary for them to 
lose sight of the very humanity of the 
people who will suffer as a consequence. 
<Gabriel Marcel, cited in Mackey, 46) 
In these ways, the symbolic weight of retribution 
draws attention to the conflicts inherent in criminal 
just ice. Retributive theory also relies upon less 
bellicose models. Notions of satisfaction, placation 
or annulment can unearth common goals of justice, even 
between retribution and pacifism. 
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In "Varieties of Retribution, " 6 John Cottingham 
usefully analyses arguments favouring punishment along 
retributive lines. He spotlights a common flaw. 
Philosophers use • retribution' to refer to disparate 
concepts. Cottingham lists nine different meanings: 
Repayment; Desert; 
fact ion; Fair Play; 
Denunciation. 
Penalty; Minimalism; Satis-
Placat ion; Annulment; and 
I shall restrict my comments to the major ones: 
repayment, desert, satisfaction, annulment and 
denunciation. 
A repayment model is suggested by such commonplace 
statements as 'the debt owed society' or 'paying the 
price for doing wrong' . Repayment is clearly not 
meant literally, since society maintains the offender 
during imprisonment. Repayment retribution assumes 
both that a wrongful act creates a debt, and that the 
debt can be cleared by suffering harm. But the 
G John Cottingham, "Varieties of Retribution," The 
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 29, 1979, pages 238-246. 
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allusion to contracts can be deceptive. To say that 
'he did wrong and is going to pay for it' suggests 
some fair bargain, like the purchase of goods. Yet 
the implication, that 'he' shall suffer because he did 
wrong, resembles retaliation more than commercial 
exchange. 
Desert, then, does not mean that an offender is 
obligated to make good the wrong; rather, it suggests 
that wrongdoing earns punishment just as goodness 
merits rewards. One could hardly be said to deserve 
harm simply because one had a debt to repay. 
Satisfaction is a key model for retributive views. 
It is held that punishment brings satisfaction to the 
viet im(s) of an offence. The claim for satisfaction 
can be, and is, extended to society, so that the state 
comes to claim satisfaction. Society can be the 
beneficiary, exacting satisfaction from the offender; 
but society can also lay claim to the rights of the 
victim, denying any victim the right to private 
satisfaction. <This is Montero's Aim.) Cottingham 
rightly observes that the latter aim is in fact 
utilitarian, since punishment is justified by its uses 
against private vengeance and the pain unrestrained 
retaliation might cause. 
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The theory of retribution propounded by G. W. F. 
Hegel concerns the annulment of the wrong. The 
offence creates a negative, which society must negate. 
The relation of annulment to retribution is uncertain. 
Cottingham argues that annulment is less retributive 
than it is a form of restitution, since it acts to 
restore the original authority of the law. It is fair 
to add that Hegel and his followers would reject 
Cottingham's point, defending the retributive aspects 
of annulment. 
Finally, Cottingham considers denunciation. 
Society responds to wrongdoing with punishment in 
order to denounce the act effectively. "The ultimate 
justification of any punishment is not that it is a 
deterrent, but that it is the emphatic denunciation by 
the community of a crime. " <Lord Denning, cited by 
Cottingham, 245) Here again, a model is int reduced 
which is not really retributive. The point justifies 
denunciation, the maintenance of social standards. 
The fact that such standards are essential does not 
serve to justify the return of harm for harm. 
Few of the models cited are retributive in the 
narrow sense of justifying retribution. Clearly, the 
most powerful tools for advocates of retribution are 
the images of repayment and desert. These, however, 
are not developed ethical theories; they are 
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metaphorical. Considered as such, the image of 
repayment may capture the essence of ret ri but ion, but 
it cannot provide the required ethical support. 
I have followed John Cottingham's discussion at 
length, in part because he surveys the wide range of 
retributive argument. His analysis is most helpful, 
though, because he illuminates the logical force of 
retributive images as models. 
A model cannot prove an ethical point, but it has 
two strengths in ethical discourse. First, the model 
can awaken an intuitive insight into values, pointing 
to agreed 1 deals. Second, any model is built upon 
inter-subjective experience. <Jesus as shepherd 
relies upon the perceived role of real shepherds; 
God's omnipotence rests its meaning upon our 
understanding of human powers. 7 ) 
Each model seeks to evoke our assent, or to reveal 
something of ethical value. The models of retribution 
7 For a more involved discussion of the use of models in 
this sense, see D. K. Edgar, The Moral Theology of Ian 
Ramsey, <M.A. Thesis, Durham, 1980), especially 11 Qual1fied 
Models". 
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begin with the familiar, concrete world of everyday 
experience, and provide a moral directive. In drawing 
attention to the functions of models I suggest that 
advocates of retribution make valuable points about 
the harms caused by offences. These can be discerned 
through an analysis of the models used. 
The notion of repayment has already been 
criticised for being paradoxical, since society pays 
for incarceration. While the immediate reference of 
repayment 
currency, 
would 
harm, 
seem to be contracts, 
significantly alters 
the specific 
the model. 
Repayment does not justify punishment by linking it to 
the benefits we receive from society, or by the 
assumptions of some sort of contract <whereby I 
promise to submit to punishment if I break the law). 
Repayment evokes two distinct images of exchange. 
The first is one of expiation, wherein offenders annul 
a wrong or compensate a loss through suffering the 
penalty. The second, where the currency is clearly 
harm, is straightforwardly the language of ret'alia-
tion. This is repayment in kind. When the retribu-
tive argument takes the first form, obligating the 
offender to 'make good', the goal is restoration, and 
it does little to justify retributive harms. In the 
latter case, the argument clearly is retributive, but 
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the link between retribution and retaliation is 
damaging. 
It is possible, however, that the advocate of 
retribution has been drawn to the punitive stance in 
the interest of compensating a loss, 1. e. of restoring 
a balance. If this is the case, then one might hope 
that language of repayment as expiation may draw out 
the advantages of a restorative approach. Resti-
tution, for example, provides some sense of repayment 
for harm done, but it does so in a non-ret ri but i ve 
style. 
below. ) 
<I shall explore this link in a final section, 
A second key model is that of satisfaction. For 
Cottingham, satisfaction is comprised of the victim's 
satisfaction at the offender's suffering and the 
state's authority to control satisfaction by eliminat-
ing private revenge. Cottingham's analysis, however, 
prejudices our view of satisfaction in two ways. 
First, there is certainly a vengeful tone in the right 
of a victim to •get even'. Second, Cottingham 
neglects the possibility that society would desire its 
own satisfaction. Certainly the relation of the state 
to satisfaction is more complex. 
Act-consequence retribution would restrict the 
effects upon the offender to harm. 
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satisfy a victim, it is simple retaliation. But to 
approach the model sympathetically we must recognise 
legitimate needs of victims. Among these are the hope 
that the harm does not recur, a need for compensation, 
a desire to make some sense of the event, and 
certainly the need to suffer no further in connection 
with the offence <1. e., to suffer neither from the 
offender nor from the state). 
The satisfaction model focuses upon the victims' 
subjective states. Criminal justice through the past 
two centuries has favoured satisfactions due the state 
at the expense of victims. Moreover, in shaping 
punishment to the demands of Montero's Aim, the 
state's influence has been to confine satisfaction to 
its punitive, retaliatory sense and to weaken its 
broader, restorative significance. 
Perhaps the most potent of the retributive models 
is annulment. For Hegel, retribution re-establishes 
the authority that had been attacked by the offence. 
Annulment is linked to denunciation, as the latter 
expresses society's. rejection of the wrongful act. 
Finally, annulment is basic to the 'boundary' model, 
whereby punishments establish and maintain the limits 
of acceptable behaviour. 
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The point of the boundary model 
who would do without punishment. It 
challenges those 
is difficult to 
conceive of ways to draw boundaries of acceptable 
behaviour without recourse to negative consequences 
for transgressions. Here again, there is a moral 
scale: 
coercion 
the mere existence of rules carries latent 
<yet rules may be sufficient to ensure 
behaviour); some acceptable 
potential offenders that 
disapproval 
they are 
alerts 
nearing the 
boundaries; when disapproval is ineffective, 
punishment comes into play. Without negative support 
for rules, it is argued, people will not be deterred, 
and anarchy will result. 
Perhaps these models are intended to demonstrate 
that punishments describe the behavioural 
If so, then the purpose is educative 
boundary. 
and the 
justification would rest upon rehabilitation theory. 
On the other hand, if the offender's pain is used to 
admonish others, then the model is part of deterrence. 
The specific category may seem trivial, but my 
point is that these aims might be met without 
ret ri but ion. Further, the deterrent aim, using an 
offender's pain as an example for others, fails to 
treat the offender as an end <a principle espoused by 
retribution 
acknowledges 
theory). 
that 
Finally, 
punishment 
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is 
deterrence theory 
an evil; hence, 
retrib-t->tion 
deterrence would minimise out~ use of p1.~nishments to 
vindicate boundarieti-. Retribution, in contrast, sets 
punishment in a positive light, and may tempt us to 
expand our use of punishment in order to gain social 
order. 
Models are multi-faceted. Retributive argument, 
on the whole, attends to the beneficial symbolic force 
of punishment. Yet, punishment carries unintended, 
harmful associations. Annulment-denunciation models 
focus on the benefit of vindicating the authority of 
law. In doing so, however, they ignore the mixed 
messages of punishment. 
The tacit approbation given to violence as 
expressed by the punishments meted out by the 
courts . [serve], for the criminal minority, 
to validate violence on their part. Thus there is 
a circular! t y in the pat tern of violence, with 
judicial violence being a part of the cause of the 
violence it seeks to contain. 
<QSRE Report, 6, L. ) 
To characterise boundary-s~tting as basically 
deterrent is misleading. As I have stated, a 
deterrence-based approach would minimise the use of 
punishment; a retributive plan would expand punish-
ment to maintain social order. But there is a more 
basic point, and this finds the core of each argument. 
Deterrence depends upon an identification between 
the citizen and the person being punished. 
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Retribution, with its insistence upon guilt, 
emphasises the categorical difference between offender 
and citizen. Clearly, at the scaffold we are to 
identify with the power of the state Cfor retribution 
to have legitimacy); we are to identify with the fate 
of the convict (for deterrence to work). 
The psychological complexity of identification 
should not deflect us from a clear implication of 
retribution. Retribution promulgates the view that 
limits are maintained not just by force, 
harm. In so doing, it legitimates 
<communally, as a society) feel 
but by actual 
harm. If we 
vindicated in 
returning harm for harm, then we are more likely to 
practice retribution privately. At the very least, 
the view that crossing a boundary subjects one to a 
loss of status would exacerbate social divisions by 
establishing a sense of us and them 
There are conflicts between the models of retri-
but ion. The satisfaction due a victim may constitute 
an injustice according to the annulment model, or by 
fair play. Conflict between the models refers to the 
conflicting interests after an offence; it should not 
be taken as mere inconsistency in the argument for 
retribution. It does suggest, though, that the 
resolution of hardships raised by offences is never so 
simple as the retributive reflex of harm for harm. 
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We have seen that models of retribution disclose 
aspects of the aftermath of offences that require 
at tent ion. For instance, actions encourage imitation, 
whether those acts be law-breaking, or retribution by 
the state. Models such as repayment or satisfaction 
cover a broad range of experience, while others are 
limited. One can see the point of many of the models 
without being led to embrace a retributive approach to 
punishment. 
The survey of models provides another lesson. We 
have seen that models of retribution contain two 
sides, and that these are not necessarily 
complementary. In satisfaction, for instance, there 
are retaliatory goals of returning harm for harm, and 
there are restorative goals of assuring the victim of 
compensation and future security. In annulment, the 
goal of dividing trespassers from the innocent 
actually threatens social cohesion, while the denun-
ciation of wrongful acts, defending the integrity of 
the boundaries, is essential to a healthy community. 
In order to explore these tensions in retribution, 
I shall introduce a 
that may include 
model of 
retributive 
responding to offences 
elements, but which 
resolutely minimises these in service to the higher 
goal of restoration. 
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I have taken three separate approaches to explore 
the concept of ret ri but ion. In the first sect ion, I 
described different styles of argument. The narrow 
act-consequence approach concentrates upon the offence 
itself and marks the agent out for punishment on the 
sole criterion of guilt. The rules-retributive school 
is broader. Advocates include those who claim that 
punishment is implied in the existence of rulesj 
other rule-retributive thinkers take care to locate 
punishment within a theory of 
third approach which I 
law (boundaries). 
have labelled 
The 
broad 
retribution - is clearly open to mixing benefits of 
retribution with rehabilitation or deterrence. This 
approach is also open to defending punishment by 
appeal to a combination of benefits. 
In the second section, I studied the central 
concept of desert in depth. Setting the concept 
within a theory of civil government has not 
established the moral validity of desert, where desert 
means that the state has the right to inflict harm on 
one who has done wrong. More important, however, the 
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establishment of desert in a theory of government was 
crucial to marking a distinct ion between desert and 
simple vengeance. 
Problems in securing this distinction illuminate 
an ambivalence within the idea of retribution. 
Retributive argument is most lucid when it is most 
like vengeance. What I have called broad retribution 
exhibits a determination to resolve the conflicts that 
surround offences, and hence wins wide moral support. 
For these thinkers retribution seems to have merely 
instrumental value in the cause of justice. Broad 
retribution also conflicts with the more 
characteristic aspects of retribution (e. g., it may 
actually oppose the practice of punishment by an 
unjust state.) 
In view of the confusion, I have suggested that 
retribution is usefully restricted to its sense of 
harm for harm. This has the effect of equating 
retribution with <or limiting it to) the theory's more 
vindictive aspects. It also raises the possibility 
that it is more accurate to see broad retribution as a 
transitional theory, between retributive justice 
<based on ret ali at ion) and restorative justice <based 
on resolutions of conflict). 
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This, however, is not the end of retribution. The 
retaliatory elements in the theory mean that 
punishment cannot be defended by retribution alone. 
But this failure should not obscure the value of 
retributive thought for shaping our response to law-
breaking behaviour. The models of ret ri but ion have 
cont ri but ed to our understanding of the aftermath of 
offences by symbolising the wounds that need to be 
healed. The benefits that retributive theory holds 
for restorative justice become clear when we 
demonstrate the transitional character of the former 
approach. 
One way of marking a change of models is to find 
the vestiges of the old in the assumptions of the new. 
J.P. Day has compared restitution and retribution. e 
He outlines Hegel• s argument, according to which two 
conditions just 1 fy punishment: A) It must right a 
wrong, annul a bad precedent; B) It may also serve to 
undo damage done by an offender. 
e J.P. Day, "Retributive Punishment, n Mind, vol. 87, 1978, 
pages 498-516. 
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Day draws our attention to the second function. 
He argues that any restitution to the victim by the 
offender, exacted by some authority, is retributive. 
In Day's view, restitution deprives the offender of 
some good, and to deprive someone of a good is to 
inflict harm. 
Restitution has the benefit of relating the 
'coinage' directly to the victim of the offence. It 
is clearly tied to a broad (i.e., non-vindictive) 
understanding of satisfaction. 
restitution is significant 
Yet Day's analysis of 
precisely because he 
develops it within the model of annulment. Day argues 
that the infliction of punishment refers not merely to 
a past event but to a desired future as well. The aim 
is to restore a balance of justice through retri-
but ion. Day argues that only the full interaction of 
offence-punishment-annulment merits serious consider-
ation as a retributive position. 
Restitution, which meets the harm done, can be 
self-initiated by offenders or imposed upon them. 
When the offender is made to compensate a victim by 
some authority, then, Day argues, the situation neces-
sarily includes retribution. Day defines retributive 
punishment as an interaction wherein the legal 
authority requires an offender to give back a good (or 
equivalent) which s/he has taken from a victim. 
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Day argues 
retributive, is 
that the deprivation of a good is 
a harm inflicted upon an offender. 
The procedure is not a reflexive mechanism of harm, 
however, for the punitive action is complex. 1) There 
is restitution;· the authority makes the offender make 
good the harm done to the victim; and 2) the 
authority thereby gives the offender a harm since (1) 
requires a deprivation of some good from the offender. 
Day's point is not that by compensating the victim 
restitution fulfils the demand that the offender be 
harmed. Nor is he saying that offenders have caused 
the harm inflicted upon them by the state. The point 
of Day's thesis is that <2> is required in order to 
achieve (1), and that (1) is the annulment of the 
offence. That is, 
the offender must 
to annul the harm is the point, and 
be punished <must be deprived of 
goods) in order to undo the harm. 
Day goes further to claim that the annulment (1) 
is just only if the benefit to the victim outweighs 
the deprivation of the offender. In other words, 
justice demands that the good in the restitution 
outweighs the harm of the retribution. 
Day adds three derivative duties required of the 
state: 1. The state must make the offender provide 
restitution to the value <taken) or to its equivalent. 
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Day cites civil law as an example to follow in cases 
of physical injury or other harms that are difficult 
to quantify; ii. The state has the duty to make up 
any deficiency in the offender's repayment; iii. The 
state must induce the offender to discharge the moral 
obligations incurred toward the victim(s). The duties 
of the state are correlated to the rights of victims. 
Day has succeeded in bringing together retributive 
and restitutive elements. Further, as he himself 
states, he has made clear that punishment is 
ultimately justified 
harm. Day has also 
by its facility for undoing a 
focused our attention upon the 
persons harmed by offences. His thesis has the 
remarkable attribute of bringing the justification of 
punishment back to the legitimate claims of victims. 
There are harsh realities that undermine Day's 
case. For instance, restitutive settlements can be 
impractical where the offender is unemployed. When 
jobs are scarce, providing offenders with jobs so that 
they can pay restitution sounds a bit like rewarding 
the guilty. Then, too, Day's scheme seems to depend 
excessively upon the victim's subjective state. The 
emotional trauma of a loss of £50 may be greater for a 
wealthy victim than a poor one, despite the fact that 
the material loss would be greater for the latter 
viet im. 
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More basic criticisms would come from the rules-
retribution school. 
functions primarily to 
the harm is secondary. 
In Hegel's view, 
right the wrong, 
Day certainly 
punishment 
and meeting 
reverses the 
priorities. In Day's scheme, laws are made to help 
people interact; people are not made to serve laws. 
Hegel's annulment is intended to preserve the 
authority of the state <with residual benefits for 
persons). Day's thesis goes to the heart of offences, 
as harm between persons, and is intended to resolve 
conflicts by meeting the harms to persons. Day makes 
the victim(s) the proper focus of a just response, and 
he does so in a way that honours the offender's 
capacity to participate in our positive response to 
the harms. 
A second criticism is more complex. It is claimed 
that retribution treats the offender as responsible by 
making wrongdoers accountable for their actions. 
While Day's arrangement does require that offenders 
amend the harm, it does not require them to admit 
their gui 1 t. According to the advocate of retri-
bution, restitution must then fail to reach to the 
heart of personal responsibility. 
As we have seen, the logic of retribution does not 
address the offender's ability to repair the damage 
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done: retributive punishment is retrospective, and 
understands accountability in terms of liability to 
punishment. Within this rather limited understanding 
of responsibility, one can see that restitution fails 
to inflict the right kind of pain on offenders. The 
pain inflicted in restitution is to undo the wrong; 
the point of the harm in retribution is to hurt the 
offender. Here again, however, the retributive 'gain' 
is indistinguishable from vengeance. 9 
The restitutive response to offences, as described 
by J.P. Day, does include elements which are clearly 
retributive. For instance, the harm that follows an 
offence falls upon the offender. There is 
proportionality, in that the compensation is 
determined according to the degree of harm inflicted 
upon the victim(s). Yet, as Day makes explicit, the 
objective of the response is restorative. He mal<es it 
clear that harm to the offender is just, but only to 
the extent required to meet the harms of the offence 
itself. In short, Day has stripped retribution of its 
retaliatory dimensions. 
I shall explore the complex area of personal respon-
sibility in depth below, Moral Responsibility; cf. 
Anthropology. 
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Such a form of 'retribution' will not satisfy 
rules-retribution advocates, for whom harm to the 
offender is primary. If, however, the ultimate goal 
of criminal justice is a resolution of the conflict at 
the heart of the offence, Day's restitution is far 
preferable 
retribution. 
to 
Here again; 
the more retaliatory 
the term 'retribution' 
f Or.'rilS of 
has become 
amtiiguous. To 
satisfy those 
remove the vengeful tints does not 
advocates of retribution who place 
emphasis on the need to harm offenders. However, it 
is just that aspect, retaliation, that discredits 
retribution. Those dimensions of what I have called 
'broad retribution' clearly accord with the 
restitutive response. 
There is a model for responding to offences that 
focuses on the benefits of restitution, focuses on the 
victims' needs and holds offenders responsible for 
making good the harm done. Restorative justice 
acknowledges that we can do no better than to 
approximate justice, and argues that the response to 
any offence should be one of healing and attention to 
the needs of both parties involved. The goal of 
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restorative justice is to bring harmony, a resolution, 
out of the discord. The offence itself is symbolic of 
that discord, but it is also a product of it, and a 
cause of its continuance. 
The concept of rest or at i ve just ice, clearly drawn 
from a peacemaking approach, is that harm does cause 
harm (as the act-consequence school argues), but that 
further harm cannot put an end to the cycle. It is 
difficult to imagine some form of harm that would 
reverse the cycle. The advocate of retribution has 
defended punishment as automatic, a response that 
follows from the offenders' wrongdoing. But there is 
no sense in which the retributive response can claim 
to stop the 'boomerang' of harm. 
There are at least two ways in which retribution 
furthers the harm: the damage is both symbolic and 
material. 
symbolising 
First, as I 
the propriety 
have argued above, in 
of inflicting harm on 
wrongdoers, the state invites the identification, and 
hence the imitation, of citizens. It may be argued -
as does Walter Moberly that the point is to mirror 
the harm to the offenders to teach them sensitivity to 
the pain they cause. But it is not only prisoners who 
get the message wrong, and learn unintended lessons. 
The institution of punishment teaches: that force 
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determines who's right, that people whose behaviour 
differs from •ours' should be excluded, that justice 
is the return of harm for harm. 
It is the second category which is the theme of 
this thesis. Retribution suffers from its retro-
spective stance. To the extent that the theory does 
look forward, it is incapable of recognising the long-
term harms of punishment. The abstract quality of the 
argument makes it possible to believe that an offender 
might be helped by suffering harm or less likely to 
re-offend out of fear of further punishment. <These 
are, of course, rehabilitation and deterrence in 
retributive-hybrid form. ) In strictly retributive 
terms, however, arguments for punishment look forward 
only as far as the satisfaction of the victim (more, 
the state) through the suffering of the offender. 
In a pacifist light, retributive harm does not 
bring restoration. Indeed, retribution inflicts harm 
without regard to the broad consequences <to those 
connected with the •guilty') and certainly without 
thought of the long-term harm to those who are 
subjected to punishment. In this sense, retributive 
punishment, particularly in the form of incarceration, 
increases the momentum of human suffering. 
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A more balanced assessment of the harmful effects 
of imprisonment is needed. Given our current 
enthusiasm for inflicting harm upon wrongdoers i.e., 
through imprisonment - it is sensible to look more 
closely at the harm prisons inflict. In setting out 
to assess the damage of imprisonment <clearly a 
depressing task) I seek to illuminate the human cost 
of punishment by imprisonment. Given the distinctions 
between retaliatory retribution and restorative 
justice, it may be possible to draw broad retribution 
devotees toward the latter. A display of the future 
costs of incarceration may encourage others, still 
wedded to retribution, to consider less damagirrg forms 
of punishment. -At the w0rst, exploring the harms of 
prison ·i~ greater depth will prepare us for the threat 
to our future posed by our retributive enthusiasm. 
<I am grateful for helpful comments on this chapter by 
David Galbraith, Frank Whidby and Frank Dowrick>. 
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AINTHROPOLOGV 
Human Nature in Penology and Theology 
Nothing is so decisive for the style of a legal 
era as the idea of man by which it is guided. 
-- Gustav Radbruch 
This chapter examines four theories of punishment 
as they reflect core assumptions about human nature. 
Retribution, rehabi 1 it at ion, deterrence, and social 
defence each build upon a distinctive anthropology. I 
use anthropology to refer to philosophical convictions 
about human nature. In this context these convictions 
distinguish penal theories from other disciplines, 
and, indeed, one theory of punishment from the other. 
To illustrate the field of study: medicine typically 
refers to humans as organisms; political theory views 
humans as citizens, i.e., as rational and free, or 
alienated, etc. In the sections that follow, I 
identify key anthropological assumptions of penology, 
and analyse them in light of Christian beliefs about 
human nature. 
Theological anthropology is comprehensive, 
including conflicting views of human nature. Broadly 
speaking, though, theological images are based on our 
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relationships to God and to others. Penal theory 
tends to rely upon more straightfoward metaphors. 
Persons may be guilty or innocent, rehabilitated or a 
recidivist <repeat offender). To complicate matters, 
theological discourse makes free use of legal labels 
to describe the divine-human relations. We are said 
to be guilty of sin, or justified by faith. 
Theology, though, 
pological metaphors. 
relies upon other 
We are spirit and flesh; 
anthro-
we walk 
in light or in darkness (i.e. , we discern revel at ion 
or not). In addition to these poles of experience, 
theology employs a host of other metaphors. We might 
be lost sheep, soldiers in the lamb's war, salt of the 
earth, temples of 
Beyond these uses 
however, is the 
the spirit, sowers of 
of images in theological 
conviction that what 
the seed. 
discourse, 
we are is 
unresolved, transcending any conclusive definition. 
In contrast, penology and legal theories have the 
advantage of precision. Criminal .just ice is highly 
specialised, and consequently the core anthropological 
metaphors are abstract, distilling specific qualities 
of persons. By its nature, law screens out aspects of 
human experience. The impartiality of the judiciary 
requires that law excludes aspects like rugged good 
looks or a sophisticated taste for wine. 
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My purpose is not to provide a theology of law, 
nor to introduce an exhaustive analysis of human 
nature in jurisprudence. I am concerned to build on 
my discussion of retribution <above) by subjecting 
theories of punishment to the images of human beings 
used in theology. 
Retribution advocates the punishment of the 
guilty. Deterrence theories draw attention to the 
springs of human motivation. Punishments intended to 
reform or rehabilitate offenders presuppose that human 
behaviour can be altered or cured. Social defence 
theories may tend toward a macro-social view, and 
stress more sociological images of selfhood. I shall 
offer a brief sketch of predominant images in each, 
and examine these core assumptions in light 
theological principles. 1 
One could find theological themes that support each penal 
theory's anthropology. I rely, as far as possible, upon 
relatively uncontroversial theological images. 
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Retribution 
If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously 
committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to 
separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But 
the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of 
every human being. And who is willing to destroy a piece 
of his own heart? 
-- Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
In my previous discussion of retribution, I 
suggested that the theory bases its distinction 
between punishment and vengeance upon the concept of 
desert. In the context of a theory of punishment, I 
argued that the root of retribution is the duty to 
harm those who have done wrong. There are retributive 
points which are fruitful in restoring wholeness after 
an offence. But these are not sufficient to establish 
a defence of punishment on retributive grounds alone. 
This section argues that the distinction between 
innocence and guilt is too weak to support the defence 
of punishment. When an offender is convicted the loss 
of many rights follows inevitably. Where imprisonment 
is imposed, the offender loses not just liberty, but 
free association, sexual access, equal job oppor-
tunity, freedom of speech <through prison censorship) 
and in many cases the right to natural justice <or due 
process). 
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Criminal law draws a putative distinction between 
actions for which one is accountable, and one's 
stat us. It is not the purpose of criminal law to 
divide persons into two categories, innocent and 
guilty. At issue is whether the accused has acted 
culpably or not. The court, in theory, determines if 
I have broken the law, and imposes a fitting 
punishment if I am convicted. 
In criminal justice practice, however, there is a 
profound disparity between the status of citizen and 
prisoner, depriving an offender of 
rights that maintain her dignity. 
many of the civil 
In prison, the 
subtle distinct ion between act ions on one hand, and 
one's status on the other- between a guilty act and a 
guilty person - is destroyed. 
I have argued above that the concept of desert is 
far from secure in theories of civil government, and 
that it does not justify a distinction between 
ret ri but ion and vengeance. This sect ion argues that 
punishment maintains a false view of human nature in 
that it establishes a categorical difference between 
the guilty and the innocent. I shall explore the loss 
of human dignity under punishment in three spheres: 
A) Actions, B) The human agent, and C) The social 
aspects of responsibility. 
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A) Desert is founded upon a very specialised 
sense of activity. The legal significance of an act 
is determined selectively, by a process that discards 
profound aspects of human activity. A 'crime' is an 
artificial construct, distilled from interaction by an 
abstract code of law. Theological images can be used 
to illuminate the limitations of the legal perspective 
on human act ion. 
In common experience, any action is subject to a 
wide range of 
or comic, 
interpretations. Actions can be tragic 
moral/immoral, novel/habitual, beauti-
ful/ugly. 'Illegal' or 'criminal' are labels for 
activity, yet it is the nature of human activity that 
no single description can be 
the specific discipline or 
anthropological images. 
Criminal justice by 
complete. Here again, 
theory conditions the 
no means unique 
bracketing off facets 
is 
of activity. Medicine, 
in 
for 
example, may view an act 
without regard for its comic 
The analogy is misleading, 
as healthy or unhealthy, 
or ritualistic poteQtial. 
though, because of a 
difference in th~ log~c of 'crime' and 'disease'. 
the differences in the logic of medicine and law 
are worth exploring, particularly since advocates of 
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punishment often assume that retaliation is 'natural'. 
Indeed, much retributive discourse treats criminal 
actions as though their meaning can be captured in 
biological images. The act of offending is said to 
'leave a mark on one's character'. Walter Moberly 
recites, '"Sow an act and reap a habit, sow a habit 
and reap a character, sow a character and reap a 
destiny. '" <Moberly, 181) 
These 
that evil 
oneself. 
images do resonate with an intuitive hope 
must necessarily result in damage to 
But the logic upon which such direct 
parallels are based is weak, and must be exposed. 
Human agency, responsibility, morality, are not 
organic processes. John Howard could speak 
confidently of exposure to moral contagion, but such 
language in fact undermines human agency. 
Actions are healthy or unhealthy, whether or not 
medicine recognises them as such. What makes an act a 
crime is that some authority has declared illegal a 
category of behaviour and has crystallised it in an 
abstracted pattern. In Britain, there are over 7000 
actions that are 'crimes', in contrast to fewer than 
500 in the last century. <Speller, 21) Crimes are 
multiplying, not through some sort of epidemic that 
might be met with vaccines or potions, but as a result 
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of human stipulations. In this sense, crimes are not 
• the same as' germs, or pollution, or a lack of 
hygiene. 
Unlike the genesis of a disease, the definition of 
a category of activity as a crime results directly 
from human deliberations and decision. There are 
parallels in the way law and medicine use images of 
human beings, but the images retain their meaning only 
if the differences in logic are observed. 
In contrast to the legal framework for actions, 
theological images form a comprehensive understanding 
of activity. Indeed, the New Testament is explicit 
about the ways in which legalism distorts human 
relet ions by measuring act ions against a code. A 
chief distortion may be the self-righteousness of 
those who maintain the letter of the law. The same 
self-righteousness is condemned when it serves as an 
obstacle for our love for the offender. 
woman taken in adultery). 
<Vide the 
I have drawn attention to the ways that legal 
codes systematically exclude meanings that fill any 
action - comical, aesthetic, spiritual. Law sometimes 
excludes even moral considerations. In court, the 
adversarial process pits one account of an event 
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against 
to the 
total. 
another. The competing stories are directed 
'victory' is single question of guilt, and 
8) Retributive anthropology also distorts activ-
ity in its view of the human agent. Here, however, 
the advocate of retribution explicitly defends the 
human image employed. Ret ri but ion, it is claimed, 
treats the offender as responsible. Hence there is a 
concern to establish that the accused was culpably 
aware of what she or he was doing. In this sense, 
desert might be seen in a limiting, preventative role. 
Advocates of retribution proudly inquire, if 
desert is rejected, on what (fair) basis can one ever 
punish another? An arbitrary imposition of custody is 
repugnant. Hence, the retributive case would seem to 
maintain justice with the vital distinction between 
the guilty and the innocent. 
The concept of desert, whatever its faults, would 
seem to stress our freedom of self-determination, our 
power to act on the basis of individual choice. 
Raymond Plant writes <of Kant's penal theory): 
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Desert implies agency and responsibility. One can 
only make claims to deserve anything on the basis 
of things for which one can claim at least some 
degree of responsibility. Thus to entrench desert 
as a necessary condition of punishment ... is to 
place at the very centre of [the) theory of 
punishment a very strong commitment to human 
responsibility. 
<In Bottoms & Preston, 63) 
anthropology 
If the point is to establish the inviolable 
dignity of human beings, we must question the 
assumption that harming offenders serves the purpose. 
Here again, desert is founded upon a distinction that 
secures the dignity of some by demeaning others. The 
conviction that humanity is one denies retributive 
punishment its major justification. 
Desert divides human beings into two categories: 
innocents and the guilty. I have argued <Retribution) 
that desert rests upon an idealised understanding of 
self-restraint on the part of the 'law-abiding 
majority'. The label 'criminal' unevenly applied to 
certain law-breakers is matched by a paradigm of 
common sense, moderation and consideration. The legal 
fiction of the innocent citizen is a clear instance of 
the power of projection to whitewash one's faults by 
stigmatising others. A. P. Herbert traces the paradigm 
of legal purity in his parable of "The Reasonable 
Man". 
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The Reasonable Man is always thinking of others; 
. He is one who invariably looks where he is 
going . who records upon the counterfoils of 
cheques such ample details as are desirable; 
who never from one year's end to another makes 
an excessive demand upon his wife ... who in the 
way of business looks only for that narrow margin 
of profit which twelve men such as himself would 
reckon to be 'fair' . . . who uses nothing except 
in moderation, and even while he flogs his child 
is meditating only on the golden mean. 2 
anthropology 
I am not suggesting that no one is this innocent, 
and thus that none holds the right to punish. Rather, 
A. P. Herbert implies that such consistent 
conscientiousness is foreign to human experience. 
Perhaps the ideal upon which law is written is man, 
free and rational; or economic man, dialectically 
propelled into class warfare. Whatever the 
anthropological base, it is a distillation, and at 
variance with human experience in its fulness. <I 
shall examine other distortions inherent 
labelling of criminals below. ) 
The Christian holds that men are always imperfect: 
that though their aspirations may be infinite, 
their achievements are always limited. The 
Kant ian ideal of the entirely autonomous man is 
only an ideal. 
(J. R. Lucas, in Ramsey, 128) 
in the 
2 A.P. Herbert, "The Reasonable Man," excerpted in Lois Forer, 
Criminals and Victims, page 162. 
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Again, it is appropriate that law does not concern 
itself with the whole person. Strict attention to the 
action in light of the legal code provides some degree 
of impartiality. But the need for a specialised focus 
should not obscure the distort ions inherent in law, 
both in images of human 
The basis of legal guilt 
activity and human agents. 
<essential to retribution) is 
necessarily a limited image. 
C) A third sense in which retributive anthro-
pology distorts human nature is in the assumption of 
the isolated agent. In criminal cases, the defendant 
is most often pictured as a solitary agent; law 
assumes a thoroughly individualistic sense of one' s 
intentions and deliberations. Regardless of the 
functions of this selective view of human choice, it 
is a distortion because it denies shared 
responsi bi 1 it y. 
Rev. Virginia Mackey has written, "The concept of 
desert violates the concern for community and inter-
dependence spelled out in Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam." <Mackey, 46) The more social understandings 
of our relations with God tend to be neglected by an 
individualistic theology. But the biblical witness to 
a corporate life under God is undeniable. 
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The prophetic tradition routinely castigates 
Israel for its communal guilt. God is port rayed as 
punishing Israel for its disobedience. The notion 
that a nation <or a people) can be blameless is, 
according to the Judea-Christian tradition, idolatrous 
blasphemy. This insight into guilt held in common 
does fade in post-Pauline thought, as personal 
culpability begins to take precedence. 
The themes of social evil are never completely 
lost. In Ritschl, the kingdom of God is off-set by a 
kingdom of sin. More recently, JUrgen Moltmann has 
written of social cycles of evil, including poverty, 
racism, pollution.::a David Jenkins writes of the 
'social solidarity of sin'. 4 Finally, as cited above 
(in Pacifism), Paul Oestreicher believes that sinful-
ness unites the oppressed and the oppressors. The 
extent to which persons are socialised into sinfulness 
may be seen as a modern conception of original sin. 
3 
4 
JUrgen Moltmann, The Crucified Go~ pages 329 and following. 
David Jenkins, The Contradiction of Christianity, 
chapter v. 
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In "Shared Guilt, " 5 Herbert Morris pinpoints the 
significance of these trends for our discussion. He 
writes of the callousness and injustice of a society 
that refuses to provide decent housing, education, 
family support. We fail to provide services that 
might prevent potential wrongdoers from criminal 
behaviour. 
His point is not that our communal guilt 
invalidates individual guilt because none of us is 
innocent. CThis would be an abstract, rhetorical 
approach to the basis of desert in 'self-restraint'.) 
Rather, Morris' point is that we, too, have 
contributed materially to the offences of others. We 
have a communal share in any decision to commit wrong, 
in the sorts of harm for which we prefer to hold 
individuals culpable. 
Theologians would rarely deny that a person can be 
responsible for acting wrongly. Retribution is united 
with Christian theology in seeking to maintain 
personal responsibility for the harm caused by one's 
s Herbert Morris, "Shared Guilt", reprinted in Herbert Morris: 
On Guilt and Innocenc~ pages 111 ff. 
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actions. However, individual sins are not used - even 
in extremist dichotomies drawn between the reprobate 
and the elect - to divide one class of human being 
from another. Rather, it is God's free grace that 
liberates people from the punishment we (all) deserve. 
Markus Barth states flatly, "There is no personal 
justification by God without justification of fellow-
man by God. " <Barth, 243) 
Again, my point is not that there are no true 
innocents who possess the right to inflict punishment, 
since 'all have sinned and fallen short'. The natural 
retort is that most people have not committed rape, or 
robbed a shop at gun-point. The advocate of indi-
vidual desert may press further to show that, despite 
the high proportions of poor people in prison, the 
majority of people in poverty lead law-abiding lives. 
But this does not meet the point. My argument is 
here built upon theological insights into personal 
identity and individual agency. Our social solidarity 
in sin is itself a causal factor in any crime. The 
effect of this insight into communal guilt upon our 
image of individual responsibility is that it becomes 
human rather than legal/abstract. The construct of 
the atomistic agent is a distortion of our true 
humanity. The theological person is a unity of self-
in-community in relationship with God. 
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A theological sense of the Kingdom as a community 
in a state of Shalom exposes the ideological bias of 
law. One does not need to establish a biblical 
concern for the poor, or Jesus' political message to 
make this point. Insofar as retribution is based on 
reciprocity in a just state, the disproportionate 
numbers of the poor in prisons lay bare the partiality 
of legal codes. Vivien Stern writes: 
'Crime' is itself a socio-political concept, which 
reflects and is the product of the structure of 
social values and attitudes in a society. 
<Stern, 24) 
This point can be expanded by a reconsideration of 
Herbert's 'Reasonable Man'. His behaviour may be an 
ideal type, a paradigm of obedience to the letter of 
the law. But his other attributes are revealing. He 
is a businessman, engaged in setting margins of 
profit. Married, with a child, he has a bank account, 
. uses public transport, and enjoys golf. He is male. 
The paradigm at the heart of legal codes is actually a 
small, unrepresentative sample of the citizenry. 
The fact that an ideological preference is 
inherent in a legal system is not intended to advance 
an antinomian view of gospel, nor to demand a new 
relation for church and state. Retribution and 
Christian theology share the view that order is 
anthropology 
indispensable for human society. Further, both see 
the function of law as a boundary, alerting 
transgressors that they risk setting themselves apart 
by their activities. Here are roots that link 
retribution 
tradition. 
with Jesus' ministry and Christian 
But alongside these shared 
anthropology reveals striking 
goals, a theological 
distortions in legal 
images of persons. To review the points made above: 
A) Criminal just ice greatly restricts the 
understanding of activity. This distorts human 
responsibility by its disregard for human wholeness. 
The limitations 
carried over to 
in images of human 
penal responses: 
activity are 
the range of 
informal, ordinary expiations is vast, yet a term of 
incarceration is monolithic (and returns very little 
to victims of offences.) 8) The image of two 
categories of human innocent and guilty is 
not mistaken; further, such distinctions are 
necessary in order to draw unambiguous distinctions 
between right and wrong actions. C> Where reciprocity 
is used to justify the return of harm for harm, it 
misses the point of community: distributive justice 
is a precondition of just punishment. 
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He that is down need fear no fall. 
- John Bunyan 
Deterrence cannot be observed. The theory depends 
upon the conviction that people will not act in 
certain ways, and hence it is a moot question whether 
a particular measure does deter potential offenders. 
This is not to prejudge the ethical quest ions, but to 
establish the premise that empirical data will not 
resolve the debate. 
Public confidence that imprisonment will deter 
offenders can be ascribed largely to the losses 
incurred by a prison sentence. Reasonable persons 
will not risk loss of their homes or jobs, or being 
severed from spouses and children. They wi 11 not 
endanger their good standing in the community, nor 
ruin the credit upon which their finances depend. 
They also fear the mystery of prisons. Finally, 
without any accurate measure of the deprivation, the 
loss of freedom is perceived to be onerous. 
The prison population can be profiled only in 
crude terms, but a brief sketch by Vivien Stern6 
G Vivien Stern, Bricks of Sham~ page 24. 
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establishes the point. In 1985, over 25 per cent of 
sentenced prisoners were under twenty-one. A (1972) 
study in the Southeast found that large numbers of 
prisoners were homeless, had previoue convictions,, 'no 
families and fri~ptds'; ~wo-thirds had unstable work 
hist oriesl 
t 
Another study7 found that over 80 per cent 
of the prisoners interviewed reported work-related 
anxieties. Two-thirds of this sample were unmarried 
or separated. 
This profile leads to the uncontroversial 
conclusion that families, jobs, respected standing in 
society, homes and prosperity (as well as age) 
effectively deter people from the sort of offences for 
which they would receive custody. It also suggests 
that incarceration is inefficient at preventing 
property offences, since prisons merely aggregate 
people who literally have less to lose. 
In Retribution, I argued that a basic difference 
between retribution and deterrence relates to the 
7 P. Priestly, J. McGuire, D. Flegg and others, Social Skills 
in Prison and the Communit~ page 54. 
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intended audience. Retribution depends upon the 
citizen's identification with the state, but 
deterrence theory expects one to identify with the 
punishee. GUnther Kaiser points to flaws in deterrent 
reasoning. He argues that our inclination is to 
identify with those we admire more than with the 
ignoble. One identifies with the victorious, not the 
loser; with success and power, not impoverished 
social misfits. 
Kaiser suggests that: 
a potential murderer will not identify personally 
with a criminal who is executed, but will instead 
identify the criminal with someone who has greatly 
offended him, someone he hates or fears. 
<UN, 12) 
Hence, "the example executions provide may inspire a 
potential murderer to kill the person who so greatly 
offended him. " CLoc. cit. ) 
Issues raised by social justice (offenders having 
less to lose) and mistaken identification <with the 
state) demonstrate that deterrence is .far more complex 
than its advocates suggest. Deprivations within 
society contribute causally to crime the 
criminogenic powers of illiteracy, racism, 
unemployment, even youth, are well-established. 
Further, the symbolic threat of punishment may 
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encourage offences by making legitimate the act of 
harming those who are defined as enemies. 
Perhaps the prospect of imprisonment does inspire 
fear in citizens. But clearly, prison cannot be 
expected to deter those who have been to prison. 
Their sentences have already stripped away most of the 
effective deterrents Ce. g., in disrupting families), 
the shock value of the unknown has been cashed in, and 
the released prisoner is less equipped to meet life's 
challenges. 
A further criticism relates directly to the 
anthropology at the heart of deterrence. The theory 
concedes that punishment is an evil, yet that the harm 
is outweighed by the benefits in some unknown 
reduction of potential offences. I have argued that 
effective deterrents can be identified clearly by 
taking a mirror image of the prison population. If 
family, work, prosperity are the best deterrents, then 
society makes a moral choice in devoting resources to 
negative sanctions rather than positive inducements. 
A theory of deterrence, in which the primary force 
for stability and harmony is fear of punishment, 
implies a pessimistic view of humans in society. 
<Speller, 89) 
Of course, Christian perspectives are not immune 
from imbalances, slighting either human goodness or 
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evil. However, Christian anthropology takes seriously 
a unity of being human, of goodness and evil in 
personhood, where both good and evil are transcendent, 
or infinite. Deterrence theory, however, is reduc-
tivist, and trivialises human powers. 
Some broad strokes applied to deterrence anthro-
pology may reveal its distortions. It is common prac-
tice to draw a distinction between general and indi-
vidual deterrence, i.e., between using the punishee to 
deter others and deterring the offender personally. I 
should like to introduce a distinction in approach, 
between those deterrents intended to induce fear 
(intimidation) and those that appeal to reason. 
Intimidation is based upon conditioning. Hence 
the punishment must be certain and prompt. Only thus, 
it is argued, will the connection between crime and 
punishment be impressed upon the audience. Given an 
indubitable associ at ion of crime and punishment, 
potential offenders would be paralysed through fear. 
Obviously, to assume that one might be taught to 
feel the pains of punishment whenever one anticipates 
committing a crime ignores the uncertainty of 
detection and conviction. But the underlying flaw is 
an image of human action as mere stimulus-response 
twitches of an organism. 
-204-
anthropology 
The theory disregards the role of interpretation. 
People assign meanings to their fears. They may see a 
threat as an obstacle, a check against recklessness, 
or as an added element in the challenge, making it 
more attractive. Deterrence based upon intimidation 
neglects our powers of interpretation, and its 
practice reflects this simplistic anthropology. 
The second form of deterrence argument appeals to 
the spirit of reason and morality. Moderation in 
punishment was achieved by convincing those in 
authority that punishment depends in part upon its 
legitimacy. Reasonable people, it is argued, will 
conform to the rules if the pain of breaking them just 
exceeds the anticipated joys of offending. In this 
sense punishment is dedicated to the didactic function 
of setting the boundary. The deterrent appeal to 
reason ignores transcendent evil, which enables a 
person to choose wrongdoing with logical consistency. 
I have drawn attention to these two images 
underlying deterrence: the biological organism, 
subject to laws of conditioning, and the rational 
being, wisely choosing the logical route to the 
maximisation of pleasure. These correspond to 
perspectives explored by Reinhold Neibuhr as 
naturalist and idealist thought: 
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The naturalist . fails to appreciate to what 
degree the human spirit breaks and remakes the 
harmonies and unities of nature. The idealist, 
identifying freedom with reason and failing to 
appreciate that freedom rises above reason, 
imagines that the freedom of man is secure, in the 
mind's impetus toward coherence and synthesis. 
Neither naturalism nor idealism can understand 
that man is free enough to violate both the neces-
sities of nature and the logical systems of 
reason. 
<Reinhold NTtbuhr, 124) 
In grasping the transcendent power of 
anthropology 
human 
freedom, Christians dispute the claim that the urge to 
break the law can be controlled with increasingly 
brutal sanctions. In the first place, as I have 
argued, act ions must be interpreted, and this means 
that the resort to more force may do no more than 
undermine the state's legitimacy. Secondly, the 
ambiguity of the symbol leaves open the possibility of 
mistaken identification, and may enhance the 
attraction of certain offences, e. g.' citizens may 
decide to use physical violence as a tool of private 
deterrence. 
Rational deterrence exhibits an idealised under-
standing of persons, without sin. In taking sin 
seriously, Christians view with suspicion theories 
that use as their premise images of humans as free, 
rational, and creative. Paul sets the tone for an 
appreciation of the subjective dominance of sin. 11 I 
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do not do the good that I want, but the evil I do not 
want is what I do. " <Romans, VII, 19) 
Sin is as irrational as it is pervasive <though 
not all that is irrational is sin). David Jenkins has 
written of sin as: 
the nonsensical power which takes people over and 
to which people contributej whereby they go 
against that which is best and hopeful and human. 
<Cited in Priest land, 73) 
The failure of deterrence based on inumidation is 
its reduction of the human spirit, not least because 
low rates of detection and apprehension may make the 
risk of imprisonment logically worthwhile. Rational 
deterrence presupposing that people will choose 
wisely - distorts human nature in its blithe disregard 
for sin. 
Were the two views of human nature complementary, 
deterrence might be a powerful argument for 
imprisonment, at least in the hope of reducing crime. 
But wherever criminal behaviour persists, deterrence 
theory unravels in its own inconsistencies. Condi-
tioning deterrence argues that the penalty must be 
made more harsh to excite the fears in people. 
Rational calculation argues that the severity of the 
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decreases respect for 
anthropology 
law, and must be 
A final contradiction in the effectiveness of 
imprisonment to deter crime concerns a hybrid of 
retribution and deterrence. While prisons manifestly 
fail to deter recidivists, the prisoner may be said to 
serve as an example to others. The potential losses 
that do deter - family, jobs, status - are beyond most 
prisoners, yet the experience of incarceration is a 
painful one. Thus, those who are not deterred 
(because they have little to lose) are harmed to serve 
as a warning to those who are deterred by jobs, 
families etc. This is a clear instance of using some 
people as means for others' ends. It could lead, of 
course, to more harsh punishments inflicted upon some 
people because others have not been deterred. The 
rationalisation of greater harm to prisoners to deter 
others is the retributive principle that categorically 
divides the innocent from the guilty. 
-208-
Rehabilitation 
If prisoners need rehabilitation, it is from 
the treatment they are subjected to in prison. 
-- Bob Canney, Florida prisoner 
Retribution harms people who have done wrong. 
Deterrence harms offenders to prevent people from 
breaking the law. Social defence aims to reduce crime 
and protect society. In each case, the benefits to 
offenders <if there be any) are incidental: the aim 
is to benefit society. 
Rehabilitation is intended to change offenders -
not because they have broken laws, and not to deter 
others, but because offenders would seem to need help 
if they are to conform to the demands of society. To 
a large degree, the endurance and growth of prisons is 
due to what David Rothman calls 'the allure of 
reform'. Anthony Bottoms parallels Rothman's point: 
Penal decision-makers are still operating in a way 
that takes major account of treatment considera-
tions. Thus, people have been sent to 
borstals in large numbers in the belief that the 
training offered in borstal will help 'to cut off 
the supply of adult recidivists'. 
<Bottoms & Preston, 9) 
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Rehabilitation theory witnesses to the humane aim 
of enabling prisoners to stay out of trouble upon 
release. Offenders are perceived not as culpable, but 
as defective. Criminality is defined as a condition 
to be cured. Here, however, rehabilitation theory 
splits into two distinct approaches. 
Traditional arguments <I shall refer to as reform) 
see the deficiency in the offender's environment. 
remedies of education, religion and job 
training are applied to prisoners. The more recent 
approach <the medical model) makes criminality a 
matter of scientific investigation. In response, 
rehabilitation alters behaviour that results from 
'antecedent causal circumstances' .a 
The medical model holds that a crime is merely a 
symptom of an illness. The 'disease' can be treated 
with behaviour modification, drug therapy and inten-
sive alteration of the personality. At the very 
least, these methods diagnose and predict the course 
of such 'illness'. Middle terms between reform <e.g. 
e Raymond Plant characterises rehabilitation in this way in 
"Justice, Punishment and the State," in Bottoms & Preston. 
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through education) and cure (through treatment) 
include early release as an incentive, or training in 
social skills to meet deficiencies in the offender's 
personality. 
Efforts toward rehabilitation have been attacked 
as ineffective. For instance, Leslie Wilkins writes: 
It is extremely doubtful whether any variants of 
present methods of treatment/punishment of 
offenders makes any difference to the reconviction 
rate. 
<Hastings Center Report, 39) 
Rehabilitation has also been called manifestly 
unjust, 9 because the offender's release may depend 
upon the therapist's discretion. Nonetheless, in the 
sense of a hope that imprisonment will help or alter 
the prisoner, rehabilitation persists in providing 
prisons with legitimacy. 
At first glance, it would seem that the human 
images at the heart of rehabilitation fall into two 
categories, viz., offenders as products of poor 
environment <reform approach), and offenders as defec-
9 Cf. AFSC, Chapter iii., and Mitford, Chapter iv. 
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tives <the medical model). In unravelling these two 
basic images, a third appears, and it is this human 
image upon which the theory hangs. 
The subject of 
malleable, plastic. 
rehabi li tat i ve techniques is 
Through a sculpted environment 
assault on the self, the and/or an intensive 
delinquent is changed, ideally into a responsible 
citizen. Rehabilitation advocates reject the ubiquity 
of sin, assuming that legally pure subjects can be 
created through social intervention. This battle to 
reshape the delinquent is fought on two fronts, with 
significant differences between the two approaches. 
The most pt~ominent distinction is mocal. What I 
have called the reform approach views the offender as 
wicked. The punishment is the instrument by which 
society shows the offender his/her wickedness. Reform 
is the offender's capacity to learn the lessons taught 
by punishment. Imprisonment is essentially edifying. 
Conversely, the medical model strives to maintain 
the ideal of value-free science, in that moral 
assessments of an offender's behaviour are irrelevant. 
They would provide unnecessary confusion for those 
working to eliminate the dysfunctional behaviour. 
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There is a further distinction in the respect for 
personhood. Punishment may be viewed as a lesson in 
justice, requiring the voluntary engagement of the 
puni shee. In a broader view, education and training 
programmes appeal to 
useful life-skills. 
prisoners' desires to 
The voluntary character 
develop 
of the 
prisoner's involvement does not mean that the prison 
surrenders 
attendance 
workshops. 
controli early 
in school or 
release may hang 
good performance in 
upon 
the 
But it is assumed that the prisoner must 
collaborate in any reform that occurs. 
The medical model features a range of methods, 
from social skills instruction to rigorous behaviour-
1st techniques. Psychological intervention has a 
humane side, in the work of trained staff who diagnose 
and treat problems that lock the prisoner into 
dysfunctional behaviour. Considerably less humane are 
the uses of psychiatry to serve the demands of 
security. In such cases, the medical model is a 
coercive tool whose rehabilitative intent is morally 
suspect. The prisoner constitutes ;a problem ~o be 
solved. Rehabili,tative intervention, in this case, 
1 functions to break the prisoner's will. 
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Jessica Mitford quotes a prison psychologist: 
'We'd assume that a felony was clear evidence that 
the criminal had somehow acquired full-blown 
social neurosis and needed to be cured, not 
punished. We'd probably have to re-
structure his entire personality.' 
<Cited in Mitford, 137) 
In its crusade to imprint a new personality upon 
the delinquent, rehabilitation justifies, and indeed 
requires, an unprecedented intrusion by those in 
authority. According to David Rothman, the advent of 
the medical model obliterated the boundaries 
personal sovereignty. 
Officials had to know the most intimate details of 
the offender's life. His fate now hinged 
not on what he had done, but upon his motivation, 
his attitudes, and his psychological state. There 
was nothing private left to the individual; the 
state had a right and a need to know everything. 
<Rothman, Hastings Center Report, 20) 
of 
Leslie Wilkins draws attention to a decreasing 
respect for personhood in rehabilitative technique. 
"Where there is more evidence of the effectiveness of 
behaviour modification techniques, the methods seem to 
be more intrusive and more damaging to our moral 
belief in the autonomy of the individual." <Hastings 
Center Report, 46) 
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Alongside differences in moral values and the 
prisoner's role, the two rehabilitative approaches 
hold points in common. A key element shared by reform 
and the medical model concerns the interpretation of 
the offenders' needs. Whether the method adheres to 
conventional morals Cas in reform methods) or aspires 
toward value-free status, the views of offenders 
themselves are slighted. Raymond Plant states: 
Granted that the therapist is going to operate 
with some sociological or psychological model of 
human behaviour . this model is likely to 
determine in the end what are seen to be the 
needs, or better the • real' needs or desires of 
the client or offender. 
Cin Bottoms & Preston, 61) 
It is this interpretative role that reveals the 
third dominant view of human beings within 
rehabilitation theory. Where there is compulsion, 
some one compels. When a prisoner is the subject of 
observation, there is an observer. If crime is to be 
cured, a 'doctor' must diagnose its causes and 
prescribe reliable cures. It is this profile, of the 
omniscient observer, whose comprehensive knowledge of 
the causes of crime enable 'him' to turn the offender 
from dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, that is most 
dubious in the light of Christian anthropology. 
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Thus Ronald Preston wrote of rehabilitation in its 
decline as ''an idol which had pretensions to knowledge 
which it could not sustain, which led to a coercive 
form of reformation hidden under the guise of concern 
for the person. " On Bottoms & Preston, 113) 
To question the omniscient observer image strikes 
at the heart of the post-Enlightenment penal 
enterprise. The central human image of rehabilitation 
is not the defective criminal, needing reform, but 
that champion of decency, guided by the light of 
science, who will isolate criminals, diagnose their 
ills, provide the required treatment, and relieve 
society of the nuisance of delinquency. David Jenkins 
writes: 
Our society has become trapped in a false set of 
expectations about our inevitable progress, 
guaranteed improvement and expanding possibi-
lities. These expectations have been built up by 
an amalgam of beliefs about liberal humanism, 
scientific progress and the political 
reorganisation of society. 
<Jenkins, in Bottoms & Preston, 205) 
Theology punctures the inflated claims 
imprisonment can cure crime, and in doing 
that 
so, 
theological criticisms rest ore to humans our proper 
dignity. The limitations of reform anthropology and 
the consequent failure of rehabilitation bear witness 
to a strength in human beings. 
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As Ronald Preston and other contributors to The 
Coming Penal Crisis demonstrate, the theologian may 
feel some dismay at the demise of rehabilitation. 
Certainly, rehabilitative practices are systematically 
discriminatory, unjust, their underlying profile(s) of 
humanity, questionable. Yet, in intent, rehabili-
tation is directed to helping the prisoner and to 
reducing recidivism. 
Curing crime may be illusory, but rehabilitative 
theory recognised society's moral obligation to 
provide care along with custody, and to make 
imprisonment a positive, or at least constructive, 
experience. It legitimated a system rife with abuses, 
but did so in a way that supported the humane and 
caring dimensions of imprisonment. Its decline may 
foreshadow a return to blaming former prisoners if 
they recidivate, in a state that 'washes its hands' of 
responsibility for maintaining humane conditions in 
its prisons. 10 
10 Thus, a Home Office study of American 'New Generation' 
prisons explains that rehabilitation has been discredited, 
and replaced by the duty of providing secure custody. "In 
this approach," the study continues, "recidivism is not seen 
as a failure on the part of the prison syste~·· 
The Home Office: New Directions in Prison Design, 68. 
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The ultimate expression of law is not order -it's 
prison. We have hundreds upon hundreds of 
prisons, and thousands upon thousands of laws, yet 
there is no social order, no social peace. 
George Jackson 
The reduction of criminal behaviour through social 
sciences, and the protection of society from dangerous 
individuals may lead to contradictory practices. Yet, 
they can be drawn from the same penal theory. A judge 
may impose custody without a trial <by denying bail) 
and use prison to protect society. Conversely, a 
penal theorist may claim, "there is ample evidence 
that the fact of imprisonment is a heavy contributor 
to post-release criminal activity." <Nagel, 149 > The 
latter may call for a moratorium on prison 
construct ion, but both judge and penologist are 
relying upon the theory of social defence. 
The striking ambivalence is understandable. At 
the heart of social defence theory is the goal of 
minimising the harm done to society by criminal 
activity. There is widespread approval of the goal -
rare is the author who advocates an increase in 
violent crime. Inevitably, too, the question of the 
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most effective methods not strictly an empirical 
matter - leads to diversity in approach. Here again, 
two types are distinguishable, each with its own 
anthropological issues. In this case, however, there 
are not two competing theoretical styles, but a 
scientific hypothesis on one hand, and trends in 
policy based on social defence on the other. 
The theory combines a scientific approach to 
criminality with a focus upon harm to society. The 
social defence advocates' rejection of the morally 
tinged term 'punishment' in favour of 'measures' or 
• provisions' reveals roots in positivism. Guilt and 
wickedness are generally thought to be obscure ideas, 
and frequently seen to obstruct the defence of 
society. As Marc Ancel, an advocate of social 
defence, states its case, social defence measures are: 
designed to 'neutralize' the offender, 
his removal or segregation, or by 
remedial or educational methods. 
either by 
applying 
<In Gerber & McAnany, 138) 
Despite the suspicious reference to 'neutralising' 
offenders, Ancel insists that social defence does not 
necessarily mean more reliance upon incarceration. 
Indeed, he writes, '"Empty the prisons' could well be 
adopted as a rallying cry by the partisans of social 
defence. " <In Gerber & McAnany, 134) 
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Following the ideal of better living through 
criminology, social defence theory takes seriously the 
data that indicate that prisons fail to reduce crime. 
Studies show that the release of all prisoners (in the 
U.S.) would result in an increase of less than 10 per 
cent in the rate of crime. ~ 1 Conversely, a quadrupled 
prison capacity would result in a mere 10 per cent 
reduct ion in the crime rat e. 12 
There are at least four reasons for the poor 
performance of prisons in reducing crime: ( 1) Only a 
small minority of offenders are confined (less than 5 
per cent). (2) Criminality is not limited to a 
finite, constant population: old offenders desist, 
younger ones begin. Young adults whose behaviour has 
not been spotless become increasingly marginalised 
until they begin to appear on accounts of criminal 
activity. (3) Many offences are committed by groups -
for one act of vandalism, one may need to hold eight 
young offenders in custody. (4) Techniques are poor 
for predicting which prisoners pose little threat to 
society and which are risky. 
1 1 
12 
Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, Overcrowded Time, 15. 
Ibid., 17. The authors include the explanation which 
follows. 
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The faith that prisons help to protect society is 
based 
first 
upon 
place, 
misunderstandings about 
criminal activity is 
prisons. In the 
not limited to a 
closed population C' criminals' ) or to a minority. 
Second, of those offenders who are incarcerated, very 
few are locked away forever. 
released eventually. 
Indeed, almost all are 
The size of any prison system is limited. The 
prison is not a dust-bin, or warehouse, but a revolv-
ing door. In order to confine one offender, another 
prisoner must be released. If prison capacities are 
expanded, there is certainly a brief period during 
which more offenders can be confined, but the original 
equilibrium returns at a slightly higher rate; that 
is, the proportion of people passing through the 
revolving door increases. Once again, however, to 
confine an offender requires the release of another. 
Clearly, 
justification 
ultimately a 
following the revolving door image, a 
of prisons based on social defence is 
rehabilitative argument. The offender 
coming out must be improved by the experience; if not, 
the trade-off <one offender going in for a prisoner 
coming out) will be to the disadvantage of society. 
If imprisonment helps the prisoner, then the time 
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spent confined will decrease the probability of 
recidivism. If imprisonment harms the prisoner, then 
the expansion of prison places will result in 
increases in crime, increased harm to society. The 
aims of social defence will be frustrated by the 
institution of the prison. 
We have seen that rehabilitation is open to 
serious doubts, 
justification 
posit ion. 
of 
and this must cast doubt on the 
prisons from a social defence 
Those who desire to defend imprisonment from a 
social defence posture may take a different course. 
It might be argued that prisons constitute a means of 
sifting those who are fairly safe from those who pose 
a clear danger to society. Prisons, then, serve 
society by quarantine incapacitating the truly 
dangerous. This is probably the most popular justi-
fication of prisons. The existence of high-risk 
offenders allows advocates of imprisonment to ridicule 
abolitionists. The latter group, it is said, would 
set loose men who are certain to kill or maim again. 
James Wilson illuminates the distinction between 
those who would apply science to cure criminals 
<rehabilitation) and the quarantine approach: 
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It is strange that we should persist in the view 
that we can find and alleviate the 'causes' of 
crime. Wicked people exist. Nothing avails 
except to set them apart from innocent people. 
<Quoted in Bottoms & Prest on, 13) 
Clearly, Wilson's point is retributive, 
anthropology 
in his 
conviction that the divide between innocence and guilt 
is total and unambiguous. Those forms of social 
defence considered above are rehabilitative; the 
suggest ion that prisons defend society is based upon 
the conviction that prisoners will emerge better 
equipped to cope. 
There would seem to be little in social defence 
that is unique, little evidence that the perspective 
deserves to be treated as a distinct penal theory. 
Indeed, the views expressed above concentrate flaws of 
each of the traditional penal theories. Like 
retribution, social defence rests upon an untenable 
distinction between good citizens and wicked 
criminals. Like deterrence, the profile of social 
harm is flagrantly class-biased and degrading to human 
dignity. Like rehabilitation, social defence suffers 
from an inflated confidence in our capacity to 
diagnose 'wickedness' or 'criminal tendencies'. These 
flaws can be combined in practice, as the experts 
predict dangerousness based on unexamined distinctions 
between safe risks and the dangerous few. 
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I have argued above <Retribution) that the image 
of a solitary agent is incomplete. In social defence 
theory, the st igmat isat ion of indi victuals is exalted 
to scientific status. Anthony Bottoms has expressed 
concern at the tendency to divide prisoners on the 
basis of evaluations of risk. A steep rise in remand 
committals is but one example of this trend, which 
Bottoms labels 'bifurcation'. 13 
Bifurcation captures key themes of present-day 
discussions that set policy in response to crime. 
Talk about the causes of criminal behaviour focuses on 
society: deprivations, lack of care, decline of 
values. When the question of possible solutions 
arises, however, the discussion turns to remedies 
applied to prisoners. 
13 
Long conditioned to the belief that problems of 
criminality lie mainly with the individual, 
society has fastened its attention on 'dangerous 
individuals' largely ignoring the learned nature 
of behavior. 
<PREAP, 129) 
See A. E. Bottoms, "An Introduction to 'The Coming Crisis'," 
in Bottoms & Preston, pages 1-24; cf., A. E. Bottoms, 
"Reflections on the Renaissance of Dangerousness," Howard 
Journal of Penology and Crime Prevention, 16, pages 70-96. 
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The illusion of the isolated culprit helps to 
explain the unenviable record of those who predict the 
degree of risk posed by prisoners. A second key fac-
tor is class-bias <equally evident in key images of 
deterrence. ) In The Politics. of Abolition, Thomas 
Mathiesen argues that the very concept of dangerous-
ness is ideologically tinged. Many act ions that are 
harmful to people are condoned; e. g., policies that 
generate pollution, or unsafe working conditions, or 
harmful products. Yet the pains of punishment fall 
hardest upon the poor. 
Theodore Sarbin comments: 
The construct, criminal, is not used to classify 
the performers of all legally defined delicts 
<offences against the law), only those whose 
position in the social structure qualifies them 
for membership in the dangerous classes. 
<Cited in AFSC, 78) 
Recalling Ronald Preston's case against the 
pretensions of rehabilitative practitioners, others 
argue that social defence falters through our 
inability to predict accurately the risk posed by 
persons. 
The obvious difficulty with pinpoint 
prediction is hedged by social defence advocates, 
who claim great powers of accuracy for 'science'. 
But . . . there are huge gaps in our knowledge of 
the human personality which none ;of the social or 
medical scienc.es hils begun to fill. 
<Gerber & McAnany, 129-130) 
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Leslie Wilkins points to another division within 
social defence theory. Danger is most often viewed in 
terms of violence. Risk to property is not generally 
thought to justify custody on a pre-emptive basis. 
Yet, predictions based on property of fenders' prof i 1 es 
are over four times as accurate as those concerning 
violent offenders. <The prediction that a given 
property offender will or will not re-offend is four 
times more likely to be confirmed than a corresponding 
prediction involving a violent offender.) Wilkins 
comments, "The violent offender is more like everybody 
else (in terms of personality tests and case history) 
than is the non-violent property offender." <In 
Hastings Center Report, 47) 
Wilkins advises social defence theorists to look 
to circumstances and social settings rather than to 
individuals to reduce violence. Following Hans Toch, 
he recommends that the • triggers' or • gambits' that 
escalate into violence be identified and pr·e-empted. 14 
14 Dangerousness is analysed in greater detail below 
<Prison Violence. ) 
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The suggestion accords well with recommendations 
of PREAP <The Prison Research Education Action 
Project). 
PREAP makes three points: 
1) that information about the poor performance of 
risk prediction be widely shared. 
2) that penal practitioners distinguish between 
the illusory search for profiles of violence 
prone actors and the more practical dis-
closure of violence-inducing structures -
making the actual harm done more central 
to the measure of risk. 
3) that the concept of special prisons for dan-
gerous people be rejected prisons make 
people dangerous; they are violence-prone 
behaviour settings. 
<PREAP, page 133) 
Theology does not offer a human profile that 
suggests that people pose no threat t.o one another. 
But, in the wake of Martin Buber, theology does 
recognise the extent to which actions and meanings are 
determined in the context of relationship. <This may 
reveal why a large proportion of various violent 
offences occur between people who know each other. ) 
Equally important, however, theology maintains a faith 
in human freedom, especially in the freedom to change. 
If we value the dignity, autonomy and diversity of 
the individual, then the exception is of more 
importance than the statistical· average. 
The essential cruelty of any penal system is that 
it treats people as nonpersons, as unchanging 
objects. 
<AFSC, 82) 
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Conclusion 
In my analysis of penal theory I have found much 
to criticise. Theological anthropology casts doubt on 
the retributive principle of inflicting harm upon the 
guilty. The problem lies not so much in doubts about 
responsibility for one's actions as in the categorical 
divide between the innocent and the guilty. A commit-
ment to the dignity of each individual before God 
condemns the use of some persons to deter others. 
Hopes of preventing people from committing offences by 
intimidation seem doomed in light of theological 
images of pervasive sin and human powers of inter-
pretation <transcendence). These same images lead us 
to question the desirability of rehabilitation <though 
here again I am led to doubt the power of the 
manipulator, 
offenders). 
anthropology 
more than the potential for good in 
I have argued that the weaknesses in 
of ret ri but i ve, deterrent and 
rehabilitative penal theory are magnified in much of 
social defence thought. 
As my approach has 
might be assumed that 
prospects for criminal 
been quick to find fault, it 
pacifism is negative in its 
justice. The thought that 
ret ri but ion, or deterrence, or rehabilitation exhibit 
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mistaken images of persons, and will inevitably create 
problems in our response to crime, may suggest that 
people are simply nat ural criminals, and we must learn 
to accept the harm that offenders inflict. The image 
of a citizenry suffering the evil of offenders without 
responding recalls the passive extremes of pacifism, 
which can be world-denying and unrealistic. 
My purpose in this chapter has not been to sketch 
ways to respond to crime consonant with Christian 
anthropology, but rather, to examine penal theories 
(that is, justifications of punishment) to study their 
assumptions about human nature. I have criticised the 
anthropological assumptions of such theories, 
especially where they offend human dignity. 
there is an implied argument for our fundamental unity 
at the heart of my attack on retribution. Central to 
my doubts about deterrence is the faith that the human 
will is not to be manipulated or cowed by force. 
Theological anthropology maintains full respect 
for human nature by holding contradictory elements in 
tension. In Christian theology, human beings can be 
free and subject to determinism; good and evil; spirit 
and flesh. Perhaps it is impracticable to construct 
institutions upon views of human nature that include 
our intrinsic tensions. But theological anthropology 
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insists that we are both creatures and made in the 
image of God; that is, that such paradoxes describe 
the deepest truths about being human. 
It is through maintaining and enduring the tragic 
contradictions of life, and not by resolving them, 
that the human spirit is tuned to its highest 
pitch. 
<Cupitt, 151) 
Don Cupitt' s summation of Kierkegaard' s anthropology 
accurately conveys this strength in the Christian 
understanding of human nature. 
Theories of punishment work by building upon 
simplistic resolutions of these paradoxes. One group 
is guilty <evil); the other is innocent <good). Human 
beings are free <according to theories of civil 
liberty based on mutual self-restraint) or determined 
<according to deterrence based on intimidation). One 
group of people are healthy and whole, the other group 
are the defectives, totally in need of rehabilitation. 
Pacifist convictions that human beings are inter-
connected are offended by the division of humanity 
into distinct categories, upon which the various 
defences of punishment depend. But, more broadly, 
Christ ian anthropology is bound to find theories of 
human nature degrading when they depend upon 
deliberate neglect of the basic tensions of our being. 
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Theological convictions about human nature have 
helped to analyse common justifications of punishment 
in view of their underlying anthropology. Where 
retribution fractures community, I have argued for the 
acceptance of an offender as one of us, and indeed 
that we, too, are offenders. Where rehabilitation 
invites our identification with the experts, I have 
asked us to scale down our complacency about our power 
to change others. Where social defence either 
subjects offenders to the powers of science or 
banishes them as wicked, I have argued that our 
behaviour settings engender violence and harm, perhaps 
none more effectively than the prime institution of 
punishment. 
The police seek in every human being a murderer; 
the wise man and the philosopher seek in every 
murderer a human being. 
We Christians seek God in every person 
even in murderers. 
And each of us will find what he seeks: 
the police will find their murderer; 
the philosophers will find their human beings; 
and we, we shall find God in every person. 
(Virgil Georghiu, cited in Atherton, 53) 
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PHENOMENOLOGY 
A Phenomenology of Prison Space 
Art. 17. The prisoners' day will begin at 
six in the morning in winter and at five in 
the summer. They will work for nine hours a 
day throughout the year. Two hours a day 
will be devoted to instruction. Work and the 
day will end at nine o'clock in winter and at 
eight in summer. 
Art. 18. Rising At the first drum roll, the 
prisoners must rise and dress in silence, as 
the supervisor opens the cell doors. At the 
second drum roll, they must be dressed and 
make their beds. At the third, they must 
proceed to the chapel for morning prayer. 
There is a five minute interval between each 
drum roll. 
Rules for the House of Young Prisoners, 
Paris, 1838 
<Cited in Foucault, 6) 
The weekday routine of a typical prisoner: 
7: 45 a.m. 
8: 00-8: 40 a. m. 
8: 40-11: 50 a.m. 
12: 00-1: 45 p.m. 
1: 45-4: 30 p.m. 
4: 30-6: 00 p. m. 
6: 00-8: 00 p. m. 
Cell unlocked; prisoners 'slop out' 
Breakfast <eaten locked in cell. ) 
Work, education, etc. <During this 
period some prisoners take ~ 
hour's exercise.) 
Lunch <eaten locked in cell. ) 
Work, education, etc. <~ hour's 
exercise. > 
Tea <eaten in cell. > 
Inmates unlocked and free to asso-
ciate on the wings. Evening 
classes and gym sessions take 
place and on certain evenings 
in the week prisoners may take 
exercise outside. 
<Schedule reported at H. M. P Gartree, 1984 CRC, 74) 
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It would be naive to suggest as perhaps these 
quotations do - that the more things change in prisons 
the more they remain the same. Clearly, different 
penal theories, manifested in different emphases in 
practice, have enjoyed priority in two centuries of 
incarceration. Then, 
making an 
practices. 
to realise 
impact on 
too, technology brings changes, 
penal theory through penal 
Finally, practices fail, to 
the aims of theory. For 
some extent, 
example, an 
administrator may find that the chief obstacle to some 
form of rehabilitation is financial; equally, an 
administrator needs to balance a legislature's calls 
for punitive regimes against difficulties in 
maintaining control over the prisoners. 
Imprisonment is a milder form of punishment than 
many of its predecessors. The Enlightenment view of 
human nature counselled an attitude toward the human 
core that closely resembled respect. That core was 
not to be savaged by torture. Rather, a programme of 
measures was developed that was intended to provide 
greater control over the subject's future behaviour. 
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In my examination of penal anthropology, each 
theory of punishment was seen to exhibit a distinctive 
view of human nature. In this chapter, I step back 
from differences between retribution and deterrence or 
rehabilitation. I have argued against the categorical 
distinction between the innocent and the guilty in 
retribution. 
intensified. 
In prison practice, that divide is 
Philosophers may debate fine points 
between penal theories, but in prison the images break 
down to two: the keeper and the kept. It is basic to 
coercion that the claim to truth of one side be 
vindicated, and that the views of the other side be 
dismissed. 
The argument that follows explores the two sides 
of caging people. I compare the idea of controlling a 
person's space to the caged person's interpretation of 
the experience. My analysis takes us beyond questions 
of the perception of space to doubts about the 
concept, 'the deprivation of liberty'. On one hand, 
the sculpting of space is intentional; penal theory 
uses space not only to confine, but to achieve an 
impact upon the prisoner. On the other hand, the 
prisoner is not a blank tablet being inscribed, but 
has the power to interpret a personal experience of 
being caged. 
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In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault 
elucidates a rationale beneath penal practices in all 
their diversity. 
What one is trying to restore in [ thel technique 
of correction is not so much the juridical 
subject, who is caught up in the interests of the 
social pact, but the obedient subject, the 
individual subjected to habits, rules, orders, an 
authority that is exercised continually around him 
and upon him, and which he must allow to function 
automatically in him. 
<Foucault, 128-129) 
Foucault's exhaustive study of the methodology of 
control within prisons includes the ordering of 
activities in time (as in the schedules with which I 
began this chapter). One could equally examine 
principles of surveillance (seeing without being 
observed), or the control of discourse (through the 
rule of silence or censorship of mail>. Each of these 
spheres would be a fitting setting for an analysis of 
the control of one group <prisoners) by another <their 
keepers). I follow Foucault in focusing upon the 
control of space. 
In the first section I present Foucault's 
understanding of the role of sculpted space in the 
prison enterprise. His description captures the ideal 
of control over the prisoner. Obviously, the purposes 
of this control may differ <whether rehabilitative or 
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simply to incapacitate). In the second sect ion, I 
present a view of perception which counters the 
assumptions of sculpted space. The phenomenology of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty illuminates the power of the 
individual to confer meaning on her/his own 
experience. More to the point, Merleau-Ponty' s view 
of percept ion is anchored in the not ion of embodied 
knowledgei i.e., he believes that the body has a 
crucial role, not only in perception, but in habits, 
skills, and familiarity with our immediate 
environment. <Hence our embodied knowledge helps us 
to understand a prisoner's experience of a cell.) 
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Michel Foucault devotes great attention to the 
role of the human body in penal practices. He argues 
hospitals, that key social institutions schools, 
barracks, monasteries - developed a sense of the human 
body as a tool or machine. The bo<;iy became 'use-
able', in a curious inversion. Rather than applying 
the physical properties of the body to mechanical 
of building machines led engineering, the experience 
to working the human body lil<e 
was calculated to manipulate 
Training maximum efficiency. 
calisthenics in the 
a machine. Training 
bodies in pursuit of 
techniques included 
army, routines of cleaning 
hospitals, exercises by rote in schools. 
Corporal punishment 
punishment used the body 
attacked the body; the 
to reach the person. 
in 
new 
The 
change of focus fuelled hopes for reforming criminals, 
but the techniques of manipulating the body can be 
used for many pur poses <retributive and det err en t as 
well as rehabilitative.) Punishment was made more 
efficient by enabling those in authority to obtain 
holds upon the body at distinct points. The body was 
no longer an example for others, ritualistically 
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evaluated 
but 
and 
rather, 
utilised. 
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a machine that could be 
The new philosophy of 
punishment saw the body as a collection of cogs, 
gears, levers to be exploited. The new penology was 
built upon the image of the malleable body. 
A key technique in the control of prisoners' 
bodies is the sculpting of space. This technique 
serves to distribute the prisoners throughout a prison 
facility, but it goes further to provide opportunities 
of control over the prisoner's mind. For Foucault, 
the art of distribution, of manipulating the space in 
which the prisoner is confined, is essential to the 
methodology of controlling, directing and exploiting 
the human forces within prisons. 
In· rough terms, the control of space requires a 
principle of enclosure. A space is marked off for a 
purpose, and all other activities are banned. 
Clearly, 
penal 
the technique 
practice, the 
pre-dated 
technique 
prisons. But, for 
was revel uti onary. 
Gradually, human traffic in and out of prisons was 
regulated; prisons were restricted to a punitive 
function. Debtors and their families could be 
excluded. Staff would be hired to prevent contact 
between prisoners and society. The prison pubs were 
shut. Enclosure made prisons a laboratory of human 
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behaviour and ensured that the prisoner was 
incapacitated from preying on other citizens. 
Obviously, simple enclosure is insufficient to 
establish patterns of discipline. Thus, the enclosure 
is partitioned, according to discrete functions of 
space. The enclosure brought a group of people 
together as prisoners. Partitioning re-divided 
them, in service to the needs of the institution. 
John Howard recommended separate confinement for each 
felon. The sexes are separated; old felons are kept 
from young delinquents. 
Partitioning means that each body can be assigned 
. 
to its own space, thus increasing the potential of the 
authority to control that space. Random movement 
within the enclosure is eliminated. Communication 
between prisoners is ordered. Absences and the 
performance of tasks are open to observation and 
document at ion. 
The technique leads to a finely honed skill of 
matching a space to its intended functions. Useful 
space became determinative of the administration of 
large groups of people in a number of settings. In 
school, functional architecture met the needs of par-
ticular groups of students. Hospitals could distri-
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bute patients with respect to the nature of specific 
ills. Industry divided a factory enclosure according 
to the tasks relevant to each stage of production. 
A final benefit of this 'spatial technique' is 
that the human units are inter-changeable. Each body 
can be inserted into a partitioned space without hav-
ing to alter the space to suit an individual person-
ality. It is the space that defines the occupant. 
In the ideal of prison space the prisoner is the 
object of all purposive activity. The prison is engi-
neered to favour a basic technique of control, namely 
surveillance. Foucault points to a profound inversion 
in criminal just ice: the theatrical ceremonies of 
capital punishment concentrated the attention: of the 
mob upon the few- vil1.ains; -in mocfern penology, the new 
econol'liy stipulates that one or two inspectors should 
observe and discipline a mass of offenders. 
Surveillance is enhanced through a subtle 
sculpting of space. Each prisoner must know that she 
is subject to observation at any time without having 
any way to verify or evade the surveillance. 
Bentham's Panopticon is seen by Foucault as an ideal 
of penal discipline for this reason, though it is fair 
to add that practice has rarely achieved truly 
unilateral vision. 
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Allied to the ideal of the ubiquitous eye is the 
complete control of the prisoner's activities. Each 
prisoner can be defined, not only by a cell space, but 
by assigned tasks. Three aspects of controlled 
activity are the structuring of time, of movement, and 
the alignment of bodies with tools or products. 
The essence of controlling activity is the power 
to link bodies to objects that define them. Posture, 
gesture, physical stance are sculpted to make the 
performance of tasks more efficient, but a key by-
product is the docile nature produced in the worker. 
Foucault cites a military ordinance: 
'Bring the weapon forward. In three stages. 
Raise the rifle with the right hand, bringing it 
close to the body so as to hold it perpendicular 
with the right knee, the end of the barrel at eye 
level, grasping it by striking it with the right 
hand ... ' 
<Foucault, 153) 
There are two series to this discipline: 
the object <the rifle) and that of the body. 
that of 
Each 
body part is correlated to its object-partner. The 
hand/the barrel; arm/stock; knee/hammer. Metaphori-
cally, we might say that the body is connected to the 
object that defines it by a thread. Human behaviour 
is directed by a subtle adjustment of that thread. 
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It would be easy, at this point, to describe a 
modern prison in ways that demonstrate the accuracy of 
Foucault' s case. 
perimeter wall. 
There is the broad enclosure of the 
There are functional partitions: 
cells, dining areas, administration block, segregation 
wing. Human units are distributed; and they are 
inter-changeable. A number fills a cell. Prisoners 
are taught a correct way to keep their cells; the 
approved footwear and clothing have been worn by 
others. Foucault is not to be faulted for his powers 
of description, 
It is essential, though, to grasp his intent. He 
argues that there is a deliberate policy applying 
techniques 
practices. 
producing 
of 
a 
control 
And, he 
population 
throughout the web of penal 
argues that this method of 
of manipulable delinquents 
actually works. 
Foucault writes of early nineteenth century 
prisons. His thesis for penal history is that the 
modern prison could not have emerged without the prior 
evolution of a penal anthropology based on the 
of vulnerability 
manipulation. 
without the penal 
human nature to control and 
I would argue 
Nor could prisons have developed 
technology to order its operations. 
that policies and practices of 
-24-4-
phenomenology 
imprisonment are founded upon an identifiable web of 
post-Enlightenment convictions about human beings. 
This penal anthropology - the foundation not only 
of rehabi 1 it at ion, but prison practice in general 
includes three aspects: 1 
1) a view of knowledge that presupposes a passive 
role on the part of the knower; 
2) atomism, that splinters experience into cate-
gories, e. g. , thought If eeling, human/ animal, 
freedom/determinism; 
3) reductivism, assuming that the most meaningful 
dimensions of life are those which are easiest to 
measure, observe, quantify. 
The influence of materialism is particularly strong in 
the last two traits. 
A number of aspects gained from Foucault's 
disciplines of control can be identified as forms of 
reductivism, atomism or passive epistemology. Indeed, 
we might say generally that the practice of punishment 
makes little sense apart from a passive punishee. But 
that is to anticipate. 
These characteristics are used in a general criticism of 
critical thought in: Jerry H. Gill, On Knowing God. 
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The functional partitioning of space presumes that 
space can be sculpted to serve discrete functions. 
There is a not ion of pre-packaged experience, obvious 
in the earliest prison designs: a workshop here, 
sleeping quarters there. Multi -purpose space allows 
disorder, unpredictability, and reduced efficiency. 
Ambiguity in architecture also means that the 
behaviour of prisoners is more difficult to control. 
Prisons, schools, 
exhibit features of 
hospitals, factories, 
purposive partitioning. 
homes 
Yet, 
there is a range of rigidity, from the fairly informal 
spaces of the home, through the task-oriented offices 
and schoolrooms, to the highly structured space of the 
maximum security prison. To define the purpose of a 
space precisely it is necessary to deny personhood to 
some degree obvious enough on the shop floor. 
Personhood is attacked by denying spontaneity, but 
also by the splintering effects of distribution. This 
fragments personhood by linking only some aspects to 
the functional space. 
Atomism features in many aspects of prisons, espe-
cially in the various means of tying prisoners to sig-
nificant objects. The monotonous tasks prisoners are 
assigned are examples, as are character-less uniforms, 
bland bed-linens and food trays, prison issue tooth 
powder. Earlier, in discussing partitioning, Foucault 
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stated that the function of the space determined the 
functions of the person-occupant. In matching a 
prisoner with some significant object, the function of 
that object determines the function of the body. 
Inter-changeability requires a deeper reduction of 
personhood. Certain spheres of experience are 
bracketed off as irrelevant to the unit's purpose. 
This tendency is common to social institutions. The 
soldier's love life, a nurse's interest in recent 
German cinema, a student's political activities 
these are dismissed as irrelevant. 
In prison, the relevant aspects of the 
individual's life are the offence, and the security 
rating. 
burglar, 
One prisoner 
a third, a sex 
is a murderer, another, a 
the prisoner's 
significance 
religious faith. 
offender. Other aspects of 
life may have great personal 
education, sexuality, family ties, 
But these are subsumed under the 
requirements of security. However import ant they may 
be to an offender, these dimensions will be ignored to 
the extent that they seem to disrupt the smooth 
running of the prison. They are lopped off, bracketed 
out, presumably without undue damage to one's dignity. 
Reduced, in this sense, to a mechanism, prisoners 
find that opportunities for personal expression are 
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drastically restricted. The disciplines spelled out 
by 
the 
Foucault are 
techniques 
performed 
may be 
upon the 
applied 
prisoner. 
in pursuit 
True, 
of 
reformative goals. 
docile, innocuous. 
The prisoner is supposed to emerge 
But passivity is basic to other 
functions of prisons as well. 
The 'Just Deserts' school of retribution rejects 
any suggest ion that an offender might take an active 
role in the aftermath of an offence. Likewise, there 
are obvious links between passivity and the aims of 
deterrence. And beneath these general points is a 
daily routine in which 
prisoner is continuously 
Prisoners are routinely 
the passive role of the 
impressed upon each one. 
required to adopt passive 
attitudes. 
<especially 
spoken to. 
decided upon 
For example, they are frequently told 
during induction) to speak only when 
Whole blocks of the prisoner's life are 
without any opportunity for her/him to 
contribute to the decision-making process. 
My concern in this chapter, however, is not the 
explicit interactions between prisoner and keeper. 
Rather, the focus is here upon the messages intended 
by the imposed physical experience of imprisonment. 
Inherent in the practices of incarceration is an 
unmitigated assault on personal privacy. The prison 
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regimen, a discipline for the body, helps to impress 
upon the prisoner the claim that the viewpoint of the 
keeper is objective; the prisoner's own perspectives 
on reality are defective. 
The brick walls around the courtyard reached as 
high as the catwalk, and they were closed over the 
top by a heavy wire grid resting on steel beams 
and crossbeams, so that you never saw the sky 
unimpeded, but always blocked off in small 
squares. 
(Breytenbach, 139) 
I came to know the cage well. It had a 
large cage front which cut the cell in half and it 
had the effect of making one feel very small. 
<Boyle, SF, 218) 
E-Wing was regarded for many years as a place in 
which inmates were 'broken'. 
<Cohen & Taylor, 12> 
The success or failure of penal practices built 
upon the techniques of moulding the prisoners' bodies 
is a moot question. The variable factors are 
exceedingly numerous; the goals are vague; the extent 
to which basic principles are practicable is open to 
quest ion. In order to explore the penal technique in 
further depth the underlying assumptions about the 
body must be contrasted to an alternative view. This 
is provided by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
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My true life is in the unspoken words of my body 
- Ezra Pound 
The view that the prisoner can be inscribed upon 
continues to ·permeate the prisons despite two 
centuries of reform. The key anthropological image is 
that of the malleable body. I have argued that this 
image is characterised by atomism, reductivism, and an 
expectation of passivity on the part of the prisoner. 
The section to follow takes us far from 
imprisonment and the assumptions of penal techniques. 
I have suggested that the idea of a penal technology -
whatever practical forms it may take depends upon 
the image of the malleable body. If I am to counter 
this view and provide an alternative paradigm of the 
body's role in knowing, it is inevitable that the 
discussion will become quite abstract and complicated. 
However, it is my view that Merleau-Ponty's 
epistemology is truer to human experience than is the 
malleable body image upon which imprisonment depends. 
-250-
phenomenology 
In his major work, Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty examines images of the human body. His 
concern is chiefly to illuminate the shortcomings of 
empiricist 
knowledge. 
the body 
mechanism. 
and rationalist understandings of 
For example, in associationist psychology, 
is segmented, and frequently reduced to a 
One could assume that persons come to 
inhabit their bodies gradually, integrating bits of 
information picked up accidentally about various body 
parts in isolation. 
Merleau-Ponty' s rendering of the body image is 
much more fluid and outward-looking. He utterly 
rejects the view that my own body is <for me) simply 
one object among all others. Rather, he argues that 
my body is constitutive of my whole world. My .body 
determines my posture toward the entire world of 
sensory information. In short, one's body is a basic 
agent of learning and knowledge. 
This body image obviously counters the assumption 
that the body is a passive receptor, that stimuli are 
the sole means of shaping my perceptions. The active 
quality of human knowing contrasts starkly with the 
passivity inherent in the image of the malleable body. 
Yet, Merleau-Ponty is sensitive to the fact that my 
body is in some sense an object. As Jerry Gill 
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writes, "the obvious but nonetheless amazing fact is 
that our bodies are both us and part of the world. 11 
<Gill, 71) 
Again, while the malleable body image can splinter 
experience because it treats body parts as receptors 
of stimuli, Merleau-Ponty's image of the body requires 
a unity of experience. My one body is my sole means 
of encountering my sole world. Obviously, the concept 
of perception is central to Merleau-Ponty• s view of 
knowledge. 
Perception, in this sense, refers to an awareness 
that underlies all cognitive <explicit) knowledge. 
Our experience hits us first at the level of percep-
tion; we bring in a web, an integration of our sensa-
tions. The bright blue of the sky, the smells of the 
marketplace, the chatter of the crowd do not strike us 
in discrete bits, but as one perceptual experience. 
-It is crucial to note that for Merleau-Ponty percep-
t ion is primary, before explicit knowledge, before 
abstractions are developed from concrete experience, 
and beneath any distinctions between subjective and 
objective knowing. <This will have implications when 
we return to the experience of prisons.) 
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My body actively grasps experience, shaping it and 
determining its meaning. A complete view of knowledge 
demands both directions: there is input, but there is 
also a necessary element of active engagement in all 
knowledge. My percept ion is a force that grasps an 
object, frames it in a setting, shapes it and directs 
it according to my own purposes. Perceiving is an 
activity; not a mechanical process. 
In the act of perceiving, I - or my body: at this 
level of perception, the two are the same - determine 
the input in two ways. 
1) I bring to that object my unique past. In seeing a 
red shirt I do not see a textbook standard colour, nor 
do I perceive a speci fie length of light waves. The 
red I see is composed of the reds of my past 
experience: apples, military uniforms, paint, blood, 
roses, jelly-beans. 
2) My body also controls my focus: I choose to see 
distant objects, or near ones; I focus on the warmth 
of a breeze or its smells; on the general chatter or 
the voice of my companion. And, significantly, I act 
as a chef in bringing these elements together in a 
continuous and unique recipe of sensation. 
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There is but one point that brings together the 
disparate input of the present and includes a personal 
past, viz., my body. An observer can examine the rock 
I am looking at, or taste the pizza I smell, but my 
body commands a privilege of perspective. 
Here again, my body is not mer~ly one object 
amongst others. My body is the anchor of my 
knowledge, both in terms of space (its setting) and 
sensation. The body frames the space in which my 
knowing is set, and gives it meaning. I shall follow 
Merleau-Ponty, and refer to space as it is shaped by 
my privilege of perspective as spatiality. He 
provides a vivid image of his claim that the body is 
constitutive of my knowledge: 
Bodily space can be distinguished from external 
space . because it is the darkness needed in 
the theatre to show up the performance. [It isl 
the zone of not-being in front of which 
precise beings, figures, and points can come to 
light. 
<Merleau-Ponty, PP, 100-101) 
In shaping my percept ions of my environment, I am 
not focusing upon my body. Rather, I rely upon my 
body for framing the world I experience. Hence, my 
body image has a constitutive role in my experience of 
space, as well as of objects. 
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We situate ourselves with respect to things and 
space in all activities, such that our whole body is 
involved. My whole body stirs the sauce in the pan, 
or leans upon a desk-top, or lights my pipe. In terms 
of knowledge, my body is the background against which 
meanings are i 11 uminat ed. It is the darkness in the 
theatre, indispensable to the drama on stage. 
Spatiality can be explored further by following 
Merleau-Ponty's rendering of depth. Using other 
images of the body, depth is awkward to explain, and 
it is commonly reduced to 1 breadth viewed from the 
side'. The rationalist might argue that depth must be 
synthesised <intellectually) from the multiplicity of 
data available to the perceiving subject. 
Both empiricist and rationalist images tend to 
begin from 1 0bjective' spacej the question is how the 
subject receives the data concerning spatial reality. 
As such, this is not so much an account of human 
perception as an abstracted, ubiquitous perspective. 
Merleau-Ponty calls this approach to depth 1 God's 
spatiality'. 
"Depth is the most existential of dimen-
sions, because it is not impressed upon the object 
itself, it quite clearly belongs to the perspective 
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and not to 
in 
things. " 
discussing 
<Merleau-Pont y, PP, 256) 
Problems depth reveal a view of 
knowledge that denies our embodiment. 
We do not infer depth from the properties of 
objects. What we see is depth itself. A car driving 
away is not getting smaller; a man two hundred yards 
distant is not smaller than at ten feet. They are <as 
they appear to me) farther away. They are not 
'objectively' farther, because depth is a function of 
our being knowing and embodied creatures. Depth 
reveals that ~he perception of space requires a 
privilege of perspective. 
In using depth to understand spatiality, Merleau-
Ponty makes clear that my knowledge of space is based 
on my body's posture toward the world. In a revealing 
footnote about aesthetic space, he points out that the 
spatiality of an oil painting is not defined strictly 
the wall. The painting by the space it occupies on 
defines its own spatiality. In like manner, space can 
be defined on a stage with a minimum of props or 
spatial buoys. Perhaps the starkest image of all, 
though, is the space which is defined by the dancer. 
Here the capacity of the human body to constitute 
spatiality is unmistakably revealed. 
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Talk of space as an existential dimension, or talk 
of a privilege of perspective may lead to the 
impression that Merleau-Ponty is a champion of 
subjective knowledge. He is not. It is important to 
distinguish between the constitutive role of the body 
and the personal preferences signified by 
'subjectivity'. 
In the first place, Merleau-Ponty stresses that 
objects can inscribe themselves upon us, that we are 
receptive to the input provided by things in our 
world. Second, he is speaking of physical awareness, 
of a familiarity that precedes explicit knowledge. My 
privilege of perspective is not an excuse for egoism, 
but is forced upon me by being a body. 
Perception is always in the mode of the impersonal 
'One'. It is not a personal act enabling me to 
give a fresh significance to my life. The person 
who, in sensory exploration, gives a past to the 
present and directs it towards a future, is not 
myself as an autonomous subject, but myself in so 
far as I have a body and am able to look. 
<Merleau-Ponty, PP, 240) 
My discussion to this point should make clear that 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology counters traditional 
assumptions about what prisons can do to or for 
prisoners. I have stressed the 'wholistic', activist 
thrusts of his thought to mark the contrast between 
the two views of experience. At the very least, 
Merleau-Ponty counsels a respect for prisoners' 
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capacity to define the meanings of the spaces in which 
they are confined. 
I do not wish to present an imbalanced view of his 
phenomenology. I have acknowledged that experience is 
two-way, that objects can inscribe themselves upon me. 
Canst it uti ve of knowledge the body may be, but it is 
also true that one's body is a thing in the world. 
The limitations entailed by my physical finitude 
might be called implantation, in the sense that I 
respond most immediately to the environment in which I 
find myself. I may daydream about a concert hall or 
lakeside bench while I skim a tedious essay in the 
library or while I sit with two others in our cell. 
But at the level of perception, my body interacts with 
my immediate setting. 
Merleau-Ponty writes, "We have said that space is 
existential; we might just as well have said that 
existence is spatial. " CMerleau-Pont y, PP, 293) 
Imagining myself at Lords might make a cricket match 
very real to me, but my body's implant at ion in the 
library calls me back to an engaged attitude toward 
the room, my seat, the whispering behind me. 
Imagination in this sense differs from the level of 
percept ion. 
explicit. 
The imagination is more cognitive, more 
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"Our body and our percept ion always summon us to 
take as the centre of the world that environment with 
which they present 
may gradually come 
workplace, or grow 
us." CMerleau-Ponty, PP, 285) We 
to ignore the noise of our factory 
accustomed to the warmth of our 
surgery or greenhouse. Typically, the intensity of 
the impressions these sensations make is diminished as 
we become implanted in the setting. Our power to 
screen out certain sensations, and focus upon others 
indicates that even in the relatively passive role of 
being implanted there is an active element. 
Implantation illustrates the ways my environment 
itself upon me. inscribes 
sense of 
sometimes 
learning. The term 
It recalls the passive 
'behaviour-setting' is 
that are conducive to used of settings 
certain behaviours. Yet, the body plays an active 
part, and I shall refer to this role as embodiment. 
There are two distinguishable aspects to the 
active role of the body in response to a setting. The 
first is the relation between knowledge and act ingj 
we learn by doing. The second aspect is the way in 
which a body extends itself through objects in order 
to gain mediated knowledge. 
turn. 
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Merleau-Ponty alludes to Husserl to claim that the 
basis of knowledge is not 'I think', but 'I can'. "We 
experience a perception and its horizon 'in action' 
rather than by 'posing' them or explicitly 'knowing' 
them." <Merleau-Ponty, PLS, 196) We learn <and show 
our knowledge of) the dimensions of a room- e.g., the 
distance from the refrigerator to the oven in our 
kitchen in activity within the room. In a similar 
manner, I do not deduce the functions of my comb each 
time I use it, but demonstrate an embodied knowledge 
of it in the activity of shaping my hair. 
Purposive activity is linked to the embodied 
knowledge of objects. The painter's hands come to 
know the qualities of each brush; the blind person's 
palm tells her what is at the tip of her cane; my 
body realises familiarity with a particular motorbike 
in the act of riding it. Here again, knowledge in 
action, as opposed to abstract knowledge, is the 
foundation of our relations with the world. 
Here I must draw out a profound difference between 
Merleau-Ponty and Foucault. In the latter's rendering 
of penal disciplines, the prisoner was manipulated by 
imposing discipline on bodies, using spaces and things 
as levers, handles. In Merleau-Ponty, the subject-
body is the manipulator, the source of the meaning-
bestowing activity. The object does not 
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meaning on the subject. Rather, the person applies 
things to purposive activity. 
The key to my body' s grasp of my kit chen, and to 
my body's knowledge of my motorbike is intentionality. 
This is a difficult concept, since Merleau-Ponty is 
talking about non-cognitive attitudes, postures, 
motions. My explicit purpose may be to find the 
quickest route through London. But I depend upon my 
body's familiarity with my motorbike to perform the 
clutch-work, the braking, the steering etc. These 
movements - while not explicit - require • intentions' 
on the part of my body. 2 
Embodied familiarity means that I do not need to 
be thinking of my kitchen's dimensions in order to 
move through it. The purpose of my activity may be 
the preparation of a meal. Yet, without making 
deliberate decisions, my body directs me through the 
kitchen - from oven to drawer, from refrigerator to 
cupboard. 
2 Equally, I can presume embodied familiarity where it is not 
yet achieved, sometimes with disastrous results. Such a 
miscalculation once resulted in a parting of the ways 
between my motorbike and its rider. 
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As this intentionality is not a conscious 
decision, it may be helpful to imagine us without it. 
Such a person would cross a room without wanting to 
move, watching her own body perform. Her body's 
actions would be events that happened to her. 
Conversely, intentionality allows us to appropriate 
things, and to define their significance by the use to 
which we put them. 
This extension of the body is basic to the 
formation of habits. There is an embodied anchor to 
habit, as it is dependent upon a familiarity borne out 
of long contact between one body and one object, be it 
typewriter, guitar, hat, walking stick or motorbike. 
To get used to a hat, a car, or a stick is to be 
transplanted into the~ or conversely, to 
incorporate them into the bulk of our own body. 
Habit expresses our power of dilating our being in 
the world, of changing our existence by 
appropriating fresh instruments. 
<Merleau-Ponty, PP, 143) 
Merleau-Ponty expands upon the embodied character 
of habit in a brief example of an organist confronting 
an unfamiliar instrument. She does not prepare by 
reading pamphlets on the qualities and temperamental 
natures of the organ in question. Rather, she learns 
the new one by playing it. 
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Here again, it is important to balance the setting 
<the 'implantation' at the new organ) against the 
active role of the subject (in embodiment). The 
organist may need to allow for unusually springy 
pedals or a swell with insufficient volume. Cooking 
in a new kitchen may require one to adapt to an oven 
door that opens the wrong way. My body senses that 
the new front wheel on my motorbike makes the steering 
heavier, and adapts my riding habits accordingly. 
Despite the fact that we can identify specific 
points in habitual behaviour that may pose problems, 
Merleau-Ponty sees the development of habit as a 
process of integration: one body engaging with one 
world. In coming to terms with a new setting, we 
situate ourselves by re-aligning our whole body image 
to meet the new implantation. Habit, then, is our 
power to respond to situations of a particular form 
with a matching embodied solution. 
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The foregoing extended discussion of Merleau-
Ponty' s philosophy provides a sharp contrast to the 
malleable body image of penal theory. In applying his 
unusual view of perception to imprisonment, I shall 
trace the prisoners' experience of prison through 
three points: 
thesis that 
A) Implant at ion, 
prison space is 
in terms of Foucault's 
sculpted to impose 
discipline on the prisoner; B) Embodiment, in terms of 
the prisoners' power to ascribe meaning to the 
space(s) they inhabit; and C) Habits, as lessons to 
take away from prison, or as embodied solutions to 
specific settings. 
In general, implantation in a setting gives us a 
sense of being there, of our bodies' active engagement 
with the environment. Personal experience is 
contingent upon the determinative factors of one's 
surroundings. 
The question for the penal enterprise is whether a 
setting can be sculpted to ensure that one's 
environment will have desired effects upon behaviour. 
Again, although this seems to assume a rehabilitative 
philosophy, retribution, too, requires a sense of 
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implantation. In describing the prison environment as 
punitive, it certainly assumes that the prisoner will 
regard it as such. 
includes in its aim of 
Likewise, deterrent theory 
intimidation the power of 
architecture to inspire fear. Finally, social 
defence, where prisons are intended to incapacitate 
the offender, clearly aims to impose patterns of 
behaviour upon the prisoner through the design of the 
prison setting. Indeed, in terms of a capacity to 
commit harm, the prison's function of incapacitation 
can be said to typify the goals of penal implantation. 
Thus, in 
imprisonment 
pulated; that 
that 
different 
presumes 
ways, each penal 
that implantation 
function of 
can be mani-
meanings can 
prison space 
be 
can 
imposed 
create 
through one's 
total contin-setting; 
gency in convicted human beings. In short, the 
keepers (i.e., society) wish to control the behaviour 
of prisoners, but also to establish a keeper's sense 
of reality as the exclusive truth. 
In their classic study of long-term confinement, 
Stan Cohen and Laurie Taylor tlisti1led th~ prisoners' 
deepest conce~ns.- These included friendship, identity 
and deterioration. The standard literature on sensory 
deprivation, sociological conflict, and contingency is 
cited, but these issues do not appear to impinge as 
deeply upon the prisoners' lives. 
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Despite their disclaimer, contingency underlies 
much of Cohen and Taylor's analysis. The prisoners 
were susceptible to feelings of powerlessness due to 
the prison officers' control of lighting, heat, diet, 
activities, 
implantation, 
etc. Merleau-Ponty, in 
commented that the falling 
discussing 
of night 
provokes feelings of contingency. On the prison wing, 
the abrupt 'lights-out', when the switch is pulled by 
the keepers, ties physical contingency to an 
ideological message of control and dependency. 
Foucault's depiction of the prison enterprise 
describes the prisoners' contingency in the intricate 
detail of the penal techniques and disciplines. In 
the time-table, the distribution of prisoners 
throughout a prison, in regimes of planned activities, 
the prison enterprise sets out to sculpt a particular 
behaviour setting; in other words, to establish 
socially designed implantation. 
Merleau-Ponty' s philosophy requires a paradoxical 
response to this penal enterprise. On one hand, 
embodiment indicates that human activity resists 
manipulation; on the other hand, the power of 
implantation to limit or restrict one's growth seems 
beyond doubt. The prisoner defines the space within 
which she is confined, yet the experience can prove to 
be damaging. 
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I am not arguing that a prison experience can have 
no effect upon a prisoner's conscious reflect ions on 
his past, or upon his/her chances for rehabilitation, 
her role in society. I am saying that the prisoners' 
experience of imprisonment necessarily generates a 
radically different sense of reality from that which 
the prison is designed to inculcate. 
1) Fr·om 
prisoner 
a passive perspective 
is implanted as a 
(implantation) 
prisoner, and 
the 
the 
behaviour-setting encourages prisoner-responses rather 
than those more typical of the keeper. 
2) From the active embodiment view, the prisoners' 
privilege of perspective allows them to assign mean-
ings to the prison experience that resist alternative 
(keepers') interpretations. 
I am arguing, then, that Merleau-Ponty describes 
an inviolable core in the human individual Cwhether or 
not we wish to ascribe to individuals a soul, person-
hood, an inner light, or even sel fhood. ) At the level 
of percept ion, the prisoners exercise a sovereignty 
over meaning. This does not imply that prisoners need 
be st.ubborn or rebellious in imposing their meaning 
upon their cell Ct his, again, is cognitive, not 
perceptual). Rather, the experience of inhabiting a 
prison as prisoner nurtures a sense of truth at 
variance with that impressed upon one by the keeper. 
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Breyten Breytenbach captures with remarkable 
clarity the fine balance between the power of the 
system to destroy and debilitate on one hand, and the 
prisoners' personal powers to confer meaning on the 
other·. He describes the deterioration attendant upon 
extended solitary confinement: 
You watch yourself changing, giving in to certain 
things, becoming paranoiac, staring at the wall, 
living with an ear to the door and yet cringing at 
the slightest noise. 
<Breytenbach, 130) 
As for changes in personality, you cannot gauge the 
damage because, in solitary, you have nothing against 
which to measure. .. and this damage is permanent 
even though you learn to live with it, however well 
camouflaged. " CLoc. cit. ) 
But Breytenbach also witnesses to the prisoners' 
awesome power to draw every speck of significance from 
their spartan setting: 
You grow rich with the richness of the very poor. 
A blanket really is a blanket and though it is 
grey it has a million colours in it. A bird, when 
it comes to nest at night ... really does make a 
very wide range of comments and it has a rich 
relationship with its mate. 
<Breytenbach, 130-131) 
The prison writings of Jean Genet demonstrate the 
extremes to which the prisoner defines the prison ex-
perience. In The Miracle of the Rose, shackles become 
garlands of roses, and his prison-issue cap, a halo. 
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Jimmy Boyle likewise testifies to the prisoners' 
power to bestow meaning. After a fight with prison 
officers he is thrown into a punishment cell <yet 
again). His experience of space defined by his 
keepers as punitive is revealing. "Being in this bare 
cell, with the roughcast walls, was almost like seeing 
an old friend." <Boyle, 181-182) 
To be clear, I must recall the distinction between 
a person's 
the sense 
conscious, deliberate interpretations and 
of reality generated by an embodied 
perception of the setting. Obviously, to see caps as 
halos or the punishment block as an old friend demands 
a sensitivity to symbolism. I would argue, though, 
that these conscious metaphors are propelled by a 
tacit privilege of perspective. The prisoners' 
experience is both that of embodied sovereignty over 
meaning, 1. e., the power to see roughcast walls as 
friendly, and implantation, trapping the person in a 
prisoner's perspective of the setting. 
The disparity between the person's perspective 
before incarceration and as prisoner can give rise to 
longings that might otherwise seem irrational. For 
the walls deny a prisoner freedom of instance, 
movement an obvious deprivation - but the walls also 
take the experience of distance. Both Jimmy Boyle and 
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Breyten Breytenbach (cited above) write of their 
longing for a sight of the moon. Jean Genet writes: 
The windows are forbidden us . And sometimes 
we commit an offence so as to be sent to the hole 
where at night we can see through the skylight 
. . a patch of starry sky and, even more rarely, 
a piece of moon. 
<Genet, 75) 
Genet commits an infraction on the slim chance 
that, confined in the punishment cell, he can catch a 
glimpse of the moon. The logic of his behaviour is 
certainly complex. However, Merleau-Ponty' s concepts 
supply revealing clues. In the first place, the 
1 inviolable core' to which I referred implies that 
Genet is free to interpret confinement to 1 the hole' 
as a benefit, and further, that the gain of an unusual 
experience <seeing the moon, seeing distance) can spur 
on his otherwise senseless action. 
More important, because depth belongs to the 
perspective <1. e., to the perceiving body's privileged 
position) his sensation of depth brings home to Genet 
his power to constitute spatiality. Not only can he 
focus upon near or far objects, not only is the 
breadth of perspective wider, but implicit in the 
greater range is an increased freedom of movement. If 
these interpretations of Merleau-Ponty are accurate, 
then a lack of depth impresses the prisoner not only 
with limited movement, but also with the limitations 
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on his/her potential to constitute a frame of space. 
<This recalls Breytenbach' s concern that his view of 
the sky was always blocked off.) 
Finally, I would argue that the crucial attraction 
of the sight may in fact be its association for the 
prisoner with the privileged perspective which he is 
categorically denied, viz., that of his keeper or 
<less polemically) that of his former, free self. The 
roots of Genet's action may lie in an attempt to 
recapture the feeling of sel f-det erminat ion. It is 
this sort of behaviour that Erving Goffman labels a 
'removal activity'; its power lies in its capacity to 
transport the prisoner vicariously out of the prison. 3 
The tension I have drawn from Merleau-Ponty, 
between the prisoners' power to label the setting and 
the keepers' attempt to impose significance must be 
complicated further by a second-level tension inherent 
in imprisonment. I have said that the red shirt I see 
is composed of reds I have previously experienced. I 
have also written of implantation in a library 
Erving Goffman, Asylum~ 309 ff. See further my discussion 
of sexual activity as a removal activity, in Sexuality, 
below. 
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recalling me from daydreams of lakeside benches or a 
match at Lords. These examples help to explain the 
prisoners' relationship with the outside world. 
Stan Cohen and Laurie Taylor write of adaptive 
strategies to cope with the deprivation of social 
contact. For the majority of prisoners, the outside 
world presents a tantalising mixture of occasional 
contact (which raises hopes), and the return to the 
closed world of the prison. The outside seeps in 
through television, visits, comments by prison 
officers, books, other prisoners. Merleau-Ponty 
describes the pain in terms of his own philosophy: 
Our body and our perception always summon us to 
take as the centre of the world that environment 
with which they present us. But this environment 
is not necessarily that of our own life. I can be 
• somewhere else' while staying here, and if I am 
kept away from what I love, I feel out of touch 
with real life. 
<Merleau-Ponty, P~ 286> 
It is certain that the prisoners' perceptual envi-
ronment differs from that of persons in society. Our 
embodied patterns - suited to catching the bus, shop-
ping for food, another late night at the pub - are 
poorly suited to the prisoners' setting. Yet, inevi-
tably, the outsider's embodied knowledge impinges on 
the prisoners' experience. Just as I might make the 
cricket match intensely real as I sit in the library, 
so the outside environment lives on in the embodied 
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knowledge of prisoners. With or without television, 
various sensations can reawaken that world. 
Sometimes, especially in the evening, a noise from 
the street may reach the prisoner in his cell. An 
automobile sounds its horn. The bell of a trolley 
car rings out in the distance. Instantaneously, 
the image of the illuminated streets and of that 
trolley car appears in your mind's eye. You see 
the conductor taking the steering bar into his 
wool-gloved hands. You see everything. You 
breathe in the smell of asphalt and gasoline. And 
then everything vanishes. 
<Victor Serge, 41) 
The prisoners' implant at ion in the prison ret urns 
him to the regimes aimed at the malleable body. The 
enclosure serves the purpose of isolating the prisoner 
from a personal past. In Foucault's rendering of 
penal techniques, the docile body of the prisoner is 
susceptible to sculpting by the keepers. It is 
assumed by rehabilitative justifications of prisons 
that good habits can be instilled, that virtue can be 
fabricated through architecture. 
Judges make the same assumption when they sentence 
someone to incarceration in the hope that the 
experience may instil discipline. The notorious 
Prison Rule One states: 
The purpose of training and treatment of convicted 
prisoners shall be to encourage and assist them to 
lead a good and useful life. 
<Cited in Plotnikoff, 26) 
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Foucault's discussion of the alignment of the 
soldier's body with the parts of a weapon makes clear 
that Foucault takes seriously the role of the body in 
instilling habits of industry. Indeed, he argues that 
the prisoner's body is the lever used to make 
adjustments in the personality. 
Here is an empiricist's understanding of the body, 
as segments which serve distinct functions, as 
receptors of stimuli. To press this body image to 
to assume absurdity, the malleable body would seem 
that the prisoner feels pain in the punishment cell, 
curiosity in the education wing, rests content in 
one's own cell, is hungry in the dining hall. 
If we are to apply Merleau-Ponty' s alternative 
body image, we must recognise that habits meet the 
needs of 
unique 
settings 
particular 
settings 
persons (i.e., bodies) in their 
and that they perceive these 
as wholes. At the level of embodied 
perception <the foundation of habit) the prisoner does 
not experience a smell, a view, a coolness. He 
experiences the sole world of the prison. 
is not perceived as a place of punishment 
be an explicit interpretation - or of 
The prison 
this would 
reform or of 
authority and obedience. Rather, the prison exper-
ience is a unity of smells, sights, sounds, spaces. 
-274--
You are buried to what you know as normal life 
outside: the rhythms of day and night, of the 
seasons of the year butterflies and 
croissants . the million little things which 
weave the cloth your life consists of. This death 
world is filled with sounds you never imagined, 
steel on steel, fear and rage; with the pervasive 
smells of not very clean men <with no joy> cooped 
up in a restricted area, of evacuation and badly 
cooked food, of clothes worn for too long by too 
many bodies . . . 
<Breyt en bach, 125) 
phenomenology 
It is against this whole setting that a prisoner 
moulds habits. For Merleau-Pont y, a habit is neither 
a mental solution to a problem, nor is it a patterning 
of instinctive responses. Habit is instead a 
readjustment of the body image in relation to a 
particular problem in a particular setting. If this 
is a more accurate understanding of habits, then we 
should expect the prisoner - after leaving behind the 
prison environment to leave behind the habits 
required by that setting. 
The prison world is not totally different from the 
wider society. Hence, the transition to life outside 
is a complicated process of shedding some habits 
quickly, retaining others for long periods all of 
which depends upon the settings to which the prisoner 
is released. For example, a number of newly released 
people have waited for me to open doors for them, 
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e. g.' at a post office or rail station. One can 
assume that the habitual behaviour of waiting for an 
officer to open a gate or door is not long retained. 
It remains unclear why some habits are retained 
and others are easily shed. There is no necessary 
link between the retention of behaviour patterns and 
the extent to which the habits are deemed desirable by 
penal theories. Merleau-Ponty provides a clue, but it 
does not fully answer the problem. 
The subject does not weld together individual 
movements and individual stimuli but acquires the 
power to respond with a certain type of solution 
to situations of a general form. 
<Merleau-Ponty, PP, 142) 
Cohen and Taylor write of a prisoner's habits of 
self-protection in prison, erecting a screen or 
barrier. This is not easy to remove after release, 
inappropriate as it may be to the outside society. 
From a subjective view, the outside society may be 
threatening as a 'general form' though the 
specific sources of threat will differ from those in 
prison. The person's wall or barrier will be 
maintained by the sense of danger. Where the 
artificiality of the prison environment differs most 
from the lifestyles and settings available to the 
prisoner upon release, the imposed habits of industry 
are quickly relinquished. 
-276-
The Human Dimension 
In speaking of the principle of enclosure I 
implied that the prison space serves the functions of 
imprisonment like hospitals organise the sick, like 
schools provide for students, like the factories 
distribute the energy of labourers. But there is a 
crucial difference. As David Canter remarks in a 
recent article, 4 medical practices can be performed 
outside of the hospital <in first aid, for instance); 
equally, books, television, discussions can educate, 
quite apart from school buildings. The prison 
enclosure, however, is intrinsic to the practices of 
imprisonment. Canter adds that to use the term 
imprisonment for any activity outside of prisons is 
metaphorical. 
I have said that the meanings of spaces can be 
flexible or relatively rigid. Flexible spaces tend to 
.d. David Canter, "Existing Psychological Research into Prison 
Design and Use," [minor case used in original title] 
printed in Bottoms & Light, 214-227. 
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be more informal and less structured. Prisons, 1 ike 
barracks, monasteries, etc., distribute human fm~ces 
and bracket out irrelevant activities. Structure is 
not harmful in itself, but must be seen as an instru-
ment that serves a variety of aims. In the factory, 
rigid structure may de-personalise workers, yet this 
makes possible high efficiency and productivity. 
In the practice of imprisonment, enclosure is 
devoted 
between 
to 
the 
incapacitation, 
innocent and the 
to marking 
guilty, to 
the divide 
disciplines 
that control behaviour, to punishment, and perhaps to 
the space is rehabilitation. As I have said, 
dedicated to the structured implantation of prisoners' 
passivity. To say that the rigidly defined enclosure 
is intrinsic to imprisonment is to say that the prison 
is materially and symbolically coercive. 
Coercion may not involve harm to one's physiology. 
Rather, it attacks one's freedom. In discussing 
Foucault's disciplines, I have tried to illuminate the 
means by which the prison enterprise systematically 
attacks freedom. In expounding Merleau-Ponty' s 
phenomenology- including 'privilege of perspective', 
'embodied intentionality' 
a sense of freedom that 
and habits - I have sketched 
is 
sole method of punishment 
truly 
that 
inalienable. 
can eliminate 
person's powers of embodiment is execution. 
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The 
a 
Harm to prisoners is not a 
matter. We can check thousands of 
phenomenology 
purely empirical 
prisoners' fingers 
for chipped nails, and find that they are actually 
better off than the social norm. We can compile 
masses of data on health, sensory performance, motor 
skills, to demonstrate that the prisoner is no worse 
off following lengthy incarceration. In short, we can 
convince ourselves that prisons do not harm by 
rigorously ignoring the dimensions of human experience 
where the harm is most obvious. 
If we accept Merleau-Ponty's body image, human 
experience cannot be summed up as the result of 
stimuli making their impact upon a blank tablet, nor 
is knowledge an abstract game played by a ghost in the 
machine. To be human is to be embodied, incarnate. 
Hence, the 'penal disciplines' performed upon the body 
are an attack upon the human being, upon the person. 
<This, of course, is Foucault's thesis.) 
I have argued that these punitive techniques of-
fend human dignity in their reductivism, atomism, and 
in an assumption of 
ing, the empiricist 
prisoners' passivity. <In pass-
approach to the harms of prisons 
which demands quantifiable evidence as the sole proof 
is itself reductivist, and atomistic. A great deal of 
harm is to relations between individuals, or to whole-
ness rather than to any single segment of a person. ) 
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phenomenology 
Imprisonment is reductivist in r~gimes that induce 
physical routines and distribute prisoners' bodies 
throughout the prison, and in penal theories claiming 
that discipline will transform the prisoners' atti-
tudes and behaviour. It is also reductivist in deter-
mining the distribution of prisoners on the basis of 
the offence and the security rating. Indeed, criminal 
justice is reductivist in labelling some people guilty 
<thus permeated with guilt), and others innocent. 
It is atomistic in methods that segment one aspect 
of the prisoners' lives from other aspects; e. g., in 
choosing the destination of a 'ghosted' prisoner 
without including the prisoner in the decision, or 
without due regard for a 'wholistic' grasp of the 
prisoner's own needs. 
The allocation of inmates is an entirely 
administrative procedure . The preferences of 
the inmate and the location of his family are 
normally taken into account, but these factors are 
liable to be outweighed by other considerations 
when a transfer is effected in the interests of 
maintaining good order. 
<Home Office, 6 ) 
Home Office, <1985) Report of the Committee on the Prison 
Disciplinary Syste~ <Prior Report>, cited by Andrew 
Rutherford in Bottoms & Light, 65. 
-280-
is 
The anthropological core of imprisonment, 
the passivity of the prisoner. 
phenomenology 
however·, 
From a 
rehabilitation view, the prisoner is the passive 
the cure. In retribution, recipient of 
is subjected to punishment. In social 
the prisoner 
defence, the 
goal is the incapacitation of the prisoner. 
Passivity is presupposed in the disciplines 
intended to inscribe upon the prisoner the lessons of 
rehabilitation, or the pains of retribution, or the 
docility at the heart of social defence. Further, 
passivity is expected of the prisoner in response to 
such coercive shaping. This is not to say that prison 
regimes anticipate no resistance from prisoners. 
Rather, eventual passivity is the goal of the penal 
disciplines. 
Hopes for passivity are realised in retribution 
when the prisoner simply 'does his bird', 'takes his 
punishment', becomes the object of punishment. 
Passivity is achieved in social defence when the 
prisoner is incapable of 
Rehabilitation seems to 
inflicting harm upon others. 
offer the most for prisoner 
activity, yet passivity is hoped for in the sense of 
an acceptance of the keeper's vie~ in the sense of a 
'proper' channeling of the prisoners' post-release 
expectations; or in labelling oneself defective and in 
wilful submission to treatment. 
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I have argued following Merleau-Ponty that 
this passivity, this malleable body, is alien to human 
experience. I have argued that we cannot evade our 
privilege of perspective; and the perspective of a 
penitent or rehabilitated prisoner will remain 
<literally and physically) a prisoner's perspective. 
Where the hopes for passivity - i.e. for the suc-
cess of penal theories - are frustrated, it is likely 
that a two-fold response should obtain. On one hand, 
goals which seem to require a more activist image of 
prisoners will be discarded, and a minimalist notion 
of penal aims will be declared. Second, efforts to 
impose passivity will increasej coercive measures will 
become 
based 
more 
on 
intense. 
the myth 
The 
of 
allure of imprisonment 
the malleable body, 
is 
the 
assumption being that just one turn more on the screw 
of coercion will curtail the disruptive influences of 
individuality, spontaneity, resistance, freedom. 
These broad strokes against penal theory are bound 
to face counter-evidence. There will be prison 
administrators who earnestly work to encourage the 
prisoners' relations with families. There will be 
prison officers who are led by their faith in 
particular prisoners to encourage the active potential 
within the personality. These should not be 
surprising, however, if my argument is valid. 
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Prison practice must 
hypothetical - prisoners. 
reflect awareness of a 
phenomenology 
work with human not 
Hence the prison regime may 
prisoner's active role in 
giving meaning to the 
prisoner' s privilege 
experience, as 
of perspective. 
well as 
<This 
the 
is 
confirmed, too, in the occasional confession by 
administrators that prisoners have a share in •running 
the institution'.) 
At its best, then, prison practice acknowledges 
the equality of keeper and kept, 
control required to maintain order. 
and the mutual 
Michael Jenkins, 
at one time governor of HMP Long Lartin, has written 
that dependence upon control is weak precisely because 
measures of control must be intensified constantly. 
"In an open regime • fairness' has much more meaning 
than power and its reciprocal quality is a better 
contributor to control." <In Bottoms & Light, 265) 
I have examined the thesis of Michel Foucault, 
though, because I am convinced that his general 
picture of the principles of imprisonment is accurate. 
His interpretation of penal theory, and its foundation 
in the image of the malleable body, are not just 
representative, but exemplary. 
A more philosophical criticism of my argument 
would defend the truth-claims of empiricist renderings 
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of the human body against Merleau-Ponty' s views. A 
case could be presented that I have denied that the 
body can be subject to causality. I have not denied 
empiricism, however, so much 
abuses, e. g.' reduct i vi sm. 
as I have opposed its 
<I shall rely upon 
empiricist methods in the chapter to follow, - Prison 
Violence. ) 
In this context, however, it· is the character of 
imprisonment, ·not empiricism, that is the problem. I 
have argued that medicine, education, law, etc. depend 
upon different images of human beings. Medicine must 
bracket out my sense of humour or another's political 
opinions if it is to treat our bodies successfully. 
Medicine and imprisonment both focus upon the body as 
object. 
The key difference is not that I submit 
voluntarily to an opet-ation upon my body, yet I am 
forced into pr·ison. Rather, the difference is that 
medicine treats my body as an organism, which it is. 
Imprisonment uses to my body to treat my will or self-
determination <or freedom) as an object to be shaped, 
which I am not. 
Where 
discarded, 
hopes 
the 
for imposed rehabilitation have been 
commitment to sculpturing the 
prisoner's will takes the form of retribution and 
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control where the goals are passivity and 
incapacitation. Again, Foucault argues that it works. 
I follow Merleau-Ponty to argue that such attacks are 
futile so long as prisoners are embodied persons. 
I have given great attention to the philosophy of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, because it seems to me a far 
more reliable guide to human nature. It is my hope 
that his perspective will shift our anthropological 
axis as we attempt to identify the harms of 
imprisonment, from purely physiological ones to harms 
inflicted upon persons; from merely quantifiable harms 
to the ways in which prison practices damage the 
dignity and integrity of each prisoner. 
Cl am grateful to Phil Mullen, of the Commit tee for Criminal 
Justice, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, for his comments on an 
earlier draft of this chapter. As many of his remarks were 
critical, it will be obvious that he is not to blame for the 
views I express. ) 
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PART TWO: 
THE HARMS OF IMPRISONMENT 
The Harms of Imprisonment 
w.hereas no man should break the law 
the law must not break man either. 
Kenny van Niekirk <Cited in Breytenbach) 
Imprisonment, as a whole, is too large a subject 
for a thesis. One approach (obviously not the one 
taken here) would first define the field of study 
precisely; it would begin by excluding very 
significant aspects of imprisonment. In contrast, 
Part One has forced an open perspective. The dis-
cussions of prison history, the philosophy of retri-
bution and the underlying views of human nature have 
raised quest ions about the purposes of prisons, and 
the presuppositions upon which imprisonment is based. 
My discussions of desert, Beccarian materialism, or 
sinfulness may appear to have been digressions from 
basic concerns about prisons; especially in view of my 
neglect of down-to-earth aspects soaring remand 
populations, education and vocational training 
opportunities, issues of race or gender bias. 
I believe, though, that Part One has clarified the 
prisons' f ai 1 ure to respect the dignity of prisoners. 
Each of the foregoing chapters explored an aspect of 
that failure from a fresh perspective. The different 
approaches in Part One were unified by their value in 
advocating the interests of the prisoner. 
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History demonstrated that the origins of the 
modern prison owed much to social crises and to 
dubious assumptions about human nature. The chapter 
showed that the birth of prisons did not resolve the 
conflict between authority and disorder, but merely 
shifted its setting out of public view. Finally, the 
chapter highlighted basic flaws of imprisonment, which 
undermine the hopes placed in prison reforms; there is 
little evidence that prisons might benefit society 
once penal techniques are refined. 
Retribution showed that the retributive defence of 
punishment depends on a categorical divide between 
offenders and innocent people. The discussion 
separated the vindictive elements of punishment from 
more noble objectives. I argued against the retribu-
tive defence of punishment as pain that the guilty 
deserve. I suggested that retributive models can help 
when we wish to restore wholeness after a crime; i.e., 
when our interests are in fact restorative. Finally, 
I suggested that the harm society 
offenders harms society itself - that 
in practice self-defeating. 
inflicts upon 
retribution is 
In Phenomenology, I explored the notion that 
prison space might be shaped to ensure intended 
changes in the prisoners' behaviour. I cited Michel 
Foucault's analysis of penal philosophy, according to 
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which the prison regime imprints certain habits Cof 
body and mind) upon the prisoner. 
not really an exposition of a 
Phenomenology was 
typical prisoner's 
experience of incarceration, but a critique of the 
epistemology at the heart of imprisonment. 
Phenomenology provides the fulcrum upon which the 
entire thesis turns. The whole of Part One encouraged 
anthropological assumptions of doubts about the 
imprisonment. I questioned the disparity in status 
between innocent citizen and guilty prisoner, and dis-
puted the materialist view that pleasure and pain 
offer a sufficient explanation of human motivation. 
Phenomenology, however, establishes a more basic 
case; namely, that we cannot understand imprisonment 
unless we consider the prisoner's perspective. 
Phenomenology argues that the prisoner holds 
sovereignty over interpretation - just as we do - that 
the prisoner bestows meaning upon the experience. 
Finally, the chapter demonstrates that dignity 
conceived, in this case, as the inviolability of the 
person - is not only a moral conviction, but a basic 
attribute of human beings. 
The manner in which this thesis advocates a 
prisoner's interests is crucial. 
that recognises only two sides 
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Within a framework 
keeper and kept - to 
criticise the keeper is 
for example, I suggest 
to exonerate the l<ept. If, 
that the prison experience 
nurtures combative reactions, one might infer that 
prison not prisoners is to blame for violence 
between prisoners. It might be assumed that I view 
prisoners as universally harmless. 
These assumptions are not justified: the shared 
responsibility discussed in Retribution demonstrates 
that my arguments cannot be construed as excuses for 
the actions of prisoners. Rather, I dispute the claim 
implicit in the expansion 
whole, incarceration is 
of prisons 
beneficial 
that, 
for 
on the 
society. 
Current penal philosophy concedes that prisons do not 
rehabilitate: I argue that the harms of imprisonment 
are of a kind and degree that inevitably contaminate 
society at large. 
In Part Two, I explore three spheres of damage to 
human dignity: 
responsibility. 
prison violence, sexuality and moral 
The significant harms of prison are 
not physical, but emotional and social. 
relationships moreso than 
quality of life more than 
human organisms. While I 
isolated 
measurable 
restrict my 
They concern 
individuals; 
effects upon 
research to 
these three spheres, the approach could easily apply 
to many other areas of prison life. The three clearly 
manifest the prison's assault upon human w~leness. 
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PRISON VXOLENCE 
Here is how it is: You are both alone in his 
cell. You've slipped out a knife (eight-to-ten 
inch blade, doubled-edged). You're holding it 
beside your 1 eg so he can' t see it. The enemy is 
smiling and chattering away about something. You 
see his eyes: green-blue, liquid. He thinks 
you're his fool; he trusts you. You see the 
spot. It's a target between the second and third 
button on his shirt. As you calmly talk and 
smile, you move your left foot to the side to step 
across his right-side body length. A light pivot 
toward him with your right shoulder and the world 
turns upside down: you have sunk the knife to its 
hilt into the middle of his chest. Slowly he 
begins to struggle for his life. As he sinks, you 
will have to kill him fast or get caught. He will 
say 'Why?' or 'No!' Nothing else. You can feel 
his life trembling through the knife in your hand. 
It almost overcomes you, the gentleness of the 
feeling at the center of the coarse act of murder. 
(Jack Henry Abbott) 
Violence in the Prison Setting 
In the late 1960s, the Philadelphia Sheriff's 
Department realised that it had a problem. Every day 
a number of sheriff's vans would appear at the local 
prison to transport prisoners to the city centre 
court rooms. Each van windowless, with no 
compartments packed 40-50 prisoners inside. Each 
day a number of prisoners would be beat en severely 
and/or raped or otherwise sexually assaulted. 
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A member of the committee raised to investigate 
the problem declared: 
The design of the van did not cause the violence 
that this incident represents. The design did 
enable that violence to happen. 
<William Nagel, in Cohen, Cole & Bailey, 106) 
In Phenomenology, I questioned the extent to which 
a prison administration can determine the prisoner's 
perceptions of the prison environment. Clearly, 
however, environment does have an impact upon the 
behaviour of the persons within it. In the 
terminology of Phenomenology, the prisoners' behaviour 
is conditioned by their implantation in a setting 
marked by force. 
Robert Barker has coined the term, 'behaviour-
setting' to label this link between the charac-
teristics of settings and the rituals of behaviour 
that occur within them. Edith Elisabeth Flynn has 
applied Balker's work to illuminate the • ecology' of 
prison violence. She notes that themes of homo-
sexuality, race, politics, gang warfare and hustling' 
(illicit dealings with contraband) predominate in 
explanations of prison violence; situational and 
environmental factors are neglected. She writes of 
situational grievances, referring to frustrations 
indigenous to prisons. 
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Prisons are skewed and unnatural microcosms in 
which inmates are forced to adjust to a highly 
artificial existence characterized by batch 
living, movement in blocks, unceasing 
surveillance, lack of privacy, monotony, enforced 
idleness, coercion, regimentation, and imposed 
activities. 
CE. E. Flynn, in Cohen, Cole & Bailey, 116) 
violence 
In attending to aspects of prison life such as 
monotony or movement in blocks, we leave behind the 
pre-cognitive phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. My 
approach in this chapter draws upon empirical studies 
to explore the problem of prison violence. 
I shall first build upon our understanding of the 
perception of space to learn more of the ways 
environment shapes our behaviour. This section will 
focus on the insights of 'proxemics', a science of the 
uses of space in interpersonal relations. In the 
sections to follow, I explore three diverse 
perspectives on aggression: ethology, physiology and 
psychology. While these add to our knowledge of human 
violence, none should be considered to be 
comprehensive. In the final section, I return to the 
question of prison violence, following others' 
recommendations for designing safe habitats. 
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Scenes of Interactivity 
The anthropologist Edward T. Hall has pioneered 
the study of the influence of culture in the use of 
and experience of space. His chief concern in 
'proxemics' is to show the ways that we sift 
experience through culturally conditioned screens. He 
opposes the claim of some empiricists that, given the 
same stimuli, any two people will enjoy the same 
experience. "Expert ence as it is perceived through 
one set of culturally patterned sensory screens is 
quite different from experience perceived through 
another." <Hall, 2) 
Hall's focus in The Hidden Dimension is the 
effects of our 'cultural screens' upon interpersonal 
activities. He points out that we depend upon hear-
ing, smell and touch, as well as sight, to apprehend 
other persons. For example, human beings in close 
quarters send and receive signals by temperature and 
smell. Hall lists the blush of embarrassment, anger, 
sexual arousal as warm signs; nervousness and fear as 
cool ones. 
Hall's views on the sense of smell are revealing 
for prison settings. He states that smells are more 
closely tied to memory and emotion than are other 
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violence 
senses. However extreme it may seem to read another 
person's emotions by their smell, Hall insists that 
this approach is common in many non-Western cultures. 
Hall opposes the more traditional interpretations 
of perception, by which "a stable, uniform 'reality' 
is recorded on a passive visual receptor." <Hall, 29) 
To a large degree, percept ion is a skill which can be 
developed or which can deteriorate. Thus, Jimmy Boyle 
writes: 
One thing I noticed about myself both in the 
extremity of the cages and . . . in the unit, was 
that my senses were 'heightened'. I could 
actually smell people, especially the leather from 
their boots or shoes, from a good distance away. 
CBoyle, 231) 
Hall builds upon his conviction that the use of 
senses is culturally conditioned. The major focus of 
proxemics is the way people use space in interpersonal 
relet ions. Hall cites work by H. Hediger in ethology, 
linking animals' behaviour to distances. Hediger 
coined the phrase 'critical distance' to define the 
range at which a given animal will flee or attack. 
Both the length and the preference for flight or 
attack depend upon the species. A lion tamer works in 
part by knowing the lions' critical distance for 
attack, stepping just outside the zone to halt the 
lions' advance. 
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When Hall applies this knowledge of animal 
behaviour to humans, he is nonetheless sensitive to 
the uniqueness of human society. 
zones of situational distancing. 
He sets out four 
These are 1) public 
space; 2> social space; 3) personal space; and 4) 
intimacy. <Hall himself begins from the intimate, 
working outward. ) 
Public distance does not require any interact ion 
bet ween one person and another. Hall writes, "At 
twelve feet an alert subject can take evasive or 
defensive action if threatened." <Hall, 123> At the 
extremes of this zone, the body loses its three-
dimensional quality; it seems flat. A number of 
people can be taken in at a glance, thus inhibiting 
one-to-one interact ion. At public distance, emotive 
signals are lost if they are not exaggerated, as 
actors do in the theatre. 
Social distance ranges from four to twelve feet. 
Informal 
greeting 
situations occur in this zone, 
another pedes t r ian. At this 
such as 
distance, 
conversation is difficult, and requires eye contact. 
Where two are emotionally close, a mutual retreat to 
social distance can provide an emotional buffer. The 
physical distance allows for a relaxation of personal 
intimacy. 
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Hall defines personal distance as a range which 
brings one into relation with a limited number of 
others, from one-and-a-half feet to four feet. One-
to-one relations often occur in this zone, parti-
cularly commerce and polite conversation. Obviously 
there can be more than one other person within this 
range, but the subject is obliged to recognise another 
person (eventually) at this range. That is to say, 
personal distance itself creates situations in which 
human beings must relate to one another. 
At intimate distance, body heat and smell are 
easily sensed, and one may even feel the other's 
breath. In most northern European countries, intimate 
distance is reserved for people who are to some degree 
emot tonally tied. <Other cultures may consider the 
int.imat e range proper for various activities, such as 
commerce. ) Situations in which intimacy is forced 
<e. g., in crowded lifts, bus queues, etc.) often 
strain relations between strangers. Intimate distance 
is more intense, for both senses and emotions, in that 
the subject is powerfully impressed with the full 
range of 'signals' from the other. 
Hall believes that the human equivalent of a 
flight or fight reaction occurs at twelve feet <i.e. 
within social distance). However, it must not be 
assumed that human beings are as tied as animals to 
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'critical distance'. Humans exhibit cultural 
variability, a flexibility of zone definition, and a 
wider range of behavioural options. In coming upon an 
acquaintance, there is a range at which an exchange of 
greetings is appropriate. (Motorcyclists greet each 
other, but not, as a rule, at only twelve feet.) 
Hall found that limits on one's freedom of move-
ment were irritating. Within a relatively small room 
such as an office, Hall's respondents were alert to 
their need to move arms and legs freely. Thus, one 
can sense an invasion of one's personal zone in terms 
of warmth, sound, or sight, but also in terms of one's 
own freedom of movement <another cause of discomfort 
in crowded lifts). Hall writes: 
Most of the data used to establish criteria for 
crowding are inappropriate because they are too 
extreme. Lacking definitive measures, those who 
study crowding repeatedly fall back on incidents 
in which the crowding has been so extreme as to 
result in insanity or death. The skin 
itself is a very unsatisfactory boundary or 
measuring point for crowding. 
(Hall, 61) 
The pains of proximity are most apparent in the 
crowded local prisons. As I have stated, the personal 
zone is potentially uncomfortable for strangers in 
Western cultures. Fairly strong emotions can be 
triggered by particular smells <and, indeed, emotions 
can project certain smells). 
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In the previous chapter I discussed ways in which 
a body becomes familiar with a room. This process can 
be particularly disrupted by the presence of another 
human body. Further, one may feel more crowded in 
higher temperatures, or - despite greater total space 
-in situations where one's own space is limited. Rod 
Caird captures the experience of the local prisoner: 
July 1970 was hot; in cell 3/35 in A-Wing of the 
Scrubs it was even hotter. A window which opens 
about a foot and a few holes in the door at the 
other end of the cell hardly provide a large 
enough flow of air to keep three men cool; we 
used to sit around in the cell in our underpants, 
pouring with sweat. For practical purposes, only 
one person can move around the cell at a time; 
the other two have to stay sitting on their beds. 
The cell is hot, the air is heavy, the mood sticky 
and tense. 
<Caird, 26-27) 
This sort of lower limit of human critical space 
necessarily creates more frequent and more intensive 
stress situations. Lee Bowker estimates that for 
every reported incident of prison violence there are 
at least six 'near-misses'. "Prison life is a contin-
uing series of close calls in which violence is nar-
rawly avoided. " <Bowker, in The Prison Journal, 29) 
I shall examine more direct effects of crowding on 
the health of prisoners below. In this context, 
however, it must be said that attempts to link 
crowding to prison violence have not gained univocal 
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agreement. 1 A number of commentators have argued that 
population density is not necessarily harmful to 
humans. Results have differed from one experiment to 
another, depending upon the sex of subjects, the 
tediousness of assigned tasks, and such environmental 
factors as noise levels, temperatures, etc. 
Edwin I. Megargee has studied links between 
crowding and the rate of disciplinary reports at a 
prison for young males. Cit should be added that a 
disciplinary report does not necessarily involve 
prison violence. ) Surprising as it may seem, there 
was not a significant correlation between the raw 
numbers of prisoners and reports of disruptive 
behaviour. Megargee found the most significant factor 
in an increase of infractions was a decrease in the 
space per prisoner. 
His findings are interesting, in that most of the 
disruptions in English prisons over the past twenty 
years have occurred in less-crowded prisons. However, 
Nigel Walker makes this point in his contribution to Bottoms 
& Light, page 187. He cites a study by D.P. Farrington and 
C. Nuttall "Prison Size, Overcrowding, Prison Violence and 
Recidivism," Journal of Criminal Justice, 8, pages 221-231. 
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such disruptions have involved mass behaviour 
patterns, and not the day-to-day infractions of indi-
vi duals. Megargee adds that his study was influenced 
by the disorienting factors of moving prisoners from 
one wing to another, which broke off ties of friend-
ship, disrupted established hierarchies, etc. 
factors may also affect disruptive behaviour. 
These 
Megargee's study supports the view that pressures 
on the personal space of prisoners foster disruptive 
behaviour. Edward Hall's proxemics explain the 
personal stresses connected with limited space. Yet 
stress-and the influence of a behaviour setting do not 
fully explain violent behaviour. Other roots of 
violence include hereditary, psychological and social 
factors. 
The sections to follow approach violence from 
three disciplines: ethology, human bio-chemistry and 
psychology. Here again, my objective is to survey a 
range of disciplines in order to build a more complete 
picture than is possible through any single method. 
The alternative, where violence is concerned, is to 
condemn it without further consideration, thereby 
declining to explore its internal logic. In a final 
section, I try to extend the scientific evidence with 
insights into the significance violence holds for 
those who use it. 
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Perspectives on Aggression 
The Aggressive Instinct 
Diverse as interpersonal prison violence may be, 
aggression certainly plays a role. Human aggression 
can be approached from various perspectives. I shall 
depart from the 
that aggression 
views 
has a 
of many pacifists 
place in human 
by assuming 
character; I 
shall not attempt to argue that it is unnatural, or 
inherently wicked; I shall not defend a theory that 
human beings are angelic. I shall speak of aggression 
as an instinct (from an evolutionary perspective) or 
as a drive (from the psychological view). 
Perhaps the best-known study of the role of 
aggression 
Aggression. 
in evolution is Konrad Lorenz' On 
He begins by defining aggression as 11 the 
fighting instinct which is directed against 
members of the same species." <Lorenz, ix. ) 
Aggression is not predation the latter refers to 
attacks upon another species. The predator attacks 
with behaviour markedly different from aggressive 
attacks. Lorenz' persistent theme is that aggression 
is a basic tool of survival. He outlines its 
functions within the framework of evolutionary laws. 
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Lorenz claims that aggression fulfils several 
evolutionary roles, in different ways, depending upon 
the species in question and the specific situations in 
which aggression is employed. He favours examples 
drawn from the ethology of ducks, geese and fish. The 
chief function of aggression in these species would 
seem to be the efficient distribution of territory. 
One of the lesser functions of aggression, according 
to Lorenz, is formation of bonds <here again, his key 
examples are drawn from the bonding behaviour of water 
fowl. ) Lorenz comments, "We do not know of a single 
animal which is capable of personal friendship and 
which lacks aggression. " <Lorenz, 127) 
of 
Lorenz enthusiastically 
instincts that motivate 
describes a multiplicity 
human behaviour. He 
follows Sigmund Freud in his view that instincts must 
have outlets. He explicitly chides parents who would 
attempt to raise non-aggressive children. Instead, 
Lorenz prescribes a course of deflection, consuming 
aggressive energy in displacement activities <like 
sport). 
Lorenz adds that each instinct has its inhibitory 
mechanism. Hunger is inhibited as we ingest food. In 
like manner, Lorenz argues, animals inhibit their 
aggression, minimising the damage that would otherwise 
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result. These inhibitors include: pre-fight rituals, 
threats, displays of power, etc.; symbolic battles in 
place of actual lethal combat; physiological inhi-
bitors that minimise the damage <as cats withdraw 
claws to slap kittens). 
Lorenz applies his ethological analysis of 
aggression directly to human society. He holds that 
we, no less than wolves or geese, are products of 
evolution. Like the wolf, human beings have developed 
enormous capacities for inflicting damage. Lorenz 
claims that our capacities for harm have outstripped 
the powers of our evolved inhibitory mechanisms. 
In graphic terms, we might say that our inhibitory 
mechanisms were developed to cope with unarmed 
physical attacks by human beings upon one another. 
These inhibitions cannot suffice to prevent or 
mitigate our uses of the knife or gun, or to dampen 
our aggressive instincts even after killing thousands 
of people at the touch of a button. 
A crucial flaw in Lorenz' case is his inability to 
distinguish between the logic of biology on one hand, 
and culture on the other. Lorenz ignores the fact 
that: 
the causes of human conflict are not the same as 
those which operate in animal society. . Thus 
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for him war is merely aggression gone astray. The 
role of culture has been to upset a biological 
balance; it has a negative but no real adaptive 
function. 
<Aland, 130) 
violence 
Whatever the nature of the bond between two 
greylag geese, or their competition for territory, 
their behaviour is tightly patterned. This marks a 
fundamental difference between their behaviour and 
that of two 'mates' in a pub brawl. Lorenz pretends 
that the weight of symbolic factors <such as the flag 
that soldiers can kill and die for) can be reduced to 
expressions of aggressive instincts. He writes: 
There is the alarming escalation of aggressive 
actions, ranging from cocks fighting in the 
barnyard, to dogs biting each other, boys 
thrashing each other, young men throwing beer mugs 
at each other's heads, and so on up to ... wars 
and atomic bombs. 
(Lorenz, 22) 
Lorenz' firm espousal of the innate dimensions of 
human behaviour served as a necessary corrective to 
the extremes of the social sciences. The latter 
seemed to assume that human culture utterly replaced 
biological evolution, such that we are born as blank 
tablets. Further, Lorenz demonstrated that aggression 
can have positive functions. His glaring neglect of 
culture, not to mention human freedo~ should not lead 
us to ignore these helpful points. 
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His views have been qualified <or clarified) by 
Mary Midgley. She, too, describes benefits of 
aggression, i 11 ust rating her case with ways children 
use aggression to learn to respect each other's 
personal zones. She, too, believes that shows of 
aggression can lead to strong bonds. Like Lorenz, she 
sees that human beings are led by a plethora of 
instinctive motivations. Unlike, Lorenz, however, 
Mary Midgley understands that human activity is 
uniquely related to such motives. Her insights into 
the logic of human instincts is instructive for our 
view of aggression. 
The popular view of instincts is blunt: birds 
build nests at the right time, bees find pollen, cats 
kill mice - all by instinct. As Mary Midgley shows, 
'instinct' 
behaviour: 
is related to two divergent elements of 
a) an inclination or innate motivation; 
and b) information needed to bring the motive to 
fruition. 
two ways), 
precision. 
First, 
switches. 
Hence, instinct must be clarified <and in 
before the term can be used with any 
instincts do not function as on-off 
Even strictly coded behaviour tends to 
originate from the crossing of a threshold. The on-
off interpretation is simple and clear, but mistaken. 
- 22-
violence 
Thresholds vary according to external as well as 
internal factors. Where a trigger stimulus is 
present, other factors may prevent the threshold from 
activating the instinctive behaviour. As for internal 
effects, a clear example is age: instincts arise at 
different phases of an animal's life. 
Second, one must distinguish between closed and 
open instincts. The former reflects a traditional 
view, a rigorously deterministic mechanism, by which 
the instinct automatically sets the behaviour in 
motion. 
external 
A closed instinct would be unaffected by 
circumstances (other than the trigger 
stimulus), and it clearly gives the animal no 
flexibility as to the fulfilment of the motive. 
The concept of an open instinct is less a set 
behaviour patter~ than it is an inclination. Where an 
instinct is said to be open, the animals still hold 
options as to the means of attainment. 
instincts do not appear in isolation. 
Further, 
Curiosity, 
fear, altruism, aggression, hunger, <to name just a 
few) are open instincts which set a highly variable 
framework for living. 
Mary Midgley's concept of open instincts shows 
that aggression can be used appropriately or not, 
moderately or in excess, for valid goals or oppressive 
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ones. Indeed, she deliber-ately ignores the empirical 
principle of value impartiality, and applies her view 
of aggression as an open instinct to human wickedness. 
She, too, denies attempts to portray human beings 
as angels, forced by some cosmic prankster into 
violent behaviour. Yet she draws a clear distinction 
between positive uses of aggression matching its 
evolutionary benefits - and abuses of the instinct, 
which are wicked. Indeed, she argues that while too 
much aggression can be wicked, too little can be 
maladapt 1 ve. 
There are not any non-aggressive human 
societies. Opposition is an essential element in 
human life: aggression is part of the emotional 
equipment for making it work. Societies which 
keep it within reasonable bounds <unlike our own> 
are doing something much harder, and more 
interesting than merely never feeling it. 
<Midgley, 92) 
The variability introduced by Midgley's insights 
into aggression alters our understanding of the role 
of the instinct in prison violence. First, we can 
distinguish between aggression, the instinct, and 
violence, the behaviour. Aggression may provide an 
open-ended incentive to maintain one's own space 
against intrusion <a motivation that might be met 
through negotiation, bluff, arbitration, appeasement, 
etc. -not only with violence). 
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instinct and 
following the distinction 
the behaviour, we can 
between 
draw a 
violence 
the 
key 
inference from Midgley's view of the variety of 
motivating elements in our activity. We must 
acknowledge the potential in persons to act violently 
on the impulse of incentives other than aggression. 
That is to say, given the multiplicity of open-ended 
instincts in humans, we may decide upon a course of 
violent action out of greed, 
rather than aggression. 
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Physiological Aspects of Violent Behaviour 
In the first section, I examined the ways that 
people use space to condition personal interaction. 
In the second sect ion, I examined ethological aspects 
of aggression, according to which it is seen as an 
open instinct with specifiable advantages for 
survival. In this section, I focus on a physiology of 
violence: i.e. , upon the bio-chemical mechanisms that 
activate aggression. 
Kenneth Moyer has written of the physiological 
dimensions of human aggression. He acknowledges that 
the activation of aggression combines external factors 
(in the situation), psychological aspects, instinctive 
react ions, as well as physiological 'causes'. He, 
too, believes that aggression is activated by a 
threshold of stimuli, as opposed to an on-off switch. 
He stresses the need to see aggression as open-ended. 
Aggression is not a unitary construct. There are 
a number of different kinds of aggressive 
behavior. The basic premise of this model is that 
there are, in the brains of animals and humans, 
neural systems that when fired in the presence of 
a relevant target, result in aggressive or 
destructive behavior toward that target. 
<Moyer, in Jeffery, 21) 
Moyer notes that aggression takes instrumental or 
expressive forms. The former ties the aggression to 
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goals and will dissipate with their achievement; here 
again, one need not be motivated by aggression in 
order to behave in ways normally associated with 
aggression. Expressive aggression, however, may be 
activated with vague or nonexistent goals, aside from 
venting anger. Moyer turns to discuss the 
physiological bases of aggression in the brain, in 
heredity and in body chemistry. 
Moyer reports that stimulation of the hypothalamus 
<part of the limbic system of the brain) can induce 
violent attacks in a variety of animals (including 
humans). Likewise, stimulation of the amygdala has 
produced fear or aggression, depending upon external 
circumstances. Moyer notes that stimulation of the 
organs was insufficient in most cases: typically, the 
aggression was activated only when the subject was in 
the presence of a sui table target <e. g. , a monkey 
would direct his violence toward another male, but 
never toward the female in the cage. ) 
Regarding heredity, Moyer cites research that 
demonstrates the power to alter aggression thresholds 
by selective breeding. In 1970, he a.'S and 'B"andler 
produced strains of especially aggressive mice. Thus 
it would seem that thresholds for aggression are, at 
least in part, an inherited trait. 
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The relation of body chemistry to aggression has 
been known - if crudely - for centuries. Animals have 
been castrated, not only to make them infertile, but 
also to pacify them. Sharply reducing the 
testosterone in the bloodstream cur~tails aggressive 
behaviour. Scientists have linked the release of 
endocrinal proteins to aggressive activity. ACTH 
<adrenocorticotropic hormone) is linked to both fear 
and aggression, and is a significant factor in 
stressful environments. 
High levels of ACTH require high amounts of blood 
sugar; in turn, demands on blood sugar can lead to 
hypoglycemia. Henry E. Kelly relates hypoglycemia 
directly to acts of violence. He reports that the 
brain consumes up to 25 per cent of the body's sugar. 
Hormonal imbalances, such as those caused by stress, 
bring about rapid rises and falls in blood sugar 
levels. Kelly argues that where less blood sugar is 
available, the brain's aggression inhibitors 
weakened. 
The hypoglycemic may suffer from temporary 
diminished responsibility because his brain could 
not function rationally, presenting alternatives 
among which he could actually choose. 
<Kelly, in Jeffery, 94) 
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Moyer and Kelly explain how bio-chemical changes 
can occur, and how those changes can prepare the body 
for aggressive activity. The intensity of sensory 
signals in small, crowded settings reinforce these 
effects. Prisons compound these physiological aspects 
with their punitive rationale. C. R. Jeffery writes 
that punishment produces: 
a high level of epinephrine in the brain, in 
interaction with the pituitary and adrenal glands, 
as well as with the autonomic nervous system. 
. . Such stress and tension is basic to the so-
called psychosomatic diseases such as ulcers, 
heart disease, high blood pressure, and so forth. 
Anxiety also interferes with learning new 
responses. 
<Jeffery, 108) 
It is essential that we temper the confident 
claims of socio-chemistry with more humble remarks. 
Of all the factors underlying violence, body chemistry 
may be the most difficult to alter. A number of 
scientists (including Linus Pauling) have defended 
bio-chemical individuality. That is, my body's bio-
chemical composition and functioning is as unique as 
rny fingerprints. Hence, a specific hormonal recipe to 
halt aggression is not so much a distant possibility 
as it is logically unattainable. 
Moyer himself concedes that physiological 
intervention to prevent violence is limited in its 
potential. It may be possible to reduce a subject's 
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expressive violence by providing some form of 
artificial inhibitor. But no single drug serves the 
sole purpose of repressing aggression. More 
important, Moyer emphasises that these sorts of inter-
vention will probably have no effect in inhibiting 
instrumental violence: one can engage in violence 
without the common affective motivations. 
The input of biochemistry helpfully traces direct 
links between prison crowding and aggression, and 
between crowding and adverse effects upon health. A 
classic study linking population density to ill-health 
was carried out by John Christian. 2 Christian 
performed physiological studies on a herd of Sika deer 
during a rapid rise in population on an 
in 1958-1959, there was an abrupt rise 
Christian sought the cause of the deaths. 
island. When, 
in mort a 1 i t y, 
He found that the food supply was adequate. 
However, the adrenal glands of the deer who died under 
population density were considerably enlarged. 
Christian concluded that the deer were otherwise 
2 Cited in Edward Hall, Op. cit., pages 19-22. 
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normal, and that the deaths wer~e due to 'prolonged 
adrenocortical hyperactivity'. 
It is obvious that such findings should not be 
projected into the prison environment without 
qualification. Human beings <e. g., prisoners) are not 
subject to population pressures in the same way as 
deer. For instance, as Edward Hall points out, 
cult ural conditioning may lead one group to r~egard a 
given level of population as more dense than another 
group. Likewise, culture enables human beings to 
adapt to changes in population, unlike Sika deer. 
Yet, there is evidence that population density in 
prisons has adverse effects on prisoners' health. 
David Canter cites the findings of an unpublished 
study of 1400 prisoners in the Texas prison system: 
1. High degrees of sustained crowding have a 
variety of negative psychological and 
physiological effects including increased illness 
complaint rates, higher death and suicide rates, 
and higher disciplinary infraction rates. 
2. Large institutions produce much more severe 
negative psychological and physiological effects 
than small institutions, as expressed in higher 
death, suicide, and psychiatric commitment rates. 
<G. McCain, V.C. Cox and P.B. Paulus, 1980, 
unpublished paper; cited in Bottoms & Light, 218) 
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The insights of Sigmund Freud are a helpful 
starting point for a psychological approach to our 
subject. He linked aggression to Thanatos, 
destructive drive, or 'death-wish'. 
Besides the instinct to preserve living substance 
and to join it into ever larger units, there must 
exist another, contrary instinct seeking to 
dissolve those units and to bring them back to 
their primaeval, inorganic state. 
<Freud, 65-66) 
a 
In Lorenz' view, it will be recalled, the key to 
an analysis of aggression is its positive benefits in 
human evolution. For Freud, the purposes of 
aggression are purely destructive. If we accept the 
functions of aggression in service to Thanatos, the 
aggressor will not be satisfied with a successful 
defence of terri tory, nor with mere dominance over an 
opponent. Freud's view of aggression is 'hydraulic', 
in the sense that the drive must find an outlet. 
<Lorenz, too, sought to deflect aggression, rather 
than seeking ways to reduce its potency. ) 
According to Freud, 'civilization' regulates the 
flow of aggression. In the pursuit of order, civili-
zation enlists the individual's super-ego. It frus-
trates the narcissistic self by denying the ego's 
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animalistic urges. Punishment joins with self-
punishment to reduce or inhibit pure destructiveness. 
Freud's theory differs significantly from that 
espoused by Lorenz. The latter declared that 
aggression is not the problem, since it has 
evolutionary advantages. Rather, for Lorenz, culture 
has produced super-human powers of destruction that 
overwhelm our nat ural, human inhibitory mechanisms. 
Lorenz argues that once aggression is triggered, the 
violence goes beyond any instrumental value because 
our powers are vastly increased. 
Freud likewise located the problem in the relation 
between the self's aggressive motivation and 
civilization. But he believed that the way to curb 
aggression was to enlist social order on the side of 
life. Civilization is the regulatory mechanism to 
inhibit aggression. 
Freud's basic sketch can be informed by appeal to 
other psychologists. 3 Leonard Berkowitz argues that 
My discussion of Berkowitz, Bandura and Aronson is drawn 
from Aronson, pages 141 and following. It provides a 
necessarily limited survey of the topic. 
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the activation of aggression in humans is largely 
learned. Civilization might be said to direct or 
canalise the drive, conditioning the individual's 
sense of appropriate aggression. Berkowitz' view 
complements Mary Midgley's point that aggression ought 
to be seen as an open instinct. Their perspective 
counters the more fatalistic image of instincts, as 
forcei that dictate precise behavioural patterns. 
Albert Bandura demonstrated our capacity to create 
novel expressions of aggression. In his experiment, 
children who witnessed an adult's violence not only 
modelled their behaviour on the adult, but they 
invented their own forms of aggressive activity. 
Bandura's subjects did not learn specific patterns of 
'lesson' was to activate behaviour. 
aggression. 
Rather, the 
The children demonstrated a capacity to 
generalise aggressive behaviour from one instance. 
Berkowitz took the last point a step further. He 
found that the subjects did not need to witness 
violence in order to activate their own aggression. 
His subjects were stimulated to aggression merely by 
the presence of an object that symbolised aggression. 
Berkowitz noted significant differences in subjects' 
behaviour when a gun was present in the room. 
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These experiments begin to explore situational or 
environmental factors in the activation of aggression. 
Elliot Aronson draws attention to the of 
frustration in eliciting aggression. Two groups of 
children were shown toys to play with, and one group 
was denied access for some time. Predictably, the 
fr·ustrated group demonstrated far more aggressive play 
when they were allowed to use the toys. Aronson adds 
that frustration has subjective dimensions. I may 
become frustrated easily, or, conversely, may not 
understand that I am being unfairly deprived. 
The insights of these more recent researchers mark 
a departure from the deterministic qualities of Freud 
or Lorenz. Aggression may well provide benefits for 
species sur-vival, but in human society, we learn how 
to activate our aggression. It may be, as Freud 
suggests, that human aggression can be purely 
destructive, serving no instrumental purpose. But 
that should not preclude our trying to understand the 
conditions that nurture such expressive aggression. 
In the 1960s, Hans Toch headed a comprehensive 
study of violence. The aim was not to understand 
prison violence, per se, but to construct a profile of 
the 'violent man'. Toch and his researchers developed 
a typology of ten different personalities - not just 
one. They drew their portraits from biographies of 
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prisoners and police officers, with records of 
physically aggressive incidents. Obviously the ten 
types include overlapping attributes, but in each case 
Toch attempts to show how these people contrive to 
create violent interactions with other people. 
Toch' s violent characters included those who saw 
their roles as enforcing norms, or who relied upon 
violence to maintain self-esteem. Others depended 
upon violence due to their limited communication 
skills. 
factors 
These types tended to weigh the external 
heavily <e. g.' peer pressure) in their 
reliance upon violent behaviour. 
A second group of personality types are more 
introspective. These persons "see themselves <and 
their own needs) as being the only fact of social 
relevance. " <Toch, 136) The roles assumed by the 
introspective aggressors included bullying, exploita-
tion <with violence used to enforce the domination), 
and 'catharting' <where violence is used to vent 
frustration and anger). 
Toch' s types suggest that some sort of logic can 
be traced through most instances of violence, and 
particularly, through prison violence. For instance, 
in society, the law can be used to enforce debts; 
inside, an illicit economy requires extra-legal 
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sanctions, and hence violence is an occasional by-
product <or, indeed, a perpetual undercurrent). 
The image of the truly diabolical, motiveless 
eruption of lethal violence is not supported by Toch' s 
findings. Rather, his study concludes that violence 
occurs as a culmination of interactions between 
persons, in situations that are incrementally more 
violence-prone. 
We have tried to suggest . that the violent 
incident is cumulatively created by persons 
involved in it. As each sequence progresses, it 
takes on violence-prone connotations, and it 
displays reactions to match. We have seen that 
violence-prone cannot at ions do not spring out of 
the incidents themselves, but pre-exist in the 
shape of unconscious assumptions. 
(Tach, 131) 
Ethology shed light on some functions of prison 
violence: the establishment of hierarchies, the 
defence of territory, even in some sense of bond-
format ion. Physiological input likewise illuminated 
prison violence, through rises in adrenal in in 
response to prison pressures, prisoners feeling under 
stress, and physiological preparations for violence. 
The physiological interpretations are superseded, 
however, to the extent that they depend upon the 
distinction between expressive and instrumental 
violence Cone can use the latter without being com-
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pel led by bio-chemical stimulants). Toch' s profiles 
combine expressive and instrumental aggression. 
The expressive-instrumental distinction is fruit-
ful, but its point is lost if we ignore its 
limit at ions. We can distinguish analytically between 
the expressive violence of a disturbance that follows 
a change 
instrumental 
the other. 
in privileges on 
attack intended to 
one 
gain 
hand, and the 
self-esteem on 
In persons, taken as individuals, however, 
these distinctions between motives and goals, between 
styles of violent activity, between internal and 
external promptings, break down. 
Perhaps the clearest example is exploitation. The 
threat <or use) of violence can be a means to maintain 
an exploitative relationship (as I have mentioned 
above). Yet, in some relationships the goal may be 
violence itself, and exploitation serves as a means to 
that end. A number of Toch' s subjects used violent 
situations as a proving ground, and were prepared to 
increase their exploitation of others in order to 
instigate a violent response. 
Lee Bowker states a further implication of the 
distinct ion. He sees merely expressive violence as 
'nonrational', with a 'high degree of instability'. 
This point is questionable. Aside from the likelihood 
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that 'nonrational', and 'instability' are tautological 
with reference to violence, Bowker's point implies 
that motivations toward violence are intrinsically 
mysterious. There may be parallels here to Freud's 
view of aggression as diabolical <and pointless) 
destructiveness. More important, I think, to label 
behaviour 'nonrat ional' relieves us of the 
responsibility to locate environmental factors that 
foster violence. 
Edwin Megargee gave greater weight to the settings 
that give rise to violence. <Cited in Blackburn) He 
hypothesised that violence results when the insti-
gation overwhelms the person's inhibitions against it. 
He deduced that people who have used violence could be 
under-controlled (with low thresholds of aggression) 
or over-controlled <in which case an extreme 
instigation prompted profound violence). 
Ronald Blackburn found Megargee's profiles 
accurate in a sample of violent offenders. However, 
Blackburn casts doubts on the hope that profiles of 
dangerous personalities can prevent violence. 
Some of these profile patterns are also prominent 
in non-violent offenders. These patterns are not, 
therefore, unique to violent offenders, and it 
seems likely that they are also not confined to 
offenders. 
<Blackburn, 267) 
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Implicit in Megargee' s hypothesis is the circular 
logic of strictly empirical approaches to violence. 
Problems of over-control or under-control describe 
people who have been violent in part because these 
dynamics are the antecedent causes of any violence. 
Hence, it is not surprising that the psychological 
profiles fit most people. In the absence of a fuller 
understanding of the factors that give rise to 
violence, it is a mere truism to state that violence 
results when instigations overwhelm the subject's 
inhibit ions. 
It is her·e that Toch' s own analysis is limited. 
His types imply, but do not examine, a sociological 
dimension. It may be that violent persons carry 
'unconscious assumptions' that serve as catalysts of 
violence. But these assumptions can be traced to 
social milieux in which violence is acceptable as a 
component of interaction. 
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We have been looking at violence as something 
related to the characteristics of the inmates 
themselves, without taking into consideration the 
interaction between the inmates and the 
environment in which they live. 
<William Nagel, in Cohen, Cole and Bailey, 57) 
I begin this final section with an examination of 
building design, and end with what might be called a 
politics of prison violence. The prison constitutes a 
behaviour setting, and a number of authors have 
specified ways to reduce incidents of violence through 
attention to building design. I should add, however, 
that the evidence holds out little hope of solving 
violence through architecture. Indeed, I shall argue 
that a philosophical understanding of violence as 
contested force is needed to approach the phenomenon 
of prison violence. 
Edith Elisabeth Flynn follows innumerable studies 
in recommending a population ceiling of 300 prisoners 
per prison. Prisons of 1500-2500 people <more common 
in the U.S. ) are clearly implicated as violence-prone 
settings. Flynn also recommends the establishment of 
certified safe areas not limited to segregation 
blocks for administrative custody. She advocates 
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purposive activity as a means of encouraging 
cooperation while providing staff with optimal 
surveillance potential. Finally, she argues that each 
prison administration should determine the high risk 
zones peculiar to that prison, and clearly identify 
them as such. 
Flynn's suggestions begin from the socio-
psychological frustrations of prison life, and she at-
tempts to meet the problem of violence on that level. 
Randy Atlas provides an architectural approach to vio-
lence in an article informed by proxemics. He studied 
a variety of prisons, comparing prisoners' opinions 
about high risk areas with reports of assaults. 
The prime site for assaults, particularly armed 
assaults, was the housing area. Whether dorms, 
six-man cells, or two-man cells, or single cells, 
housing was the biggest contributor. Support 
spaces such as showers, baths, and dayrooms had 
the next largest number of assaults. Circulation 
areas such as corridors, stairwells, and lobbies 
had 7 percent - 30 percent of the incidents. The 
outside areas had fewer incidents of violence than 
expected. The dini~g room, without fail, 
seemed to invite more assaults than would be 
expected. 
<Atlas, The Prison Journal, 69) 
The most surprising aspect of these data is that 
some of the most dangerous areas are those most open 
to surveillance. Indeed, 20 per cent of all assaults 
occurred under direct observation. I suggest, follow-
ing Hall, that the rate of incidents was low on the 
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outside, and high in living areas, in part because of 
the reduced critical space (for flight or fight). The 
high proportion of attacks in baths and shower areas 
provides further support for this view. 
Randy Atlas provides a different explanation. 
Assaults that imply planning e. g.' armed or 
multiple-attacker assaults -did tend to occur in less 
Atlas theorises that supervised areas. 
spontaneity of most prison assaults accounts for 
the 
the 
high proportion of assaults under surveillance. 
However, the unexpected level of attacks under 
observation prompted Atlas to remark, "It was as if 
the inmates' actions were almost a dare for official 
action." CAtlas, The Prison Journal, 71) 
The term 'spontaneity' seems to slight Tech's 
claim that violence marks the culmination of increas-
ingly aggressive interactions. However, in char-
acterising prison violence as spontaneous, Atlas means 
simply that the incidents were not planned attacks. 
Analyses of prison arch! t ect ure as a behaviour-
setting provide an incomplete explanation of the role 
of prisons in generating violence. A deeper under-
standing of the prison ethos is required. Albert 
Cohen raises three sociological elements that contri-
bute to prison violence Cin Cohen, Cole & Bailey): 
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1) Age - a high proportion of prisoners are in an 
aggressive-prone age range; 
2> A violence-prone code of values, comprised of: 
a) machismo- demanding physical defence of one's 
reputation; 
b) private justice - a distrust of authority 
<clearly an attribute of prisoner culture) with 
its corresponding reliance upon personal 
retaliation; and 
c) hierarchies based upon physical prowess. 
3> The importation of external conflicts into the 
prison. 
Albert Cohen's points again enlarge the scope of 
our study of prison violence. The aggression-prone 
age of prisoners recalls Mary Midgley's insights into 
instinct <which takes hold at varying stages in the 
subject's life) without reducing the aggressive person 
to the level of geese. The violence-prone ethos is 
not 'nonrat ional': professional sports, too, 
establish hierarchies based on physical prowess. A 
tendency toward private just ice in prisoners is 
sufficiently rational as to be a self-evident result 
of legal marginalisation. CI discuss the extra-legal 
nature of prison violence below. ) 
Albert Cohen's perspective neglects the inherent 
stresses of the prison setting: 'batch living', 
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punitive deprivations, assaults on privacyt and prison 
discipline maintain a high level of frustration. One 
prisoner wrote: 
There is no real way in prison to work out one's 
frustrations and anger. . The better part of 
these emotions must be swallowed whole. The 
phenomenon strikes us as being one of the primary 
destructive aspects of prison in terms of warping 
and embittering inmates' personalities. 
<Cited by Kevet The Prison Journalt 48) 
Prison violence likewise involves the frictions of 
relations between confined persons. Daniel Lockwood 
argues that a significant dimension of prison violence 
is the atmosphere of sexual harassment. 
Sexual harassment, that 
perceived as offensive by 
fightst social isolat iont 
and crisis. 
is, sexual approaches 
their targetst leads to 
racism, fear, anxietyt 
<Lockwood, The Prison Journal, 76) 
More generallyt Lockwood remarks that feelings of 
potential vulnerability give rise to defensive 
posturest including distrustt fear, and psychological 
preparations for violent self-defence. 
My point is not that prison violence is to be 
condoned; nor that all human beings are equally prone 
to inappropriate aggression. But interpret at ions of 
violence that rest all blame upon the 'predator' are 
biased. They disguise the role of the prison setting 
in encouraging violence. 
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A friend told me how to survive a term in a state 
penitentiary: 
back-up is 
confiscated, 
immediately procure two knives. 
essential, since, if one weapon 
The 
is 
you may not live to obtain two more. 
Prisons ar~e violent places. That violence concerns 
two aspects of prison practice: 1) control and 2) the 
personalities of dangerous, violence-prone prisoners. 
Each dimension will be considered in depth. 
Control and the Politics of Violence 
There is profound unity, even between prisoners 
and staff, that prisons ought to be made as safe as 
possible. Given this common interest in making 
prisons safe habitats, there is a disappointing rift 
over the means. The Brit ish prison presupposes int en-
si ve staff involvement. Numbers of officers are far 
less important, though, than the style of interaction. 
The question of control involves cooperation and 
consent as much as it does imposed order. Critics of 
recent prison policy charge that the balance between 
consent and coercion has shifted to a reliance upon 
the latter. For instance, Mike Fitzgerald flatly 
states, "The primacy of security over staff-prisoner 
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relations is the key feature of the British prison 
system. " 4 
A central factor in control is the power to 
determine the course of events. Violence is also 
about, power. Its logic is perfectly clear to someone 
who interprets human relations in terms of dominance 
and submission. It is •nonrational' where rationality 
refers to relations based on reciprocity, negotiation, 
dialogue and conciliation. 
In his analysis of violence, David Riches 
concentrates upon the meaningCs) ascribed to violence, 
and the strategies in which it features. 5 The ready 
availability of violence, its political dimensions, 
and the clarity of aggression mean that resort to 
violence can be quite attractive. 
.... 
6 
Mike Fitzgerald, "The Telephone Rings: Long-term Imprison-
ment" in Bottoms & Light, 146. I am aware of the distinc-
tion between security <containment within the perimeter, 
protection of the public) and control (internal order). 
However, it is part of Fitzgerald's case that the Prison 
Service itself confuses the two. He argues that a central 
issue for control is the adminstrative-staff relations. 
This subject clearly takes us beyond my present focus. 
My analysis of the meaning and use of violence is drawn from 
David Riches, "The Phenomenon of Violence, " in Riches, Op. 
cit. I give somewhat greater weight to situations of un-
equal power than does Riches. 
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The capacity for physical violence is ours by 
virtue of being human. This is not to say that we are 
naturally violent, but that our bodies alone - fists, 
nails, feet can be weapons. "The performance of 
violence r e qui res r e 1 at i v e 1 y li t t 1 e by way of 
specialized equipment or esoteric knowledge. " 
<Riches, 11) 
Central to any violent act is an ambiguity 
concerning its legitimacy. The contestable nature of 
violence, together with its roots in power, form a 
politics of violence. I am not referring violence to 
ideologies, or to civil politics. Rather, the 
political dimension refers to the role violence plays 
in determining the outcome of disputes between people 
<power) and the intrinsic need to justify such extreme 
measures <legitimacy). 
For John McVicar, the prisoner's capacity for 
violence was a major criterion in deciding disputes as 
well as in forming the prisoner hierarchy. While 
popularity or common sense were useful attributes in 
working through differences between prisoners, aggres-
sion seemed to McVicar to be the decisive factor. 
What mattered in prison, as far as respect and 
influence were concerned, was how violent a con 
was or could be. I knew that his potential for 
violence was the most influential power resource a 
con could wield in interaction with both other 
cons and warders. 
<McVicar, in Cohen & Taylor, 224) 
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McVicar argues that 'might' is decisive in part 
because prison aggregates people who have rejected law 
as a means of resolving disputes. Most people rely 
upon government (through the courts, for example) to 
settle volatile differences. The extra-legal world of 
prisoners replaces the institution of regulated force 
i. e.' law enforcement by unregulated force or 
physical prowess. 
McVicar's points need clarification. His insis-
tence on the primacy of violence should not be taken 
to mean that all prisoners settle differences through 
might. Rather, in prison, aggressive prisoners tend 
to dominate others, using 
violence instrumentally. But 
actual 
this is 
or threatened 
obvious: not 
all prisoners are aggressive. The point is that the 
political dimension ~f physical violence becomes key -
differences are settled through aggression. 
Many prisoners use other strategies to cope with 
imprisonment. An approach to prison life based 
primarily in terms of might is one - but only one - of 
a wide range of possible methods of doing time. 
Further, as Tech implies, the wide range of aggressive 
roles means that no single function <such as getting 
one's own way) explains violence in prison. 
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The quest ion of legitimacy is an essential 
component of the use of force, but it is far from 
straightforward. McVicar suggests that a prisoner who 
is prepared to use violence is accorded respect on 
that basis alone. Conversely, violence ordinarily 
requires explanation, by appeal to the desirability of 
the ends, or limitations of the available means. 
In Retribution I argued that a basic difference 
between the force used by government and private 
retaliation is the claim of the state to legitimacy. 
Whether the prisoner sees the force used by the state 
as legitimate or not, the existence of the prison 
implies that force is a legitimate method of resolving 
disputes. And, 
the custodians, 
validated. 
crucially, the more force employed by 
the more the use of force is 
The prison must clearly distinguish between proper 
and improper use of force in order to impress upon 
prisoners the difference (if any) between state-force 
and personal force, 
personal retaliation. 
between state-retribution and 
Given that the prison 
demonstrates that the use of force can be legitimate, 
and given the inherent contestability of force, the 
prison cannot depend upon 
distinction between justified 
force 
force 
to 
and 
draw the 
violence. 
This, too, seems obvious. However, it is just this 
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point that reveals contradictions in prison policy 
evoked by the problem of prison violence. 
In terms of their own behaviour, prisoners are 
particularly susceptible to sanctions against any 
resort to force. Authorities take major decisions 
about the prisoners' lives, giving substantial 
attention to any reports of violence. Such decisions 
include job allocation, the prisoner's eligibility for 
early release, as well as the style of regime under 
which he will serve his sentence. 
Mike Maguire, Frances Pinter and Catherine Collis 
investigated the factors that are weighed in 
evaluations of a prisoner's relative risk. One aspect 
has obvious links to the question of legitimacy: 
Comprehensibility of the offender's behaviour was 
sometimes a key element. Thus while staff could 
empathise to some extent with a man in an extreme 
situation pushed into an explosion of anger or 
passion . they were often ill-at-ease with a 
prisoner whose behaviour appeared alien and were 
much less confident of predicting his future 
act ions. 
<Maguire, Pinter and Collis, 261) 
The prison's function of penalising force it deems 
illegitimate links questions of control with attempts 
to define violence as a product of an explosive 
personal! ty. 
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The Quicksand Prison 
In 1982, the Chaplain General's Office appointed a 
Working Party on Regimes for Dangerously Disruptive 
Prisoners. The Working Party studied the problem of 
creating a regime for the dangerous prisoner. They 
described their target group as, "a handful of men who 
appear to suffer from a flaw of personality, reflected 
in unpredictable and excessively violent and 
aggressive conduct." <Working Party, page 1) They 
add that they find dangerous prisoners "a virtually 
self-defining group". (Ibid. , 2) The Working Party's 
major recommendation is that the dangerous few 
prisoners be identified and a regime be designed 
especially for them. 
Paul Keve writes of the tendency in prison policy 
to react to disruptive prisoners with 
consequences or tighter controls. 
With such curtailment of freedom, certain 
prisoners react with those forms of rebellion that 
are needed for support of their own satisfying 
self-images. . . . Necessarily, official response 
from the custodians is to impose still more 
repression which further promotes the 
prisoner's hostility. And so we sustain the 
correctional quicksand. 
<Keve, The Prison Journal, 48) 
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The implication seems clear: disruptive prisoners 
pose a threat to the well-being of all who live and 
work in the prisons. 
mate force lies the 
Beneath the question of legiti-
practical need to control the 
behaviour of such prisoners. More philosophically, 
the violent prisoner who cannot understand that the 
state's use of force is objectively right and just is 
dangerous for that reason alone and must be 
contained in order to assure the smooth running of the 
prisons. Obviously, being incapable of recognising 
his wrongdoing, such a prisoner will grow more recal-
citrant, and probably encourage others by his example 
of rebellion. This is the dilemma of the custodians: 
their only option is to impose greater severity. 
I find this description of the problem misleading 
and ominous. It ignores the quest ion of legitimacy. 
The contestability of the prison's use of force shows 
how the punishment of violent prisoners can lead to 
wider support for them. 
tradictions in using 
force. More important, 
of Keve' s case - that 
the violent prisoner. 
It ignores the inherent con-
force to condemn the use of 
it assumes - the very opposite 
the problem lies entirely with 
It labels the prisoner's 
violence mysterious, evading the duty to examine its 
causes. 
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An alternative view of violence in prisons begins 
with the recognition that the social setting 
encourages violence. Such a premise leads to the 
hypothesis that isolation of a few will induce other 
prisoners to take their place as disruptive or violent 
prisoners. 
Roy King has attacked the tendency to address 
prison disruption by identifying problem prisoners. 
He writes that such an approach ignores the 
environmental factors that will continue to create 
problems. Moreover, he claims that the identification 
of dangerous prisoners contributes to the problem: 
It is likely that among those who get defined as 
troublemakers there are some who are made into 
troublemakers as a result of the way they are 
dealt with in prison. 
<Cited in Boyle, Duff and others, 17-18) 
A dramatic case in point is provided by Robert A. 
Burt. A client, 'John Doe', labelled a 'criminal 
sexual psychopath', was given an unusual offer. Doe 
could choose to remain in prison, or submit to experi-
mental psychosurgery to cure his uncontrollable 
violence. 
Burt argued that the prisoner's consent was 
forced, and therefore not genuinely voluntary. 
Obviously, Doe's consent was forced, given the 
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alternative of a return to prison. But Burt's 
insights are significant, because he pinpoints a more 
important sense in which Doe's consent was invalid. 
Bluntly, his point is that Doe's acceptance of the 
surgery reflects society's condemnation of Doe 
himself. Burt suggests that labelling someone 
disruptive or violent contributes to that person's 
tendency toward violence. His argument is not that a 
person who accepts the 1 abel 'criminal' resolves to 
' 
act like a criminal, but that such labelling is a 
violation of the person deemed dangerous. 
Total rejection or abhorrence is incorporated into 
the disruptive person's self-image, such that the 
prisoner abhors himself. His own aggressiveness 
norm-enforcing, catharting, etc. - is boosted by our 
violation of him. If it is true that his burden is 
society's fear and rage, directed toward him, it is 
not surprising that the dangerous prisoner seems 
overwhelmed by his own capacity for violence. 
In Retribution, I opposed the principle, at the 
heart of punishment, that the guilty person was 
categorically different from the innocent. Burt 
argues that it is Doe's guilt that allows us to 
consider the profound intrusion of psychosurgery in 
his case. 
-55-
violence 
Erik Erikson writes that this sort of stigmatising 
approach upholds the pretence that some particular 
group of people is a different species. Where 
ideologies of pseudo-species are practiced, the 
subjected group tends to adopt their oppressors' image 
as part of their own self-understanding. 
A species which has come under the dominance of 
another is apt to incorporate the derisive opinion 
of the dominant 'species' into its own self-
estimation, that is, it permits itself to become 
infantilized, storing up within and against itself 
a rage which it dare not vent against the 
oppressor. 
<Erikson, cited in Burt, Hastings Center Report, 
page 33) 
In History, I suggested that the symbolic weight 
of the scaffold as a battleground has not disappeared 
without trace. The violence that the monarch 
inflicted upon the criminal is the violation of the 
offender we inflict upon the prisoner. Retributive 
punishment justifies the return of harm, and impris-
onment constitutes the harm we choose to inflict. 
In theory, retribution acknowledges that harm has 
effects. Yet, in our penal enthusiasm, we are 
reluctant to admit that the prisoner is deeply harmed 
by imprisonment. Instead, we equate the evidence of 
that harm - the person's violent tendencies with 
some 'deep psychological flaw' in the prisoner we have 
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damaged. We compound that hypocrisy by citing the 
damage as a justification for further harm. 
Nothing I have written justifies the violence that 
occurs in prison. I have not condoned the violent 
behaviour of prisoners by illuminating the causal 
factors that lie within the prison system itself. My 
objective in this chapter has been to establish that 
prison violence is itself one of the harms of 
imprisonment, 
offender. 
which society 
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PRXSON SEXUALITY 
Introduction 
It is almost sixty years since Reo Fortune set 
out, in the footsteps of Bronislaw Malinowski, to 
study the Dobu. 1 The behaviour he found shocked 
Western values. To begin, adolescent females welcomed 
a different young male to their beds each night. 
Worse, the adult culture seemed over-run with 
adultery. Marriages were extremely unstable: an 
older informant had been married eight times, and a 
•young male' had already had three wives. 
Fortunately for their sake, the children saw their 
mother's nearest male relative as their father 
despite the fact that the Dobu were well aware of the 
male's role in procreation. Divorce was simple: the 
male walked out of the woman's village, and did not 
return. 
Reo Fortune was no amateur. He recognised the 
difficulties in describing the sexuality of the Dobu 
R.F. Fortune, Sorcerers of Dob~ London: 
George Routledge and Sons, 1932. 
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in terms based in West ern culture. He scrupulously 
referred to 'marital groupings' <over Professor 
Malinowski's vehement objections to jargon terms when 
'family' would do!) To use 'marriage' or 'adultery' 
to describe the Dobu sexuality would press our own 
discourse too far. When each person enjoys several 
marriages over a lifetime, and these are interspersed 
liberally with fairly random couplings, Western terms 
lose their descriptive power, let alone any normative 
significance. 
There are forms of sexuality that are stranger 
than the Dobu. But a world in which the biological 
father has little interest in maintaining the marital 
bond, because he has his own (sister's) children to 
look after, should alert us to the fact that sexuality 
is not biologically pre-determined. It is not just 
that the nuclear family is not the natural setting for 
the enculturation of children and the economic co-
operation of woman and man 
sexuality is not natural at all. 
the structure of 
A wide cross-cultural perspective on sexuality 
provides a useful caveat for an approach to sexuality 
within the prison community. But entering that 
culture is still more complex than journeying to a 
distant society: prison culture is both alien and 
tied to the wider society. We should expect prison 
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sexuality to exhibit its own logic - drawn from the 
demands and perspectives of the unique setting and 
yet to reflect the sexuality of the Western post-
industrial world. 2 
I am not suggesting a retreat into cult ural or 
moral relativity. It is not the case that adultery is 
accepted in one culture and vilified in another. 
Rather, it is more accurate to say that sexual 
behaviour takes on divergent meanings, and that these 
meanings must first be clarified before any ethical 
approach is possible. In order to examine sexuality, 
we must not only set aside the bias inherent in our 
social world, we must also find an appropriate 
theoretical framework. 
The dominant understanding of sexuality during 
this century has been the legacy of Freud. The 
images of sexuality presuppose a powerful force within 
2 
'Western industrialised society' is probably, in this 
context, far too broad. Most of the work cited in this 
chapter is based on studies of the American prison setting. 
-62-
sexuality 
each individual; it is the wellspring of human energy; 
it is the ruling motivation, determining economic 
relations, art, language, religion. The sexual force 
becomes both the source of pathology, and the 
fundamental interpretative device for its cure. 
Drive theory has influenced Western interpret a-
tions of sexuality in a number of ways. It has 
generated a whole theory of repression: for where 
there is a powerful force, it is logical to assume 
that counter-force is required. The existence of the 
drive also means that people with little sexual outlet 
must sublimate their sex needs, or are extremely 
repressed. 
output must 
example, is 
competition. 
Similarly, those people who enjoy a high 
find their energy level sapped - as, for 
believed by athletes who abstain before 
Drive theory, on the whole, tends to assume that 
the nuclear family is objectively the natural mode of 
sexuality, against which all else is deficient. Where 
deviance does arise, the theory encourages a clinical 
approach, siting the problem within the individual, as 
a pathological behaviour that can be realigned with 
normality. Finally, the drive theory focuses upon 
coitus; while this does not preclude aspects of 
sexuality such as nonphysical intimacy and gender role 
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expect at ions, the framework is largely determined by 
the dynamics of sexual intercourse. 3 
Symbolic interact i onism, in cant rest, presupposes 
a role for society in creating and refining the 
meanings of conduct. Interact ionism argues that the 
phenomena of human society have a different logic than 
brute biological facts. It is necessary to clarify 
the significance which behaviour has for both the 
agent and the society at large in order to understand 
it. Thinking beings act, not on the basis of brute 
stimuli, but in terms of the meanings attributed to 
their actions by society, by individuals and by the 
agents themselves. 
In this chapter I use an interactionist approach 
to investigate the meanings which the prison culture 
shapes regarding sexual conduct. Thus, the types of 
sexual conduct and their frequency are less my concern 
A different theoretical approach would follow the work of 
Kinsey in 'sexual bookkeeping', quantifying the sexuality 
of prisons through data on the frequency and types of sexual 
conduct within the prisons. This approach is partly ruled 
out by a lack of such information. But it, too, has a ten-
dency to presume that sexual conduct has a clear, objec-
tive significance. 
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than the role played by the prison in shaping a 
structure of sexuality. 
The focus of the final section is the relationship 
between penal philosophy and prisoner sexuality. This 
in itself is difficult to define. While the prison 
world has very clear rules regarding sexual conduct -
most institutions prohibit it - there is not a stated 
philosophy of prisoner sexuality, and it is reckless 
to infer one from the prevailing policies. 
Before turning to the questions of punishment, I 
first describe the interactionist approach as applied 
to sexuality. Interactionism 
sexuality within the prison. 
social context of a distinct 
will help to explain 
It illuminates the 
prison sexuality 
meanings relating to sexuality which are conditioned 
by the prison environment. 
To explain the functions that sex has 
prisoners, I investigate three major topics: 
for 
the 
first is deviance, and the ways in which conduct 
labelled deviant emerges in an individual. The second 
is sexual relations between same sex prisoners - I 
contrast these to homosexuality on the outside. Third 
is the issue of gender role expectations. I examine 
masculinity as an image of 
to unattainable standards. 
roles that bind prisoners 
Finally, I consider 
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possible implications of penal philosophy for its 
attempts to impose asexuality upon prisoners. 
The Social Construction of Sexual Meanings 
The interactionist approach is not a simple con-
tradiction of the drive theory. 'Drive', after all, 
is an image; it ties sexuality to other drives - most 
often, to hunger. A better understanding begins by 
altering the image, and hence the obvious parallels. 
One commentator suggests that we are sexual, in much 
the same way that we are intelligent beings. 4 
Two immediate benefits of this model are: A) It 
lacks the male bias of drive, in which the male is 
assumed to be driven; the female, assumed to be the 
object of the force. Seeing us as sexual beings 
shifts the centre of sexuality from individuals to 
relations between them. B) This broadened view also 
4 In discussion, with Prof. Dorothy Martin, 
University of Pennsylvania School of Social Work. 
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inclines away from a view of sexuality that is derived 
from coitus sexuality is no longer bound to 
determine the meaning of conduct in terms of the 
assumed objective of heterosexual intercourse. 
Interactionists warn against the presumption that 
sex is 'natural'. Human beings do not exist as human 
without culture; hence, there is no natural wo/man who 
is being repressed by society, authoritarian or 
otherwise. The two foremost scholars in the field, 
John Gagnon and William Simon, strongly object to the 
notion that the meaning of sex can be reduced to - or 
even be based upon - the biology of reproduction: 
Sex is represented as something so natural that it 
can barely be linked to the human experience, 
which is by definition unnatural in the sense that 
it derives its real meaning from an emotional 
content that is not located in or produced by the 
biological functions. The most typical imagery is 
that of the noble sperm heroically swimming 
upstream to fulfill its destiny by meeting and 
fertilizing the egg. The sexual act is described 
in ways that either misrepresent or totally 
obscure the sources of pleasure and meaning in 
sex. 
<Gagnon & Simon, HS, 122) 
Gagnon and Simon downplay the importance of sex in 
people's lives. They argue that sex is really quite 
tame when it is relieved of the mystique and 
exaggerations of drive images. Indeed, much of that 
power is due not to some natural instinct, but to the 
belief that sex is a potent force. 
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A drawback of interactionism is that it can over-
estimate the ways the social setting conditions 
sexuality. It implies that sexuality is so plastic 
that settings might create complete asexuality. The 
premise that sexuality is an essential dimension of 
our lives counters such an extreme form of 
interact ionism. 
From an interactionist approach, drive theory is 
itself an object of study, as a potent symbol of 
sexual experience. Whatever its strengths and weak-
nesses as a theory of sexuality, the drive model has 
woven its themes into our understanding of sexuality. 
It is the possibility of transgression and 
normative violation that gives sex a status beyond 
gourmet cooking it is the possibility of 
believing that one is controlling a powerful drive 
that allows a sense of virtue to arise from 
conformity and the observation of norms, and a 
sense of sin to arise from their violation. 
<Gagnon & Simon, HS, 108) 
It is in part a result of the exaggerations of 
drive theory that the social ramifications of sexual 
deprivation can outweigh any physiological impact. 
Further, drive theory has introduced a 
tension within sexuality itself. 
A combination of meanings which simultaneously 
encourage sexuality . and prohibit it . 
lodges the sexual experience in a contradiction 
which may generate guilt and anxiety, and bestow 
an exaggerated importance on sexuality. 
<Ken Plummer, cited in Brake, 232) 
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sexuality 
The tension intrinsic to Western sexuality reveals 
itself in gender roles <as I discuss below) and in 
interpretations of sexual conduct. Individuals assign 
meanings to their sexual experience, based in part 
upon the socially imposed categories of conduct, and 
partly upon the subject's interpretations of internal 
sensations and emotions. The categories of conduct 
appear as objective facts, taking on a specious 
absolute status. 
From a reproductive emphasis heterosexuality is 
natural and all else is deficient. But in human 
society, even the choice of sexual objects is a social 
construct. In other words, not only are we controlled 
by social limits to our urges, but our desires are 
themselves shaped by the power of social discourse. 
"Our sexuality always already embraces some form of 
regulation because we cannot know/experience sexuality 
apart from the discourses within which it is 
constructed. " 5 
Carol Smart, review of Susan Edwards: Female Sexuality and 
the Law, Contemporary Crises. 6, <1982), 195-204. 
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From this predominantly interactionist perspective 
we can put forward a tentative framework for sexuality 
inside prisons. Our subject will not be the 
physiological effects of a powerful drive that is 
repressed by the prison regimes. Our approach wi 11 
not be based on the view that sexuality is confined to 
orgasms, or to physical intimacy between prisoners and 
others. Rather, I discuss sexuality as a sphere of 
meanings that includes: gender, and gender roles; 
affective as well as physical relations between 
people; the process of defining sexual conduct in the 
alien environment of the 
sexual conduct serves for 
prison; and 
prisoners. 
the purposes 
In exploring 
this topic, I do not wish 
impression of uniformity in the 
My goal is not a comprehensive 
to present a false 
prisoner population. 
typology of prisoner 
sexuality, but a more general characterisation of the 
effects of the prison setting on sexuality. 
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outlined 
Sexuality in the Prison Setting 
broader 
informs 
perspective on 
our exploration 
sexuality 
into the 
sexuality 
I have 
sexual 
dimensions of imprisonment. A more narrow 
interpretation could confine our study to overtly 
sexual contact between prisoners. In contrast, the 
interactionist stance alerts us to a rich tapestry of 
gender roles, an economy of sex, as well as the 
ubiquitous undercurrent of domination and submission. 
Here again, the approach illuminates the ways that 
physiological harms are outweighed by socio-cultural 
ones. 
Perhaps the most important effect of the wide 
approach is to free us from defining the sexual 
conduct inside prisons 
Instead, our premise 
as 
is 
a sub-set 
that the 
of homosexuality. 
prison setting 
inevitably generates a unique structure for sexual 
conduct. Bluntly stated, a community which is 
deliberately restricted to one sex lacks the mixed sex 
foundation against which homosexual conduct defines 
its meaning. Yet, prisoners enter the single sex 
community with a commitment to many sexual norms of 
the outside society. 
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The first point to be made about prisoner 
sexuality is that the deprivation of sexual access is 
not the most profound. 
The sudden elimination of heterosexuality is part 
of [ thel whole deprivation procedure, but it is 
rarely the most critical. Loss of most bodily 
pleasures, the capacity to direct one's own move-
ments, the choice of work, the kinds of clothing, 
the times available for cleanliness, the hours of 
sleep, the size of income - all of these things 
besides sexual enjoyment are denied the 
prisoner. These losses are important social 
psychological elements, first in identity 
stripping and second in identity creation. 
<Gagnon & Simon, HS, 237) 
Accurate as their assessment is, Gagnon's and 
Simon's point 'must be clarified. The deprivation of 
which they write is more narrowly focused on physical 
sexual relations than the perspective taken here. For 
instance, I shall argue that a major tool in the 
identity stripping to which Gagnon and Simon refer is 
the emasculation of male prisoners. Another depri-
vation with distinctly socio-sexual dimensions is that 
of family life. 
Erving Goffman believes that enforced group living 
marks the sharpest contrast to family life in Western 
societies. Effects upon individual prisoners vary. 
Group living may deprive the single woman of her 
privacy and autonomy, and take from the mother the 
responsibility for her dependants. 
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These deprivations - and the eccentric stresses of 
group life - are not • sexual' except insofar as they 
involve gender- roles. Yet, gender roles provide a 
primary constituent of identity formation. Stated in 
more concrete terms, imprisonment deprives both men 
and women of their parenting role, but the roles of 
father and mother differ. The difference in depri-
vation is one of gender role, and this is a dimension 
of sexuality. 
Gagnon and Simon discuss the functions social 
roles play in determining the meanings of sexual 
experience. They comment that coitus means 
achievement for young males and a form of social 
service for young women. I am not clear what they 
mean by 'social service', but the gender distinction 
they make is revealed in prison sexual conduct. Male 
prisoners tend to use physical sex as a means of 
achievement, whereas female prisoners often turn to 
sex as a means of bonding, at times to the extent of 
forming 'family units' within the prison. 6 
The formation of 'families' was reported by both Rose 
Giallombardo at Alderson <U.S.A.) and James G. Fox. The 
latter found that a majority of the women at Bedford Hills 
<NY> were active participants in kinship units of approx-
imately five to eight members. See Fox, op. cit., cf. Rose 
Giallombardo, Society of Women, New York: John Wiley, 1966. 
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Gagnon and Simon support their view that depriva-
tions other than sexual access are more significant. 
They write, "Our first major sense of the [prison] 
experience is actually how little sexual activity of 
any sort occurs within the prison. 11 <Gagnon & Simon, 
HS, 242) 7 They ascribe most of the sexual activity 
that does occur to social functions. Sexual relations 
are used less for sexual release than to create "a 
community of need-satisfying relationships that the 
prison fails to provide in any other form. 11 <Gagnon & 
Simon, HS, 258) 
It may be worthwhile to examine in some depth 
their claim that prisons exhibit low frequencies of 
sex relations. Two explanations for the low rate are 
offered by Gagnon and Simon, the second more 
complicated than the first. 
The first builds upon the interactionist principle 
that the context has a crucial role in defining a 
7 Gagnon and Simon cite data from the Institute for Sex 
Research: Rates of sexual activity varied from 10 to 20 
per cent of the prisoners' rates outside. For some males 
the institution rate nears zero. <HS, 242, note.) 
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situation as sexual. They cite a number of anecdotes 
that may or may not be sexual, depending on cues not 
provided 
beings: 
by the physical encounter 
A boy watches a football match. 
between human 
Two men kiss 
each other. A doctor examines her patient's ear. If 
the boy is aroused by virile athletes; if the two men 
are warmly greeting each other (in another culture); 
if the 'patient' is the doctor's boyfriend, and she is 
blowing into his ear the broader context, 
including potentiating cues, determines whether the 
situation is sexual or not. 
Gagnon and Simon argue that the rate of sexual 
activity within prisons is low because of the absence 
of potentiating cues. "The man in prison finds 
himself without the appropriate stimuli which suggest 
opportunities for sexual activity or situations that 
are appropriate. " <Gagnon & Simon, HS, 243) 
'Potentiating cue' should not be taken to mean 
'women'. Any sexual activity depends upon far more 
than the meeting of two or more persons; heterosexual 
relations do not result whenever a female meets a male 
<whether he is 
cue' refers to 
aroused or not). Thus, 
the social setting in 
'potentiating 
its power to 
define an interaction as a sexual one. Nor is 
pornography a typical potentiating cue. 
to the sexual arousal of a given male 
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prisoner or not - yet this hardly means that he will 
inevitably view his next encounter with a woman as an 
appropriate occasion for sexual intercourse. 
The second interpretation of the low frequency of 
sex activity links the rates to the select population 
subjected to incarceration. Gagnon and Simon declare 
that the typical prison population does not begin with 
the same view of sexuality as middle- and working-
class groups outside. Citing a trend observed in 
Kinsey's data, they argue that the male populations of 
prisons are more likely to use sex merely for 
homosocial validation - in short, to impress other men 
with their sexual prowess - and not for expressive or 
bonding purposes. 
Gresham Sykes gives support to their interpreta-
tion, arguing that males use sexual intercourse as a 
prime measure of masculinity. With heterosexual 
conquests ruled out, other gauges of manhood are used, 
" and the display of 'toughness' now 
becomes the major route to manhood." <Sykes, 98) I 
shall examine this hypothesis in greater depth when I 
turn to the problems of masculinity. 
I am not convinced by Gagnon' s and Simon'::;. claim 
that the rate of sex acti~.rity is 1-nw. It- is not 
consisten..t with U~clr-own view that human sexuality is 
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plastic, that an individual's sexual conduct variable, 
depending on the social context. Moreover, our 
broadened understanding of sexuality implies that 
definitions limited to overt physical relations are 
misleading. Finally, sexuality Cat least Western 
sexuality) is permeated with moral significance, hence 
evidence is open to question. These factors cast 
doubt upon •authoritative' claims about the frequency 
of sex activity. 
An obsession for the empirical data may lead us to 
slight other, equally important aspects of prison sex-
uality, most notably the ways in which sexuality 
bestows meaning on behaviour in pr-ison, and the pur-
poses that sexual conduct has for prisoners. This 
again requires a broad view of sexuality, since we 
must be prepared to seek objectives that are not de-
rived from sexual release. Likewise, we must be pre-
pared to view certain kinds of interaction as sexual, 
whether or not they lead to overt sex activity. 
The general theme for a functional approach to 
prison sexuality is provided by Erving Goff man. In 
Asylums he describes the inmates' adaptations to total 
institutions like the prison. Primary adjustments 
include all kinds of conduct that are considered 
legitimate by the institution. Secondary adjustments, 
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defences against the indignities of inmate status, 
subvert the prescribed manner of living. Goff man 
distinguishes between secondary adJustments that are 
disruptive and those, more habitual ones, 
contained. 
that are 
Secondary adjustments ar·e by no means limited to 
sexual ones. They may include territoriality, in 
claiming a particular seat in front of the television; 
job perks, e. g., working in the kitchen, or jobs that 
give one access to the outside; fraternisation itself 
may be a form of secondary ad,justment: a bond is 
found in the shared sense of being victimised by 
injustices. 
As an ad,justment to prison life, sexuality is 
almost inevitably secondary 
except ion being prisons that 
(illicit) the single 
set prescriptive rules 
for sexual relations. For the most part, ad,j ust ment s 
based in sexuality are contained, though sexuality is 
as volatile in prison as it is outside. Of the four 
functions I mention, the first three tend to be 
contained; the last tends toward a disruptive 
though no less widespread influence. The key 
functions of prison sexual activity might be termed: 
A. frat ernisat ion, B. economic gain, c. removal 
activities, and D. aggression-domination. 
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A) Fraternity: In a social climate marked by 
suspicion, anger, fear, boredom, etc., sexual contacts 
provide bonds not unlike those that are formed in 
other extreme settings, e. g., in battle. Second, the 
fraternity or bonding in sexual conduct directly 
attacks the prison's tendencies to prevent unity among 
prisoners. Hence, third, same-sex contact, in 
contrast to masturbation, is expressive and social. 
B) Currency: The willingness to engage in sexual 
relations with other prisoners can secure benefits 
though, as in any exchange, there is the vital 
question of who is setting the terms. 
"The thin, hand-rolled cigarette will buy anything 
even a fellow prisoner's body." (A. Heckstall-
Smith, cited in Goffman, n., page 271) The logic of 
bartering enables us to reverse the terms - the offer 
of one's body can purchase almost anything, including 
drugs. Where the prison work pay is so meagre, a 
prison-style prostitution may have attractions. 
However, a more common exchange involves a pronounced 
element of coercion, as weaker prisoners trade sex for 
protection. 
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C) Removal activity: This secondary adjustment 
comprises those adaptations that allow the inmates to 
feel as though they were outside the institution. 
They range from rule-bending alterations in uniforms 
to near-obsessional involvement in weight training or 
education. Sexual conduct is particularly suited as a 
'removal activit y• because it serves much the same 
function in society. Gagnon and Simon remark upon the 
tendency of sex to isolate participants from the rest 
of their lives. They describe the : 
severe sense of discontinuity between experiencing 
the self in nonsexual circumstances and in sexual 
circumstances. It is awkward at both the 
transition from the conventional to the sexual 
identity and from the sexual to the conventional, 
language-filled identities. 
<Gagnon & Simon, H~ 105-106) 
It is this sharp discontinuity that enhances the role 
of sexual relations as a removal activity. 
The removal functions served by sexual activities 
depend for their meaning upon the specific interpreta-
tions made by the actors involved. For one, it may be 
that the successful intimidation of another prisoner 
into sexual favours demonstrates a potency that the 
prison has not weakened. For another, the mutual 
caring and support deny that coldness and distrust 
which prisons by their nature maintain. For still 
others, the relations may be no more significant than 
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a transient physical pleasure, augmented by its 
illicit status. 
Jean Genet records the elaborate measures that a 
prisoner may employ merely to trade glances with 
another prisoner. Is this sexual? 
The two have formed an affective bond, not merely 
against the prison, but against the identities which 
the prison setting - perhaps unintentionally - imposes 
upon them. They recognise in each other an attitude 
toward them as unique personalities, 
• prisoner'. 
against the 
When the importance 
mould • prisoner' is 
free of the stamp 
of this rebellion 
recognised, the 
apparently trivial tugs-of-war between prisoner and 
prison take on meaning. It is in this sense that 
sexual relations however mild constitute a 
profound removal activity for prisoners. 
D) Aggression: The final form I shall consider has 
as much to do with imported ideas of sexuality as it 
does with the prison setting. Sexual harassment is 
almost certainly more common than 
relations. Daniel Lockwood writes 
physical sexual 
that though few 
prisoners are victims of sexual attack, as much as a 
third may be subject to harassing sexual overtures. 
Lockwood disputes the popular opinion that the prison 
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sex aggressor is ordinarily successful. Nonetheless, 
the harassing activity can bring the aggressor 
benefits, in intimidating other prisoners. Male 
aggressors can be said to interpret their threatening 
activity as validation of their perception of 
masculinity. 
The foregoing overview of prison sexuality reveals 
the breadth of functions, interpretations, roles and 
phenomena that 
needed, and 
the topic involves. Greater detail is 
this can be gained from further 
exploration of key components of prison sexuality. 
These are deviance, homosexuality and gender roles. 
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The classification 'deviant' is not restricted to 
sexuality. The concept of deviance, and the emergence 
of deviant conduct in individuals, has been the 
subject of much work in sociology as well as 
psychology. The symbolic interactionist approach 
proves to be most fruitful for our purposes, both in 
terms of sexuality and with special relevance to 
prisons. Interactionists study the labelling process 
to discover why certain acts are stigmatised in some 
societies, but not in others. Peter Berger has 
written: 
Cross-cultural comparisons of sexual conduct bring 
home to us powerfully the near-infinite 
flexibility that men {sic} are capable of in 
organizing their lives in this area. What is 
normality and maturity in one culture is pathology 
and regression in another. 
<In Plummer, 43) 
The above discussion of symbolic interactionism 
has suggested that a part of any culture's structure 
of sexuality is an assumed objective standard of 
normality. The classification 'deviant' assumes that 
this standard is absolute and sharply defined, and 
that it is possible to classify conduct which - as a 
category - departs from normality as deficient., Any 
such conduct is also presumed to aspire toward the 
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absolute standard. Thus homosexual conduct is con-
sidered more normal in long-term stable relationships 
or is otherwise doubly stigmatised as homosexual and 
promiscuous. 
There is a basic tension in the concept of 
deviance as a principle of sexuality. We recognise 
the vast range of conduct which human beings practice 
in sexual relations. But societies universally set 
parameters - whether flexible or rigid - outside of 
which the conduct is assumed to be defective. Again, 
the categories are presumed to be objective facts. 
But cultural variability teaches that the absolute 
objectivity is an illusion: deviance, too, is a 
matter of socially generated categories. 
Ken Plummer follows an interactionist method in 
his study of the emergence of homosexuality. Plummer 
concentrates upon the ways in which groups define 
certain conduct as deviant. He claims that the quasi-
objective status of deviancy categories is due to the 
broad, cross-institutional support for the labels. 
Laws, morality, language, even arts imply that 
some modes of sexual expression are normal <e. g. , the 
family>; others are unusual or problematic 
implication); 
<the label 
and still 'spinster' carries such an 
others are deviant. Insofar as the prison is a 'total 
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institution', it, too, will have a distinctive ethos, 
with 
stat us. 
some sexual 
However, 
not~ms 
prisons 
enjoying quasi-objective 
cannot maintain total 
isolation from the outside, and hence prison sexuality 
will always exhibit the dialectic between the two 
worlds. 
Gagnon and Simon identify three types of deviance. 
There is conduct deemed deviant which is practiced by 
the vast majority of people their term is 'normal 
deviance'. They argue that the designation 'normal' 
is applied because the behaviour in some way legit-
imates or ties into conduct which society supports. 
Generally private in nature, these acts do not chal-
lenge the presumed norms of sexual conduct. They cite 
masturbation and pre-marital coitus as examples. 
The second type is not tolerated in the same way, 
but is nonetheless institutionalised in pockets which 
are themselves tolerated. Pornographic businesses may 
be restricted to certain areas, homosexual communities 
may be formed, but the conduct is vulnerable to 
sanctions - sometimes severe - in the wider society. 
The third type is either too radical an attack on 
institutions of sexuality, or practiced by too low a 
minority to benefit from the established zones of the 
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second type. Here, Gagnon and Simon come closest to 
employing a clinical perspective. The conduct is not 
the product of a social setting but results from "a 
causal nexus [which] appears to exist in the 
family and personality structure of the individual." 
<Gagnon & Simon, 5~ 7) 
These distinctions, while helpful, cannot be 
applied to prison standards without 
They are helpful in describing much of 
qualification. 
the labelling 
that does occur in prison. For example, masturbation 
might easily be seen as an example of 'normal 
deviance', as an adjustment that receives little 
censure either from prison rules or the prisoner 
community's own norms. Similarly, there are pockets 
within prisons certainly larger ones in which 
deviant conduct <e.g., prostitution> is established. 
But the uniqueness of the prison environment 
conditions these principles in ways that are not 
always predictable. For example, the tolerance of 
masturbation is greatly dependent upon the setting. 
In society, 
is referred 
it can be assumed that when masturbation 
to as 'normal deviance', the conduct 
occurs in private. Indeed, in Kinsey's work, the key 
question concerning deviance was the frequency of the 
behaviour. 
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In prison, the rate is far less important than the 
setting: the parameters of deviance are determined 
primarily by whether the scene is the single-cell 
dispersal prison or the overcrowded local prison where 
the behaviour is almost inevitably public. a 
Plummer clarifies the effects of social settings 
on definitions of deviance. He points out that the 
response of others is a key to the identification of 
deviance. Some acts are situationally deviant if they 
evoke stigmatising responses from other people. 
It is in this sense that homosexual conduct may be 
deviant in one setting and not in another. Put in 
other terms, coitus between a married couple is 
deviant if the act is performed in the market square. 
"All that is required for situational deviance to 
occur is the presence of two factors: norm violation 
and stigmatizing responses." <Plummer, 72) 
a Law defines prison space as entirely public; this implies 
that all same-sexual activities in prison are illegal 
because they are public. See further Punishment and 
Sexuality, below. 
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Conversely, settings can define certain actions as 
normal, while they are labelled deviant in other 
settings. The power of the prisoner community to arm 
the prisoner against the social stigma of deviant 
<criminal) 
communities 
is well-established. 
provide settings in 
Similarly, gay 
which the social 
deviance of homosexual conduct becomes the situational 
norm. Plummer himself argues that the prison 
community constitutes a prime example of a setting in 
which the stigma against homosexuality is neutralised. 
Undoubtedly the major trait of the prison setting 
that neutralises the stigma of homosexuality is the 
absence of the opposite sex. R. Cloward and Lloyd 
Ohlin have examined 'differential opportunity 
structures' in the community <cited in Plummer, 57). 
They follow Freud in seeing that people committed to 
deviant identities often gravitate to occupations that 
provide maximum opportunity for their conduct. But 
the concept of differential opportunity structures can 
be used in another sense. 
Human sexuality is adaptable; people can modify 
their sexual conduct to fit the opportunity structures 
available in a particular setting. This is not to say 
that people who work with one group or other inevi-
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tably grow to see them as sexual objects. Rather, I 
suggest that settings of institutionalised deprivation 
engender a greater flexibility in target choice than 
that found in settings of open opportunity. 
My discussion of prison sexuality and deviance 
thus far has examined: secondary adjustments, 
subverting discipline; minimal opportunity structures, 
altering the range of possible sexual objects; single-
sex prisoner communities, neutralising the stigma of 
deviance. These concepts clarify difficulties facing 
a prisoner in interpreting conduct as deviant or not. 
The subjective response to prison sexuality takes 
us from the social definition of deviance to the 
emergence of deviant sexual identities within 
individuals. Again, such behaviour is not objectively 
unnatural or evil. The range of meanings that can be 
ascribed to sexual conduct makes such a claim 
untenable. 
Plummer approaches the questions of sexual iden-
tity and of deviance categories as matters of negotia-
tion and interpretation. 11 Deviance does not arrive 
unannounced. Rather, it has to be identified, inter-
preted, and subsequently fashioned and structured." 
<Plummer, 73) Plummer cites a number of needed 
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principles to explain how persons can develop into a 
full identification with conduct deemed deviant. 
The problem of identifying deviance is complicated 
by the fact that our understanding of sexual conduct 
is drawn from both sexual and nonsexual contexts. For 
example, M. H. Kuhn argued that sexual motives. are in 
part 
the 
derived from the broader social roles played by 
partners <cited in Plummer, 29). Similarly, 
Gagnon and Simon write that the individual must match 
his/her subjective experience against the categories 
made available by society. 11 The very experience of 
the body must be translated through meanings 
that are drawn from nonsexual domains." 
Simon, HS, 73) 
<Gagnon & 
Taken together, these interact ionist claims show 
that nonsexual elements play a key role in both 
labelling someone deviant and in that person's self-
image. The point is starkly illustrated in prisons. 
Plummer shows that prison does not neutralise same-sex 
relations evenly. The determinative factor is not the 
participation in same-sexual conduct, but the broader 
social role of each party and the manner of their 
involvement. The prison ethos does not stigmatise the 
sexual aggressor as it does the counterparts, nor does 
it sanction all aggressors evenly. 
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The prison is both a part of society and an alien 
environment. Prison sexuality, with its unique 
functions of sex, and the problems of defining sexual 
deviance, displays the profound clash of norms and 
values between the two worlds. 
Confronted with the moral conflicts active within 
prison culture, the prisoner's sense of identity is 
confused. That confusion is exacerbated by stresses 
roles in prison. The unique, upon one's gender 
debased character of the roles of masculinity within 
distinguishes sexual activity within prison prisons 
from homosexuality. I turn next to consider pressures 
upon masculinity, and same-sex relations in prisons. 
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Homosexuality and Gender Roles in Prisons 
Interpretations of sexual activity within prisons 
cannot be isolated from considerations of gender role. 
In my examination of sexual relations in male prisons, 
I focus first upon the concept of masculinity, and 
upon the prison's pressures upon masculine self-
labelling. 
In his landmark study of the New Jersey State 
Prison, Gresham Sykes stated, "If the inmate . is 
rejected and impoverished by the facts of his impris-
onment, he is also figuratively castrated by his 
involuntary 
spectacular 
celibacy." 
statements, 
critical examination. 
<Sykes, 70) Like most 
Sykes' claim must face 
His words imply that the 
deprivation of sexual access to women strips the 
prisoner of his manhood. 
Sykes buttresses his claim with two, distinct 
arguments: 1) He draws out the implications of living 
up to the expectations of manhood in a world without 
women; and 2) he describes the adaptations prisoners 
use to offset the deprivation of sexual access to 
women. 
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The former needs to be developed further to dis-
cover the stresses on masculinity and to hone in on 
the threats to masculine self-images that permeate 
prisons. The latter claim <that the cause of the 
'castration' is the lack of heterosexual activity> may 
illuminate the sex activity that does occur in prison. 
Sykes argues that an exclusively male setting 
leads inevitably to anxieties in the individual about 
his own manhood. Here again, an interactive stance is 
helpful. The male prisoner's problem is not simply 
that he has no female population against which to 
compare himself; nor is it merely that those women who 
provide the feed-back role of significant others are 
isolated from him. The problem for his masculinity 
partakes of both deprivations. 
The inmate is shut off from the world of women 
which by its very polarity gives the male world 
much of its meaning. Like most men, the inmate 
must search for his identity . . . in the picture 
of himself which he finds reflected in the eyes of 
others; and since a significant half of his 
audience is denied him, the inmate's self image is 
in danger of becoming half complete, fractured. 
<Sykes, 72) 
A primary tension in the male role relates to 
domination. The male attraction to dominance, some-
times to the point of aggression, subjects him to 
domination. Mark Gerzon, citing a study from the 
1950s, "The- Authoritarian Personality", describes the 
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dominating male. "On the one hand, he tends toward 
'passive submission to authority'; on the other, he 
adopts the 1 idea of aggressive and rugged 
masculinity'." <Gerzon, 63) 
This tension, played out in the domination of 
prisoners by officers, intensifies the belligerence of 
the male image in society at large. Weapons to 
dominate others include aggression and, indeed, 
violence. In the exaggerated masculinity of prisons, 
aggressiveness is a positive attribute; uncertainty is 
a weakness and sign of effeminacy. The prison culture 
tends to value abrupt, aggressive traits. 
Gerzon voices a concern that these values of power 
and inflexibility are increasingly dangerous. Writing 
of 1 hard-driving, tough-talking' heterosexuals, he 
argues, "Their manhood seems to be the problem. Their 
desire to dominate is so desperate that the desire 
dominates them." <Gerzon, 106) 
Prisons are not the only notoriously single sex 
institutions. Mark Gerzon explores the ways the 
military plays upon the contradictions in masculinity 
in order to produce soldiers. Gerzon charges that a 
chief motivating tool of the military is gender 
uncertainty. Young men are assaulted with the 
challenge to prove that they aren't 1 sissies' (i.e., 
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sisters) or effeminate. Military training identifies 
character with manhood, and builds the contrast to the 
presumed timidness of femininity to such a pitch that 
the fear of being seen as un-masculine surmounts the 
fear of being wounded or killed in battle. 
Though military training might be an extreme case, 
it highlights the development of masculinity in 
society at large. "Boys, trying to be masculine but 
not knowing quite what masculinity requires, come to 
define masculinity as the opposite of what they can 
observe, feminine. In addition, they come to regard 
feminine characteristics as deplorable." <Davidson & 
Gordon, 20) 
The gender pressures in male prisons are clearly 
not limited to the prisoners. The aggressive milieu, 
the painful contradiction between being dominant and 
dominated, the distorted values of a male-only world: 
these themes are as relevant to the prison officer's 
situation as to the prisoners. 9 Indeed, the 
9 Robert J. Wicks discusses a range of pressures upon prison 
staff in Guard!, Houston TX: Gulf Publishing Co, 1980. 
My focus upon the harms prisons inflict on prisoners pre-
cludes treatment of the effects of high stress on the 
relationships of prison officers. 
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male-to-male interactions 
involve prison officers 
that Sykes 
as deeply 
alludes 
as they 
to 
do 
prisoners. 
Prison officers, though, are able to leave the 
prison. Further, there is no suggest ion that they are 
deli be rat ely deprived of sexual access. A third di f-
ference recalls us to the problems faced by the 
prisoner. Erving Goffman draws attention to the 
echelon structure of total institutions. In his 
analysis, echelon differs from hierarchy chiefly in 
terms of accountability. The member of a hierarchy is 
subject to the ranks above, and holds authority over 
those below. 
however, any 
staff member. 
subjugation, 
There is stratification among prisoners; 
prisoner is subject to any uniformed 
Continuously forced to acknowledge his 
the prisoner finds that issues of 
dominance and submission are of primary significance 
in his understanding of manhood. Thus, the lack of 
sexual access to women is probably less determinative 
than the more immediate problems of domination and 
subjection. 
Analytically, it might be possible to contrast the 
self-determination necessary for human dignity against 
the kind of arrogant wilfulness more typical of 
idealised rugged masculinity. But the prisoners to 
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which I refer are male: it is not surprising that 
masculinity, however defined, should form part of 
their self-image. Second, the preponderance of males 
in the environment implies that masculinity would be 
highly valued. 
the prison 
A third factor is the very friction of 
environment, in which an aggressive, 
unbending approach has pronounced advantages <at least 
in the short-term). For these reasons and others, 
issues that might otherwise be seen through conflict 
theory or as questions of basic human rights, are 
framed as threats to manhood. 
In the wider society, it is not only the presence 
of women that helps to define one's masculinity: our 
industrialised culture ties masculinity to work, 
paternity, athleticism. Not only employment per se 
but the type of job and the course of a man's career 
are used as indicators of his status as a man. 
The prisoner community's view of employment 
largely reflects negative experience. A significant 
proportion are chronically unemployed persons, those 
who have had sporadic jobs in unskilled work, and 
those with unsatisfying working-class careers. It is 
ironic, perhaps, that the one career in which a 
prisoner might have experienced the positive rein-
forcements of enhanced manhood is his criminal one. 
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Prison work was at one time heavily tinged with 
punitive significance, as offenders were sentenced to 
hard labour. The work that is available, often under-
scoring the prisoners' subjugation, cannot provide 
reinforcement for a male prisoner's sense of manhood. 
Certainly the 'wages' preclude the possibility of a 
prisoner's providing help for a family. Indeed, the 
sole sense in which prison work might reward a kind of 
masculine role is the production of lethal weapons. 
Alongside dominance and employment as props of 
masculinity is sex itself. Whilst to a great extent 
sexuality provides benefits for the male role in inti-
macy and mutual support, there is also a gain in homo-
social status in one's stature in the eyes of other 
men. Sex, in fact, may be performed with the primary 
objective of assuring one's status in his peer group, 
and this attitude can be imported into the prison. 
Mark Gerzon states: 
The easiest way to prove oneself a man today is to 
make it with a girl. . We are not, like our 
primitive forebears, joining together with a woman 
as adults. We are coming together in order to 
become adults, if not in society's eyes, then in 
our own. 
<Gerzon, 175 > 
I have cited claims that manhood is measured in 
terms of character, career success and sexual potency. 
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I have argued further that in prison, the social 
setting tends: 
aggressive traits of 
experiences of work, 
sexual activity to 
to emphasise or reward the 
character, 2) to purvey negative 
and 3) to stress the power of 
achieve stature in one's (male) 
peer group. Given the low rewards for manhood in 
their work experience, and the tension evident in the 
character values based on domination, one might claim 
that deprivation of sex is a more ··profound loss for 
prisoners than it might be for those with established 
props to manhood in character or career. 
I would argue, to the contrary, that the props of 
manhood are more plastic than the counter-argument 
assumes. If, for example, a man loses his job, he 
might maintain his sense of worth by giving more time 
to his children. Likewise, a hapless suitor might 
transform the pains of his rejection into renewed 
commitment to his work. 
In the prison environment, however, the transfer 
to alternative props of masculinity is ominous. Denied 
affirmation in sexual activity and subjected to the 
drudgery of make-do work, the prisoner's resources for 
maintaining a sense of manhood are increasingly con-
centrated in show-downs of domination and aggression. 
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This discussion sets the scene for an examination 
of Sykes' other point; viz., that the loss of sext!al 
access to women ~elps to expla,~n the_ form£=t of sex 
activity that are found in male prisons. Sykes sums 
up the data on sexual relations in prisons. It is 
impoftant to note that he was writing in 1958, and 
that the evidence for his case is drawn entirely from 
the American prison experience. 
First, a fairly .large proportion of prisoners 
engage in homosexual behavior during their period 
of confinement. Second, their sexual deviance is 
rare or sporadic rather than chronic. And third 
much of the homosexual! t y which does occur 
in prison is not part of a life pattern existing 
before and after the confinement; rather, it is a 
response to the particular rigors of imprisonment. 
<Sykes, n. , 72) 
Sykes' claim that a large proportion of prisoners 
engage in sex during imprisonment seems to conflict 
with Gagnon's and Simon's point that the rate of sex 
activity is low, but there is no necessary contra-
diet ion. Clearly the rate of overt sex activity could 
be low, while most prisoners engage in sex at some 
time. Here again, difficulties in definition and the 
moral intensity of sexuality should make us wary of 
authoritative claims about the frequency of overt sex. 
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Sykes focuses his attention on the roles of sexual 
relations in prison, especially that of 'wolf', or 
sexual aggressor. He argues that aggression far 
from evoking the censure of other prisoners - is a way 
of securing one's masculinity. He believes that the 
stigma of deviance is neutralised by the wolf's 
affective state: other prisoners must see his act as 
merely physical release. There can be no suggestion 
that he would actually choose homosexuality, or that 
he holds any affection for the other. "His perversion 
is a form of rape and his victim happens to be a man 
rather than a woman due to the force of 
circumstances." <Sykes, 97) 
Here, Sykes' vivid language overstates his case. 
For example, Gagnon and Simon report that the role of 
aggressor is not confined to those who are exclusively 
heterosexual outside, but that men who engage in homo-
sexuality by preference can also take the wolf's role. 
A second point concerns the st igmat ising ef feet s of 
the sexual relations. Sykes holds that the aggressor 
gains in masculine status through zero-affect sexual 
release. It is just as likely, though, that the 
'wolf' is not stigmatised by others because he is 
aggressive in nature. <The point makes sense if we 
recall that the measure of deviance is often nonsexual 
social roles rather than sexual preference. ) 
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but 
Aggression is 
not in the 
bound up with sexuality in 
way that Sykes implies. 
prison, 
Daniel 
Lockwood tempers talk of prison rape with evidence 
that sexual harassment is a far more pervasive 
problem. "Sexual approaches perceived as offensive, " 
he writes, "should be seen as the most important basis 
of the problem of prison sexual violence. " (Lockwood, 
73) Lockwood suggests that violence is used as a 
defence by prisoners when potential aggressors try to 
impose female roles upon them. 
Sykes quite rightly comments that the coerced 
partner loses masculine stat us because of his 
passivity. Passive submission interpreted as 
weakness - is identified as a feminine trait. Thus, 
in Lockwood's interpretation of prison sexuality, the 
aggressor attempts to force 'weaker' prisoners into 
the gender 
short, the 
intent upon 
roles that he associates with women: in 
passive object of a dominating aggressor 
sexual conquest. In this sense prison 
sexual activity provides a range of surrogate 
heterosexual relations - especially when relationships 
are viewed in terms of dominance and predation. 
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A brief review of the foregoing sections will help 
to frame the context for a discussion of prison 
philosophy and policies regarding sexuality. I have 
followed an interactionist approach in preference to 
the more popular 'drive theory'. The latter method 
tends to ignore or underestimate the wide variability 
inherent in human sexual! ty. Further, drive theory 
centres sexuality upon heterosexual coitus; and this 
stresses the pleasure of sex in intercourse over the 
equally important functions of sexuality in setting 
the roles appropriate to each gender, and in shaping 
relations not just between husband and wife or 
females and males, but all social relations. 
The interactionist approach is sensitive to the 
broader meanings of sexuality, as they are determined 
in social interaction. It is a difficult method, 
because it renders problematic the sexual dimension of 
all relations - not just the overtly erotic ones. In 
its broader scope, it comprehends nuances of gender 
roles, the qualities of relations between people, as 
well as the parameters of deviance. Hence, the 
interactionist method illuminates the structure of 
sexuality within the prison setting. 
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In the overview of prison sexuality I introduced 
the concept of secondary adjustments as contained or 
disruptive ways of coping with the demands of prison 
life. Sexuality can serve to offset the coldness and 
suspicion of the prison environment. It can be used 
as currency in the prisoner economy. Perhaps the 
greatest attraction of sexuality within prisons is its 
power to create a world apart from that which is 
bounded by the walls: sexuality constitutes a 
'removal activity'. Finally (and the most disruptive 
of the functions) sexuality can be used to demonstrate 
or establish one's power in a setting that strips 
people of self-determination. 
The 
inspired 
search for 
by drive 
overt sexual relations, perhaps 
theory, actually distorts the 
sexuality within prisons. It ignores the insights to 
be gained from the broader dimensions of sexuality, 
and focuses upon a small sample of conduct. If we 
ignore the assaults upon masculine self-esteem, then 
the sexual relations that occur in prison will appear 
perverse. If we fail to consider that a minimal 
opportunity structure will create a distinct sense of 
appropriate sexual targets, then we are likely to 
equate prison sexuality to any other form of 
homosexuality. 
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prison life today might be viewed as punishments 
which the free community deliberately inflicts on 
the offender for violating the law; in part, they 
might be seen as the unplanned· <or, as some would 
argue, the unavoidable> concomitants of confining 
large groups of criminals for prolonged periods. 
<Sykes, 64> 
sexuality 
The deprivation of sexual access imposed by prison 
is seen by many as a part of the punishment; others 
would claim that this loss is one of the unintended 
concomitants of incarceration. In a sense, it doesn' t 
matter: whether the deprivation is seen as punitive 
or unavoidable, the prisoner is deprived of far more 
than heterosexual coitus. With enviable efficiency, 
the prison deprives its charges of marriages; it 
strips away values based upon trust and mutual caring, 
it destroys that balanced confidence in filling a 
gender role that enables wo/men both to achieve and to 
cooperate with others in doing so. 10 
10 R.J. Sapsford stated in a 1977 report, based on a sample 
of sixty life sentence prisoners: 
At reception all men ... had a close contact with some one 
outside, and nearly half had a wife or girfriend. By the 
end of the first year, however, only 20% were in better 
than tenuous contact with wife or girlfriend, and none of 
the ten men who had served more than eleven years had been 
in any such contact since their seventh year." Quoted in 
Alan Duce, An Outline of Issues Raised by Long Term Impris-
onment, <unpublished), British Council of Churches 
Penal Policy Group, 1984. Cf. Sapsford, 1978, page 136. 
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We have seen glimpses of the distorted sexuality 
that results from a punitively single sex society. 
There are two perspectives from which one can judge 
the role 
sexuality. 
sets the 
of prison philosophy in creating prison 
The first, inspired by the drive theory, 
deprivation of sexual access among the 
aspects of punishmentj the second approach builds upon 
the hypothesis that prison policies toward sexuality 
are primarily shaped by the attitudes of the wider 
society. 
Punitive Celibacy 
Mike Brake writes, «we connect with our animality 
through eroticism, which offers us an escape from the 
iron cage of rationality." <Brake, 14) Undoubtedly, 
sex is a freedom. The variability of forms of expres-
sion, the choice of sex partners, the ways that having 
sex transports us out of the worlds of language and 
reason - these demonstrate the power of sex to free 
us. Brake does not suggest that eroticism controls 
us, but that we can use it in order to escape from the 
mechanising influence of rationality. Sex, therefore, 
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is not only subject to controls, but capable of 
confirming our sense of power and self-determination. 
The dual role of sex in personal liberation and 
self-determination is replicated on the social scale. 
Sexuality is a contested property. On one hand, the 
sex drive is seen as the source of creative energy, 
the force that advances social progress. 
hand, obviously, this force must be 
restrained, directed at particular ends. 
is most awesome in its control of sex, 
presupposed scope of sexual energy. 
On the other 
organised, 
Social power 
given the 
I have argued that imprisonment affects prisoners' 
sexuality in many ways, not just in the denial of 
heterosexual activity. Meaghan Morris draws important 
links between the control of the body and one's 
sexuality. Morris argues <following Foucault) that 
domination includes the power to define the subject's 
body by its functions for the authority above it. The 
bodies of the subjected group are controlled in order 
to conform the subject to the requirements of the 
particular institution, whether medical, legal, educa-
tive, or punitive. <Compare Phenomenology, above) 
"Hence," writes Morris, "so much reluctance to recog-
nize the body and the sex of other classes - precisely 
those being exploited." <Morris, in Brake, 270) 
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In prison, personal belongings are freely handled 
by staff (during induction, cell searches, etc.). 
More important, 
which are rare 
one's body space is invaded in ways 
outside: strip searches (including 
anal inspect ion) the more common pat-downs, and . the 
ubiquitous surveillance. Erving Goffman points out 
that while these are less dramatic violations of the 
body than rape, they are violations nonetheless. As 
violations of the body, these intrusions, in the 
interest of control, contaminate the prisoner's 
sexuality. 
Something of the pointed ambivalence of prisons 
regarding the sexuality of prisoners emerges from the 
drive-repression approach. Imposed, punitive celibacy 
is a demonstration of society's power to control the 
prisoner. Surrendering this 
provision of conjugal visits, 
transfer power to the prisoner. 
power to control prisoners must 
crazed and celibate. The 
power, through the 
for example, would 
To prove the prison's 
be seen as both sex-
former supports the 
assumption that the sex drive is overwhelming; the 
latter shows that the prison regime has mastered that 
anarchic drive. 
There is a parallel in prison history to the 
current attempt to treat prisoners as asexual. When 
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it opened, Pentonville followed Eastern Penitentiary 
<U.S. A.) in imposing a silent system, 
eliminate the diffusion of criminality. 
intended to 
If today, we 
consider that nineteenth century society was ignorant 
in presupposing that prisoners could be made mute, 
then it is remarkable that we do not recognise the 
same folly in the assumption that sexuality can be 
denied for the duration of a prison sentence. 
Drive imagery implies that one's sexuality can be 
switched on or off like a light-bulb. Similarly, 
prison practice, with its prohibitions against overt 
sex activity, presupposes a drive which can be denied 
(just as hunger can be denied by fasting). The inter-
actionist account might be faulted for making it 
appear that sexuality is merely a product of a social 
behaviour setting. <Were that the case, one could 
imagine a de-sexed environment where sex was not so 
much denied as non-existent.) If, though, sexuality 
is intrinsic to being human <like intelligence) then 
our sexual being is indispensable, essential to 
wholeness and dignity. 
In our handling of the prisoners' sexuality we do 
exert control, but the results do not benefit us. Ken 
Plummer proposed that we might expect an increase in 
pathology where the individual has no support system 
-109-
sexuality 
and is subject to overt prescriptions against his 
conduct. Looking more particularly at prisons, Gagnon 
and Simon state that "any attempt to become more 
coercive . in order to reduce homosexual contacts 
may result not in a decrease in activity, but perhaps 
in an increase. " <Gagnon & Simon, HS, 259) 
The drive theory of sexuality promises a potent 
tool for social control. In practice, the control of 
that drive has been overly punitive, and 
manifests the harm in destroyed homes and 
society 
in the 
distorted views of sexual relations amongst prisoners 
as they return. The drive theory itself, upon which 
the treatment of prisoners' sexuality would seem to be 
based, distorts our view of sexuality. But even on 
its own terms, the prison's continued mismanagement of 
the sexuality of prisoners fails to find reasoned 
justification. 
Sexuality in Penal Philosophy and in Society 
I have argued that sexuality is closely linked to 
prison violence. Hence it is clear that sexuality 
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represents a delicate issue for prison administrators. 
However, I have not taken the view that the depri-
vation of sexual access to women causes inter-prisoner 
violence; that, in other words, people fight because 
they are overwhelmed by sexual frustration. Rather, 
my argument 
within the 
has been that the structure of sexuality 
punitively celibate world of prisons 
results in sex-related violence. The prison fosters a 
violent sexuality through its character of distrust 
and personal isolation from others; through its 
pervasive assaults on the gender status of prisoners; 
through its norms of domination and aggression. 
If we allow that the deprivation of sexual access 
may be unintended or unavoidable, our perspective of 
those in authority changes. We do not need to assign 
blame or to question the philosophy behind their 
decisions. Indeed, it is possible to suggest that a 
philosophical basis is no longer relevant. 
In the decision to incarcerate, we, as society, 
take responsibility for offenders; our obligations 
take the same form as our control of children. 
there are fruitful parallels between our handling of 
the prisoners' sexuality and of that of children. The 
difference and it is a key one is that we 
deliberately work to develop a sexuality in our 
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children. The effects upon the prisoners' sexuality, 
however, can be assumed to be unintended. 
Gagnon and Simon write that the duty of guiding a 
child's sexuality entails a prior step of facing up to 
our own. We shall no doubt pass onto the child our 
gui 1 t as well as our sense of pleasure. But the key 
point is that the expression of sexuality to another 
involves the act of presenting our own sexuality 
making it public. 
Prisons are public. Not only does the media have 
access to report on the life of the prison as news, 
but the constant surveillance of prisoners means that 
their lives lack the privacy which we take for 
granted. 
sexuality. 
This carries two implications for prisoner 
First, our survey of prisoner sexuality shows that 
the prison setting conditions sex in undesired ways. 
Masturbation pro vi des an example. The meaning of this 
sexual activity is conditioned by the setting. Single 
cells approximate the privacy of the wider society, in 
contrast to the local gaols, where masturbation is 
necessarily a public act. 
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Similarly, surveillance tends to debase shows of 
affection in visiting rooms, unlike the public char-
acter of kissing in a bus queue or park. The prison 
setting imposes profound stresses upon couples, and it 
would pollute their relations even if conjugal visits 
were provided. The public character of prisons 
reveals the extent to which the prison cont ami nates 
sexuality. 
The second implication of the public character of 
prison sex is the way it reflects upon us. The prison 
system that provides for sexual relations publicises 
its society's own sexuality. Our own sexuality is 
revealed in the actual conduct of the prisoners, or, 
in the framework which we design to accommodate them. 
This is something which we are not particularly 
eager to publicise. In concrete terms, to allow 
unmarried couples to enjoy conjugal visits publicises 
the fact that sex occurs outside of marriage. <We do 
not wish to advertise this fact.> To deny such 
couples conjugal rights because they are unmarried is 
to pretend that sex does not occur outside of 
marriage. <And we do not want to show that we are 
hypocritical. > 
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Gagnon and Simon make a similar point about the 
sexuality of children. While it appeared that Freud 
shocked society by discovering the child's sexuality, 
the real shock was "an assault upon public anti-
sexuality and asexuality of adults. " <Gagnon & 51 man, 
HS, 111) Following this logic, I suggest that we 
maintain the fallacy of asexual prisoners in order to 
maintain our own public asexuality. The imposed 
celibacy is in this sense a mode of censorship. 
The dilemma seems unresolvable. If we are to 
become open about prisoners' sexuality, then we must 
honestly face up to our own. If we continue to hide 
these needs, we maintain a hypocrisy that inflicts 
great harm on prisoners' wholeness as well as upon our 
own sexuality. As we pretend that prisoners have no 
sexuality, we create environments in which that 
sexuality becomes centred upon dominance and violence. 
Sexuality will 
prison environment 
human. 
their 
We cannot 
se:x:uali ty, 
inevitably comprise part of the 
because sexuality is part of being 
deliberately deny a group of people 
forcing them into a de-sexed 
existence, without cost. In previous generations, the 
cost was social; prisoners on release bore a 
distorted, alien sense of sexuality, as I have 
sketched above. 
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Today, the risk of AIDS carries a more lethal 
cost. AIDS makes clear the extent to which any prison 
department must balance the health of prisoners 
against its own requirements of control. 
At one extreme, sexual behaviour can be 
prohibit edj every detected instance can be rigorously 
punished. At the other, safe sex can be promoted 
through the provision of condoms by the Prison Medical 
Service, by greater use of 'High Street' agency 
advice, by freer associ at ions between prisoners, by 
the increased use of home leave and by the provision 
of conjugal visits. 
Dr. John Kilgour, Director of the Prison Medical 
Services, has stated: 
We must ensure in the prison system . . . that we 
reflect the attitudes, the ethics and the stand-
ards of care of the community at large in the face 
of the threat presented by the AIDS virus. 
<Kilgour, 17) 
In the wider community, the approach to the 
disease has been fairly consistent. The isolation of 
high risk groups has not been pursued by the wider 
society. Instead, the medical response to the disease 
has been to identify high risk behaviour. Education 
and the desired changes of behaviour may involve 
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reductions in the number of sexual partners, but safe 
sex practices also play a significant role. 
In prisons, a policy of punishing sex activity is 
likely to increase the transmission of the disease in 
two ways. First, the punitive atmosphere increases 
the pressure on the prisoner, making it more likely 
that s/he will turn to another prisoner, either for~ 
affection and caring or to dominate and assault. 
Second, a punitive approach ensures that the prisoners 
hide the behaviour. Unreported or hidden sex activity 
poses perhaps the 
especially in light 
greatest risk of transmission, 
of the difficulties in detecting 
the virus through screening. 
Prisons are also high risk settings because the 
comparatively closed population makes it more likely 
that sexually active prisoners will have repeated 
encounters with partners who are infectious. (Higher 
rates of contact with a virus vastly increase the odds 
of infection. ) Where all sexual behaviour is 
forbidden, all forms are equally liable to transmit 
the virus. Where consensual relations are permitted, 
those at least can be made more safe. <Obviously, 
assaultive sex is very unlikely to be protected sex.) 
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We do not have the choice of eliminating 
prisoners' sexuality. Nor, apparently is there much 
hope of an enlightened administration establishing 
full conjugal rights for each prisoner. Yet, given 
the risks, AIDS could bring prison staff and prisoners 
together in a combined effort. To do so, however, 
would require that the prison service recognise the 
sexuality of the prisoners, make freely available to 
all prisoners the current 'High Street' information 
about the disease, and encourage those who will 
participate in sexual relations to do so safely. 
<I am grateful to Tim Bond for his reflections on this 
chapter. ) 
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MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Introduction 
The theory of retribution holds that punishment 
treats the offender as a responsible person. It is 
paradoxical - if not contradictory - to claim that in 
harming persons we treat them as responsible. But 
retributivists argue that the alternative is to excuse 
the offence, thus denying offenders their right to 
expiate their crimes through the endurance of punitive 
pain. One cannot escape the feeling that the 
dichotomy is forced, artificial. Yet the advocate of 
punishment insists that to refrain from punishing the 
offender is to condone wickedness. 
Punishment might be said to treat the offender as 
responsible in two ways. The first, and most basic, 
requires of any offender some suffering or endurance 
of harm to atone for the offence. Perhaps the 
offender must suffer to buttress a rule, by serving as 
an example of the cost of transgression. 
examined such arguments in Retribution. ) 
<I have 
A second approach, a synthesis of ret ri but ion and 
reform, presupposes that an offence is a step toward 
the moral deterioration of the offender. Punishment 
constitutes an abrupt check, 
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giving offenders the 
responsibility 
opportunity 
thus, both 
to reconsider their choices. Punishment, 
mat~ks a 
<denunciation), and 
boundary 
shocks 
of acceptable 
the offender 
behaviour 
into an 
attitude of obedience <reform). The offender's 
responsibility combines the accountability of the 
first rationale with the offender's power to re-
interpret choices in 1 ight of the state' s definition 
of right and wrong. 
Imprisonment is meant to treat the offender as 
responsible in ways that build on both explanations. 
By enduring the pain of punishment, offenders expiate 
the offence, enabling them to return to the community 
in harmonious relations. Imprisonment also makes 
forgiveness possible by bringing the offender to 
repentance, and by seeing that justice is done. 
Both senses of responsibility the power to 
choose one's future for good or evil and the duty to 
undo the wrong by enduring pain - can be seen to have 
roots in Christian theology. I would argue, however, 
that retribution distorts the concept of 
responsibility 
it insults 
<selecting one 
human dignity 
or two aspects of 
and community, 
it)' 
and 
whitewashes retaliation. To hold a person responsible 
is not wilfully to damage the wrongdoer. Rather (as I 
have suggested in Retribution) true responsibility 
points to the wrongdoer's duty to make amends. 
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My focus in this chapter is the relation between 
personal responsibility and prison discipline. In the 
section that follows, I sketch the meaning of 
responsibility, drawing upon H. Richard N:ttbuhr. I 
argue that responsibility is a comprehensive concept, 
and is misrepresented 
Responsibility 
initiative; it 
includes 
includes 
persons rather than rules. 
when 
duty, 
it is segmented. 
but also self-
accountability, but to 
In the third section, I examine prison discipline 
in terms of the relations between staff and prisoners, 
especially the imbalances of power between the two 
groups. The disparity in power conditions the pris-
oners' interpretations of their own actions. Not only 
are their actions defined in terms of loss and gain in 
status, but, more broadly, prisoners' acts are subject 
to rules set by the 'keepers' <staff and adminis-
tration). Consequently, all activity inside prison is 
conditioned by the marked imbalance of power. 
The fourth section is devoted to prison justice, 
including adjudications by the governor and the Board 
of Visitors. A central issue is the question of 
fairness in prison discipline. I examine claims by 
prisoners that prison justice is fundamentally unfair, 
and tie those claims to our understanding of personal 
responsibility. 
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The final two sections (five and six) demonstrate 
in greater detail the harmful effects prison disci-
pline has on the development of a sense of personal 
responsibility. I follow Jean-Paul Sartre's argument 
that imprisonment inflicts a deeper penalty than the 
loss of the power of choice; that incarceration 
deprives prisoners of: a) their equal status as 
human; b) the capacity to transcend their actions and 
interpret them; and c) the freedom to transform 
themselves along the lines of a fresh sense of 
direct ion. 
I conclude with an analysis Ct!l' tJJ-~g f.:mill. qn:J.gr,~4 
prison community in light of the harms done to 
personal responsibility by prison. discipline. I use 
prison discipline to refer to the operations of 
prisons intended to control the behaviour of prisoners 
including regiment at ion, rules, surveillance, 
relations with staff, transfers, etc. I take prison 
rules to mean all rules within the prison system, 
including the many Standing Orders that prisoners are 
not allowed to see. Still, I shall have occasion to 
refer to prison rules that pertain especially to-
offences against discipline (for which prisoners can 
be charged and punished). I use prison justice to 
refer to the adjudicatory processes that formally 
provide sanctions against indiscipline. 
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The Meaning of Responsibility 
Responsibility can be distinguished from deonto-
logical ethics, built upon rules, duties, etc., and 
from teleological ethics, that cite ideals to be 
fulfilled. The former tends to begin with principles 
or laws, and to discriminate between right and wrong 
action upon these bases. The latter focuses upon the 
consequences of our actions, and judges the morality 
of an action in terms of its good or evil effects. 
On the face of it, responsibility may not seem 
much of an improvement. Jean-Paul Sartre's sense of 
responsibility - as consciousness of being the incon-
testable author of an event.. is thoroughly 
egocentric. In popular usage, responsibility is often 
incorporated into the legal approach, reduced to 
guilt. To apply the concept of personal 
responsibility to prison discipline, we need to be 
explicit about its meanings. 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingnes~ page 707. 
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Responsibility is used to denote obligation, as 
when a parent assumes responsibility for her children. 
In the plural, however, responsibilities imply a sense 
of specific duties. Within a legal context, it refers 
to both guilt and the capacity to decide for oneself. 
Capacity includes a nuance of initiative, as when an 
employee is promoted because she is responsible. 
Ethically, this case is noteworthy, since the person 
acts without waiting for the right or good thing to be 
clarified <it is not a case of obedience, but of 
creativity). 
There is an element of personal backing in taking 
responsibility, or in owning up to something. 
Standing by my assertions, owning up to my actions, is 
a form of accountability. Taking responsibility 
includes a healthy sense of personal identity, linking 
the consequences of my actions to my own decisions. 
by 
This overview of responsibility can 
pointing to basic meanings of 
appropriation, deput yshi p, 
be summarised 
the concept: 
and account-capacity, 
ability. One could choose other terms to describe the 
four aspects of responsibility: trustworthiness, 
initiative and reliability, undertaking a duty for 
<something> and answerable to <someone). 
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These four anchors disclose a method of 
responsible et hies. The uniquely human capacity for 
responsibility differentiates moral actions from other 
behaviour. A responsible act differs from the 
reaction of an organism to stimuli, as it does from 
the mechanical effect of physical causes. A response 
is based upon my interpretations of the actions of 
some Other in particular, and, more generally, of the 
situation as I encounter it. Whilst my response 
includes organic reactions as well as physical causes, 
it is not limited to these. 
I interpret the situation facing me by reference 
to two types of information: 
1) The evidence of past experience of such encounters. 
This includes generalisations about human behaviour, 
derived empirically, and personal experiences. 
2) I also interpret particular clues in my 
counterpart. 2 I smile upon seeing him. He frowns. I 
frown in response. He sees my expression and laughs 
:2 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann make this point, 
pages 19-46, illuminating it with the example that follows. 
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at me. Together we smile. In interpreting the 
actions of an Other, a person "identifies, compares, 
analyzes, and relates events so that they come not 
as brute actions, but as understood and as having 
meaning. " CH. R. Nit e. buhr, 61) 
Of course, we could make the general point that 
all such actions will either be pleasing or painful, 
good or bad for me, contribute to my survival or 
threaten it. There is no benefit in doing so, 
however, since reducing all interact ion to threat or 
benefit debases the role of the intellect in reading 
the complex intentions of the Other. To reduce all 
activity to threat or benefit narrows the frame for 
our responses, and biases us toward a defensive 
stance. We are inclined to react out of fear Cor 
trust) and therefore, to ignore a plethora of 
significant motives that underlie our actions. St i 11, 
because interpretations are based on past experience, 
this aspect of responsibility tends toward caution and 
conservatism. 
Laws of human behaviour inform my interpretation, 
but my response cannot be limited to their input. The 
freedom of my counterpart is fundamental to our 
responsible interaction. There must be a distancing 
respect between my self and the Other's self. That is 
to say, if my reply to someone' s action is to be 
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responsible and not mechanistic or determined, I must 
see her act ion as issuing from a person: not an 
organism or thing. The Other provides both the origin 
and the limitation of my own responsibility.a 
The Other's impact upon my responsibility may be 
illuminated by turning to a second aspect of 
responsible ethics, namely accountability. Any action 
finds its place in a dialogue of interaction in which 
my response will inform the Other's next move. Mutual 
accountability or reciprocity provides constancy, 
tying each response to precedents and objectives. I 
expect to be held accountable insofar as I anticipate 
certain kinds of responses to my act ion. I hold the 
Other account able in my react ion (s) to her act ions. 
"No act ion taken as an atomic unit is responsible. " 
<H. R. N•~buhr, 64) 
In accountability I recognise that my action will 
have consequences. In a sense, my act negates all 
other possibilities. I have made this happen, and not 
For 'distancing' see Martin Buber: I and Tho~ Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 1958. Dietrich Bonhoeffer discusses the 
Other's role in constituting my own freedom in Ethics, pages 
224-262. 
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that, or that, or that. As such, all activity is 
irreversible; I cannot simply withdraw a promise as a 
means of nullifying an obligation. While there will 
be physical effects of any action, the key for 
responsibility is my expectation that my action will 
condition the actions of Others toward me. 
Hence, the concept of accountability is 
necessarily mutual and reciprocal. I believe that my 
action will be respected by my counterpart as the 
action of her Other. My act may resonate with hers, 
and we can further the direction we <together) have 
authored. Or I can re-direct the interact ion, making 
possible a fresh path. 
We must include a further sense of accountability. 
I mentioned the function of accountability as a 
constant. Accountability gives interaction its future 
tense. The time period of any specific action may be 
very limited. I may act as though I may never see my 
counterpart again <if, for example, he happens to sit 
across from me on the train). And yet, clearly, my 
sense of future will condition my response. The task 
I envision may be specific and short-term Cget~ing to 
Birmingham>; or it might be immense, a life-calling 
<as it would be were I engaged to the man opposite). 
In this context, we need not distinguish between 
minimal goals and life-projects. 
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The essential point 
responsibility 
is that each responsible action is affected by some 
such time framework. 
Thus far I have spoken of one Other, as though 
human interact ions were a series of dialogues. This 
traditional setting of the issues is distorting, 
however, without the dimension of social solidarity. 
the social I stressed In previous 
construct ion of 
chapters 
sel fhood. Ethical systems, however, 
are often constructed upon the model of the isolated 
agent. The subject, while not quite solipsistic, is 
certainly isolated and atomistic. The agent is set 
against the rest of the world people, objects, 
events. Responsibility, however, builds upon the 
foundations of selfhood in social forces. 
George Herbert Mead argued that the self is 
generated in social interaction. The self is 
peculiar in its capacity to stand in relation to 
itself; i.e., to be subject and object reflexively. 
But this is only possible via a manufactured dialogue. 
In Mead's view, the counterparts of the self in these 
dialogues are the significant others in one's life. 
Mead goes further to illuminate a fundamental triad 
essential to encounters between persons. Interactions 
occur between selves and significant others in the 
context of the Generalised Othe~ In the light of the 
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anonymous thir·d per·son, we see our own acts, discourse 
and roles. 
Similarly, Martin Buber saw the self as 
constituted in an I-Thou relation, together 
encompassed under a transcendent Thou. There are 
profound differences between the Generalised Other of 
Mead and the transcendent Thou of Martin Buber, but 
both set responsible relations within a broader 
context that gives the dyad its meaning. Mead's 
Generalised Other, in particular, is a constancy, a 
regularity that I perceive through the actions of 
individual selves upon me. These constancies are 
essential to a sense of accountability, and to giving 
meaning to my actions. The self responds to 
others who as Thou' s are members of a group in 
whose interactions constancies are present in such 
a way that the self can interpret present and 
anticipate future actions upon it. 
<H. R. N1~buhr, 78) 
My interpretations draw meaning from the constancy 
I observe, both in myself and in my counterparts. 
These constancies become laws of human behaviour; 
1. e., 'objective' facts about human beings. This 
sense of law is a law of nature moreso than a 
reference to civil law codes. The social web of 
shared interpretations and behavioural constancies 
contributes much to the significance of my actions. 
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The social construction 
distributes responsibility, 
ways. 
responsibility 
of selfhood extends or 
and it does so in two 
First is the bestowal of meaning. My role - as 
father, labourer, male, thief - is culture-specific. 
Society has a share in creating it, helps to define my 
actions and their consequences, and hence shares in 
giving the roles and activities their meanings. To 
take a loaded example: a society that outlaws 
heterosexual love 
shares in the 
as in George 
responsibility for 
Orwell's 1984 
the so-called 
criminality of widespread sexual activity. The social 
origins of meaning cast doubt on Sartre's claim of the 
totally autonomous self. Further, socially validated 
roles such as mot her hood demand that one can act on 
behalf of, and be responsible for others (deputyship). 
This points 
responsi bi 1 it y. 
to the second extension of 
Bonhoeffer mentions that others form 
the origin and limits of my responsibility. The 
Other's respect for my freedom allows me to exercise 
responsibility. My constancy of behaviour exposes me 
to the manipulations of others. We can draw an 
analytical distinction between the distancing respect 
that enables me to determine events on one hand, and 
the Other's power to determine my choices on the 
other. In social interaction, however, the two roles 
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are combined in our experience of shared 
responsibility. 
Shakespeare's Iago demonstrates the power of one 
person to shape the purposes and actions of another. 
Iago plays a part in directing Othello's actions. We 
can sketch a useful continuum of Iago's respon-
sibility. At a minimum, he awakens Othello's 
jealousy. At the most, Iago is responsible for 
Othello's tragic downfall. It is possible <analyti-
cally) to locate a point at which the responsibility 
can be distributed between the two <to say nothing of 
the social framework). We can say that Iago' s 
responsibility ends here, and Othello is responsible 
for all the rest. These judgments, however, are 
arbitrary. The course of events is determined neither 
by Iago nor Othello, but by both and others - in a 
world whose meanings are socially stipulated. 
Nevertheless, this bestowal of meaning and the 
opportunities for others to manipulate me should not 
lead us to dismiss the self entirely. Both the social 
self and the I of the I-Thou assume that there is a 
self i there is an I. Though there are personal and 
physical influences that determine my choices, and 
though their meaning is described in a social 
framework, I make choices based upon my act of 
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interpretation. I am a self who chooses in activity. 
Despite its grounding in social solidarity, 
responsibility demands that we acknowledge our 
authorship of our acts <appropriation). 
I spoke of the task of interpretation in response 
to the act ions of the Other, and in terms of the eye 
of the Generalised Other. In appropriation, I 
interpret my own action and take a position about it. 
Earlier, tying interpretation to past experience, I 
mentioned the caution inherent in the task. Yet, in 
personal responsibility, I can re-interpret my past, 
recasting its meaning, and re-directing my life-
project. This interpretative .process is metanoia, as 
it radically shifts my sense of calling and identity. 
An ethic of responsibility includes, but is not 
determined by judgments of right and wrong, objectives 
which are good or evil. In situ, in the midst of 
relations that require ethical judgment, 
responsibility calls for a quality of action that 
Neibuhr describes as the 'fitting' response. Such a 
quality encompasses my capacity to pursue a given 
course, the meanings applied to my actions <through my 
own and others' interpretations), my obligations to 
the Other or Others, and my reasonable expectation of 
future actions by those Others. 
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Where responsibility is reduced to guilt, 
accountability, or simple desert, aspects such as 
personal capacity, or reciprocal interpret at ions are 
devalued. My general argument in this chapter, 
however, is not merely that punishment slights these 
other aspects of responsibility; but that 
responsibility is a comprehensive, integrated quality 
of social relations. This quality as a whole - is 
distorted by punishment in the prison setting, and it 
is in this sense that imprisonment impedes the 
development of responsibility in prisoners. 
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The Enforcement of Prison Discipline 
Nothing is more rare in any man 
than an act of his own. 
- Ralph Waldo Emerson 
The Prior Committee, formed by the Home Office to 
study the prison disciplinary system, published its 
findings in 1985. Vivien Stern, a member of the 
Committee, reports that they specified three aspects 
essential to control: 1) staff-prisoner relations; 2) 
a meaningful programme of activitiesj 3) the perceived 
fairness of the system. Prison discipline benefits 
when a regime brings meaning to the prisoner's day, 
but discipline itself is directly tied to (1) and (3) 
above. Hence, staff-prisoner relations, and fairness 
illuminate the character of prison discipline. <The 
following is not a full study of the relations between 
staff and prisoners. My concern here is the impact of 
the staff's enforcement of prison rules upon the 
prisoner's personal responsibility.) 
Two prison rules set the theme for a study of 
personal responsibility in prison. Rule 2, like Rule 
1, was at one time intended to frame a philosophy of 
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imprisonment, to set the tone for policy. Rule 47 
concerns prison discipline, and is the major means by 
which prisoners can be charged with disciplinary 
offences. In this section, my focus is Rule 47, and 
the impact of the Rule on relations between prison 
officers and prisoners. In the next sect ion, I study 
the question of fairness in the adjudication of 
offences against discipline. These two sections will 
prepare the ground for reflections on 
discipline and personal responsibility. 
2. (1) Order and discipline shall be maintained 
with firmness, but with no more restriction than 
is required for safe custody and well ordered 
community life. 
<2> In the control of 
seek to influence them 
and leadership, 
cooperation. 
and 
prisoners, officers shall 
through their own example 
to enlist their willing 
(3) At all times the treatment of prisoners shall 
be such as to encourage their self-respect and a 
sense of personal responsibility, but a prisoner 
shall not be employed in any disciplinary 
capacity. 
<Cited in Plotnikoff, 26) 
47. A prisoner shall be guilty of an offence 
against discipline if he: 
< 1) mutinies or incites another prisoner to 
mutiny; 
<2) does gross personal violence to an officer; 
(3) does gross personal violence to any person not 
being an officer; 
(4) commits any assault; 
(5) escapes from prison or from legal custody; 
<6> absents himself without permission from any 
place where he is required to be, whether within 
or outside prison; 
(7) has in his cell or room or in his possession 
any unauthorised article, or attempts to obtain 
such an article; 
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<8) delivers to or receives from any person any 
unauthorised article; 
<9> sells or delivers to any person, without 
permission, anything he is allowed to have only 
for his own use; 
(10) takes improperly or is in unauthorised 
possession of any article belonging to another 
person or to a prison; 
(11) wilfully damages or disfigures any part of 
the prison or any property not his own; 
<12) makes any false and malicious allegation 
against an officer; 
(13) treats with disrespect an officer or any 
person visiting a prison; 
<14-> uses any abusive, insolent, threatening or 
other improper language; 
<15) is indecent in language, act or gesture; 
<16) repeatedly makes groundless complaints; 
(17) is idle, careless or negligent at work, or, 
being required to work, refuses to do so; 
C18) disobeys any lawful order or refuses or 
neglects to conform to any rule or regulation of 
the prison; 
(19) attempts to do any of the foregoing things; 
<20> in any way offends against good order and 
discipline; 
(21) does not return to prison when he should have 
returned after being temporarily released from 
prison under Rule 6 of these Rules, or does not 
comply with any condition under which he was so 
released; 
<Cited in Plotnikoff, 82) 
responsibility 
Rule 47 exemplifies the quasi-legal structure 
under which a prisoner lives. It represents a vast 
and complex code that regulates the behaviour of 
prisoners as well as the conditions of their 
confinement. While Rule 47 details disciplinary 
offences, other rules regulate visits and mail, the 
release of information, protective or preventative 
segregation <Rule 43), work, diet, exercise, hygiene, 
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education - in short, prison rules govern every aspect 
of the prisoners' lives. I focus upon Rule 47 because 
it constitutes the formal framework for holding 
prisoners accountable for their actions. 
In my discussion of responsible ethics, I 
described the role of interaction in shaping the 
agent's responsibility. Unfortunately, H. Richard 
N.te.buhr' s analysis is weak on the contaminating 
influence of power disparities, which mark the 
interaction of persons as they respond to each other. 
Erving Goffman sheds light on staff-prisoner relations 
by drawing attention to the echelon power structure, 
whereby any inmate is subject to the discretion and 
sanctioning power of any staff member. Interactions 
within prisons are profoundly conditioned by the 
opposed roles of staff and prisoner. 
Stan Cohen and Laurie Taylor remark upon the 
quality of us and them in the perspectives of 
prisoners with whom they worked. In the words of one 
of their prisoner-correspondents: 
Much of the interaction between staff and inmates 
revolves around the assertion of authority and the 
attempts by cons to negate or offset its impact on 
their lives. This is the centre of gravity of 
prison life. 
<Cited in Cohen & Taylor, 226) 
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Similarly, James Peck has written: 
The hacks of course hold all the aces in dealing 
with any prisoner because they can always write 
him up for inevitable punishment. 
<Cited in Goffman, n. 40, page 159) 
responsibility 
A quick scan over the articles in Rule 47 demon-
strates the prisoners• case. 47(20), for example, 
illustrates the vast range of the prison officers' 
disc ret ion: a prisoner may be punished, according to 
Rule 47 C20) if s/he "in any way offends against good 
order and discipline. " <in Plotnikoff, 82) 
Rule 47 establishes the imbalance between 
prisoners and prison officers on a number of points. 
It is an offence, according to article <12), to make a 
false and malicious allegation against an officer. 
There is no corresponding protection for prisoners in 
the rules. 4 Further, given the powers of discretion 
Nigel Walker, in his contribution to Bottoms & Light, 
follows Rule 44 to argue: 'Unlawful or unnecessary exercise 
of authority' by an officer is a disciplinary offence» 
<Bottoms & Light, 196-197). Rule 44, however, relates to 
the illegitimate use of forcej it prohibits officers from 
acting 'deliberately in a manner calculated to provoke a 
prisoner'. There is no explicit reference to false charges 
against a prisoner. 
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enjoyed by prison officers, article <12) will 
obviously inhibit genuine complaints as well as 
specious or malicious ones. 
Rule 4-7(6) prohibits the prisoner from absenting 
himself from a place where he is required to be 
without permission. Confinement is the central 
purpose of prisons, and the rule does help staff to 
ensure against escapes. But the intrusion into the 
prisoner's behaviour is damaging. Erving Goffman 
comments that this sort of obligation: 
not only puts the individual in a submissive or 
suppliant role 'unnatural' for an adult but also 
opens up his line of action to interceptions by 
staff. 
<Goffman, 41) 
Perhaps the greatest effect of the power imbalance 
upon discipline under the rules is hidden. The 
ultimate discretion is the prison officer's choice to 
enforce a given rule or not. The officer may choose 
to overlook an infraction. In practice, an offence is 
not punished unless the prison officer decides to 
enforce the article in question. 
Discipline refers to many ways that the prison 
officer exercises control over prisoners. Prison 
officers escort prisoners from one part of the prison 
-14-0-
responsibility 
to another; they observe prisoners constantly; they 
give orders; a prison officer reads (and censors) 
letters to and from loved ones. 
Despite these roles, the prison officer's power 
can be overstated. Gresham Sykes states that the 
prison officer must depend ~pon prisoners to maintain 
order. He rightly points out that coercion - whether 
physical or psychological - is limited as a means of 
motivation. Instead, the keepers rely upon a system 
of rewards and punishments to enlist the prisoners' 
aid in maintaining order. 
The custodians . . . far from being converted into 
brutal tyrants, are under strong pressure to 
compromise with their captives, for it is a 
paradox that they can insure their dominance only 
by allowing it to be corrupted. 
<Sykes, 58) 
The provision of rewards and punishments 
include early release through parole, or loss 
remission. But the prison officer does not have 
power to award extra remission or directly to 
parole. Sykes stresses the officer•s power 
may 
of 
the 
deny 
to 
overlook minor offences in trade for compliance with 
more serious offences. Donald Sansford explains (with 
reference to a Borstal in New Zealand>: 
Officers rely heavily upon punishments of various 
sorts to maintain the behaviour they want in 
preference to reinforcers. . .. [The] officer on 
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the spot is left with very little room to do much 
on 'his own initiative except give verbal approval 
... because of his low position in the hierarchy 
of command. 
(Cited in Wicks, 61) 
responsibility 
To some extent, the compromise of power must be 
qualified. Sykes writes of Trenton State Prison, in 
the U.S., where staff-prisoner ratios are often as low 
as 1 to 200. In British prisons, a much higher 
proportion of staff may reduce the individual 
officer's need to rely on a prisoner's cooperation. 
Yet, because the British prison officer possesses 
limited power to reward prisoners, it would be hasty 
to dismiss Sykes' point as irrelevant to Britain. 
A prison governor has written that beneath the 
strict code is a tacit understanding that prisoners, 
prison officers and administration compromise 
maintain stability. 
The prime function of this unwritten contract is 
to get people sensibly through their sentences. 
From the staff point of view this reduces hassle, 
stress and injury; for the management it avoids 
hostility from staff and inmates and keeps costs 
within bounds; for prisoners it allows men to • do 
their bird'. There is a momentum towards 
'balancing the boat' or 'steering into a skid' to 
counteract the fear on all sides of things going 
out of control. It allows the majority to live in 
peace. 
<Michael Jenkins, in Bottoms & Light, 270) 
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Michael Jenkins• views provide two fruitful 
insights for our discussion of prisoner-staff 
relations. First, not all products of informality are 
harmful or undesi ra bl e. Depending upon its nature, 
can be very much in the prisoners' stability 
interests. One of the informal compromises which 
stabilise the prison is the staff's recognition of the 
prisoners' contribution to order. Prison Service 
policy may be one of total control; but, at this 
informal level, the interest of most prisoners in 
tranquillity is acknowledged and built upon. 
The second implication of Jenkins' comments 
tempers the trust placed in rules and procedures to 
maintain human dignity and freedom. A legal code can 
as easily gird an oppressive system as liberate the 
oppressed. More practically, the et hies of 
responsibility help us to recognise the limitations of 
rules in shaping human activities: 
free to invent novel responses. 
human agents are 
Formal limits, however, may be the best defence 
against the inevitable abuses generated by the power 
imbalance. The prisoners• digni t.y is most directly 
denied in the range of informal punishments available 
to the 'staff. These can include: cell re-assignment, 
sometimes from a single cell to a shared one; sudden 
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cuts in options for training or education; job demo-
t ions, reducing the already meagre pay. In addition 
to formal charges under Rule 47, the administration is 
empowered to impose segregation under Rule 43 - for 
'good order and discipline'. Because Rule 43 can be 
enforced without adjudication, Rod Morgan includes it 
in a list of informal sanctions. 
Morgan and Richardson stress that the tendency to 
rely upon informal punishment harms the prisoner. 
Displacement of formal by informal disciplinary 
controls clearly constitutes a backward step for 
prisoners' rights and, by implication, subverts 
the process of judicial review. It means that 
hard-fought-for special rights and due process 
procedures are effectively evaded. The informal 
system is for the most part covert and lacking in 
safeguards. Applied repeatedly to long-term 
prisoners, the informal controls can involve 
extremes of segregation and dependency. 
<Morgan & Richardson, in Bot toms & Light, 174-175) 
The problem with informal disciplinary measures is 
not simply that they lack judicial guarantees of 
fairness. The deeper problem is that the rule 
structure institutionalises a gross disparity in power 
between prison officers and prisoners. 
Two points arise from this imbalance. First, it 
is false: the hierarchy it creates is artificial. 
Prison practice depends upon compromises of this abso-
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lute power, including the decision to overlook certain 
minor infract ions. Second, the power imbalance 
nurtures the conviction that prison discipline is 
arbitrary and unfair. As H. Richard Nt.e.buhr argues, 
personal responsibility collapses without reciprocal 
accountability. In the absence of more potent 
safeguards, the keepers are immune from the claims of 
accountability to prisoners, and the sense that the 
prisoner is at the mercy of the staff is inevitable. 
Alfred Hassler, a conscientious objector, writes 
that the way he was treated in prison continuously fed 
his sense of indignation. He did not feel innocent or 
wrongly incarcerated, yet his experience of prison was 
marked by a sense of unfairness. 
What indignation I feel toward prison practices is 
not the indignation of the persecuted innocent or 
the martyr, but of the guilty who feels his 
punishment to go beyond his deserts and inflicted 
by those who are not themselves free of guilt. 
This latter point is one that all inmates feel 
strongly. 
<Cited in Goffman, 57-58) 
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In an open r~gime 'fairness' has much more meaning than power 
and its reciprocal quality is a better contributor to control. 
-- Michael Jenkins, HMP Long Lartin 
Fairness can serve as a criterion of imprisonment 
in three key areas: 1) the convicted prisoner's 
desert of her/his particular sentence; 2) the balance 
of rights and duties between prison officers and 
prisoners (the subject of the preceding section); and 
3) the formal adjudicatory and disciplinary 
procedures, which I refer to as prison justice. 
In the first section, I cited H. Richard NLt.buhr' s 
point that the self finds its origins in interaction 
with Significant Others. As both parties interpret 
the actions of the Other, in light of the Generalised 
Other, the meaning of those actions is defined. 
Prison rules and their enforcement contribute to the 
process of best owing meaning upon one's act ions. In 
this way, the rules help to define the selfhood of the 
prisoner. 
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An example might clarify my point. Complaining to 
one's spouse about a callous officer may evince health 
in a marriage. The ability to share personal 
grievances would have survived the separation of 
imprisonment. If the grievance is overheard on a 
visit, the accusation may lead to informal 
repercussions <more likely, it will be ignored). If, 
however, the grievance is expressed in a letter home, 
then it may be held by the censor, following Standing 
Order 5Bl <regulating the censorship of prisoners' 
letters). Indeed, the prisoner may face disciplinary 
sanctions for her/his contravention of Rule 47<12) 
<making false charges against an officer). 
The detail of my example should not detract from 
the point. An action which in one sense manifests 
intimacy between wife and husband <self as a faithful 
spouse), can also be defined as a cause of future 
discomforts <through informal sanctions), or labels 
the prisoner a rule-breaker, deserving of punishment. 
The self arises not merely out of its possessor's 
interactions with significant others, but also out 
of the arrangements that are evolved in an 
organization for its members. [E. g., in prison, 
for prisoners] 
<Goff man, 148) 
Erving Goffman identifies the tendency of total 
institutions to intrude into significant relationships 
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as a contamination. The structure of prison justice 
can be said to contaminate the prisoner's act by 
forcing its meaning; i.e., by determining the meaning 
of the act with reference to the lower status of the 
prisoner. To develop this point, I shall sketch the 
formal structure of prison justice. I then examine 
two sources of complaint: a) the biases inherent in 
the adjudicatory system; b) the uncertainty of 
punishment through the withholding of vital 
information from the prisoner. 
Prison justice can be divided into three levels. 
At the first, the governor deals in summary fashion 
with the charges. Appt~oximately 95 per cent of all 
disciplinary cases are heard by the governor - Graham 
Zellick estimates the number at 60,000 per year 
throughout the English Prison Service. 6 The second 
level involves the prison Board of Visitors. The 
basic differences between governor's adjudications and 
those of the Board concern the gravity of the offence 
and the severity of the penalties available. <The 
Board hears more serious cases and is empowered to 
Graham Zellick, 11 Justice and Accountability in Prisons," in 
The Noel Buxton Lectures, 1982-1983, London: NACRO, 1983. 
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punish the offender much more severely. ) In the third 
case, the prisoner is charged with a criminal offence, 
and the case is handed over to the outside courts. 
<Here, of course, prisoners can be punished with 
additional prison sentences. ) The chief punishments 
used by the governor and the Board are cellular 
confinement, loss of privileges, and loss of remission 
<that is, the prisoner forfeits a portion of the 
systematic reduction of the prison sentence.) 
In recent studies of the disciplinary process, the 
view of prisoners has been consistent. Vivien Stern 
cites the report of the Prior Committee: 
Inmates clearly believed that the adjudicatory 
system was heavily biased against them and that 
the inclination of both governors and Board 
members was to believe staff, rather than them. 
<Stern, 116) 
There is ample evidence in support of the 
prisoners' suspicion. For example, two studies of 
Board of Visitors adjudications6 <one covering four 
See: Susan Iles and others, and 
David Smith and others, below, List of References. 
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prisons during 1978-1979, the other, during the first 
six months of 1982) found that in most of the cases 
brought before the Board, the prisoner was found 
guilty. At the four prisons studied in 1978-1979, 95 
per cent of cases resulted in findings of guilt; in 
the 1982 study, only 4 per cent of cases were 
dismissed or resulted in acquittal. 
A preponderance of convictions does not in itself 
mean that the adjudicatory system is unfair. More 
serious is the prisoners' charge that the Board of 
Visitors is biased by its close ties with the prison 
system. A key problem of justice is the conflict of 
interest in the Board's role. The chair of one Board 
of Visitors may have been too candid in explaining the 
care given to decisions by the Board: 
If we're convinced that the prisoner is not 
guilty, we find the prisoner not guilty. If it's 
a bit of a toss-up or we're fairly convinced he 
did it but there isn't necessarily a legal proof, 
possibly hearsay . we, as likely as not, for 
the good of the establishment, would support the 
officer. 
<Cited in Fitzgerald & Sim, 81) 
Joyce Plotnikoff examines deeper issues of 
justice, including the very status of adjudications. 
The Board is empowered to hear cases involving gross 
personal harm or possession of illegal drugs 1. e. ' 
cases concerned with act ions deemed crimes out side. 
<Data from the 1982 study show that approximately 40 
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per cent of cases before the Board might have been 
prosecuted as criminal offences. ) Also, the Board 
can punish a prisoner with the forfeiture of up to 180 
days, in effect sentencing the prisoner to an 
additional six months of prison. 
Despite these powers, the Board is not formally 
restricted in the same way as a court. In 1978, the 
Court of Appeal established the principle that Board 
of Visitors' decisions are subject to review by the 
courts. Yet, as Joyce Plotnikoff describes, other 
rights automatically .held by defendants in criminal 
court are subject to the Board's discretion, granted 
to prisoners only by permission of those who serve as 
his/her judges. Prisoners may find themselves without 
the right to legal representation or even legal advice 
concerning the case. 7 
7 I am not competent to discuss the issues of jurisprudence 
involved, but one objection to the court's involvement in 
prison justice deserves mention. The claim was advanced 
that outside review undermines the governor's authority and 
introduces anarchy. I shall consider the links between 
coercion, control and responsibility below. Yet, the view 
that social order is maintained by protecting authority from 
claims of natural justice denies the mutual accountability 
between prisoners and keepers. In its unilateral sense of 
justice, this attempt to immunise prison discipline from 
review inhibits the growth of a sense of responsibility in 
prisoners and staff alike. 
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In H. Richard N·tl~ buhr' s understanding of respon-
sibility, the sense of being accountable to others is 
founded upon a reasonable chance of predicting the 
Other's response. It was in this cent ext that N,t t buhr 
spoke of laws in terms of constancy in human behaviour 
rather than a legal code. Still, even within the more 
restrictive field of jurisprudence, the predictability 
of justice is crucial. 
Personal responsibility and justice come together 
in three points: responsibility in the sense of 
capacity to choose the course of one's act ion; 
accountability, in the sense of owning up to one's 
actions; and foreknowledge, in the power to predict 
the social consequences of one's action. H. L. A. Hart 
defines criminal responsibility as follows: 
[The person) at the time of his crime [should) 
have had the capacity to understand what he is 
required by law to do or not to do, to deliberate 
and to decide what to do, and to control his 
conduct in the light of such decisions. 
<Hart, 218> 
At present, prisoners are not entitled to receive 
a copy of the prison rules on reception. Somewhat 
absurdly, in place of the rules, the prisoners are 
given, in the form of a booklet, a summary of 
information thought by the Home Office to be necessary 
for prisoners. Although the information varies from 
one prison to another, many booklets fail to mention 
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censorship of letters, and are sketchy on procedures 
of prison discipline. 8 
Audrey Peckham wrote of her frustration 
attempting to live within the rules. 
The thing I found hardest in the early days was 
the uncertainty of never knowing what innocent act 
could result in . . punishment. I was suddenly 
returned to my small childhood, being shouted at 
by furious adults for some transgression which I 
did not even know was a transgression. 
<Peckham, pages 173-174) 
in 
Prison rules that establish wide discretion for 
enforcement also contribute to perceived unfairness 
through the uncertainty of punishment. Rule 47<20) is 
notorious in this regard. The prisoner can be charged 
with an offence if he "in any way offends against good 
order and discipline". A significant number of cases 
are involved. To say that this rule in particular 
contributes to uncertainty is neither trivial nor a 
selective reading of the facts. The Prior Committee 
heard that, in 1984, 29 per cent of all proved 
offences were charged under Rule 47<20) <Cited in 
e See Plotnikoff, page 19. 
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Plotnikoff, 87). This figure does not include the 
instances of segregation under Rule 43 <also 'for good 
order and discipline' ) which is for many an informal 
punishment. 
I have discussed Rule 4 7 <20) above in terms of 
discretion and the power imbalance between staff and 
prisoners. Here, my focus is the personal 
responsibility of the prisoner. It is clear that 
punishment under such uncertainty might be perceived 
as unfair or arbitrary. I t is d i f f i c u 1 t t o imagine 
how such a rule could contribute to a prisoner's 
developing sense of personal accountability, or how 
its enforcement could contribute to long-term order. 
In Justice in Prison <1983) JUSTICE argued that 
Rule 47(20) should be abolished: 
is 
A provision of this kind is manifestly 
inconsistent with the principle that a person 
ought not to be punished for an act not known to 
be punishable at the time of its commission. 
<Cited in Plotnikoff, 87) 
A number of critics have charged that uncertainty 
deliberately fostered by the Prison Service. 
Information of all sorts <not simply relating to 
discipline) is withheld from prisoners. David Leigh 
argues that secrecy is maintained: 
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to preserve power to manipulate the flow of 
information. As far as the prisoners themselves 
are concerned the principle is that they should 
have little information about their circumstances 
and the authorities should have an all-seeing eye. 
9 
Here again, the power imbalance is crucial. Given 
the discretion of the officers, the prisoner may not 
have known in advance that she would be charged for 
her act ion. Given the legal issues in the 
adjudicatory procedures, the prisoner may not have 
understood the process through which she was punished. 
Given the limits on her ability to call witnesses or 
cross-examine, she may feel that she has not been 
judged fairly. Taken together, the process of prison 
just ice does hot seem to nurture a sense of 
responsibility in prisoners: 
1) The arbitrariness inherent in rules which, through 
disc ret ion, lodge great power in her keepers, make it 
unlikely that a prisoner should feel responsible for 
the fact that her action has made her liable to prison 
just ice. 
David Leigh, "At Her Majesty's Pleasure," The Guardian, 
16 August, 1980, Week-end, page 7. 
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2) The hearing is authoritarian in the discretionary 
powers of the Board or, more often, the governor, and 
in the restrictions that inhibit the prisoner's 
conduct of her defence (calling witnesses, cross-
examination, etc.) While the outcome affects the 
prisoner greatly, through loss of remission, or 
cellular confinement, the prisoner is unlikely to view 
the process as one in which she held responsibility as 
a participant. More likely, the process will 
encourage her to see herself as its victim. 
3) To the extent that (1) and <2) describe prison 
justice, the prisoner is unlikely to develop a sense 
of genuine accountability, 
punishment to her actions, or 
threats to, or disruptions 
that is, to link her 
to see those actions as 
of, social order and a 
sense of community. Further, the penalties encourage 
the view that her accountability <the punishment) is 
tied to rules, and not persons. Where cellular 
confinement or administrative transfer is used, the 
punishments clearly inhibit any sense that she is 
accountable to a person she has harmed or a community 
she has disrupted. 
The 1983 JUSTICE report, Justice in Prison, 
summarises the tense relations between fairness and 
prison justice: 
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The standards of open and impartial justice 
required by the rule of law are specially needed 
by prisoners because of their vulnerability, in 
the closed world in which they live, to abuse of 
power, humiliation and degradation. [Our] 
system fails to provide satisfactory procedures. 
That failure increases the tensions of prison 
life. It creates an atmosphere of greater 
uncertainty, arbitrariness, unfairness and 
resentment. Condemned for infringing the law, the 
prisoner finds himself in a society ruled not by 
law, but by arbitrary power. 
<JUSTICE, cited in Stern, 129) 
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The Shaping of Selfhood 
by Prison Discipline 
In Saint Genet, Jean-Paul Sartre explores the 
claim that imprisonment debases personhood. Sartre 
traces three dimensions of selfhood which are violated 
in prisoners: equality, transcendence and freedom. 
Each of these is a fitting subject for volumes of 
philosophy. I 
their relevance 
hope to confine my study of them to 
to the foregoing discussions of 
responsibility and prison rules. 
Equality -
Equality is a complex and paradoxical concept. 
Quest ions about equality pert a in to legal practice, 
and to political structure, but beneath these is the 
assumption of a basic quality, intrinsic to moral 
personality. In law, 
that like cases must 
a principle of equality dictates 
be treated alike. In political 
philosophy, equality is a principle for a just 
distribution of rights. Such equality, in law or 
politics, is not natural; if it were, societies would 
not need to strive toward it. Different capacities, 
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attitudes, personalities, etc. hinder equality in this 
sense. Yet, oddly, these inequalities apply only to 
fragments of persons, never the whole personality. 10 
The moral personality forms a significant link 
between equality and responsibility. John Rawls 
defines the moral personality by two attributes: 1) a 
capacity to know what is good for oneself; and 2) a 
sense of justice. Clearly, the capacity for 'moral 
personality' is not expected to be equal in all 
persons; what is equal is the respect owed to persons 
who possess a minimal level of the moral personality. 
"Provided the minimum for moral personality is 
satisfied, a person is owed all the guarantees of 
justice." <Rawls, 507) 
The prisoner is assumed to fall below the minimum 
for moral personality; hence, the structure of prison 
rules is not required to grant equal respect to 
prisoners. Prison rules limit the prisoner's range of 
10 See Georg Sinwel, "How is Society Possible?" in Maurice 
Natanson: Philosophy of the Social Scien,ces, S'ee also John 
Rawls: A Theory of Justi,ce. · 
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actions, but they also formally establish the 
prisoner's inequality. Given a structure that denies 
the capacity of prisoners to determine their own good 
and to maintain a sense of justice, their capacity for 
responsibility inevitably suffers. 
In my discussion of staff-prisoner relations I 
focused upon the power imbalance between the two 
groups. I drew attention to the effects of this 
imbalance upon the interpretative aspect of 
responsi bi 1 it y. The prisoner's capacity to interpret 
his/her own behaviour, and that of the staff, is 
unsettled by a code of rules that defines and 
maintains the prisoner's lower status. 
Erving Goffman explicitly ties the distortion of 
responsibility to the power imbalance between the 
keeper and the kept. Goffman writes: 
The inmate's life is penetrated by constant 
sanctioning interaction from above. Each 
specification robs the individual of an 
opportunity to balance his needs and objectives in 
a personally efficient way and opens up his line 
of action to sanctions. The autonomy of the act 
itself is violated. 
(Goffman, 38) 
Prison discipline violates autonomy by segregating 
one act from the whole stream of the prisoner's 
activity, and by defining that action with reference 
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to an abst rae t code. Moreover, the echelon structure 
disrupts the prisoner's ability to respond to others 
simply as persons; certain others have the power to 
subject the prisoner to punishments, both formal and 
informal. 
I stated above that the disparity in power between 
staff and prisoner is false. As Gresham Sykes' study 
indicated, staff power is not wholly determinative of 
the staff-prisoner relationship. The uses of informal 
means of control and the necessary compromises of 
power outline a level at which responsibility is 
inevitably reciprocal. 
The basic equality of the moral personality <at 
the level of human dignity, for example) shows how 
relationships based on dominance and subjugation 
distort the humanity of both parties. Responsibility 
entails mutual obligation marked by a balanced 
capacity to determine the direction of the 
interact ion. It is in this sense that the echelon 
structure is a deceit. In denying the basis of 
morality in reciprocity between equals, prison 
discipline generates the perception of 
hinders the sense of social unity 
harmony. 
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Transcendence -
By transcendence, Sartre means the self-distancing 
reflection by which persons are able to examine their 
own actions and to judge them. We negate a prisoner's 
power of transcendence by ignoring the prisoner's 
version of events. An adjudicatory procedure that 
fails to provide prisoners with assurance that their 
version of events has been given equal weight is not 
only unfairj such bias convinces prisoners that though 
they can be punished, they are not genuinely 
accountable to the prison community, since they are 
not considered participants in it. The threat of 
punishment, attached <somewhat arbitrarily) to 
actions, subjects prisoners to a constant coercion. 
This stress is aggravated by the echelon structure 
which, far from ensuring order, unsettles the 
prisoner, who must examine her actions from the 
<capricious> perspective imposed by the keeper. 
Taking responsibility, owning up to my own action 
<appropriation), means that I am able to reflect upon 
an act and interpret it Ci. e., to bestow a meaning 
upon my own act). Further, I must be able to 
recognise the parallel between my interpretation of 
what I did and how I feel about that act ionj in short, 
to describe, but also to judge my own act. Finally, I 
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need to be able to predict, with reasonable accuracy, 
the response of others to my act. 
Erving Goffman used the term contamination to 
describe the ways that staff intrude into the inmates' 
relations with Significant Others. In Prison 
Violence, a case was presented of an offender who 
sought brain surgery, primarily because he had adopted 
his keepers' definition of him as dangerous. This i,s 
an extreme example of a pervasive contamination in 
which the keepers claim the right to define the action 
of the kept. In terms of transcendence the intrusion 
is between the self and her own action. 
Total institutions disrupt or defile precisely 
those actions that in civil society have the role 
of attesting to the actor ... that he has some 
\ 
command over his world, that he is a person with 
'adult' self-determination, autonomy, and freedom 
of action. 
<Goffman, 43) 
In Sartre' s words, the prisoner must "affirm the 
object he is to others over the subject he is to 
himself" CQuoted in Fine, 413). Prisoners are led to 
mistrust their own interpretative skills, as the 
judgment that determines their future is imposed from 
above. In this way, imprisonment encourages 
heteronomy, an attitude that surrenders to others 
one's own capacity to judge right from wrong. The 
adjudicatory process distorts the prisoner's action by 
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limiting its meaning to the interpretation imposed by 
the keepers. Hence, prison justice makes it difficult 
for prisoners to recognise their own actions. If 
prisoners fail to own up to their actions, then this 
is partly due to the alienating procedures of prison 
just ice. 
Freedom -
Sartre writes of our existential freedom, a basic 
quality of being human, and not of the civil liberties 
conditionally granted to citizens. To discuss 
Sartre' s point meaningfully, we must confine the term 
to the context of prison discipline and the ways that 
imprisonment fixes the prisoner in a particular 
role. 11 
1 1 The reg1mentation ot prisbners, which directly counters 
individuality, denies freedom, but it is not my specific 
concern here, nor is the fact that stigma inhibits devel-
opment in prisoners after release. My focus is the way 
prisoners are fixed in one role by prison discipline. 
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The community, in depicting Genet as essentially a 
thief, for all time past and future, as displaying 
this character in all aspects of his life, denies 
Genet's freedom. 
<Sartre, cited in Fine, 411> 
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In the wider society, the citizen's roles with 
respect to law are few. We may be law-abiding citizen 
(ideally>; we may be law-enforcing judge or police 
officer; or we may be law-creating legislators. 
Prisoners are neither legislators nor <formally> 
enforcers. Their role with respect to the law 
parallels that of the citizen. 
The difference between prisoners and citizens is 
not that the latter has greater say in the rules 
<laws) which they are called upon to obey. Rather, 
the primary difference is the degree of intrusion 
maintained by those rules. Legal codes allow citizens 
a considerable latitude. In prison, however, the 
sense of social order is more fragile. Behaviour 
which would be tolerated in society is defined as an 
offence inside. Joyce Plotnikoff quotes from the 
Manual on the Conduct of Adjudications, issued to 
Boards of Visitors: 
A breach of the Prison Rules will often fall far 
short of conduct which would constitute a breach 
of the criminal law outside prison. . such a 
breach may often approximate more closely to what, 
outside, might be regarded as no more than anti-
social behaviour. 
<Plotnikoff, 83) 
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In interactions marked by personal responsibility 
I bestow meaning on the actions of some Other. In 
discussing responsibility, I remarked that all 
interpretations of the Other's action can be reduced 
to the threat-benefit dichotomy. In general, such 
simplification is unnecessary, since it degrades our 
interpretative creativity and flexibility. We can 
take pleasure in the unpredictable nature of the 
Other's response, accepting it without taking a 
defensive stance. In extreme settings <war, for 
example) we narrow the range of latitude granted to 
our fellow human's possible responses. It is safest 
to rely upon suspicion in meeting a stranger. 
encounter is potentially a threat. 
Each 
Prison control fits such reductivism precisely. 
Actions deemed to be threats are prohibited or 
punished informallyi benefits are defined by reference 
to the objectives set by the prison system. The 
prisoners' own desires are subject to the negation of 
transcendence: prisoners enjoy very little 
opportunity to define their own benefits. The rule 
structure locks the keepers into a mechanistic 
react ion to the prisoner. Prison practice reacts to 
perceived threats by meting out punishment, it rewards 
<with far less attention) the few actions deemed 
beneficial, and (officially) ignores a whole world of 
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interpersonal behaviour, the dimensions of symbolic 
expression, of loyalty, of faith, of sorrow or humour. 
For the prisoner, the keepers' obsession for 
control contaminates these other dimensions of human 
life. In the sphere of good order and discipline, the 
rules and adjudicatory procedures fix the prisoner in 
the role of a potential threat. Where control is the 
dominant interest, no aspect of the subject's life can 
be left to chance. 
The Rules . regulate or authorise restriction 
of nearly every element of human existence - the 
very antithesis of self-respect and personal 
responsibility. 
<Marin, cited in Plotnikoff, 28) 
To be sure, the prisoner community collaborates in 
maintaining the mores of distrust and threat. For 
Erving Gof fman, inmate mutinies are a defensive 
strategy against the total institution's assault on 
the self. For Stan Cohen and Laurie Taylor, fighting 
the system is a way of adapting to, or coping with, 
the pressures of prison life. Confined in the 
mechanism of threat/benefit, both keeper and kept 
shape an environment marred by sharply defined 
allegiances, mutual distrust, defensive attitudes, the 
authority of force and the deep commitment to counter-
force. 
-167-
responsibility 
The last-mentioned, termed 'fighting back' by 
Cohen and Taylor, would seem to enable the prisoner to 
demonstrate to himself that he has not been broken by 
the system. He may depend upon rebellion to convince 
himself that coercive control has not deprived him of 
his will-power. One of Cohen and Taylor's 
correspondents directly links his rule-breaking 
behaviour to the excitement of transforming the 
tedious prison regime. In so doing, he proves to 
himself: 
that life is not solely an authoritarian 
controlled existence of ennui, that one can break 
out of this, one can 'live' and not just exist, 
perhaps it entails living dangerously, perhaps 
leading finally to self-destruction but it does 
offer choice the choice of existing the 
existence of non-events or living the life of 
events, good or bad, which are at least one's own 
creation. 
<Cited in Cohen & Taylor, 135) 
Selfhood -
As the above quotation implies, a stress on 
authority and control invites counter-force. Prison 
discipline may well have a restraining effect on a 
proportion of prisoners, but there is a mixed message 
at the core of the method. The intrusive nature of 
the rules, their authoritarian enforcement, the 
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punitive consequences of misbehaviour - these suggest 
to prisoners that self-control is beyond their grasp. 
According to Erving Goffman, the discipline of 
total institutions has an impact not only on the 
inmates' interpretations of their own actions, but 
also on their self-image. Whether or not sanctions 
such as cellular confinement have lost their sting for 
consistently punished prisoners, the self image 
hardens. 
First, the stigma of prisoner - with the loss of 
equality, transcendence and freedom - means that some 
prisoners feel they have nothing to lose. Second, 
certain punishments increase the prisoner's stature 
with other prisoners (and some staff). Third, and 
most damaging to personal responsibility, the prisoner 
learns to treat her/his reputation with diffidence: 
Having one's past mistakes and present progress 
under constant moral review seems to make for a 
special adaptation consisting of a less than moral 
attitude to ego ideals. One's shortcomings and 
successes become too central and fluctuating an 
issue in life to allow the usual commitment of 
concern for other persons' views of them. It is 
not very practicable to sustain claims about 
oneself. The inmate tends to learn that 
degradations and reconstructions of the self need 
not be given too much weight, at the same time 
learning that staff and inmates are ready to view 
an inflation or deflation of a self with some 
indifference. 
<Goffman, 164-165) 
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Stan Cohen and Laurie Taylor reject the view that 
prison discipline creates a distinct kind of selfhood, 
that the prisoner is passive, forced to play the role 
of prisoner at every moment. Yet, paradoxically, they 
explain a number of typical roles of resistance to the 
mould 'prisoner'. <One might argue that to divide 
resistance behaviour into five styles indicates 
something of the prison's power to shape prisoners. ) 
Their discussion is helpful in illuminating the anti-
authority values of a sub-culture with little to lose. 
They also remind us that prisoners are varied, and do 
not spend every hour in the role of prisoner. 
There are two ways to meet the seeming division 
between Cohen and Taylor, who stress the prisoner's 
powers of resistance, and Goff man <as well as 
Foucault) who emphasises the institution's power to 
control. The first explanation builds upon the 
individuality of 
the privilege 
prisoners. The second arises from 
of perspective I advanced in 
Phenomenology, above. 
From the first perspective, one prisoner may be 
susceptible to the manipulations of the institution, 
while another may not. More accurately, prisoners can 
grow in their powers of self-determination, in self-
confidence, in active responsibility Ci. e. ' 
activating their capacity for responsibility). 
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Prison rules formally ignore the developmental 
aspects of personal responsibility. Only through 
disc ret ion or informal sanctions can the difference 
between one prisoner and another be recognised. 
Otherwise, infract ion of a rule is straight forward, 
regardless of age or capacity, and punishable. 
Moral responsi.bility, so far from existing in a 
fully fledged sense in every man <with the 
exception of a few carefully defined categories) 
is in fact something into which we grow, as a 
result of our life experiences, and the way in 
which we are treated by others and encouraged to 
see ourselves. 
<Adrian Speller, 86, quoting from Prisons and 
Prisoners in England Today 1978) 
A second explanation of the paradox between the 
keepers' cant rol and the independence of the kept is 
possible. Prison moulds a delinquent role even as it 
fosters the strength of resistance in prisoners. This 
conclusion is consistent with the view I espoused 
above (in Phenomenology) that there is an inviolable 
core of persons which penal techniques cannot over-
whelm. Prison discipline can distort one's sense of 
responsi bi 1 it y, but the moral personality is an 
inalienable aspect of human nature. As such, it finds 
its origins and limits in reciprocal relations with 
others. We grow into responsibility and community 
allegiance as we develop a sense of self; i.e., by 
learning to interpret the ways our actions are judged 
by others. 
-171-
Prisoners and Responsibility 
The foregoing sect ions pr-epar-e us to reconsider 
the prison environment as it shapes personal 
responsibility in general, and accountability to a 
community in particular. The central issues in this 
context are the encouragement of responsibility in 
individual 
harmonious 
prisoners (built 
relet ions>; the 
upon a personal stake in 
maintenance of control 
<order imposed from above>; and a sense of community 
(through fairness and reciprocal respect>. 
One way to summarise the chapter to this point 
would apply H. Richard N1_~ buhr' s demonstration that 
responsibility rests upon personal freedom. The 
prisoner, facing the power of the prison officer, the 
intrusion of prison rules, and the biases of prison 
justice, is 
which .the 
sentenced 
loss of 
to a powerless existence, in 
responsibility is inevitable. 
Bluntly, despite hopes that a prison term might force 
an offender to develop some self-control, the prison 
system's coercive authority maintains prisoners in 
passivity, thus destroying any growing capacity to 
direct their own lives. 
is incomplete. 
Such a conclusion, however, 
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The extent of the compromises needed to maintain 
control, the prisoners' ability to perceive the 
unfairness of prison justice, the manifold styles of 
resistance to the mould 'prisoner' - all demonstrate 
that the above summary ignores the basic (i. e. • 
inalienable) freedom of prisoners. Responsibility is 
not only a capacity toward which we strive, but also a 
quality of all human interaction. 
Hence, the prison is marked by a reciprocity, 
belied by official policies of control and imposed 
order. Where the prisoners' capacity for 
responsibility is respected, the exercise of that 
power encourages growth, genuine accountability and a 
sense of self-determination. The possibility that 
prisoners will exploit the tolerance, and that 
violence and/or disruptive behaviour may increase must 
be conceded. Where control is built upon coercion, 
however, and the prisoners' personal responsibility is 
attacked, a perverse reciprocity is likely, marked by 
polarisation, defensive reactions, brutal control and 
self-righteous rebellions. 
There is a paradox at the heart of the issue: 
prison policies of control the discretion lodged 
with staff, the governor's punitive measures 
the basic human responsibility of prisoners. 
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But 
responsibility 
because responsibility is basic, prison cannot destroy 
that responsibility. Indeed, insofar as responsi-
bility is intrinsic to human interaction, 'control' of 
prisoners Cpatterns of behaviour imposed from above) 
is impracticable. 
Paul Keve has written: 
We are basically and deeply wrong when we set up a 
'correctional' institution that simply cannot be 
operated unless it reverses normal human 
psychology, punishing the prisoner for acts of 
insistent individualism and rewarding him for 
.. [what] in the prison context may in fact be 
a tragic surrender of self pride. 
<Keve, 44) 
Keve's statement neatly captures the complexity of 
prison control and personal responsibility. On one 
hand, the prisoner's individualism is punished; the 
prisoner's capacity to determine her own benefits and 
to perceive injustice is attacked. Her powers of 
personal responsibility suffer. 
' < 
On the other hand, 
personal responsibility cannot be destroyed; it is 
part of • normal human psychology' . 
Prison policy, of course, is rarely explicit about 
the tendency to attack insistent individualism, to 
break wilful prisoners, or to discourage personal 
responsi bi 1 it y. Prison Rule 2, for example, states 
that the treatment of prisoners must be such as 'to 
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encourage their self-respect and a sense of personal 
responsibility' . In a 1984 document, the Control 
Review Committee <CRC) wrote: 
It is . . essential that the whole system which 
bears on the prisoner should be structured in a 
way which encourages him to co-operate rather than 
the reverse and which makes a clear connect ion 
between the prisoner's behaviour and the course of 
his prison career. We doubt if the present system 
passes this test. 
<CRC, paragraph 22) 
The CRC states that coercion is a limited tool of 
control. Prisoners, it concedes, are given the wrong 
signals, and decisions taken about their lives often 
seem arbitrary and capricious. The Committee 
acknowledges that the system of incentives for 
prisoners must be expanded, so that they can see 
personal benefits in cooperation. The need to involve 
prisoners in planning their 'careers' is recognised. 
Perhaps most important, control is considered in the 
context of the whole prison system: educational and 
vocational resources, staff training, architecture, 
allocation of prisoners. Control is not restricted 
(as I have had to do here) to supervision, prison 
rules and adjudication. 
The CRC Report implies that a well ordered 
community, achieved through hierarchy and the rigour 
of prison rules, is compatible with the development of 
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a prisoner's capacity for responsibility. At the 
heart of their position is the primacy of control 
imposed upon prisoners from above. They assert the 
need: 'for staff to be in control at all times' C'!Tl6); 
for 'a clear framework of rules that are applied 
firmly and fairly' C'!Tl3); and for direct connections 
between behaviour and consequences. 
At issue is not only the undue reliance upon 
control 'from the top', but also the various inter-
pretations of the concept 'responsibility'. 
Responsibility is fundamentally reciprocal: to 
maintain my freedom I must acknowledge and respect the 
freedom of others. A report by the Chaplain's Working 
Group spoke of maintaining the humanity of disruptive 
prisoners in highly controlled settings: 
An important aspect of keeping 'human life really 
human' is the practical recognition that 
responsibility and accountability for one's 
decisions are of the very essence of the moral 
stature of men and women. 
<Chaplaincy Working Party Report, chapter v.) 
Building upon this principle, the Working Group 
requires a reciprocity of responsibility, such that 
the keeper is held accountable to the kept, balancing 
the prisoner's burden to respect the prison officer. 
Yet the Chaplaincy• s Repor~t does not acknowledge the 
debilitating role played by the disciplinary 
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structure, or the effects of the power imbalance in 
destroying the prisoners' fragile sense of personal 
responsibility. It does not discuss ways in which 
prisoners' personal needs are sacrificed to the 
objectives of the Prison Service. 
In both the CRC Report and the Chaplaincy's 
Report, responsibility is reduced to accountability. 
Prison justice is seen in terms of fair enforcement of 
rules; the prisoners' responsibility, in terms which 
are clearly ret ri but i ve: incentives for good 
behaviour, • disincentives' for disruptive behaviour. 
Underlying both documents is a double standard of 
responsi bi 1 it y: power and control must rest with the 
staff; blame for disruptive action rests with those 
identified as dangerous prisoners. 
In contrast, I have argued for a comprehensive 
sense of personal responsibility, comprised of: 
A) A capacity to decide upon a course of action to 
which one is committed <appropriation); 
8) Based on one's understanding of the Other's 
actions (interpretation); 
C) In expectation of further patterns of interaction 
(accountability); 
0) Where selfhood is conditioned by the social 
setting. 
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From this perspective, the prisoner is accountable 
to other persons not to rules. ObJectives are 
determined by the prison community in daily 
interaction - not imposed from above. The capacity 
for responsibility is nurtured by respect and 
flexibility, allowing the prisoner to exercise self-
determination responsibility is not encouraged by 
reacting to 'misbehaviour' with punitive sanctions. 
Critics point out that, despite the CRC' s 
thoughtful words about open regimes, the Prison 
Service fails to recognise that human dignity lies at 
the heart of good order. Vivien Stern comments that 
prisons must reverse their tendency to begin from the 
priority of control, and base their policies instead 
upon the need to maintain human dignity. 
Starting from such a premise to preserve 
prisoners' individuality, humanity and dignity -
almost every aspect of daily life in most prisons 
could be examined and found wanting. 
<Stern, 230-231) 
I have argued that the rigid stratification of 
prisons, the intrusive nature of the Rules, the 
secretive and authoritarian enforcement of prison 
policies deny self-respect and personal 
responsibility. I have argued that the uncertainty of 
punishment, the arbitrary nature of informal sanctions 
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and the unilateral 'justice' of formal hearings 
inevitably distort the concept of account ability. I 
have not asserted that prison governors are wicked 
tyrants 
physical 
or that prison officers 
brutality. Rather, my 
routinely 
point has 
resort to 
been that 
prison coercion, in its denials of 
equality, transcendence and freedom, 
degrading, and inevitably distorts 
capacity for personal responsibility. 
the prisoners' 
is intrinsically 
the prisoner's 
The CRC is able to pretend that control and 
personal responsibility are compatible by reducing the 
latter to liability to punishment (1. e., by reducing 
responsibility to retribution). In stressing firmly 
applied rules and staff supervision, the CRC - like 
the Prison Service in general - slights the dimensions 
of interpretation, appropriation and social 
solidarity. The requirements for these cannot be met 
piece-meal: responsibility, as I have stressed, is a 
comprehensive quality, intrinsically personal and 
reciprocal. 
In this context, the social dimension of respon-
sibility is decisive. From a fairly secure position, 
we may assume that the Generalised Other represents 
socially agreed standards, a public ethos of widely 
shared norms. Yet our perspective reflects fairly 
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healthy, supportive experiences of socialisation. We 
who trust our social institutions do so, 
because our social institutions support us. 
in part, 
Our perspective on the Generalised Other is not 
shared by those who are by definition - socially 
marginal i sed. Where socialisation raises conflicts in 
selfhood, the Generalised Other is restrictive; when 
coercive means are utilised, where conformity is won 
through force, the Generalised Other is oppressive. 
It is here that one may find an alternative identity 
in resistance, one that provides support and 
affirmation. 
Hence, the coercive means basic to prison practice 
confirm many prisoners in the mores of the alternative 
identity. 
punishment, 
Attempts to impose conformity through 
or to establish the state's interpre-
tations as objective truth, validate the prisoners' 
suspicions that force determines what is right, and 
that their views are systematically excluded. It is 
not surprising that prisoners, too, 
responsibility merely in terms 
punishment; that they should fail 
should come to see 
of liability to 
to develop self-
determination, or a sense of obligation to society. 
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Prison discipline and control deny a sense of 
responsibility to community hence, the capacity for 
morality in three ways. First, responsibility 
reduced to retribution implies that one is accountable 
to rules, and not to persons. The common punishment 
of cellular confinement Cor the transfer, more often 
an informal sanction) reduces the chances that the 
prisoner might connect the punishment to harm s/he has 
done to the community. 
Second, the power wielded by staff and adminis-
t rat ion, that defines the prisoner's act as 
punishable, encourages in prisoners a heteronomous, 
force-based morality. Excluded from the processes of 
determining objectives <benefits) or justice 
(fairness), the prisoner learns that 
because the dominant party defines it 
an act is wrong 
as wrong. The 
prisoner connects the punishment to the enforcer the 
keepers - rather than to fellow prisoners or the pris-
on community; that is, rather than the actual victims. 
The third way that prison discipline discourages 
responsibility to the prison community concerns the 
discretion of the prison officer. Offences are not 
punished unless staff members choose to enforce the 
rule. Inevitably, the mores of prison communities 
include the notion of 'getting away with' infractions. 
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Whilst informal compromises might be essential to the 
maintenance of order, irregular enforcement teaches 
that actions are wrong only if they are punished. 
This lesson is underscored by the deliberate and 
systematic denial of the prisoner's interpretative 
powers. Prisoners must yield to their keepers' sense 
of the boundaries of acceptable behaviour; 
which do not result in punishment 
acceptable. 
hence, acts 
are judged 
Prison justice actually unhinges a personal basis 
of morality. Rather than a sense of duty or respon-
sibility to one's community, prison discipline 
develops a sense that things are wrong simply because 
they are punished; that one cannot trust one's own 
.judgment but must find an outside authority to deter-
mine the morality of one's act; that the state's ver-
sion of events - according to which I am in the wrong 
- is the true account, since the state has the power 
to enforce its <peculiar) sense of right and wrong. 
The arbitrariness of the application of prison 
.justice teaches that it is just luck if you are 
punished or not. More important, it teaches that it 
is just luck if x or y is good <i.e., tolerated), or 
bad (i.e., punished). Here is the source of moral 
nihilism in totalitarian rule: Since punishment is 
-182-
responsibility 
based in power rather than in a reciprocity of respect 
for one's sense of right and wrong; and since power is 
applied unevenly (to compensate for the risks of 
rebellion, or to humanise an otherwise mechanistic 
rule, or to gain trade-offs in return), right and 
wrong, good and evil are likewise arbitrary. 
Such is the damage inflicted upon prisoners by 
'good order and discipline'. This chapter has iden-
tified and discussed aspects of prison control which 
directly attack personal responsibility. It is less 
clear if prisons can operate in a way that encourages 
or even recognises the prisoner's personal 
responsibility. I have argued that responsibility is 
a basic quality of human relations, and that a crucial 
aspect of responsibility is reciprocity. If this is 
plausible, then 1 t is also 1 ikely that increased 
attempts to assert discipline through force will be 
met with more determined counter-force. 
An attempt to maintain order through respect for 
prisoners seems to be the more difficult and risk-
laden course. There are prisoners who, as John 
McVicar described (above, Prison Violence) judge 
others merely by force. 
descriptions, determined 
violent confrontations. 
Others match Hans Tach' s 
to escalate disputes into 
Still other prisoners eagerly 
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exploit fellow prisoners. The thriving underlife 12 of 
prison provides persuasive reasons for rigid 
surveillance and controls. 
Nevertheless, because 'respect for prisoners', 
honouring the dignity of the prisoner, encouraging 
genuine responsibility, builds upon the reciprocity 
common to all interaction, it is the more realistic 
approach. Despite its risks, the recognition of the 
prisoners' equality, transcendence and freedom is 
likely to lead to the most stable and constructive 
social order. 
I shall conclude with three general points about 
prison regimes built upon human dignity. First, the 
recognition of the prisoner's transcendence requires 
listening to prisoners' perspectives. Mike Fitzgerald 
has written, in response to the CRC Report: 
12 
Staff-prisoner relationships involve negotiations, 
and for negotiations to take place each side must 
be able to speak, and to have its accounts heard 
and granted meaning by the other. 
<Fitzgerald, in Bottoms & Light, 154) 
The term 'underlife' is used by Erving Goffman, Op. cit, to 
describe the adaptive strategies of the inmate sub-culture 
within the total institution. 
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Second, greater equality between staff and 
prisoner, and hearings under natural just ice, 
introduce the prisoner to the sense of fair conditions 
and of genuinely fair proceedings. In this way, the 
rules under which s/he lives are not so much a symbol 
and means of her oppression, but a means of ordering 
the community. Such rules would have social order as 
their goal rather than to maintain the prisoners' 
inferior position, and rather than to control the 
situation from above at all costs. Hence, the rules 
might genuinely attract the prisoners' assent. 
Andrew Young, referring to the CRC Report, wrote: 
We should not only think of control as the 
imposition of coercion. . the most effective 
form of control is that which facilitates the 
voluntary and rational recognition of rules. The 
most stable forms of order are those in which 
individuals feel an obligation to rules, not ones 
in which conformity to rules is imposed by 
pressures external to them. 
<Young, in Bottoms & Light, 111) 
Finally, respect for the personal responsibility 
of the prisoner - however under-developed the respect 
or the responsibility might be builds upon the 
participatory status of the prisoner, to give the 
entire prison community a voice in setting its 
objectives. True benefits for prisoners are not the 
base bribes of privileged job assignments or freedom 
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to exploit weaker prisoners under the blind eye of a 
particular officer. True benefits involve the right 
of prisoners to determine their own ends. A clear 
signal to prisoners that their dignity is respected is 
the willingness of the keepers to share in the 
development of objectives. It is this step that 
enables the prisoner to fill a role of responsibility, 
compromise and perhaps even of allegiance. 
John Rawls has written: 
The recognition that we and those for whom we care 
are the beneficiaries of an established and 
enduring just institution tends to engender in us 
the corresponding sense of justice. We develop a 
desire to apply and to act upon the principles of 
justice once we realize how social arrangements 
answering to them have promoted our good and that 
of those with whom we are affiliated. In due 
course we come to appreciate the ideal of just 
cooperation. 
<Rawls, 473-474) 
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·POSTSCRIPT 
Review 
The prison is a basic social institution. Its 
roots pervade society so deeply that even a single-
minded focus on the insulated world of the prison must 
raise profound themes of our culture; e. g., good-evil, 
freedom-determinism, justice. The intended functions 
of prisons are no less complex. Imprisonment serves 
to punish or rehabilitate; to symbolise boundaries of 
behaviour; to represent and supplant personal 
vengeance; to establish formal means of responding to 
social disorder and conflict. This complexity rules 
out a simple ethical approach: I cannot argue that my 
analysis entails a blanket condemnation of prisons, 
nor that pacifist principles logically require 
specific reforms. 
My study has provided a critique of prisons, 
however, in clarifying fundamental questions about 
them, and in identifying significant flaws. In 
closing, I shall review the major points of Part One 
and Part Two. These points will raise issues that are 
more explicitly theological. Finally, I offer three 
principles for responding to the harms I have 
identified. 
po5"tscript 
Prisons 
foundations 
in Perspective analysed the theoretical 
of imprisonment. Using diverse 
approaches, each chapter identified and questioned 
established penological assumptions. 
History demonstrated the ambiguities in the early 
prisons, many of which continue to afflict 
imprisonment. Prisons were never defined with any 
precision. Reformers' claims combined deterrence 
through punitive deprivations with rehabilitation 
through intrusive measures. As a symbol, the prison 
cannot mirror the offence, nor can we restrict its 
symbolic reference to the state's power. 
History also indicated that imprisonment is 
closely linked to conflict in 
surfaced in later chapters). 
that prisons assumed the roles 
society <a theme that 
In History, I showed 
of quelling disorder 
and dissolving conflict by means of quarantine or 
banishmentj in short, by hiding the conflict rather 
than by resolving it. As an approach to crime, 
prisons are inherently divisive, and this was clear in 
the earliest examples. 
A final theme of History was that the prison 
gained a hold on the public through Utopian claims 
that they would reduce social unrest and criminality. 
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I argued that these claims were built upon faith in 
the emerging human sciences. My critique of materi-
alism implied that the promises of prison reform were 
false, built upon mistaken assumptions about human 
nature (a second recurring theme). If contemporary 
penologists are persuaded that prisons are not 
effective in rehabilitation, then perhaps we may make 
the parallel point that prisons are not reformable. 
Retribution disclosed a continuum of justice, from 
the retaliatory harm for harm, through the boundary-
setting functions of denunciation, to the aim to 
restore wholeness after an offence. I conceded that 
retributive models can reveal the harms that need our 
at tent ion. But as a theory of punishment, ~1 ust i fying 
harm to wrongdoers, retribution fails because the harm 
of punishment is immeasurable: penal harm cannot be 
meted out proportionately and, more to the point, the 
cycle of harm has no clear end. In Retribution, I 
first suggested that the punishment of wrongdoers is 
socially dysfunctional; the pains of confinement harm 
society. 
Anthropology showed the failures of penal theory 
to recognise the humanity of prisoners. Each theory 
was shown to rely upon a simplistic understanding of 
human nature. Retribution is persuasive only if we 
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guilty human beings. 
postscript 
divide between innocent and 
Rehabilitation reflects 
excessive faith in the powers of the human sciences to 
'cure defectives' on one hand, and a reduct 1 vist view 
of human beings as profoundly malleable on the other. 
Deterrence, too, reduces human motivation to a 
simplistic level. Humans are either above sin, and 
wholly rational, or mere organisms, controlled by the 
impact of stimuli. In terms of social defence, 
society must be defended from potential predators, 
'the dangerous few' . In each case, penal anthropology 
is reductivist, dissolving the complex tensions within 
human nature. <I shall discuss this tendency below.) 
the 
Phenomenology showed that 
prisoners' bodies to the 
prison regimes restrict 
objectives of impris-
onment. At the same time, paradoxically, the body's 
privilege of perspective establishes the prisoner's 
capacity for independent interpretation. Phenomen-
ology also suggested that the failure of penal theory 
to acknowledge the prisoners' perspective renders 
penal practice a perpetually futile enterprise. 
The Harms of Imprisonment demonstrated that the 
prison, according to the balance of evidence, is far 
more likely to corrupt than reform the prisoner. In 
Personal Responsibility, I showed that prison 
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discipline contaminates the prisoners' relations with 
others and, specifically, damages their capacity to 
make decisions and own up to their actions. In 
Sexuality, I showed that the punitively celibate world 
of prisons debases sexuality, inclining sexual conduct 
towards aggressive or exploitative purposes. In 
Prison Violence, I linked the violent behaviour of 
prisoners to society's abhorrence of them. 
The Millstone 
We submit that the basic evils of imprisonment are 
that it denies autonomy, degrades dignity, impairs 
or destroys self-reliance, inculcates authori-
tarian values, minimizes the likelihood of 
beneficial interact ion with one's peers, fractures 
family ties, destroys the family's economic 
stability, and prejudices the prisoner's future 
prospects for any improvement in his economic and 
social status. It does all these things whether 
or not the buildings are antiseptic or dirty, the 
aroma that of fresh bread or stale urine, the 
sleeping accommodation a plank or an inner spring 
mattress ... 
<AFSC, page 33) 
Stumbling blocks are sure to come; but woe to him by whom 
they come! It would be better for him if a millstone were 
hung around his neck and he were cast into the sea, than 
that he should cause one of these little ones to stumble. 
<Luke 17: 1,2> 
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The biblical symbol of the millstone captures a 
central concern of my argument. While aspects of my 
analysis reflect convictions unique to pacifism, a 
broad range of theological opinion will find the 
corrupting influence of imprisonment disquieting. On 
practical gx~ounds alone, the profound harms inflicted 
upon offenders by prisons reveal that impr·isonment 
harms society. 
Phenomenology followed Michel Foucault's argument 
that the penal enterprise limits the freedom of the 
prisoner. In Moral Responsibility, I described the 
means by which prisons violate the prisoners' 
autonomy. The work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, by 
contrast, explored a level at which we are 
intrinsically free. In this light, prisons are 
founded upon an inherently futile mission. 
Imprisonment is not a deprivation of freedom, but a 
contamination of it. 
The at tempt to make what is morally evil more or 
less impossible by coercion is not only . 
quite utopian in this world, but must in the 
concrete degenerate into a morally wrong attempt 
to eradicate the scope for freedom itself. 
<Rahner, 248-249) 
From a theological perspective, it is clear that 
prisons are socially divisive. I have discussed the 
simplistic manner of classifying human beings in 
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penology. Prisons are inevitably divisive and reduc-
tivist, since the institution of punishment entails 
two opposed roles of punisher and punishee. This 
sharp dichotomy shows itself in the exaggerated impor-
tance given to the role of banishment, isolating one 
world from the other. The contemporary form of this 
distortion is the obsessive concern of authorities for 
control over other worthy requirements of prison life. 
Another interpretation, however, builds upon the 
contradictions within each opposing pair. Impris-
onment can be characterised as both utopian and 
pessimistic. In view of the harmful effects of 
prisons, each decision to incarcerate an offender is a 
pessimistic judgment, and each commitment to build a 
new prison is utopian. To give priority to retribu-
tive punishment is pessimistic in that other responses 
to wrongdoing are likely to bring greater benefits. 
On a deeper level, pessimism colours the presuppo-
sitions about the nature of offenders. To character-
ise prisoners as malleable is pessimistic in denying 
the prisoners' powers of transcendence. To stigmatise 
an individual as dangerous is pessimistic in reducing 
that person to the monolithic status of a threat. 
Faith in prisons is utopian in its confidence that 
control over prisoners' act ions can be achieved. The 
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current ethos 
rehabilitation, 
is less optimistic than that of 
which showed some faith in both the 
therapist and the prisoners. But central to hopes for 
imprisonment built on social defence theory is the 
faith that we can predict who among us will pose a 
risk. Retribution, treated as pessimistic because of 
its advocacy of punishment, is equally utopian in 
characterising the majority of people <or, indeed, 
anyone) as innocents. Further, 
view that punishment brings the 
it promulgates the 
conflict to an end. 
Because retribution ignores the harmful consequences 
of punishment, the resolution it promises is specious. 
From its 
experimented 
Enlightenment 
in ameliorating 
beginnings, 
the ills 
the 
of 
prison 
society 
through coercion and through intrusions based in human 
sciences. In practice, imprisonment reveals many 
idealistic excesses. Prisons counter evil by condemn-
ing a small section of the populace to banishment, 
thereby trivialising the pervasive nature of human 
evil. The prison marks an attempt to create a setting 
of total control, or a laboratory of human sciences, 
free from the variables of the wider society. The 
prison's function of preventing or veiling the 
stresses and conflicts in society is likewise utopian. 
A true interest in resolving conflicts would give 
priority to restoring wholeness, and seek the sources 
of conflicts. 
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The specific nature of this idealism sets 
imprisonment against a Christian social ethic. Words 
written with reference to policies of nuclear 
deterrence apply equally to the prison enterprise: 
The characteristically human excellences lie in 
working with, not against, limits - in living in 
the body, aware of its mortality and fragility. 
To work with a vision of transcending all limits 
is to seek not to be human . and the search 
for a technologically impregnable social structure 
is in danger of this aspiration not to be human. 
<Rowan Williams, pages 6-7) 
If there is irony in a pacifist charge that 
prisons are idealistic, then this reveals how easily 
the case can be turned on its head. Prisons, it might 
be argued, represent a realistic assessment of the 
limitations of social life. One who sees that the use 
of force is inevitable, and who understands that no 
social institution can be made perfect, will also 
accept the necessity of prisons. 
To respond theologically to this point, I must 
make explicit an implication of Rowan Williams' state-
ment, and then counter it. To oppose the hope of 
transcending limits suggests that one opposes 
progress. In this sense, human progress is a 
rebellion against God, insofar as it assumes some sort 
of salvation independent of God. 
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This logic could be extended to claim that we play 
God in judging 
punishment. Our 
others, in condemning them to 
attempts to rehabilitate people 
through behaviour modification would also appear to 
usurp God's role; it, too, would seem to evince a 
search for a 'technologically impregnable' society. 
My approach has taken a different course. I have 
argued that peace provides criteria for true progress. 
Peace encompasses harmony, allowing diversity to 
prosper; solidarity, recognising and building upon our 
inter-connections; engagement, entering directly into 
conflicts to discover the underlying tensions. 
Prisons mark an attempt to veil the stresses of 
industrial 
terms, our 
society. Prisons 
inter-connections. 
deny, in the strongest 
In curtailing the free-
dom and transcendence of prisoners, prisons are inher-
ent ly degrading. The penal vision of progress - ever-
increasing control over the confined assaults and 
trivialises the soul. The regimentation and stigma of 
imprisonment deny equality, sow divisions and destroy 
harmony. Thus, in light of Christian pacifism, 
prisons entail an anthropology that is theologically 
untenable. Pacifism does not oppose progress, but it 
denies the future vision upon which penal objectives 
are based, a future that offends hopes for peace. 
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Principle Recommendations 
After such a catalogue of flaws, there seems to be 
no hope of redemption. In Pacifism, I characterised 
Quaker pacifism as practical and hopeful as opposed to 
practical and cynical. I stressed the Christian paci-
fist conviction that all are inter-connected. 
I cited a Friend's belief 
people 
that God does not require 
This sense of a finite more than is humanly possible. 
duty empowers me to affirm suggested reforms that are 
both thoroughly un-original and somewhat facile in 
light of the profound harm identified in Part Two. 
1) Decisions made through reasoned negotiations based 
upon mutually beneficial principles are ethically 
preferable to the enforcement of oppression through 
coercive force. We should welcome those reforms that 
give prisoners formal instruments to hold society 
accountable for the conditions we impose upon them. 
These include the code of minimum standards advocated 
by NACRO 
enforcement 
and others; increasing scope 
of human rights in prisons (e.g., 
for the 
through 
the European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners); and the application of natural justice 
to prison discipline advocated by the Prison Reform 
Trust, the Howard League for Penal Reform and others. 
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2) Robert Stroud held that the most powerful force 
for rehabilitation was the prisoner's own powers of 
creativity. The prison' s attacks on sel fhood might 
rule out rehabilitation. But Stroud's point is more 
broadly applicable to prison dilemmas. The creativity 
of prisoners can be respected through the establish-
ment of formal means of listening appreciatively to 
their perspective <e. g., prisoner councils), the 
relaxation of censorship <where it is still 
practiced), and through increases in resources for 
artistic expression <painting, music, sculpture, etc.) 
3) Harmony does not consist in complete uniformity, 
nor in the isolation of different groups, one from the 
other. Harmony respects inter-connectedness. The 
categorical divide between the innocent and the 
guilty, made concrete by the prison walls, denies our 
links and thereby destroys harmony. The irtsularitf 0i 
,, 
the prison encourages ster~otyp;ing <deception), veils 
prison practic;::es <-tnhibiting the impact of morality) 
and- produces a distorted, alien social setting. For 
these reasons, the prisons urgently need to increase 
contact between prisoners and the public . 
The twist is that the prison that practiced (1), 
(2), and (3) would no longer be a prison. 
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